POLICING IN WINNIPEG
AN OPERATIONAL REVIEW

Curt Taylor Griffiths, Ph.D.
Nahanni Pollard, Ph.D.

With the assistance of

Brent Jette
Josh Murphy

Richard Frank, Ph.D.
Lisa Kitt, Ph.D.
Lori Beckstead, M.A.

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Curt Taylor Griffiths, Ph.D.
Nahanni Pollard, Ph.D.

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INTRODUCTION

This document represents the results of an Operational Review of the Winnipeg Police Service. The purpose of this review was to examine and evaluate the core activities of the WPS and to develop recommendations that will improve the effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery. More specifically, the review involved an in-depth examination of the use of overtime in the WPS, the potential for civilianization of positions in the service, staffing, deployment, the response to calls for service, and the activities of investigative units. The review was informed by best practices in police management and operations, and multiple data sources were used in the review, including field observations of patrol, interviews with patrol members and senior police personnel, quantitative data on overtime and from Computer-Aided Dispatch, and a survey of selected investigative units. These analyses were conducted within a framework that considered the environment in which the WPS delivers services and responds to community demands and expectations.

The components of this review are set out in chapters, beginning with a discussion surrounding the context of policing in Winnipeg, focusing on the unique challenges surrounding the delivery of policing services in the City of Winnipeg. A special focus is afforded to relationships between the WPS and Aboriginal peoples, immigrants, and refugees. This also includes a discussion surrounding mandates and downloading between different levels of government and the WPS, particularly surrounding persons with mental illness, chronic youth runaways, and special event policing.

Two stand-alone chapters examine two separate issues – those of civilianization, and overtime usage for the entire Service. The objective of the civilianization review is to discuss the benefits and drawbacks of civilianizing positions within a police force, and then objectively analyze what positions would be appropriate to civilianize in the WPS. A number of positions currently occupied by sworn officers are identified as more appropriately staffed by civilians. Converting these positions will allow for greater continuity of expertise, reduced operational costs in many instances, and will free up sworn members for deployment in areas of greater need, including patrol.

The study of overtime in the service identifies the source of these costs. A key finding is that patrol members generate the majority of overtime, an indicator that the WPS does not currently have sufficient resources deployed. The analysis makes it possible to determine what initiatives can be taken to reduce overtime, including making adjustments to staffing and shift deployment. Generally speaking, the opportunities for cost savings appear to reside within the staffing levels in some parts of the organization, namely in Patrol. Staffed properly, this could result in savings of approximately $1.5M.

The materials in Chapters 8 through 10 provide an in-depth examination of patrol, investigative and support operations in the WPS.   Field observations and interviews with patrol members are presented, as well as a quantitative analysis of dispatch data. The analysis revealed that WPS patrol is under-resourced. This is reflected in a variety of outcomes, including lengthy response times to serious incidents and the inability of patrol officers to engage in proactive policing activities. A major contributor to the high workload of WPS patrol officers is downloading from the federal, provincial, and municipal governments and other agencies as they reduced programs and services. The examination of investigative units within the Service considers unit mandates, overtime, and placement within the organization. Data indicates that some units appear to be operating with an unjustifiably large number of officers given statistics or comparison to other units.

The Operational Review has also documented the nearly total absence of analytical capacity in the WPS. This has significant implications for the effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery. Patrol officers, Community Support Units, and investigative units do not have the services of crime analysts, a hallmark of best practice police services in the early 21st century.

The results of this Operational Review indicate that there are numerous areas where the WPS can increase its effectiveness and efficiency. This will see a benefit from a greater streamlining of activities, leading to savings in overtime and staffing costs due to civilianization and mandate clarification. A primary focus is on the opportunity for more proactive and problem-solving policing, and how the strategic deployment of resources can achieve these goals. The final analysis, assuming full civilianization opportunities, recommends changes[1] that will result in the need for 30 fewer sworn officers, and 85 additional civilian employees, for a net staffing impact of 55 positions. These numbers, understandably, may change depending on hybrid model opportunities for civilian and sworn members, particularly in Tech Crimes and Forensic Identification Units. Based on full civilianization, the overall cost implications for salaries only are estimated at just over $2M. However, estimates for overtime savings offset this cost by approximately $1.5M, reducing the overall net budget impact to just over $500K, or 0.2% of the 2013 budget. In addition, it should be noted that indications at the time of reporting is that the WPS contract with the Airport Authority will not be renewed. Thus a number of police officers will be available for reassignment.

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[1] The recommendations herein contemplate outright civilianization opportunities; however, given the legal complexities and continual evolution of policing, particularly in highly skilled and specialized units, changes should be carefully considered to ensure that hybridization models are applied when appropriate to ensure best practices in policing.

SUMMARY OF STAFFING RECOMMENDATIONS AND ASSOCIATED COSTS[2]

Individual Units	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian	Sworn Costs	Civilian Costs	Net
Wellness Coordiantor				-1		1	-100,756	48,577	-52,178
FIPPA Coordinator				-1		1	-86,858	80,986	-5,872
Div 30 - Services	-1		-1	-2		4	-428,347	270,299	-158,048
Div 34 - HR					-1	1	-86,858	48,577	-38,281
Div 37 - RMS					-1	1	-86,858	67,575	-19,284
Total	-1	0	-1	-3	-3	8	-789,678	516,015	-273,663

Division 11	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian	Sworn Costs	Civilian Costs	Net
Patrol					37		3,213,759		3,213,759
Div. Detectives			-1	-4	-10		-1,378,442		-1,378,442
Dom. Violence							0		0
CSU					-7	1	-608,008	80,986	-527,022
Foot Patrol				2	6		722,661		722,661
Administration			-1			1	-106,836	67,575	-39,261
Total	0	0	-2	-2	26	2	1,843,134	148,561	1,991,695

Division 13	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian	Sworn Costs	Civilian Costs	Net
Patrol					41		3,561,192		3,561,192
Div. Detectives			-1	-2	-10		-1,176,931		-1,176,931
Dom. Violence					4		347,433		347,433
CSU					-1	1	-86,858	80,986	-5,872
Foot Patrol				4	16		1,792,756		1,792,756
Administration			-1			1	-106,836	67,575	-39,261
Total	0	0	-2	2	50	2	4,330,757	148,561	4,479,318

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[2] The recommendations herein contemplate outright civilianization opportunities; however, given the legal complexities and continual evolution of policing, particularly in highly skilled and specialized units, changes should be carefully considered to ensure that hybridization models are applied when appropriate to ensure best practices in policing.

Division 14 (East)	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian	Sworn Costs	Civilian Costs	Net
Patrol					7		608,008		608,008
Div. Detectives			-1	-2	-10		-1,176,931		-1,176,931
Dom. Violence							0		0
CSU					-1	1	-86,858	80,986	-5,872
Foot Patrol							0		0
Administration			-1			1	-106,836	67,575	-39,261
Total	0	0	-2	-2	-4	2	-762,616	148,561	-614,055

Division 12 (West)	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian	Sworn Costs	Civilian Costs	Net
Patrol					7		608,008		608,008
Div. Detectives				-2	-10		-1,070,095		-1,070,095
Dom. Violence					-4		-347,433		-347,433
CSU				-2	-11	1	-1,156,953	80,986	-1,075,967
Foot Patrol							0		0
Administration			-1			1	-106,836	67,575	-39,261
Total	0	0	-1	-4	-18	2	-2,073,309	148,561	-1,924,747

Division 40 - Organized Crime	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian	Sworn Costs	Civilian Costs	Net
Organized Crime					-1	2	-86,858	161,973	75,115
Street Crimes			-2	-4	-20		-2,353,861		-2,353,861
Green Team					-2		-173,717		-173,717
Comm. Corrections Liaision					-1	1	-86,858	48,577	-38,281
Integrated Proceeds of Crime							0		0
Integ. Warrant Apprehension							0		0
Integ. Organized Crime TF							0		0
Division Management							0		0
Total	0	0	-2	-4	-24	3	-2,701,294	210,550	-2,490,744

Division 41 - Special Investigations	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian	Sworn Costs	Civilian Costs	Net
Sex Crimes						1	0	80,986	80,986
Child Abuse						1	0	80,986	80,986
CEU (Vice)							0		0
Internet Child Exploitation							0		0
Domestic Violence					-1	1	-100,756	67,575	-33,181
Missing Persons							0		0
Vulnerable Persons							0		0
Youth Crime & Child Abuse Intake					-1	1	-86,858	67,575	-19,284
Int. High Risk Sex Offender							0		0
ViCLAS - @ RCMP							0		0
Division Management							0		0
Total	0	0	0	-1	-1	4	-187,614	297,122	109,508

Division 42 - Operations	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian	Sworn Costs	Civilian Costs	Net
Crime Analysis						-7	0	-566,905	-566,905
Technical Surveillance				-1		1	-100,756	80,986	-19,769
Polygraph							0		0
Technology Crime					-8	8	-694,867	604,988	-89,879
Forensic Imaging					-2	2	-173,717	151,247	-22,470
Secure Operations							0		0
Surveillance							0		0
CISM							0		0
Administration							0		0
Total	0	0	0	-1	-10	4	-969,339	270,316	-699,023

Division 42 - Forensics	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian	Sworn Costs	Civilian Costs	Net
Forensic Identification				-4	-16	20	-1,792,756	1,512,469	-280,287
Forensic Artist					-1	1	-86,858	75,623	-11,235
Firearms Investigative Analysis					-1	1	-86,858	75,623	-11,235
NWEST							0	0	0
Administration							0	0	0
Total	0	0	0	-4	-18	22	-1,966,473	1,663,716	-302,757

Division 43 - Major Crimes	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian	Sworn Costs	Civilian Costs	Net
Administration							0		0
Arson							0		0
Commercial Crime					-2		1	-201,511	80,986	-120,525
Historical Homicides							0		0
Pawn Unit							0		0
Stolen Auto					-2		-173,717		-173,717
Homicide					2		1	201,511	80,986	282,498
Major Crimes						1	0	80,986	80,986
MMW Task Force							0		0
NEW GIU			2	8	40	1	4,494,051	80,986	4,575,037
Total	0	0	2	8	38	4	4,320,334	323,946	4,644,280

Division 50 - Ops Support	Insp.	Staff Sgts.	Sgts.	Det/Pat. Sgts.	Constables	Civilian	Sworn Costs	Civilian Costs	Net
Airport							0		0
Bomb							0		0
Canine							0		0
Flight Operations							0		0
Tactical							0		0
Clandestine Lab							0		0
Crisis Negotiation							0		0
Crowd Management							0		0
Ground Search & Rescue							0		0
Protective Services							0		0
Underwater Search & Recovery							0		0
							0		0
Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Division 51 - Community Relations	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian	Sworn Costs	Civilian Costs	Net
Victim Services							0		0
School Education				-1	-3		-361,331		-361,331
Diversity							0		0
Crime Prevention					-4	1	-347,433	48,577	-298,856
Mounted Patrol							0		0
Volunteer Coordinator						-1	0	-48,577	-48,577
Auxiliary Cadets							0		0
School Resource							0		0
Division Administration (Insp. with Traffic)							0		0
Total	0	0	0	-1	-7	0	-708,764	0	-708,764

Division 51 - Central Traffic	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian	Sworn Costs	Civilian Costs	Net
Photo Enforcement							0		0
Traffic Collision Investigation				2	-4		-145,922		-145,922
Vehicle Inspection							0		0
River Patrol							0		0
Traffic Readers							0		0
Special Events/Speed Timing							0		0
Impaired Driving Counter Measures							0		0
Enforcement Section				2	10		1,070,095		1,070,095
Administration							0		0
Total	0	0	0	4	6	0	924,173	0	924,173

Division 31 - Development Support	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian	Sworn Costs	Civilian Costs	Net
Evidence Control Unit			-1			2	-106,836	97,155	-9,681
Central Reading					-18		-1,563,450		-1,563,450
Court/Property Forfeiture					-1	1	-86,858	48,577	-38,281
Arrest Processing							0		0
Central Reporting Unit							0		0
Service Center				-2	-26	26	-2,459,828	926,273	-1,533,555
Alternate Phone Response				2	14		1,417,528		1,417,528
Report Car				-2	-14		-1,417,528		-1,417,528
Info Cell (CPIC)							0		0
Direct Voice Entry (DVE)						2	0	97,155	97,155
Records Compilation						1	0	35,626	35,626
Administration							0		0
Total	0	0	-1	-2	-45	32	-4,216,972	1,204,786	-3,012,186

NET IMPACT OF STAFFING RECOMMENDATIONS[3]

NET IMPACT

	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	CIV	Net Sworn	Net Civilian	Net Staff
Net	-1	0	-9	-10	-10	85	-30	85	55
Net Cost							-$2,957,662	$5,080,696	$2,123,034

Budget Impact/Year	OT Savings (est.) - Patrol Only	Net Est. Budget Impact
$2,123,034	$1,529,351	$593,683
0.9%		0.2%

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[3] The recommendations herein contemplate outright civilianization opportunities; however, given the legal complexities and continual evolution of policing, particularly in highly skilled and specialized units, changes should be carefully considered to ensure that hybridization models are applied when appropriate to ensure best practices in policing.

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Chapter I: The Winnipeg Police Service

The Winnipeg Police Service is responsible for four main functional areas: calls for service responses, criminal investigations, traffic safety and enforcement and crime prevention. Crime prevention efforts are mostly handled through proactive policing as well as awareness and education by specialty sections within the department. The Community Relations group, which was created in 1982, is set up similarly to many other police departments across Canada with units of Crime Prevention, Diversity Unit, School Education and Victim Services. Proactive policing, although strongly desired by Executive levels of departments is harder to implement through front line officers who simultaneously need to respond to higher and higher levels of crime. Police officers should not typically be responsible for program delivery; however, they are experts in crime prevention, and therefore should be present at tables that are including this in their strategic plans for their communities. Where the City remains experts in urban planning, the WPS are experts in safety and security and should be accredited with that. The main issue with being experts however and therefore the high need for community policing proactive responses are the limited officers available to do so, availability of officers of specific cultural backgrounds and strategic succession planning for units such as Diversity in a police departments long term plan for increasing safety within the city.

Figure 1: Winnipeg Police Service Organizational Chart

As of mid-2013, the WPS had 1411 officers and 400 civilian employees. The POP ratio is 1:501, considerably higher than other urban police services in Canada. More than half of WPS members are involved in the frontline of policing. The WPS operates out of six police stations and eight community-based policing service centres.

Chapter II: The Context of Policing In Winnipeg

Any study of a police service requires an understanding of the context in which police services are being delivered. Police scholars often refer this to as the "task environment." The task environment of a police service includes such features as crime patterns and trends, the socio-demographics of the city or region, the spatial geography of the jurisdiction under study, and community perceptions and expectations of the police, among others. An examination of the City of Winnipeg reveals a task environment with several distinct and distinguishing features that must be considered in an operational review. These include an increasing number of Aboriginals and Newcomers, the presence of urban Aboriginal gangs, and several areas of the city that are characterized by high levels of poverty and disorder. As well, it is anticipated that the Winnipeg police, similar to their counterparts across North America, are experiencing increasing workloads due to downloading caused by cutbacks in programs and services.

The following discussion will examine these issues and, more specifically, how they impact the demands on the WPS and its ability to respond to these challenges.

Demographics

Key demographic features of the City of Winnipeg include the following:

- Population: 663,617 in Winnipeg proper. Of this number, 73.5 percent are Caucasian[4]

- Approximately 730,018 people live in the Winnipeg Census Metropolitan Area (CMA)

- Largest city in Manitoba

- Winnipeg CMA includes rural municipalities of Springfield, St. Clements, Taché, East St. Paul, Macdonald, Ritchot, West St. Paul, Headingly, Rosser, St. Francois Xavier and the First Nations reserve of Brokenhead 4

- 48.3% male; 51.7% female

- 24.3% 19 or younger; 27.4% 20-30 year olds; 34% 40-64 year olds

- Avg. age: 38.7 years

- Between 2001-2006 population increased 2.2% vs. 2.6% for Manitoba and 5.4% for Canada

- Population density avg. – 1,365 per square km

- Aboriginals account for 10.2% (compared to national avg. of 3.8%) of Winnipeg's population and is the fastest growing ethnic group

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[4] Canada Census, 2011

Economy

- Rated third in a national survey of 25 city economies by the CIBC Metropolitan Economic Activity Index in 2011

- Third fastest growing economy among Canada's major cities as of 2009

- Largest employers include government and government-funded institutions, including: The Province of Manitoba, the City of Winnipeg, the University of Manitoba, the Health Sciences Centre, and Manitoba Hydro

- Approximately 14% of the workforce are employed in the public sector

Winnipeg has not experienced the "boom and bust" cycle that has historically afflicted a number of other urban centres in Canada [5]. Rather, Winnipeg continues to experience slow and steady growth averaging annually at 0.75%. In the past five years growth has been just under 1% annually, due in large measure to immigration. As a result 7919 acres of newly inhabited land has been added to Winnipeg with new housing developments representing an increase in patrollable boundaries by 6.74% [6]. In terms of patrollable distances, "total street length (including lanes and alleys) has increased by 80km from 2006 – 2010 representing a half per cent increase every year or 20km of additional roadway" [7].

The population is not centralized in or around the downtown core as in some Canadian cities, but rather is spread out over 475 square kilometres encompassing 230 neighbourhoods. This has significant implications for the delivery of police services and the challenges that are presented to the WPS.

City Features

The city is currently facing a number of issues. There is a population boom that has not been accompanied by an increase in housing stock. Both the Newcomer and Aboriginal populations are growing and competing for the scarce resources available in the Downtown area. Poverty, addiction, homelessness, violence, and especially alcohol abuse are all pervasive issues that are afflicting parts of the city. In contrast to the well-known Downtown East Side in Vancouver, which encompasses a few square blocks, the disadvantaged areas of Winnipeg extend for kilometres.

There are areas in the city, most notably the Downtown area and the North end that are avoided by citizens, particularly at night. Many of its buildings in the downtown core require upgrading and although there are major

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[5] Winnipeg Police Service Strategic Plan, 2012-2014
[6] Winnipeg Police Service Strategic Plan, 2012-2014
[7] Winnipeg Police Service Strategic Plan, 2012-2014:9

development plans, they do not involve the development of low cost housing or housing for young professionals – both of which are essential for a vibrant downtown core. It appears that the city has done little to "build out crime." For example, there have been few initiatives to address two major crime hubs in the Downtown area – the Salvation Army on Martha Street and Portage Place Mall on Portage Ave.

The poverty rate in Winnipeg has increased in recent decades, particularly in the inner city[8]. Figures from 2006 indicate that poverty is still concentrated in Winnipeg's inner city: while 20% of households in Winnipeg at large were living in poverty, 40% of households in the inner city were living in poverty[9].

The North End and the Downtown Core

Winnipeg's historic North End has always been the home to a rich and vibrant culture, resistant to the deep poverty that has plagued it since the early 1900's. At that time, large numbers of Eastern European immigrants arrived and settled in the North end because of its expansive rail yards and associated industries[10].   The lack of housing led to overcrowding, one observer noting that, "in 41 houses there are 120 families, consisting of 837 people living in 286 rooms"[11]. None of the homes were connected to a water supply and in 1904 – 1905 Winnipeg had more deaths from typhoid than any North American city.

Following WWII, large numbers of residents began to leave the North End for more desireable areas of the city and many manufacturing firms left as well. There was a shift in the labour market from full-time unionzed jobs to non-union, part-time low skill and low wage employment[12]. Simultaneously, housing prices dropped and many units became rental properties. More than a century later, the North End remains segregated from the rest of the City. Aboriginal peoples and Newcomers have replaced the Eastern European immigrants. "Slum" landlords moved in. Aboriginal perople moving to the city were attracted to the North End by the cheap rental housing. Today, these residents are subjected to racism and inadequate and overcrowded housing.[13] Nearly 40% of Aboriginal people in the city reside in the North End and composes almost half of the population in this area.

Observers have stated that although the City would like to believe times have changed and they are more inclusive and less class structured, "These things about Winnipeg's North End have not changed. It is home to

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[8] Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA), 2009
[9] CCPA, 2009
[10] Silver, 2010
[11] Woodsworth, as cited in Silver, 2010:2
[12] Silver, 2010
[13] Silver, 2010

deep and widespread poverty; those who are poor are reviled and blamed for their own fate; and the North End remians spatially and socially segregated from the rest of the city"[14]

The inner city of Winnipeg, including the downtown core and North End, is composed of 36 identifiable areas and covers approximately 6.4% of the city's total area[15] and has a population of approximately 121,615 residents. Poverty in this area is widespread and many residents are dependent upon welfare. The unemployment rate in the downtown area is 7.8% as compared to 5.2% for the remainder of the city. This area is also identifiable by old and deteriorating housing conditions: almost 50% of the buildings were built prior to the 1950's and more than 50% of the current dwellings have been identified as requiring serious repairs[16]. The majority of residents in the downtown core are renters and are not in a financial position to purchase property in the area or elsewhere in the city.

The Downtown and North End areas have the highest concentration of Aboriginal peoples. It is estimated that 40% of the Aboriginal population in the city resides in these areas, which are characterized by high density and low residential stability.

There are high rates of unemployment and many residents in these areas are addicted to drugs and/or alcohol, transient, homeless, and/or living well below the poverty line. Many in the Aboriginal population come from the Northern reserves with little to no experience in an urban environment and are suffering from culture shock. This coupled with the inter-generational effects of the residential schools, the lack of basic resources, and major substance abuse issues have placed the Aboriginal population of Winnipeg at a severe disadvantage. In the past year, this situation has been exacerbated by the arrival of members of three First Nation communities that were forced off their land by severe flooding. The Province of Manitoba provided them lodging in a number of hotels in Downtown Winnipeg, and many still remain in the city.

There is a high population of Aboriginals in District 3, and a vast majority of police interaction is with this community. Officers in Division 11 estimated that over 80% of their contacts are with Aboriginal peoples. In many cases the interactions are the result of alcohol and substance abuse. Additionally, most, if not all, of the gangs in District 3 are Aboriginal youth gangs. This includes the Indian Posse, one of the more powerful and long-standing gangs.

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[14] Silver, 2010 :3
[15] Canada Census, 2006
[16] Canada Census, 2006

A General Patrol member in District 3 (North End) estimated that approximately 80% of calls he responded to involved Aboriginals, with the majority involving substance and especially alcohol abuse. Among the challenges the officer identified was a lack of respect from Aboriginals toward the police. He stated that a lot of Aboriginals clearly do not like the police and that it can be very disheartening for members: "It's sad to see a four, five, six year old kid give you the finger when you drive by, just because his parents told him to hate the cops." He went on to state that in some instances he has been accused of being a racist or only targeting Aboriginals.

Youth in the Downtown Core and the North End

There has been a significant increase in the numbers of disenfranchised youth in the downtown core and in the North End. This has had a significant impact on crime and safety issues in the City[17]. As many as 50% of these youth live in impoverished single parent families, and many have experienced intergenerational trauma following the European colonization of their grandparents and the Indian Act (such as residential schools).

These youth are more likely to become involved in negative behaviours, such as substance abuse, sexual promiscuity/exploitation and criminal behaviour, including involvement in gangs and associated violence at levels that are twice that of non-Aboriginal youth with similar socio-economic backgrounds. These youth are also more likely to perpetuate the cycle of becoming young parents themselves, and not completing high school, thus limiting their chances for a positive and successful future. Aboriginal youth are more likely to have lower educational attainment, have alcohol and drug abuse problems, have much higher rates of criminalization, and are over-represented at every stage of the Criminal Justice System (CJS)[18]. The large numbers of vulnerable Aboriginal and Newcomer youth provide fertile recruiting grounds for gangs. Following the national trends in most medium sized cities, Winnipeg's inner city has shortages of housing at an affordable level and therefore "the one step up from the street" – the rooming house – is what many Aboriginal people call home[19]. Many Aboriginal people in the area live marginal lives in of low income, substandard housing and, for an increasing number of male youth, no housing at all.

Aboriginal People in Winnipeg

Census data indicate that of 1,500 Aboriginal people who moved to Winnipeg in 2006, 50% became homeless or were forced to live with friends while on waiting lists as lengthy as 2500 people for social assistance units.

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[17] City of Winnipeg, 2004
[18] Statistics Canada, 2010
[19] Frideres, 2006

Nearly 50% of youth are living with single mothers, compared to only 16% of non-Aboriginal youth in the City[20]. There is also high unemployment, a reliance on social assistance, serious health issues and an increased likelihood of contact with the police and the criminal justice system.

The three census tracts in Winnipeg that have significant concentrations of Aboriginal peoples are Lord Selkirk Park, the east half of Dufferin, and the south half of William Whyte. These neighbourhoods, along with Burrows-Keewatin, East and Central Centennial and Southeast St. Johns have a nearly 60% concentration of all Aboriginal residents[21]. Although these levels of segregation are modest on scale to the rest of Canada, projections from Statistics Canada are that these populations will increase which will place even more pressures on housing, programs and services, including policing.

This high concentration of 12,000 Aboriginals in the inner city is significantly different from cites such as Vancouver, where the population of Aboriginal peoples for the entire city is estimated to be 11,000. This is a feature of Winnipeg that has significant implications for the demands that are made on the WPS. And, significantly, although the 2006 Census found that 20% of the Aboriginal population in Winnipeg changed addresses at least once in the preceding year, they did so within the downtown core and North end area indicating that that these moves were due to economic failure rather than to positive lifestyle changes.

The population of Winnipeg by Dissemination Area (DA) is shown below. "A dissemination area (DA) is a small, relatively stable geographic unit composed of one or more adjacent dissemination blocks, with a population of 400 to 700 persons. It is the smallest standard geographic area for which all census data are disseminated. DAs cover all the territory of Canada"[22]. As can be seen, the denser DAs show up in orange, and are relatively small in geographic size. The blue DAs, although representing higher populations, are often a larger geographic area, denoting fewer definable neighbourhoods.

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[20] Frideres, 2006
[21] Winnipeg Census, 2006
[22] Statistics Canada, 2010

WPS Population and Census Demographics (City-Wide)

The following figures provide an overview of the demographics in the city.

City of Winnipeg
Population by Dissemination Area (DA)
2011 Census

Legend
Districts
2011 Census by DA
Population
- 0 - 496
- 496 - 690
- 690 - 1,022
- 1,022 - 1,808
- 1,808 - 3,269

Nahanni Pollard
July 3, 2013
City boundary provided by WPS
Census data obtained via Statistics Canada
UTM Nad 83, zone 14

Meters
0   1,850   3,700   7,400

---

[23] Canada Census, 2011

As dissemination areas are of differing sizes, care must be taken to interpret the map depicting population counts. Although dark blue indicates the largest population, those areas may be fairly large in geography and therefore may not represent density.

While many of the areas within Winnipeg indicate French or English as their mother tongue, in other areas there is a significant portion of the population that reports mother tongue as neither French nor English. While this census data does not necessarily refer exclusively to immigrant populations, it does assist in understanding in which areas of the City there could be challenges associated with language barriers, including in police-citizen interaction.

_____

[24] Canada Census, 2011

A simplified depiction of the dispersion of residents without French or English as their mother tongue is seen above, with that population being shown as a percentage of the total population recorded for each dissemination area. As can be seen, there are areas within the City reporting a very high percentage of neither native English nor French speakers. Again, caution should be taken to interpret this vis-à-vis immigration, as while immigrants may form a portion of these numbers, Aboriginal and other local ethnic groups would be

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[25] Canada Census, 2011

represented here as well. The North area (primarily D3 and D1) shows the highest percentage of areas with a high concentration of those reporting a mother tongue other than French or English.   This may translate into specific challenges for officers in that area, and it should be acknowledged that these challenges may put greater strain on their workload due to complexities and/or sensitivities.

Additional census data is presented in Figures 5-10 and include information, broken down by dissemination area, on citizenship, Aboriginal population, African immigrants, total visible minorities, unemployment rate and median income. Again, these features are important in the study of the delivery of police services as they provide an indication of the demands on the police and the challenges that may confront the WPS and its officers.

City of Winnipeg
Total Non-Canadian Citizens by Dissemination Area (DA)
2006 Census

Legend

Districts

Total Non-Canadian Citizens

0.000000 - 25.000000
25.000001 - 70.000000
70.000001 - 140.000000
140.000001 - 275.000000
275.000001 - 500.000000

Nahanni Pollard
July 3, 2013
City boundary provided by WPS
Census data obtained via Statistics Canada
UTM Nad 83, zone 14

Meters
0   1,750 3,500   7,000

---

[26] Winnipeg Census, 2006

Figure 6: Total Aboriginal Population[27]

The map is titled:

City of Winnipeg
Total Aboriginal Population by Dissemination Area (DA)
2006 Census

Legend

Districts

Total Aboriginal Population
- 0.000000 - 40.000000
- 40.000001 - 95.000000
- 95.000001 - 190.000000
- 190.000001 - 360.000000
- 360.000001 - 635.000000

Nahanni Pollard
July 3, 2013
City boundary provided by WPS
Census data obtained via Statistics Canada
UTM Nad 83, zone 14

Meters
0   1,750   3,500   7,000

---

[27] Winnipeg Census, 2006

City of Winnipeg
Total African Immigrants by Dissemination Area (DA)
2006 Census

Legend

Districts

Total Immigrants - from Africa

0.000000

0.000001 - 25.000000

25.000001 - 65.000000

65.000001 - 140.000000

140.000001 - 235.000000

Nahanni Pollard
July 3, 2013
City boundary provided by WPS
Census data obtained via Statistics Canada
UTM Nad 83, zone 14

Meters
0   1,750 3,500   7,000

---

[28] Winnipeg Census, 2006

City of Winnipeg
Total Visible Minorities by Dissemination Area (DA)
2006 Census

Legend

Districts

Visible Minorities

0.000000 - 50.000000
50.000001 - 125.000000
125.000001 - 235.000000
235.000001 - 385.000000
385.000001 - 675.000000

Nahanni Pollard
July 3, 2013
City boundary provided by WPS
Census data obtained via Statistics Canada
UTM Nad 83, zone 14

Meters
0   1,750 3,500   7,000

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[29] Winnipeg Census, 2006

City of Winnipeg
Unemployment Rate by Dissemination Area (DA)
2006 Census

Legend

Districts

Unemployment Rate

0.000000 - 2.000000
2.000001 - 5.700000
5.700001 - 9.600000
9.600001 - 16.100000
16.100001 - 40.900000

Nahanni Pollard
July 3, 2013
City boundary provided by WPS
Census data obtained via Statistics Canada
UTM Nad 83, zone 14

Meters
0   1,750   3,500   7,000

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[30] Winnipeg Census, 2006

City of Winnipeg
Median Income by Dissemination Area (DA)
2006 Census

Legend
Districts
Median Income (2005)
0.000000 - 7634.000000
7634.000001 - 21884.000000
21884.000001 - 29273.000000
29273.000001 - 38450.000000
38450.000001 - 82119.000000

Nahanni Pollard
July 3, 2013
City boundary provided by WPS
Census data obtained via Statistics Canada
UTM Nad 83, zone 14

Meters
0   1,750 3,500   7,000

---

[31] Winnipeg Census, 2006

Crime Patterns and Trends

Among the key features of crime in Winnipeg are the following:

- Violent crime capital of Canada
- According to Statistics Canada Winnipeg had the highest homicide rate of all 33 Canadian metropolitan areas per year for every year between 2007 and 2011
- Highest homicide and robbery rates in f Canada[32]
- Scored 173.8 on Stats Canada's severe crime index in 2011, which is double the national average
- Violent crime rate climbed 6% between 2010 and 2011 – the only Western Canadian city to see such a rise[33]
- Robbery rate rose 3% in 2011, while robberies decreased 3% nationally[34]

Although the majority of Winnipeg residents live in suburban areas within the city proper, over 30% of the crime is within the downtown core and North End areas of Winnipeg. While most jurisdictions in Canada have recorded decreases in property and violent crimes over the past 15 years, the decrease has occurred much more slowly in Winnipeg.

Winnipeg's rate of 4.1 homicides per 100,000 residents was the highest homicide rate in 2009 among major Canadian cities. The city also placed first for robberies and vehicle thefts, and notched the third-highest rate of break-and-enters behind Regina and Saskatoon. Youth crime rates, which Statistics Canada tracks by province instead of city, were highest in Manitoba for homicides, serious assaults and robbery. It is the third consecutive year Manitoba's homicide rate has topped the list[35]. Gang violence is one of the key components of Winnipeg's crime rate.

Winnipeg's Crime Trends

Winnipeg consistently records the highest violent crime rate compared to Canada's national average. It is the highest among the nine major cities and there has been a 15% increase in violent crime severity since 2008. Crime is concentrated in the downtown core and in the North End, which comprise only three percent of the neighbourhoods in the City. Citywide, Aboriginal persons are overrepresented in the top-5 crime categories and it is estimated they are involved in 30% of all calls for service. This is in only 3% of the neighbourhoods. Statistics indicate that about 35% of all identified accused males between the ages of 15–24 were responsible for over

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[32] Statistics Canada, 2013
[33] Statistics Canada, 2013
[34] Statistics Canada, 2013
[35] Penner and Proctor, 2010

30% of the reported violent offences in the downtown core and North End District 3, and 43% of the property crime[36]. In addition, there is a high unemployment rate within the Aboriginal community. According to one WPS constable, the high rate of unemployment means that, "It isn't a Friday or Saturday thing. It's an everyday of the week thing. Sundays are as good as Saturdays."

Domestic Violence and Abuse

Domestic violence incidents comprise one of the top five calls for service in the City and a large portion of these calls are in the inner city and the North End (District 3). These calls present challenges for the WPS and a need to ensure the protections of victims. Research conducted by the Aboriginal Healing Foundation[37], shows domestic abuse is higher among Aboriginal women than non-Aboriginal women. It also shows that violence against Aboriginal women is often more severe. Statistics compiled by the government of Manitoba in 2006 indicated that 21% of Aboriginal people reported being victims of violence from a spouse in 2004. This is three times higher than the number for non-Aboriginal people (7%). Not only did Aboriginal women report higher rates of spousal violence in 2004, they were also significantly more likely than non-Aboriginal women to report the most severe and potentially life-threatening forms of violence or being sexually assaulted (54 % of Aboriginal women, compared to 37% of non-Aboriginal women) [38].

Domestic violence and abuse are almost always linked to trauma for the victims, as well as for children witnessing the violence. Domestic abuse is also and most often the result of intergenerational trauma. This poses problems for police departments responding to this type of calls for service as police departments such as WPS are not going to be responsible for changing the core reasons that Aboriginal peoples experience and perpetrate such high levels of violence. However, changes in responses to violence while weighting safety for victims needs to be addressed with community partners and social agencies. Understanding the core reasons for violence in this community can change how WPS responds to calls for service and deals with violence on the ground during incidents.

Lack of understanding by communities of police duties and expectations while executing those duties continues to be an issue for many Aboriginal people. Mistrust is heightened when police are believed to be "too aggressive" or are seen to be "heavy handed", specifically during child apprehensions which are already traumatic. This is compounded by histories of trauma unrelated to the police. This requires police officers to understand and appreciate the challenges of the persons with whom they are interacting.

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[36] Penner and Proctor, 2010
[37] Bopp, Bopp, and Lane, 2003
[38] Bopp, Bopp, and Lane, 2003

Crime in the North End

Crime is a primary reason that the North End has changed over the decades. The drug trade fueled street gangs result in the complete disconnect of young people from the rest of the city, their families and the labour market and have created serious problems for the WPS, specifically with respect to violence.

According to one constable, drug dealers and gangs run the North End. There is high rate of poverty, which draws youths into gangs that promise money, safety, and security. In addition to gangs, the drug trade is boosted by a high presence of dial-a-dealers and "crack-shacks." The drug trade also drives many other crimes such as robberies and commercial break-ins. The 'spoils' of robberies and break-ins are taken to many of pawn shops in the area for money that is spent on drugs. Prostitution is also associated with the drug-trade and is beginning to move into residential areas, which is a growing concern for community members.

In addition to drugs, the Constable identified alcohol abuse as a major issue in the North End. The vast majority of calls that members of Division 13 respond to involve intoxicated persons. According to the constable, this alcohol abuse is driven in part by hotels on Main Street that are supplying alcohol. CSU members do go into hotels to curb this practice, but according the constable, this merely displaces the problem.

The majority of the crimes against persons tend to radiate outward from the downtown core.   The downtown core and North end of the city have consistently record the highest levels of crime in the city. These are also areas with the highest percentages of residential mobility.

WPS Hot Spot of Community Demands (CFS 2012 data)

Legend

Districts

CFS Density

Low Density

Medium Density

High Density

N. Pollard
July 8, 2013
WPS CAD Data

Coordinate System: NAD 1983 UTM Zone 14N
Projection: Transverse Mercator
Datum: North American 1983
False Easting: 500,000.0000
False Northing: 0.0000
Central Meridian: -99.0000
Scale Factor: 0.9996
Latitude Of Origin: 0.0000
Units: Meter

Meters
0   1,750 3,500   7,000

With a large percentage of violence and property crimes being perpetrated in parts of District 1, and the majority in District 3, the challenge for frontline officers when dealing with and responding to crime throughout the city becomes increasingly difficult. Included in this has been the increase in nighttime venues in the downtown area (Winnipeg Jets games) adding to the response time issues and creating larger budgetary constraints in dealing with crime and safety. It is increasingly obvious that the challenges for the police in dealing with identity specific communities who historically have had extreme mistrust of law enforcement will only be compounded in the years to come as the influx of immigrants is stated to rise at similar levels from the previous decade (19%) with the majority having little money and few skills.

Gangs in Winnipeg

Gangs are a key and distinguishing feature of the urban landscape in Winnipeg. Table 1 presents information on gangs in the city. Note that the gang "landscape" is ever-changing and there may be a great deal of fluidity among less-established groups.

Table 1: Gangs in Winnipeg[39]

KNOWN TO BE ACTIVE	BELIEVED TO BE ACTIVE	MAY BE ACTIVE	NEW GANG IDENTIFIED
334 MOB SQUAD	ALL 'BOUT MONEY	DA PITBULL ARMY	204 GIRLZ
AFRIKAN MAFIA	CRIPS	DEUCE	NOE LUV CREW
GOOD SQUAD		GANGSTA CRIPS	SOUTH BROADWAY GANG
INDIAN POSSE		TERROR SQUAD	SPADE BLOODS
JUNIOR WARRIORS		TROUBLESUM BLOODZ	TERRORIZER
KRAZIES		WESTSIDE OUTLAWZ	WESTSIDE CRIPS
MAD COWZ			
MANITOBA WARRIORS			
MOST ORGANIZED BROTHERS			
NATIVE SYNDICATE			
RENEGADES			
RUTHLESS CREW			
SODIERS			
WESTSIDE BLOODZ			

Aboriginal Gangs

Winnipeg is considered the Aboriginal street gang capital of Canada. The WPS estimates that there are 1400-1500 active gang members involved in as many as 35 gangs. Seventy-five percent of these gangs are comprised of individuals of Aboriginal decent[40]. Among the more prominent gangs are the Manitoba Warriors, the Indian Posse, and the Native Syndicate. For all gang types, youth make particularly attractive gang members because

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[39] RCMP "D" Division Street Gang Map, 2012 January to July Overview.
[40] Sheremeta, 1999

their crimes will get them less time in jail under the *Youth Criminal Justice Act*. Youth are attracted to gangs for a variety of reasons, including the fact that gangs provide a family structure that many lack, a place to fit in, identification with peers, protection and money. Family conflict, poverty and lack of alternatives are root causes for youth joining gangs. Unfortunately for places like Winnipeg and Manitoba as a whole, high percentages of Aboriginals are confined in youth and adult custody facilities which are recruiting grounds for gangs[41].

Most Aboriginal gangs fall into the "Street Gang" group of Gordon's[42] gang typology. Members tend to be younger, less educated, and more economically disadvantaged in comparison to members of criminal organizations. The organization, leadership, and structure of Aboriginal gangs vary. However the peer group attraction and the promise of economic prosperity contribute to Aboriginal gang membership[43]. Gordon[44], writes that individual members of the "street gang" typology join up due to ethnic marginalization, experience of domestic violence, ineffective parenting, poverty, an inability to obtain income, lack of a father figure, additional dependant siblings, and isolation from the larger community.

While the numbers of Aboriginal peoples in urban areas are growing, the availability of cultural, educational, recreational and social activities for Aboriginal youth has not increased. For instance, urban centres lack employment training programs that are necessary to effectively guide Aboriginal youth into the labour market. Further, affordable housing is scarce and this makes it challenging for Aboriginal youth to meet their basic needs. Consequently, urban Aboriginal youth are becoming increasingly engaged in gang involvement and gang-related activities for income and security[45].

Aboriginal girls between the ages of 17 and 25 are at a high risk of becoming involved in gangs. Relatively little attention has been given to violent and aggressive behaviour among girls as well as their high levels of victimization. Aboriginal girls, marginalized by race, age and gender, have an even higher chance of experiencing structural inequality and institutional racism, increasing the likelihood of them becoming involved in violent incidents either perpetrated against them or by them. Limited educational and employment opportunities, increase the despair in these girls and increase the probability of them engaging in self-destructive, delinquent

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[41] Totten, 2009a
[42] Gordon, 2000
[43] Grekul and LaBoucane – Benson, 2006
[44] Gordon, 2000
[45] Totten, 2007

activities. This is especially true for girls who reside in neighbourhoods in which crime and gang violence are prevalent[46].

Newcomer Gangs

The reason many visible minority immigrant youth are vulnerable to gang recruitment is rooted in the levels of poverty their families experience upon arrival in Winnipeg. As with Aboriginal youth, immigrant youth are detached both from their old culture and from the usual safety nets in their new location, such as school and sports. This increases their vulnerability to gang recruiters, who know these youth lack basic needs. This is compounded by new immigrant youth living in poor areas such as the North End, their inability to obtain employment, barriers to school and community participation and a desire to feel connected in a new environment.

In a recent report, *Youth Gangs in Canada: A Preliminary Review of Programs and Services[47]*, the largest proportion of youth gang members is African Canadian (25%). When African refugees started moving into the West End of Winnipeg in late 2003, they started forming gangs. By the summer of 2004, the Mad Cowz was an official gang and had an intense feud with B-Side Boys, a gang located in the area of Wolseley. While feuding with B-side, a group of Mad Cowz broke off and formed their own gang, the African Mafia. Rivalry between the two groups became intense, and violent crimes became common. As one WPS officer noted:

> *"Our refugee kids are victims of gang recruitment because, for a refugee kid coming from a camp and moving into an apartment block on William [St] and somebody says, "Hey, I'll give you $100 to move an envelope for me…." $100 to a refugee kid!!! That is, amazing. So, of course they're gonna do it."*

Identity-Based Group Conflict

A major challenge is inter-ethnic conflict between youth gangs in Winnipeg. This violence is due to a variety of factors, including racism between groups, poverty, and unemployment. A component of increasing gang violence in the inner city area is tension and conflict between identity groups in the inner city; these issues contribute to the instability and unhealthy lifestyles experienced by many youth[48].

On October 10 of 2005, a young man was gunned down at the corner of Sargent Avenue and Sherbrook Street, an innocent bystander caught in the gunfire between two rival gangs known as the Mad Cowz and the African Mafia. This youth's death was not the first gang-related death in Winnipeg. In the year prior to his killing, four

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[46] Chesney-Lind, 2001
[47] Mellor, MacRae, Pauls, and Hornick, 2005
[48] Curran, Bowness, and Comack, 2010

young men from new immigrant families were also victims of the extreme violence of Winnipeg streets. What was different about this shooting was that it brought national media attention to the emergence of newcomer youth gangs in Winnipeg.

It also highlighted the growing tensions between two groups known as the Mad Cowz and the African Mafia. In 2003, a group of African refugee youth banded together to become the Mad Cowz. This group (primarily from Somalia and areas south of the Sahara – Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan) had become rivals of an existing group called the B-side Boys. Tensions escalated and turf wars emerged. The drug trade, an extremely lucrative economy, was what was being fought over. In the melee, the intra-group friction caused a split in the Mad Cowz, and the African Mafia was born. These gang members are predominantly from areas north of the Sahara (Iraq, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Egypt & Libya).

While Winnipeg has a long history of gang violence, and has numerous times been dubbed the gang capital of Canada by the media, the Mad Cowz and the African Mafia have engaged in levels of violence that the police are describing as 'extreme'[49]. It appears that in many instances the youth in these two gangs engage in violence for the sake of violence. In contrast, traditional gangs such as the Hell's Angels and their puppet gang, the Zig Zag crew, are generally involved in violence only to protect their criminal enterprise interests. While other street gangs in Winnipeg may resort to violence for a specific purpose, for the Mad Cowz and African Mafia, violence is the goal and is both gratuitous and extreme.

Not only do WPS have to deal with gang conflict as it relates to specific populations but they also have to contend with the increasingly violent conflict that is occurring between gangs composed of Aboriginal against those of new immigrant youth, more notably youth from African and war torn countries. This identity-based group conflict exist among the parallel communities in Winnipeg, is increasing in intensity, and threatens the ability of Newcomers, Aboriginal and established youth to overcome their differences and build a strong, viable and diverse community in Winnipeg. This tension, which increasingly boils over into conflict and violence, limits the educational and work opportunities of the youth, reduces their sense of inclusion in Canadian social and economic life, and can lead to a focus on a false sense of security that is provided by gangs. This group identification is often based on ethnicity[50].

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[49] Turenne, 2007

[50] Penner, and Proctor, 2010

Chapter III: The WPS And The Aboriginal Community

"Peace begins in the home and the homes are broken." ~ WPS constable

Aboriginal Population in Winnipeg

Winnipeg has the highest percentage of Aboriginals of any Canadian urban area. Aboriginals comprise 10.2% of the total city population[51]. Figure 11 depicts the breakdown of Aboriginal groups in the city.

Figure 11: Aboriginal Representation in Winnipeg

	First Nations	Métis	Inuit
Population	24,950	37,390	280
% of Population	4%	6%	0%

One-half of this fast-growing population Winnipeg is under the age of 25 years. This trend is fuelled by in-migration from reserves throughout the province and by increasing birth rates. Increasing numbers of Aboriginal people are moving in from the northern regions of the province and settling in the downtown area of the City. This places a burden on programs and services and increases the potential for contract with the police.

Winnipeg's Aboriginal population has grown by almost 9,000 people since the mid-nineties and is projected to well exceed 100,000 people by the year 2020. This population is the city's fastest growing ethnic group. Adding

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[51] Statistics Canada, 2008

to this demographic shift is statistic that, as of 2015, 50% of this population will be 30 years of age and younger[52].

There are sixty-three First Nation communities in the province of Manitoba, all of which fall under the umbrella of the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, which is then divided into the Northern Chiefs and the Southern Chiefs. This means that there are Aboriginal persons coming into Winnipeg from a large number of communities and are transitioning from these areas for variety of reasons sons including education, medical reasons or in some instances criminal opportunities. Medical care in the northern regions of the province is limited. Persons afflicted with diabetes or who are on dialysis come to the City for care. These persons often experience culture shock coming into an urban environment.

This population faces numerous challenges. The Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics[54] reports that 46% of all Aboriginals living in Winnipeg have incomes below $25,000 compared to 27% of non-Aboriginals. In Winnipeg,

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[52] City of Winnipeg, 2004
[53] Statistics Canada, 2008
[54] Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (CCJS), 2010

twice as many Aboriginal people as non-Aboriginal people live in poor neighbourhoods [55]. Large numbers of Aboriginal people in the City have not completed secondary school. Census data from 2006[56] show that roughly 30% of all Aboriginal people living in Winnipeg between the ages of 25 – 64 do not have any form of degree, diploma or certificate, which is far lower compared to their non-Aboriginal counterparts. Labour force participation rate is less than 50%. Of those Aboriginals who were eligible for the labour force, only 36% are employed[57].

Alcohol and substance abuse are major issues facing Aboriginal peoples and most interactions between Aboriginals and police are a direct result of intoxication and drug addiction. According to officers in Division 11, the "drunk-tank" is constantly full, is too small, and stretched to the extreme. As a result, officers are often forced to remain with subjects for an hour or longer before they unload them into the "drunk tank." This is a tremendous drain on resources, as officers are unable to respond to other calls while pre-occupied with intoxicated individuals.

There is a growing concern with the levels of alcohol use and the prevalence of Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD) in the Aboriginal community and the role that FASD plays in Aboriginal adult and youth conflict with the law. Response to incidents where the assailant or victims are afflicted with FASD is extremely different than when dealing with a non-affected individual. Individuals afflicted with FASD behave impulsively and often violently; have impaired cognitive abilities; and require structured environments and specialized intervention. The primary disabilities for adolescents and adults with FASD include memory impairments, problems with judgment and abstract reasoning, and poor adaptive functioning. There are no studies and no estimate of the prevalence of FASD among Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal residents of Winnipeg.

The health status of Aboriginal people is well below that of other non-Aboriginal Canadians. Up to 40 % of urban hospital patients are Aboriginal, and it is estimated that Aboriginal people use hospitals and medical services at a rate two to three times higher than that of other Manitobans[58]. Aboriginal people have shorter life expectancies, experience more violent and accidental deaths and have higher infant mortality rates and suffer from more chronic health conditions. Aboriginal people are also more likely to face inadequate nutrition,

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[55] Statistics Canada, 2008
[56] Winnipeg Census, 2006
[57] Statistics Canada, 2010
[58] Winnipeg Regional Health Authority 2006

substandard housing and sanitation conditions, unemployment and poverty, and discrimination and racism, all of which are negative factors in maintaining health and wellness[59].

Many mental health problems of Aboriginals arise from a long history of colonization, residential school trauma, discrimination and oppression, and losses of land, language and livelihood. Rates of mental health problems, such as suicide, depression, and substance abuse, are significantly higher in many Aboriginal communities than in the general population. The rate of suicide among Aboriginals is 2.1 times the Canadian rate[60]. Similarly, the rate of suicide for Aboriginal women is three times the national rate[61].

In most urban centres, including Winnipeg, mental health services have not been adapted to the needs of Aboriginal peoples and this is reflected in the low rates of utilization by this population. Costs of diagnosis are also extremely high unless youth are in the care of the Ministry and even then the likelihood of diagnosis rates is low for the same reason. Undiagnosed youth lose out on opportunities to access services and assistance that could lead them away from conflict with the CJS.

Suicide is one of the most dramatic indicators of distress and unstable mental health in any population but profoundly effects young people in Aboriginal communities. Risk factors identified in studies are male gender, history of substance abuse (especially solvents), history of psychiatric problems, parental history of abuse or psychiatric problems, feelings of alienation and history of physical abuse[62]. It is likely that contributors to high levels of emotional distress and problems like depression leading to substance abuse and suicide are closely related to issues of identity and self-esteem. This explains in part why Winnipeg continues to experience issues with Aboriginal gangs, serious violence in the home as well as on the street, all factors that create a serious crime and safety problem for the city.

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[59] Winnipeg Regional Health Authority 2006
[60] Health Canada, (2002
[61] Health Canada, 2002
[62] Kirmayer, Brass, and Tait, 2000

One of the constables in the ADP section summed it up as follows:

> *"You basically just have a lost race of people in a lot of ways. Then, with all of those social issues comes crime. Then our justice system is filled with a minority group that is really only ten per cent of our population here in Winnipeg. Yet, our jails are often 80% Aboriginal. That's disheartening. The inter-generational effects of the residential schools are still evident. Peace begins in the home and the homes are broken."*

Another constable in the ADP section noted: "There's a lot of great people out there that are really trying to help and make a difference. In spite of all of the negativity, there are a lot of positive things that are going on. It just that progress is slow."

The Inspector in charge of Division 51 noted that perhaps 50 per cent of WPS officers were from rural areas and had considerable exposure to Aboriginal peoples: "we don't come with any perspective or discrimination or prejudice. We just come with a background from playing hockey with them."

Aboriginal Peoples' Perceptions

Overwhelmingly, Inuit, Métis and First Nations peoples in Winnipeg believe non-Aboriginal people hold a wide range of stereotypes of Aboriginal people[63]. These images include:

- *Addiction problems*. This is, by far, the stereotype most frequently mentioned by the Urban Aboriginal Peoples Study (2011) participants in Winnipeg: three in four (75%) believe non-Aboriginal people associate them with drug and alcohol abuse. Métis and First Nations peoples in Winnipeg equally hold this view.
- *Lazy and lack motivation*. About a third (36%) of Aboriginal peoples in Winnipeg believe non-Aboriginal people assume they are lazy and unwilling to work hard to get what they want and need.
- *Poor and on welfare*. One-quarter (25%) of Aboriginal peoples in Winnipeg believe non-Aboriginal people think Aboriginal people are always poor and on welfare.
- *Unemployed*. One in five (20%) Aboriginal peoples in Winnipeg believe a common stereotype of Aboriginal people is that they are perennially unemployed and unable to keep a job, and as a result do not contribute to society.

The WPS and Aboriginal Peoples

There appears to be reluctance on the part of many residents in the Aboriginal community to contact the police and to report victimization, evidenced by a sergeant who recalled in one orientation session persons stating incidents that happened to them years ago. When asked why they didn't reported to the police they indicated

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[63] Urban Aboriginal Peoples Study, 2011

that they were not comfortable informing the police. This highlights the importance of educating people in the community, building relationships so that they are not hesitant to call the police in a time of need.

The sergeant reiterated the point that relationships between the WPS officers and Aboriginal persons in the community were hindered by the fact that the frontline officers are overworked. More specifically, there is a lack of proactive policing time for the officers. WPS members viewed this as the biggest obstacle to developing relationships of trust with the Aboriginal community:

> *"It's so busy sometimes you treat people like numbers rather than a person. We need to have the time to put in the effort to overcome that. The pressure is on from the dispatchers, the comm centres, they're constantly voicing, 'There's a robbery in progress.' 'There's a sexual assault in progress.' 'There's a domestic in progress.' They're getting pressure from their coworkers or their boss. Like, 'How come they're spending so much time on that call?' The comm centre or the dispatcher will contact your car asking, 'How much longer are you gonna be?' So, how can you expect us to provide quality service? It's just reflects badly on the service when you're not giving quality service to the people you serve."*

> *-"The officers put pressure on themselves to hurry up and get it done and get back out there. We need more frontline officers so I don't have to feel rushed to take your statement. 'Here's my card, I'll call you tomorrow.' It's hard to show that empathy."*

Given the high rate of Aboriginal victimization, the constraints imposed by the high workload of patrol officers must be addressed. As one constable noted, "If you're a victim and I'm trying to write down all the information as fast as I can because I know there's a serious crime waiting out there, that's a problem."

Research conducted by the Aboriginal Healing Foundation[64] documented the conflict that has often surrounded police-Aboriginal relations in Canada. This has been due to a variety of factors, including racism and abusive behavior by police officers that have led to mistrust. In Winnipeg, the relationship between the WPS and the Aboriginal community is best described as "complex" and "fluid". Some officers and community resource persons described the relationship as "deteriorating", while others felt there had been significant improvements in recent years.

Over the years there have been a number of critical incidents that have affected the relationships between the Aboriginal community and the WPS. In the late 1980s, the death of an Aboriginal man, J.J. Harper at the hands of a WPS officer and the death of Helen Betty Osborne in The Pas, were the catalysts for the Commission of Inquiry

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[64] Aboriginal Healing Foundation, 2003

into Native Peoples and the Justice System in Manitoba[65]. In 2005, the shooting of Matthew Dumas by a Winnipeg police officer increased tensions between the police and the Aboriginal community.

Some observers have argued that race and racism inform the routine practices of police officers and define the reference that officers adopt in their encounters with Aboriginal people[66]. The "Racialized Communities and Police Services Project, 2005-2012" was a major initiative designed to examine and improve relationships between the WPS and Aboriginal communities. The project was initiated in 2005 as a result of concerns "that police services were biased, based on race (Aboriginal ancestry) and concerns about the treatment of aboriginal residents by police and the absence of crime prevention services and how police responded to calls for service from aboriginal residents[67]. Initial consultations with the community revealed that many residents had a fear of the police and that there was a need for more police resources to be devoted to cross-cultural training and community outreach, as well as more options for residents to express their concerns about the police.

In a midterm review in 2009, community residents reported an improvement in the relationships with police officers and "a general sense that the WPS and individual officers were willing to work with them, in an 'active partnership atmosphere'"[68]. A number of initiatives had been undertaken including Project Breakaway and Neighbourhoods Alive. The general consensus at this time was that progress was being made in improving police aboriginal relationships although the pace was slow. The final consultation, conducted in 2012, found that there was a general consensus that "communication between the WPS and community organizations has improved over the past five years"[69]. Frustration continued to be expressed that "The direction is good, but the pace is too slow"[70].

The sergeant. in the ADP section who focuses her attention on the Aboriginal community stated:

> "I know for frontline officers, they often get painted with the same brush from years ago. They're accused of being racist [and] things like that. That still plays a factor and vice versa. The Aboriginal community will still phone and complain, "Why was I treated this way, because I'm Native? Nine out of ten times it's usually a lack of an understanding of police procedures. Once we explain to them why police have to react the way they do, then it's like, 'Oh okay, I didn't know that.' I try and explain our use of force policy just to understand why police have to respond the way they do in certain situations.

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[65] Hamilton and Sinclair, 1991
[66] Comack, Deane, Morrissette, and Silver, 2010
[67] The Manitoba Human Rights Commission, 2012:2
[68] The Racialized Communities and Police Services Project, 2005-2012:5
[69] The Racialized Communities and Police Services Project, 2005-2012:9
[70] The Racialized Communities and Police Services Project, 2005-2012:10

A major challenge for WPS members in their interactions with the Aboriginal community is the lack of opportunity to do proactive policing. The sergeant. in the ADP section noted that in the core areas of downtown and in the north end the officers were so busy that was difficult for them to build relationships with the communities:

> "I can't blame the officers because they're just overworked. Those are the busiest areas where there is the highest concentration of Aboriginal communities in the city. If we had more officers working the front lines, there would be more time to spend an extra minute talking person-to-person, rather than, 'Just the facts, just the facts,' because people feel that. They often feel like they're treated like a number rather than a person and I've heard that a lot from a lot of the people in the Aboriginal community."

An Aboriginal constables in the Aboriginal and Diversity Relations Unit stated that she had success in working with the community in the North End as an SRO, "but it takes a lot of work and it takes manpower and time, and we don't have those positions to be that intimate and close to the community."

The inspector in charge of the Community Relations Unit indicated that the WPS had taken a number of initiatives to provide better policing services to Aboriginals in the city. He pointed out that the WPS had hired more Aboriginal officers and that the "us versus them" mentality had dissipated. A key objective is to build trust between the WPS and the Aboriginal community and for both parties to work on strengthening their relationships.

A key challenge in the view of the inspector is the entrenched negative attitudes that some in the Aboriginal community have towards the police. An effective approach in his view is letting Aboriginal people know: "Hey, we're real people." "Come talk to us any time. You can ask us anything and we'll give you a complete honest answer as much as we can.' We're trying to create that relationship where Aboriginal person says, 'I can reach out and talk to these guys and they're going to give me the answers that I need.'" The inspector in charge of Division 11 stated that the WPS had come a long way since the critical incident involving a WPS officer and JJ Harper in 1988:

> "There's not that entrenched us versus them mentality any more. I think we've done a fairly good job there. We're really trying to make inroads with the Aboriginal leadership and try and help them understand where we come from as a police agency, how we can help them and help to move together in a partnership. We're trying to create that relationship where, 'I can reach out and talk to these guys and they're going to give me the answers that I need.' They need to take ownership of a lot of the issues they have as we have to take ownership of some of the problems that we have."

> *"Aboriginals have the solutions. We're here to help take that stand and say, 'You have be strong leaders and can change the status quo as well.' So, we are taking that tough approach but in a partnership sense. Overwhelmingly the response has been very positive."*

Many Aboriginal people continue to report a very uneasy relationship with police services as well as the courts and criminal justice system as a whole. The inspector in charge of Division 51 observed:

> *"The social issues and the history of the Aboriginal people in this country have created a situation where they don't trust the police. Unfortunately, a lot of their experiences with the police are of the police taking their dad away or arresting their mum or taking them to CFS. So, we're combating that and trying to, you know, have them understand…well, for us, internally, trying to have [members] understand the Aboriginal perspective as well as for [Aboriginals] to understand our perspective on things."*

There are on-going concerns about racial profiling by police officers and the need to ensure bias-free policing. An in-depth examination of these issues was beyond the scope of the Operational Review, although field observations by the project team did not discern any discriminatory behaviour toward Aboriginal or Newcomer residents. However, it is important to address the perceptions of Aboriginal community members that there is biased treatment by the WPS and to discover and address the sources of these perceptions.

The WPS has made progress in developing relationships with a number of Aboriginal organizations such as the MKO and the Treaty Association. Through the Diversity Unit, the WPS is making a concerted attempt at increasing their visibility at Aboriginal events and gatherings. Considerable work remains to be done at the local, grassroots level. On the street, the animosity of many Aboriginal adults, youth, and children toward the police was quite evident. One of the challenges facing the WPS is the considerable downloading of responsibility for the welfare of Aboriginal people in the city onto the WPS. During field observations, there were few signs of Aboriginal organizations on the street.

Neglected Children

Situations involving neglected children present challenges for the WPS. The Aboriginal population is very transient and many members of the community have come from the North and do not have a fixed address. It is often difficult for officers to locate a responsible adult to place the child with, so they do not have to involve CFS.

Aboriginal Youth

An SRO officer identified poverty and neglect as the major challenge facing Aboriginal youth. There are also the challenges of inter-generational effects and a gang culture that has become so ingrained in the way of life that

there are third and fourth generation gang members. This officer stated the biggest challenge facing the police when dealing with Aboriginal youth is breaking through the hatred and animosity. According to the officer, children coming from the reservation are "told that the cops will beat them. They are taught to fear the police and to hate the police."

In this officer's view, it is critical for the WPS to break the cycle of fear, hatred, and animosity. It is in this role where SROs are most critical in that they are in the best position to break down these barriers and to connect with the youth and the community at the broader level and begin to develop trust. When asked to characterize his relationship with the Aboriginal youth, an SRO officer stated, "It "depends on the day. It is still a work in progress."

The Southeast Tribal Council is one of the seven tribal councils in Manitoba. Many of the communities on the southeast side of Lake Winnipeg are remote, fly-in communities and most of the schools only go to Grade 8. Twenty years ago, the Council bought a school in Winnipeg and children from these communities are in residence there for Grades 9-12. This is a huge culture shock for the children, as they are required to leave their family and come to an urban environment. According to the sergeant many of the youth are highly vulnerable to being recruited into gangs and to becoming involved in drugs and criminal activity: "There's a huge learning curve for them."

One constable in the Aboriginal and Diversity Relations Section noted that there were many positive developments happening with Aboriginal youth. This includes more Aboriginal students going to university than in the past. Progress is slow, however, due to the lack of mentors: "When you have so few people who are successful in the Aboriginal community, there is a lack of mentors for the youth, which they need."

The WPS Aboriginal and Diversity Policing (ADP) Section

The relationships between the WPS and the Aboriginal and Newcomer communities are an important feature of policing in the city of Winnipeg. To this end, the project team made a specific effort to gather interview materials from the inspector in charge of the Community Relations Unit and his staff sergeant. As well, officers in the Aboriginal and Diversity Policing section were interviewed about their work and the challenges that they face.

The ADP section is Division 51, which is an amalgamated division that contains the WPS Community Relations Unit, the Mounted Unit, the Traffic Unit, Diversity Unit, in addition to overseeing and coordinating the Cadet program. According the inspector in charge of Division 51, the reason for the amalgamation of these seemingly

unrelated units was based largely on numbers. That is, each unit contains such a small number of officers that it does not warrant being a unit in and of itself.

The mandate of the ADP is to develop relationships with the various ethnic communities in the city including Newcomer communities, refugee communities, and Indigenous communities. As of mid-2013, the unit was composed of six officers (including a staff sergeant and two patrol sergeants) and was preparing to add four additional members – two of which will focus exclusively on Aboriginal relations.

Through the Community Relations Unit and the ADP section, the WPS has established partnerships with representatives of various Newcomer communities. Among the non-profit and government-funded agencies that the WPS have partnered with are: the Islamic Social Services Agency (ISSA); the Immigrant and Refugee Community Organization of Manitoba (IRCOM); and, UMOJA (Swahili for "unity"). Members of the Diversity Unit also serve on various committees related to Newcomer issues.

The sergeant in the ADP section has been a WPS police member for 19 years and is currently the supervisor for the section. She stressed the importance of having knowledge of the Aboriginal community in the city, noting that she does "because I lived it and breathed it and grew up in it." She indicated that she understood the political structures and how they worked.

CHALLENGES IN THE ADP UNIT

Officers in the unit identified a number of issues and challenges, including the following:

Absence of a Clear Mandate for the Unit and the Officers in the Unit

Interviews with members of the unit suggest that their roles have changed over the years. As one officer in the unit commented:

> "The roles have been changing. Two years ago when I took this spot it was to be – I can only speak for my own position – a resource and a liaison for the service and the community and also deal with recruit training. It would be advisory to the Chief about things that were going on in diverse communities. Almost like an expert in that field, in dealing with the different communities as a whole and building a better relationship with them. That was our mandate under the previous Chief. Things are changing now.
>
> We have moved away from the liaison for the community and the service and started getting really focused on doing presentations on policing that, in my personal opinion, doesn't have anything to do with diversity per se. I think that a lot of the presentations that I do can be done by crime prevention or community support or human resources.

This officer's preference was to return to a liaison role.

The Absence of Performance Measures

There is currently no capacity to record the activities of the members of the unit or to assess what it being done, how it is being done, and the outcomes of unit activities.

Inadequate Staffing

The officers in the ADP section have heavy workloads, are stretched very thin and cannot to do as much as they would like. As a result, they are forced to limit their outreach efforts and are unable to build as many partnerships as necessary. As of mid-2013, one constable was responsible for all Newcomer communities (including immigrants and refugees). Two officers (one patrol sergeant and one constable) are responsible for all Aboriginal peoples, the fastest growing and most at-risk population in Winnipeg.

In addition to the lack of uniformed staff, the inspector in charge of Division 51 also felt that there is a lack of civilian support. In his view, the WPS have been "strangled" by a lack of civilian support (e.g., crime analysts). The activities of the unit are resource-intensive and require a considerable investment of officers' time and energies. Officers in both the diversity unit and general patrol expressed the sense that officers are stretched too thin and are, in some cases overworked and overburdened. A point that was emphasized is that as Winnipeg's population has continued to grow, the size of the WPS – particularly the number of officers in general patrol – has remained relatively constant. As such, the WPS is increasingly strained as it attempts to meet the needs of Winnipeg's increasingly diverse population.

The lack of staff in the diversity relations unit makes it difficult for the officers to sustain and expand specific initiatives that they have undertaken.

Sustaining Initiatives with the Newcomer Communities

It appears that there is widespread support for the initiatives among the Newcomer community, but the lack of resources in the unit could result in a decrease in the support.

One of the officers in the unit discussed the challenges of sustaining initiatives with Newcomers:

> *"Because I'm the only one for right now with the Newcomer community, I can't make any promises to UMOJA or to the community because no one will ever remember the positive that we did, they're only going to remember what I didn't do. So, I'm not ready to make any commitments until I have somebody to share the responsibility with."*

> *"I organized a Newcomer dinner with the Chief of Police. We had 100 people come. I had one or two officers and six or seven community members at each table. That event very successful and there was wonderful feedback from all of the communities that were involved. But I can't*

do follow-up on my own. [For example}, UMOJA is looking for a commitment from the police. So, they want to do the youth programs and they want to do things like that, but you can't give the commitment if you don't have the resources to commit or you're a failure.

The lack of resources in the section also precludes developing new initiatives that would strengthen the relationship between the police service and the newcomer community. One officer in the unit stated:

"They wanted to start a homework program at IRCOM House and I think it's a great idea, but I can't go every night and read and do homework with these kids. I can't go on my own every night. This has to happen from the service. That's where I think community policing needs to come back in. If they had an officer in Community Support that took care of a certain neighbourhood and it was in their mandate then they could stop by IRCOM House on a Saturday and do homework for half an hour with the kids. It wouldn't even be about the homework at all. But we're just running with such limited manpower that we can't do community policing because we don't have enough officers. If everybody keeps running from call to call to call to call …. I know the Chief has said, "Well stop by your local school… ." You can't! You can't even get to the taxpayer's house when they're phoning for help. So, the frustration is more about what should be done than what will be done because we don't have the money to hire more officers. We just can't do it."

The members of the APD section are also limited in the extent to which they can provide assistance to patrol members, one officer commenting:

"When somebody would call me and say, 'Hey, I'm at this woman's house right now and she's from Poland and I'm having trouble,' and I could say, 'Okay hang on and let me try and find someone or let me try and find the resource centre.' But, they [officers] don't even know we exist because it's just me and I'm a band-aid solution to everything. We've gotten so busy and the Chief's focus is community relations and diversity, so I've had to band- aid everything because I just can't be everywhere at one time."

The sergeant indicated that it had been a busy time, including protests surrounding the "Idle No More" movement. Among the activities of the members in the section were educating WPS members about the background and objectives of the movement and to assist them in understanding what was going on. Also, educating the Aboriginal community as to the role of the police at the protests and marches was an important function. She indicated that one of her goals was to be a bridge between the different units in the WPS as well as between the WPS and the Aboriginal community.

The sergeant described the work in the unit as "very demanding." Aboriginal organizations and residents are very specific about whom they want to deal with and it takes time to gain their trust. However, she noted, "Once you build that trust your phone's ringing off the hook on weekends [and] evenings. They expect a quick response as well." In addition, the sergeant stated:

> *"There's so much work to do … outreach as well. There are so many diverse groups out there that want the police involved. There are so many Aboriginal organizations that want police involvement as well. And there's only a handful of us here in this unit, so it's hard to accommodate. You go wherever you can help. I would love to do more but I'm one person and there's more things that I would love to have my hand it, but we don't have the manpower here to do that. So, at times it can be a juggling act, or you have to say, "No, I can't make it."*

She noted that the main political Aboriginal organizations, like the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, Southern Chiefs and Northern Chiefs, would like to have a full time officer working out of their offices for liaison work but that this cannot be accommodated: "We can barely respond to the requests that we have now. There's a huge workload."

The sergeant has also made efforts to educate WPS members by having training days during which an aboriginal resource person from the community comes in to speak with them. This provides the officers with an opportunity to ask questions and to gain additional insights into the aboriginal community. A month previous, the unit held a community feast and approximately 500 residents from the Aboriginal community attended. Frontline officers served the guests and it provided an opportunity for the officers and community residents to spend positive time together. This was viewed as an important step toward building trust between the Aboriginal community and the WPS.

A constable in the ADP section had previously worked with Aboriginal youth at the Children of the Earth High School. She had worked closely with the community, the students, and the families. This constable described her role as follows:

> *"Liaising with the community, building positive relationships, [and] educating the community. Basically, you're a resource. If there are people from the community that you can connect with and network with they'll call you for advice or guidance and direction on certain issues."*

In addition, this constable sits on various committees in the community, including the Planning Committee National Aboriginal Day and at a Ni Kanichihk, a community-based Aboriginal organization. She is also involved in making presentations to Aboriginal groups that have special requests and in mentoring

A constable who had previously been an SRO noted the importance of selecting the right officers to be in the position:

> *"Some people don't know how to build those relationships. It's getting the right people in those spots too, by the way. You can't just stick anyone in those spots because they have a uniform on. They have to understand the need and the importance of building a positive relationship with the Aboriginal community in spite of the challenges that, as an officer going*

into that, you would be faced with. Like, let's face it, to be stuck in the middle of Children of the Earth High School as a police officer knowing that you are going to be hated by some and you have to work in that all the time…I mean, and officer has to be able to handle that and have the answers and be open to those social rejections and build on that. You can use it and build on that, you know? So, it's not just about sticking anybody in spots. It's having the right people to do those things."

"Some of them go into it because it's a Monday to Friday and they have kids and the shift works for them. It's not about the passion that comes from wanting to help a less fortunate community. That was my drive and sometimes you don't always find a person that has that same motive. Their motives for going in are different. That's the disheartening part too."

In 2013, two additional officers were added to the section. Neither of these officers are Aboriginal, which means that they will have to be given an in-depth orientation by the sergeant The sergeant also noted that a number of Aboriginal WPS members have indicated that they have no interest in working in the unit.

In-Service Training for WPS Members

Currently, the ADP section is responsible only for new recruit training and Aboriginal awareness. There is no in-service training for officers. The sergeant is responsible for putting the syllabus together for Aboriginal awareness training for police members. Officers are educated on Aboriginal history, including the residential schools, as well as current issues that the officers will encounter on the street. A residential school survivor comes and speaks to them and they talk to them about the inter-generational effects of [the residential schools]. A lot of the homeless and addicted are a product of the inter-generational effects from the residential schools. There are also materials on the history of the treaties and the promises, the agreements that were made from the government and the Aboriginal communities that are still binding to this day: "They have to understand that because that's why there are a lot of protests like 'Idle No More'."

The sergeant in the section expressed an interest in preparing a one-day program for in-service officers. She had done this on a trial basis for officers in the North End. Aboriginal community members attended and were able to discuss various issues with the officers. With the addition of two members to the unit it is anticipated that there will be more opportunity to do these types of initiatives.

ABORIGINAL-FOCUSED INITIATIVES OF THE ADP SECTION

The officers in the ADP section sponsor/participate in a variety of outreach initiatives and activities. These include:

Attending Special Events

Officers in the section attempt to participate in a variety of community events, including high school and the University of Manitoba's Aboriginal graduation Pow-Wow and spending more time with Aboriginal organizations. According to the Patrol Sergeant responsible for Aboriginal relations, it is key that police attend as many events as possible in order to build trust, break down barriers, and foster relationships.

It was also suggested that the WPS could become much more proactive and participating in various Aboriginal festivals and events. This not only increases the visibility of the WPS and provides the opportunity for developing relationships; it is also an opportunity to recruit new aboriginal members into the WPS. The inspector in charge of the section recalled,

> *"We went to an event for the Aboriginal Chamber of Commerce and when we were going in, I had mentioned to [my colleagues][that we were going to raise some eyebrows in there. And it did raise some eyebrows. But, I think we're starting to establish a bit of comfort. They expect to see us at these things now. And with comfort comes the ability to start building relationships, trusting honest relationships. We're just starting to really gain some traction there."*

The inspector in charge of the section indicated that it was very important for WPS members to attend these events in uniform.

Partnering with Key Aboriginal Organizations

The section has developed relationships with Aboriginal organizations, including the MKO, the Southern Chiefs, the Manitoba Treaty Relations Commission and the MKO as well as with NGOs in the community. The WPS has used the Treaty Relations Commission as a neutral meeting ground to host meetings with Aboriginal organizations to improve and to work on building relationships.

A number of the Aboriginal organizations have expressed an interest in having full-time WPS members working with them but there are insufficient resources to accommodate this request. The sergeant noted, "They're willing to give us an office at their offices, so we may be working on agreements where we could spend a half-day [per] week at each office. It's still in the works. This way, the people from the communities are comfortable going to their own Aboriginal offices rather than to police offices. It's still in the works."

The officers also attend the Indian-Metis Friendship Centre in support of programs offered for youth. This is particularly important during the summer months when the kids are not in school. Interestingly the RCMP has a full-time officer working in the Friendship Centre as well as with the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs. The RCMP Aboriginal Unit has eight officers, compared to the four WPS officers in the unit who are focused on the

Aboriginal community. As the sergeant stated, "We just don't have the manpower to do those things." Ideally, the sergeant would like to see four additional officers added to the unit to work with the Aboriginal community.

The sergeant noted that it was very important that the WPS have ongoing communication and contact with Aboriginal organizations in the city. These are particularly important when critical incidents occur that involve Aboriginal persons and the police.

Contributing to Local Newspapers

The WPS routinely contributes columns to two Aboriginal-based newspapers that are distributed throughout Saskatchewan and Manitoba and Northern Ontario. These are the *Grassroots News* and the *First Nations Voice.* The *First Nations Voice* is affiliated with the *Winnipeg Free Press* with about 100,000 in hard copy circulation and they have their own online publications as well.

Other Initiatives

Among the other Aboriginal-focused initiatives of the ADP is the Aboriginal Leadership Relationship Team, an initiative of the City of Winnipeg Division of Aboriginal Relations; reaching out to educational institutions such as SE Collegiate; and a Youth Gangs Initiative. The WPS also sponsors an annual Aboriginal Youth Careers Camp. In the view of the inspector in charge of Division 51, these initiatives have produced positive results: "They expect to see us at these things now. And with comfort comes the ability to start building relationships: trusting, honest relationships."

The inspector in charge of the ADP section noted that the feedback surrounding their participation in these events has been "overwhelmingly positive."

Areas Identified For Improvement

The WPS faces a complex task in providing effective, culturally-sensitive services to the Aboriginal community. As previously noted a good portion of the community in the inner city and in the North End are beset by poverty, lack of employment, and other social ills that significantly affect quality of life and result in Aboriginal persons having high rates of contact with the police as offenders and as the victims of crime.

A number of critical incidents over the years have challenged the WPS to change its organizational culture with respect to responding to the Aboriginal community. The materials gathered for this portion of the project indicate that the efforts to initiative change are bearing fruit. Observations on ride-a-longs were that patrol officers treated Aboriginal persons with patience, tolerance, and respect. While these observations were not in-

depth, patrol officers and senior managers spoke openly about the challenges and the need for the WPS to continue building relationships with the community.

On the street, WPS officers are burdened by a heavy call load which is a function of the high rates of conflict in the community, the absence of alternative mechanisms for dispute resolution, the lack of call screening, and downloading onto the police by other agencies.

The ADP section is making progress in establishing sustainable, trusting relationships with Aboriginal political and community organizations. Their efforts, however, are hindered by a lack of resources and personnel. This may result in officer burnout and make it difficult to attract qualified and highly motivated officers to the unit in the future. There is a need to strengthen the unit and for the section to develop a Strategic Plan to ensure that the resources that are available are utilized as effectively and efficiency as possible.

Given that high rates of police-Aboriginal contact will continue to exist in the inner city and in the North End, a Strategic Plan for policing these areas should be developed. This would be developed in collaboration with community residents, Aboriginal political and community organizations, and the various agencies that have as some portion of their mandate providing services to Aboriginal persons. This Strategic Plan would identify the training needs of officers assigned to these areas as well as opportunities for police-agency/organization collaboration. This would include developing relationships with organizations such as Restorative Resolutions and Onashowewin and exploring the potential for developing and expanding restorative justice approaches.

A key component of this Strategic Plan would be to delineate the boundaries of WPS responsibility. The WPS cannot be all things to all people. There are not unlimited resources. In this respect, a detailed examination of the phenomenon of "downloading" should be conducted. This should be a component of a larger examination of the downloading that has occurred onto the WSP in the past decade. Materials presented elsewhere in this report can provide the foundation for such a study.

With respect to recruiting, the WPS should develop a Strategic Plan for recruiting Aboriginal and Newcomers into the Service. At present, recruiting efforts are not coordinated and could be more effective. There appears to be considerable potential to proactively engage the communities and to put into place initiatives designed to increase the number of applicants. The RCMP Aboriginal cadet program has been very successful in increasing the numbers of Aboriginal officers in the RCMP. Consideration might be given to developing a similar program in the WPS.

A key factor that has hindered the development of positive relationships with the Aboriginal community and more positive encounters between WPS officers and Aboriginal persons on the street is the heavy workload of WPS officers. The lack of time to "personalize" encounters was identified by a number of WPS officers as a major challenge. The examination of patrol deployment in other portions of this report document these issues and a number of recommendations are set out.

The overall impression of the project team is that the WPS officers in the ADP section are committed to improving relationships with the Aboriginal community and in bridging the gap between the WPS and the Aboriginal community. At present, their efforts are hindered by a lack of capacity and resources as well as a strategic plan that would facilitate prioritization of existing resources, the identification of service gaps, and an assessment of the impact of the officers' activities and initiatives.

The WPS officers and community resource persons interviewed for the study identified a number of areas where additional work remains to be done. Many of these observations apply to the relationships between the WPS and Newcomer communities as well. These can be broadly grouped into the following:

Education

It is critical to continue to educate WPS members on the culture, language, social and historical circumstances of Aboriginal peoples. According to Aboriginal interviewees this education must be in the form of immersion within First Nations culture as the cultural component is fundamental to building an understanding. Officers should take part in ceremonies with Aboriginal elders. In their view, a key priority should be creating more opportunities for officers to engage in this type of experiential learning.

Improve/Address Victims Services

Many Aboriginal persons are hesitant to report victimization and express a feeling of re-victimization when the police are involved. Increased attention is required to addressing victim's services.

Increased Networking Between Groups

The inspector in charge of the Community Relations Unit indicated that there is competition for fiscal resources among the various agencies and organizations in the Aboriginal community:

> *"Everybody seems to be competing for dollars. There are hundreds of social agencies and a lot of them don't know what each other are doing. A lot of them seem to be doing the same thing. It's one big long table and we're only one seat at the table, but our role is to start holding the government accountable, the city accountable, the province accountable, [and] the feds accountable. To ensure that there are performance measures in place to even see what's happening with the money. We see us in the big picture playing a role at the table and*

saying, 'How can we channel our resources and make sure we're doing our jobs better?'
We're a player, we're going to be a facilitator of this."

Increased networking would reduce this competition and lead to great efficiencies and effectiveness.

Increased Proactive Visibility Within the Community

Police contact with Aboriginals persons generally occurs in times of crisis. One Aboriginal community member noted that Aboriginals only see police from the chest up (they never get out of their cars). They would like to see more positive interactions between patrol officers and the community. This would entail more involvement with neighbourhood associations and more proactive involvement with youth in order to prevent gang involvement. Speaking of developing relationships with the community, one Aboriginal constable in the ADP section noted "We need to influence the leaders to believe that we're on their side and we're supporting them at every level. We do work with leadership, but I'm really all about the grassroots people. My heart's with the people at the grassroots level."

Recruiting Aboriginal Persons to the WPS

There was a shared view among the officers in the ADP section that the WPS could be much more proactive in recruiting Aboriginal officers. One constable stated: "When an Aboriginal young person says, 'I'd love to become a police officer,' I mean, you're just like, 'Wow, really? Okay. Right on.' You know, it's so rare. I really don't think we're targeting Aboriginals enough. I think we should be doing more." In June, 2013, for the first time, the WPS offered a career symposium set up at National Aboriginal Day that was held at the Metis Friendship Centre for June 21st. Officers indicated the need to do a similar initiative at other events such as Manitoahbee.

An Aboriginal constable in the ADP section spoke of the challenges of being an Aboriginal police member:

> *"Some people would view you as a traitor. I've had that from my own family. It's all about building that relationship and putting a little bit of humanness to what you do. Breaking down those barriers or beliefs that they come with because prejudice goes two ways. Once you break their belief systems and break through some of their walls, it's a matter of building on that."*

Training

Currently, WPS recruits go through a four-day cultural awareness training that's primarily two days Aboriginal awareness training and two days of, in the words of one officer "everything else." For members, there are internal courses and courses offered by the municipality.

Both WPS officers and First Nations representatives expressed the need to improve and expand training. The two days of Aboriginal sensitivity training are viewed as insufficient to provide officers with the knowledge required to police in the Aboriginal community. One concern is that once the officers are deployed to the street, this brief training is forgotten and new perceptions and typifications of Aboriginal people are formed. One constable stated,

> *"They [the officers] get on the street and they're dealing with it ten hours a day in Downtown or the North End and their belief systems run deep. So they start to go, 'Why don't they get their lives together?' That, I think, can be a challenge. It's been a challenge for me. Being Aboriginal and dealing with those high need issues, you constantly have to gauge your thinking about, 'Wow, am I getting angry with my own people?' because that happens. It's pretty hard. I can say personally that even I get like that after dealing with it constantly all day. I think that's a challenge, for sure."*

One constable in the section offered:

> *"I would like to see more [in terms of training]. It shouldn't just be at the start of the career because our belief systems are constantly shifting. So, if you have somebody brand new in the academy getting the two-day training and then five years down the road they're not getting anything else, you know for sure they've forgotten about the two-day training and their belief systems are influenced again in a negative way. So, it would be nice to remind them that we're dealing with a dysfunction as a result of a lot of historical and contemporary factors."*

The introduction of mandatory training would be difficult under current circumstances including the heavy workload of the GP officers, one constable in the ADP section pointing out:

> *"I could see it being really difficult trying to do mandatory training for [Aboriginal relations] based on our manpower and the demands on the street. Especially during summer months: you're constantly dispatched. I can't see how they would be able to fit more mandatory training in. They have a difficult time fitting in mandatory training for use of force."*

A representative of the Southern Chiefs (SCO) suggested that academy training be extended to at least a week. Aboriginal interviewees emphasized the importance of immersing officers in the culture – "Indigenizing their training" so that WPS officers know who Aboriginals are as people, and their cultural and historical background.

It was also suggested that there was a need for WPS officers to be educated on the role of treaties and the relationship between the State and Aboriginals as enshrined in the constitution. For example, the challenges that the WPS had with the Idle No More movement was viewed by the MKO as being partly due to officers' lack of knowledge. The MKO stated that they would be open to facilitating this training/learning.

Among the WPS officers interviewed for the project, views were mixed as to whether there should be mandatory in-service training for all members on issues related to the Aboriginal community.

Suggested Initiatives

The officers in the ADP section offered a number of suggestions for future initiatives that would be designed to enhance WPS relations with the Aboriginal community. These included holding a conference that would bring together Aboriginal youth and the police. It was also suggested that there be more networking between groups, although this is currently stymied by a lack of staffing resources.

A key challenge is to determine the role of the WPS and of the various agencies and organizations that are working with the Aboriginal community, one constable noting: "Everybody really is trying to do their best. It's just trying to figure out who is doing what and how we can play a part or a role in helping you as a resource. Again, it's the networking and the connecting."

The Use Of Social Media

At present, the WPS and the ADP section make only limited use of social media. An expanded social media effort could be used to disseminate information to members in the service about events such as Idle No More. The inspector in charge of Community Relations stated that, "To be perfectly candid, we reacted but it was a little too late. It would be nice to be on top of these things as they arise." Social media can be particularly effective in establishing and maintaining contact with specific segments of the community, including youth.

The WPS has recently appointed a civilian member to be the social media expert and the focus will be on community relations. The inspector in Charge of Community Relations noted that the WPS had fallen behind other police services in the use of social media.

Keeping Ahead of the Curve

Several of the officers interviewed indicated that it was important that the Winnipeg Police Service be prepared to confront situations that arise. This is illustrated in the events surrounding the Idle No More movement and associated demonstrations that occurred across the country and in Winnipeg in 2012. As one inspector noted:

> "When they started their protests here in Winnipeg, it caught our entire organization off guard and [a member of the Diversity Relations Unit] had to put together a training session, going around to the briefings, letting them know about the background and what it's all about. If it continues, I think we'll be quite prepared. But just something like that came up and we were completely unprepared for it."

Aboriginal Community Organizations: Onashowewin Justice Circle

Onashowewin is an Aboriginal Restorative Justice diversion program for Aboriginal youth that is funded by the Department of Justice and the Province of Manitoba. The Aboriginal Justice Inquiry and the cases of Helen Betty Osborne and J.J. Harper were the catalyst for the creation Onashowewin. Onashowewin has five community justice workers and three cultural advisors on their staff. The role of cultural advisors is to reconnect individuals to their culture, something that for many Aboriginals has been lost. As the executive director of the program stated, "Most people that we are working with, their charge is the least of their worries." The majority of Onashowewin's clients are youth, with 85-90% of those youth being under the care of Child and Family Services (CFS). Onashowewin has an open-door policy that allows Aboriginal individuals to voluntarily participate in workshops. They do not have to be involved in the justice process.

Relations with the WPS

As designed, the WPS and the Manitoba Crown Council are responsible for selecting cases to be diverted to Onashowewin. The executive director stated that there was to be a direct relationship between Onashowewin and the WPS; however, that has not been the case as very few, if any, cases are diverted by the WPS. Her feeling was that WPS members do not take the time to proactively or actively engage in with offenders and victims. By being largely reactive rather than proactive, officers go from case to case and the focus is on arrest and crime control. She also felt that WPS members do not have the necessary discretion or ability to make a diversion determination or recommendation. She also stated that many officers are unaware that Onashowewin exists and is an option. Her suggestion was that by not diverting more individuals, the WPS are actually increasing their workload as they are placing individuals in the revolving door of the Manitoba justice system.

Furthermore, when submitting case files to Crown, the Director stated that WPS members do not always identify individuals as Aboriginal. As such Crown are forced to rely on photo and name recognition, so not every Aboriginal case file is recognized, and thus, are not diverted. Consequently, Onashowewin relies heavily on Manitoba Crown Council to provide them with case files. A problem with this is that Onashowewin feels that they are only getting a fraction of the files that they should be getting.

For those who are diverted to Onashowewin, the goal of the organization is to prepare them for life after their involvement in the justice system. In order to do this, the organization offers eight culturally-based workshops aimed an informing Aboriginals of the resources available to them and reducing recidivism. Onashowewin's core programs is referred to as the "Brave Path" and, among other things, it identifies what the individual needs to do at Onashowewin to complete their diversion. If they do not successfully complete their diversion then they

are directed back into the traditional justice system. Onashowewin also reaches out to victims and offers to allow them to participate if they so choose, though victims rarely participate. Moreover, if the offender has been ordered by the Crown to provide the victim with restitution, Onashowewin assists them in doing so, as most offenders are not able to do so on their own.

Perceptions of WPS/Aboriginal Relations

In the opinion of the executive director of Onashowewin, there is a significant amount of mistreatment of Aboriginals by WPS members. This was reflected in the negative view and adversarial attitude towards the WPS that emerged during the interview. Many of the statements made by the executive director were in direct opposition to the statements made by members of the ADP section, MKO, and the Treaty Relations Commission. According to the Executive Director, the positivity being discussed at the general level is not being seen at the grassroots and local level and, in her opinion, there was still a significant amount of fear and suspicion of the police within the Aboriginal community and hesitancy to contact the police out of a fear of victimization among Aboriginal residents. She stated that many Aboriginals involved in Onashowewin claim to have been unfairly targeted by WPS members and to have had their rights violated.

Aboriginal Youth

Aboriginal youth are the predominant clientele of Onashowewin. According to the executive director many Aboriginal youth (and Aboriginal offenders in general) are in the system as a result of minor crimes and breaches. The primary issue, in her view, is court attendance. Many Aboriginals are charged with small or petty crimes and then repeatedly fail to attend court, which results in a warrant being issues for their arrest. As such the system is bogged down by breach charges that are, in large part, a product of Aboriginal youth that feel they having nothing to lose. From her perspective, this speaks to the broader social issues facing Aboriginal youth in Winnipeg.

Suggestions for Improving Police/Aboriginal Relations

The executive director offered a number of suggestions for improving relations between the WPS and the Aboriginal community. These included the following:

- An increased value placed on the Aboriginal perspective: The WPS should work to better understand why Aboriginals are in the position that they are in and to act and react accordingly. In this respect there is a feeling that police lack the necessary knowledge of the quality (or lack thereof) of life of many Aboriginal people living in the Downtown and North end areas.
- More outreach to the Aboriginal community: This would extend beyond what the executive director referred to as "token events". She felt that the ADP section was a token unit that did not have the ability to make meaningful change. In her view, for outreach to be meaningful it must come through

consultation with the community and centered on their needs and desires. While there is engagement between the WPS and Aboriginals at the political level, there needs to be more engagement done at the grassroots level.

- Increased discretion of officers to divert individuals to Onashowewin.

- Improved accountability measures for the WPS.

- <u>Enhanced academy training and mandatory in-service training on Aboriginal issues:</u> This would involve exploring the deeper issues facing Aboriginals. The executive director stated that Onashowewin would be open to facilitating this in some form, such as having officers attending the facility during their training.

- <u>Inter-organizational cooperation and communication:</u> This would involve moving out of the "silo mentality" in which everyone is operating and that results in the Aboriginal population is falling through the cracks. In her view, there needs to be improved connectivity between agencies such as CFS, WPS, Healthcare, Social Assistance, and the Ministry of Children and Youth. At the moment this is non-existent.

- <u>Interventions with youth:</u> This would involve targeting Aboriginal youth at an early age to prevent gang initiation and diverting youth gang members to Onashowewin rather than incarcerating them.

Police-Aboriginal Relations: Concluding Comments

Aboriginal peoples comprise 10 percent of the population of Winnipeg. Many Aboriginal residents live in areas afflicted by poverty and disorder. This, in combination with the history of Aboriginal peoples in Canadian society, has a direct impact on the demands made on the WPS and the challenges that surrounding WPS/Aboriginal relations in the city. Historically, the relationship between the WPS and Aboriginals was characterized by suspicion and mistrust and although significant progress has been made, the relationship is best characterized as complex and fluid.

Among the challenges facing Aboriginal persons are poverty, the generational impact of the Residential Schools; alcohol and substance abuse; inadequate housing; un/under-employment; and discrimination. Challenges for the WPS include hostility and distrust among Aboriginal residents, an increasing rate of violent crime, and the inability of WPS officers to engage in proactive policing.

WPS officers and community resource persons identified a number of issues that, if addressed, would improve police-Aboriginal relations. At present, the ADP section has a limited capacity to fulfill its mandate. Additional resources would facilitate an expansion of its role in establishing and sustaining collaborative partnerships with Aboriginal community organizations and social service and health agencies. Increasing the numbers of patrol members would provide officers with the opportunity to participate in proactive policing activities that would allow officers to move beyond a reactive role to engage in problem-solving and establishing relationships with

the persons and communities they police. There were calls for additional training for both recruits and in-service officers. However, the impact of this training on improving police service delivery to the Aboriginal community will be minimal if steps are not taken to reduce the call load on patrol officers so as to increase the opportunities for proactive policing.

The distrust and animosity that Aboriginal people in certain areas of the city have of the police are a result of a complex combination of history, and intergenerational poverty and the conflict that exists in the urban environment. Improving police-Aboriginal relations will take a concerted effort on the part of all parties, including First Nations organizations and NGOs, federal and provincial agencies, and the City. Responsibility for addressing the outstanding issues should be shared among all stakeholders and extend beyond the WPS.

Recommendations

The WPS should collaborate with key stakeholders, including Aboriginal organization, health and social services, and community agencies to develop best practice strategies for responding to intoxicated individuals. A review should be done of best practices in other jurisdictions that could inform the development of a comprehensive approach in Winnipeg.

The WPS should develop a rigorous selection process for the selection of officers to serve as SROs. These criteria can be developed based on discussions with officers who have previously excelled in this position.

The WPS should make a concerted effort to develop an evidence-based social media strategy. The SMART Policing Initiative (n.d.) , sponsored by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance, has produced a document titled "Effective Marketing Practices" that could be used as a guide for developing a social media strategy in the WPS.

Chapter IV: The WPS and Newcomers

Immigration Trends

Immigration in Manitoba has more than doubled in the past decade and the majority of these persons settle in Winnipeg (see Figure 13).

Figure 13: Immigration to Manitoba, 2000-2009[71]

IMMIGRATION TO MANITOBA IN THE PAST DECADE

In 2011, 15,962 people immigrated to Manitoba and 13,338 chose Winnipeg as their destination. Of the immigrants, 1303 were Refugees who chose to settle in Winnipeg. The top five countries of origin of immigrants coming to Winnipeg in 2011 were the Philippines, Germany, India, China, and Israel. The top four countries of origin for refugees were Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan. The top five languages spoken in Winnipeg, other than English, are Tagalog (from Philippines), French, German, Chinese, and Ukrainian. The majority of Manitoba's immigrant community comes from Asia and the Pacific, followed by Africa and the Middle East. The education levels of our immigrants based on Principal Applicant over 25 years of age: 41% have some type of degree from their home country and 17.4% had secondary education or less. The top five occupation choices of immigrants were industrial butchers, health care workers, welders, truck drivers, and engineers.

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[71] Manitoba Labour & Immigration, 2009

The number of persons coming as refugees has also increased. From 1997 – 2006, nearly 8,000 individuals originating from 44 different African countries came to Manitoba, with the majority settling in Winnipeg[72]. The proportion of Africans who immigrated as refugees has increased from 47% in 1095 to 82% in 2006. In 2006, the top five source countries for refugees to Winnipeg after Afghanistan were Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Within the inner city of Winnipeg, the 2006 Census counted more than 3,280 black-skinned visible minorities and this figure is presumed by residents to have increased exponentially with the total estimate of those emigrating from Africa being over 15,000 in number[73].

A key feature of the WPS policing environment are Newcomer communities. In 2011, 16.3 percent of the city's population of 691,800 were visible minorities. Figure 14 (also see Figure 8) depicts the breakdown of visible minority groups in the city.

Figure 14: Visible Minorities in Winnipeg, 2011

Visible Minorities in Winnipeg, 2011

	Chinese	Black	Filipino	Arab	Southeast Asian	West Asian	Korean	Japanese	Other VM Groups	Mixed VM Groups
Population	12,660	14,200	36,820	2,115	5,325	1,885	2,065	1,725	1,585	3,060
% of Population	2	2.3	5.9	0.3	0.9	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5

[72] Madariaga-Vignudo, 2009
[73] Simbandumwe, 2007

The rapid and increasing influx of Newcomers is altering the demographics of Winnipeg. The city currently ranks sixth in the country in terms of the rate of immigration[74]. In 2006, Winnipeg's foreign-born population reached 161,600 people, accounting for 19.8% of the city's population, and in 2009 it welcomed 13,520 permanent residents; 5.4% of Canada's total immigration[75].

The Newcomer population is composed of immigrants and refugees and is continuing to grow at a fairly significant rate. In addition to the Philippines, other Newcomer groups in Winnipeg come from Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia. In particular there is a growing African (mostly refugee) population from countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia, and most prominently, Sudan. Indeed, the Sudanese population in Winnipeg is steadily increasing.

Downtown Winnipeg has become home to many Newcomers, and the number of immigrants, specifically visible minorities in this area continues to increase yearly. Citizenship and Immigration Canada note that one in twelve families in Winnipeg is a recent immigrant family, meaning one or both parents immigrated within the past two decades[76]. An example of this is the Central Park Neighbourhood where 43% of residents are immigrants. Over 56% of these residents have arrived in the past five years[77].

Manitoba has received record numbers of immigrants and refugees over the past 10 years - a trend that researchers say is anticipated to continue at a record-setting pace. A current target set by Manitoba Labour and Immigration is 20,000 arrivals per year for the next 10 years[78]. As a result not only do service providers need to be in a position of readiness but safety and security measures need to be in place to deal with the influx of issues that these new residents bring with them and result from them migrating to the North end of Winnipeg, an already overcrowded and crime ridden district of the city.

Winnipeg's inner city is undergoing demographic shift. The large numbers of refugees who are settling in the North End and inner city have altered the ethnic composition of these areas and, in turn, increased the demands on the police and other agencies.

[74] City of Winnipeg Census, 2009
[75] Statistics Canada, 2008
[76] Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2013
[77] Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2013
[78] Manitoba Labour and Immigration, 2009

Challenges For Newcomers

Each of these Newcomer groups encounters challenges upon arrival in Winnipeg. This in turn, presents challenges for the WPS, social services, health, and education.   The most common challenges experienced by immigrant populations in the city, and specifically by visible minority Newcomers are:

- lack of affordable housing and childcare
- lack of programs for single parents
- lack of employment opportunities
- youth dropping out of school
- barriers to learning English
- family break-down
- lack of training programs
- poverty
- fear of gangs recruiting youth

New immigrants face many barriers to integration into Canadian culture. It is estimated that as many as 21% of recent immigrants are living in crowded housing thus leading to the perpetual cycle of experiencing lower incomes than residents in the rest of the city[79].

Furthermore, these new immigrants are two to three times more likely to live in poverty, and indicators from the Social Planning Council of Winnipeg study show that unemployment went up in the past five years while the rate has gone down for Canadian-born residents. All of these disadvantages contribute to issues of crime and safety, including youth susceptibility to recruitment into gangs, violence in the home, and distrust of the police.

A large proportion of new immigrants to Winnipeg come from countries where they experienced conflict and often war. Many have suffered severe trauma and loss.   Senior officers in the Community Relations Unit offered a number of observations on the challenges facing new immigrants:

> *"The first generation Canadians, a lot of them are living in poor areas of the city, going to school in poor areas, and are exposed to the criminal element. The children and youth are impressionable. They see the easy money and the drugs and gangs. When you apprehend the kids and take them home, the parents are so frustrated and they don't know what to do anymore. That's the part that we really need to try and combat."*

> Another officer commented:

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[79] The Social Planning Council of Winnipeg, 2008

"From a policing perspective, a lot of the refugees that we have here are coming from war-torn countries that have been exposed to absolutely horrific experiences. Going to jail here in Canada is nothing compared to what they have seen living in the war camps and the refugee camps over there. We can't relate to what they've seen or what they've experienced."

Although recruitment into gangs of children is high on the list of concern for Newcomer families (56% of families surveyed)[80], general safety by parents living within the North End of Winnipeg remains a primary issue. Studies show that the majority of families surveyed felt unsafe even walking in their neighbourhood, stating they had either witnessed or been the victims of violence. Intoxicated and homeless people in parks prevented families from utilizing recreation areas for their kids and prevent them from accessing services that may be located in areas where they feel unsafe[81].

Many of the parents complained that the WPS presence in their neighbourhood was not sufficient to make them feel safe and when the police were there it was responding to calls as opposed to being present in a community policing capacity.

Compared to other immigrants arriving in the city, refugees (particularly those sponsored by the federal government rather than by a family or an organization) may have a difficult time adjusting to a new environment and lack of support of government beyond financial payments. The financial assistance under the Resettlement Assistance Program amounts to about $466/month per person, including $271 for shelter and $195, or about $6.50/day for all other expenses[82].

There appears to be differences among the various Newcomer groups with respect to the specific challenges faced. The Filipino community was cited as an example of a community that provided a strong infrastructure of support for new arrivals from that country, one officer observing:

"When people from the Philippines immigrate to anywhere they have it set up. They take care of each other. So, you move to Winnipeg and you move in with your family and then you pool that money together and you buy a business together and you all work at that business. There are probably very few Filipino families that move to Winnipeg and aren't successful. It's the refugee kids, particularly from Africa that have struggles."

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[80] Garang, 2011
[81] Maclean, 2010
[82] Silver, Ghorayshi, Hay, and Klyne, 2006

Mental Health Issues

Although immigrants have a lower rate of mental disorders than the native-born Canadian population, research shows that this is only the case upon arrival into Canada and with time mental health status is likely to deteriorate[83]. The psychological impact of conflict and war in their country of origin often do not manifest themselves for many years after arrival. [84]. Police officers may encounter residents who have unaddressed psychological and mental health issues even though they have been resident in the city for some time.

The stressors associated with immigration and resettlement may also put immigrants and refugees at increased risk for developing mental health problems once they arrive. Some of the stresses involved in resettlement may include an inability to speak one of the official languages, prejudice and discrimination from the host society, low socio-economic status, separation from one's family, and isolation from one's cultural background. One consequence of this may be an increased likelihood of conflict with the law.

These and other factors contribute to higher levels of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)[85] among immigrant populations as compared to residents who are Canadian-born.

Perceived Racism

Newcomers living in Winnipeg's inner city neighbourhoods may be more vulnerable to victimization due to their inability to access proper housing, employment and services which would assist them in moving out of what has been termed "racialized poverty"[86].

Previous experiences with law enforcement and government in their home countries, including corruption and violence may colour perceptions of immigrants in Winnipeg. A study conducted with the Nigerian church in Winnipeg revealed that 31.3% believed that police did not treat all ethnic groups the same and fairly. Moreover, 20.9% believed that the police and the criminal justice system treated ethnic persons more harshly[87].

A Lack of Programs and Services

The executive director of Spence Neighbourhood Association commented on the programs and services for Newcomers:

> *"There's quite a few but there's not enough for all the needs. There's a network of twenty agencies in this neighbourhood, but we're not reaching the most at-risk or the most in-need.*

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[83] Winnipeg Regional Health Authority, 2010
[84] Magoon, 2005
[85] Magoon, 2005
[86] Silver, 2008
[87] Oriola and Adeyanju, 2011

So, there's still a lot of gaps. There is a lot of need but there are no funds to address f it."

A staff sergeant in the Community Relations Unit commented that there was insufficient long-term care and support for Newcomers coming into the country:

> *"When they come, there's a set time limit for their Newcomer's allowance, but when they come they also have to repay their airfare, things like that. What they really need is long-term care, particularly if there are language and education issues. They need it on a long-term, twenty-four hour a day basis, but it is in short supply."*

In the view of one constable in the ADP section, the government is setting up Newcomers for failure. This is due to a lack of resources for Newcomers who are ill-informed about the challenges facing them in Canada; a lack of low-cost, social housing available (social housing vacancy in Winnipeg is currently 0%); and the fact that skills formed in their country of origin may not be useable in Canada. As such, individuals in skilled/professional positions in their country of origin may be forced into menial or service jobs in Canada. This can lead to frustration and conflict within the family. This is exacerbated by the lack of social support available to Newcomer communities, particularly refugees.

This situation was viewed as creating the conditions for families to be susceptible to becoming involved in criminal activities, the staff sergeant in Division 51 stating:

> *"What ends up happening is the frustration level that can grow within some of those Newcomers as a result of not getting that continuous care. A young family is starting out and gets frustrated by not being able to navigate government processes or find employment or training. It doesn't take very long before they might get lured by the opportunity of quick and easy money. Those kinds of temptations and influences, especially when Newcomers end up being situated in the downtown core area, there are a lot of those negative influences that can turn them into money makers real quick. They're vulnerable, if nothing else, because they don't have good role-modeling or good to support to say, 'Here are the dangers when you come to this country.' Frustration can turn into criminal behaviour if it is not addressed."*

Language/Cultural Barriers

Language barriers present multiple challenges for Newcomers and have a number of serious ramifications. These include:

1. The inability to speak English means that Newcomers are essentially illiterate and are unable to access services. This includes the difficulties accessing transit services, which may, in turn, limit their employment opportunities.

2. This language-induced lack of mobility restricts Newcomers to interacting solely with their own community and increasing the perpetuation of myths and misunderstandings about Winnipeg, including the role of the police.

3. Language barriers make it difficult for Newcomers to adapt to the culture or subculture in which they have arrived.

4. Children are often the first to learn English and this creates a power imbalance in the home, with the role of children disproportionate to the parents. Consequently, the new responsibility placed on the children's shoulders makes them more vulnerable to recruitment into gangs and gang culture at the expense of their own culture. According to the Director of IRCOM, an immigrant/refugee resource network, the prevailing fear in Newcomer communities is that their children will become involved in gangs. Personal safety is not a concern.

5. Language barriers also make it difficult for Newcomers to familiarize themselves with the Canadian legal system and the role of the police.

The executive director of Spence Neighbourhood Association noted the challenge of language barriers was "big time" challenge, stating

> *"We don't have any translators besides Newcomer staff that we have who, hopefully, speak another language. It's really difficult. It's easier to speak with kids because they have an easier time understanding. So, a lot of our work is done through kids. If we're dealing with housing issues and there are kids, we usually get the kid to come in and help translate. It's definitely one of the most difficult things. A lot of times we are contacting them they are in crisis or on the verge of a crisis, so it's even harder then. There's just nothing available."*

Language barriers can have a significant impact on police officer/citizen interaction. One officer stated:

> *"I hope that officers are telling people – when they're with somebody who's first language isn't English – I hope that they're telling people this might go easier if we get somebody to translate. But, I don't know that they are because there are so many flippin' units doing whatever and nobody [officers] knows who else exists. So, lots of people won't even know to phone me to ask me [for a translator]. I didn't even know this unit (the ADP) existed until I came here two years ago. I didn't even know it was here."*

This view was shared by the Inspector in charge of Division 51: "For us, as more of a support unit we've got more time to ensure that we've got translators in place. For frontline, reactive policing, it's more problematic." Most often in situations requiring translation the duty officer will check the roster and see if there any officers working will have the language skills required. As previously noted, the WPS also has access to a language bank although that does not appear to be a reliable resource.

Lack of Adequate Housing

There is a lack of adequate, suitable housing in the city for Newcomers. As the executive director of Spence Neighbourhood Association noted:

> *"It's really difficult. It's more a problem of not enough accessible low-income housing in the whole city. It's hard to find a rental place affordable prices. If you can't pay $1000, it's really hard to find a good place. We do a lot of work with landlords and work together to fix up their places. We have some matching grants, where if they put a little money in, we can match it."*

> *"It's difficult and one of the bigger problems with Newcomers it they tend to have larger families. So, finding low-income multi-bedroom apartments, especially rentals, is almost impossible."*

Lack of Awareness of Social Services

Many immigrants and refugees are unaware of the programs and services that are available. A major issue raised by both police and community groups is that service providers are not effectively advertising themselves and making Newcomers aware of their existence and availability. As noted above, language barriers often make it difficult for many Newcomers to access support services. The executive director of Spence Neighbourhood Association commented:

> *"We always make sure that we have somebody at the front desk when we're open so we can help do that connecting but it's always difficult to inform people. Especially more marginalized groups and lower income groups. How do you get that out? It's not as simple as posting something on the Internet. We do a newsletter that goes to every resident in the neighbourhood. We don't go into apartment buildings yet [because] that's a little tricky. But we go to every residence, so that's one of the ways that we try to get information out to every resident in the neighbourhood. When you deal with marginalized groups of people they're often isolated."*

Issues of Safety and Security

The executive director of Spence Neighbourhood Association noted the challenges surrounding safety and security in the community and the Association's role in addressing these issues:

> *"We used to call the heading 'safety', but we switched to 'community connecting' because the approach we take is really about looking at safety issues but also perception of safety and how we can change that perception and make people feel safe in the community they live in. So, a lot of the safety work we do is about connecting neighbours, building networks on blocks so that people feel like they can talk to their neighbours. You know, if someone's out of town, they can watch their house or those kinds of things. So really we're strengthening the community ties that address safety issues rather than looking at street patrols or policing as a*

solution to addressing community concerns. We really look at how we can strengthen our community and connecting the people living in the community to each other and the necessary resources so they can feel safer.""

Fear of Police

Many immigrants and refugees come from countries where the police are a symbol of oppression and fear. As such many Newcomers lack trust in and are fearful of the police. Parents may advise their children not to have contact with, or trust the police[88]. This often leads to hesitancy to contact the police. This is exacerbated by language barriers that prevent Newcomers from learning about the role of the police in Canada. They may not be able to put the images that they see on television in context. An image of the police arresting a young black man, for example, may lead a Sudanese refugee to believe that the police are unjustly arresting young black people – perpetuating their fear and suspicion.

The inspector in charge of Division 51 observed:

> *"There is a fear of the police officers too. I mean they're inherently afraid of the police because of the way they operate [in their country of origin].... When they come here, there is a mistrust of the police and when we initially came here our members were going and attending these immigrant centres in plain-clothes cause they didn't want to have the people fear them. But in my perspective, if they're not being exposed to the uniform [and] if they don't make the connection between the police officer and the uniform you're not really accomplishing anything. So we had [officers] start to wear their uniforms to meetings and to community groups. This was to make the point that the uniform isn't something to be afraid of, it's something to aspire towards for a career or, if you need help not to be afraid to call the police."*

While there was a shared view among the WPS officers who were interviewed that the police have a significant role to play in Newcomer communities, there was also recognition that there were limits to the ability of the police to address many of the challenges encountered by Newcomers. One officer stated that it was a challenge for the police to understand how to deal with more than just the immediate situation, noting:

> *"We are very short-term in their life. If it's an arrest situation, we arrest, we process. Now, of course we have challenges there of perhaps needing translators and things like that. But once we have, in essence, finished with them either by releasing them on some form of conditional release or they have been detained at the remand centre, that's our involvement until the next time."*

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[88] Maclean, 2010

There was a general sense among the officers that the WPS had made good efforts to establish relationships with the Newcomer communities. The UMOJA (Swahili for "Welcome") was specifically mentioned as an important initiative. This is a working group of police and the Newcomer community that is designed to facilitate long-term discussions and relationships. To this end, a major objective of was to educate Newcomers on the role of the police and that the police were available to provide assistance when required and when they were in fear or in danger.

Lack of Legal Knowledge

A large majority of Newcomers arrive in Winnipeg with no understanding of the Canadian justice system. Most have come from vastly different – in some cases repressive – legal systems, and thus, are not aware of the rule of law, the *Charter,* or due process. For example, many Islamic immigrants and refugees come from countries with justice systems rooted in Sharia Law. This lack of understanding of the Canadian judicial system complicates their interactions with the most visible branch of the judicial system, the police. As with other challenges noted above, language barriers exacerbate this lack of legal knowledge.

Power Imbalances in the Home

As previously noted, the presence of language barriers creates a power imbalance within the home. Children, who tend to learn English before their parents, gain disproportionate influence and control in the household. Moreover, in the growing Sudanese community women are the traditional power base; however, in Canada the existence of language and cultural barriers has disempowered most women, making it more difficult for the household to function. This has a number of consequences, including domestic issues.

Newcomer Youth

The executive director of Spence Neighbourhood Association identified meeting the needs of Newcomer youth as a major challenge, more specifically "figuring out a way to effectively engage young people in the community in positive ways and make them feel a sense of belonging is really important to the work we do."

A School Resource Officer who works in the Inner City identified a number of challenges in dealing with Newcomer children. Language barriers often exacerbate their fear of the police. The officer stated, "Many children don't talk because they are embarrassed to speak. This makes it hard for officers to make small talk, which is one of the best ways to break down the barriers." This situation appears to be exacerbated by the education policy of placing Newcomer youth in grades that correspond to their age as opposed to their language ability.

An officer in the ADP section who was responsible for Newcomer groups observed:

> "We pretty much throw the Newcomer kids in the grade of what age they belong. So, if a kid comes from a refugee camp and he's 12, well he's going to grade seven and has to read [and] write in English when he's been living in a camp for ten years. It's amazing what we do to these people and expect them to succeed here and not to have troubles with the law."

The executive director of Spence Neighbourhood Association noted that the education system doesn't work for Newcomer youth:

> "It's really a Eurocentric model. The school system is so inflexible. Like, we've had youth that have tried to change their schedule so they had enough time to walk their brothers and sisters to school and the school said 'no', so they dropped out. They're not willing to engage with at-risk or high-risk youth in a meaningful way. There are a few alternative schools. They're all full and trying to get a kid into them is really difficult. The two major systems, education and Child and Family Services don't work for our kids."

The Views Of Patrol Officers In Division 11

There is a high concentration of Newcomers in the downtown area. This is, in large part, due to the lack of affordable housing in Winnipeg. As a result recent arrivals that have few resources tend to settle in the downtown area where housing is less expensive.

According to the patrol constables who were interviewed, Newcomers present two major challenges for officers: language and cultural barriers. Cultural issues manifest themselves especially in situations involving incidents that are considered a crime in Canada, but are generally accepted in the Newcomers' country of origin. A prime example raised by both officers, is that of domestic violence. In many instances it is challenging for officers to inform suspects that they are under arrest – in many cases neither the victim nor offender can understand why. One officer commented:

> "[They} breach their orders because they can't understand that in their country it's okay for domestic violence to occur; [whereas], here you're getting arrested and you've signed a document saying you can't go back into the home, you do, and now you're getting breached. So, [for example] we'll just say, for all intents and purposes, that the wife is the victim, which it mostly is, and even she can't understand why he can't come back.""

These issues are exacerbated by the presence of language barriers.

In the view of one constable, it was very difficult at times to access an interpreter. That is, if there is no officer on the road that speaks the needed language, then officers may have to wait or put it off until an interpreter is

available, which may not be until the next day. The other resource that may be available to officers is the Language Bank although officers related instances in which they called the bank and no one answered.

Language barriers are also challenging for officers in cases that are time sensitive. If officers are unable to get a translator expeditiously, it can negatively impact their legal responsibility. An example is impaired driving. There is a specific time frame in which officers need to get a breath sample and if they cannot properly inform the suspect of their rights, then the legality of the breathalyser test may come into question.

Addressing the Issues Surrounding the Newcomer Communities

In the view of one officer, it is a matter of finding the right "balance" in working with the Newcomer communities:

> *"The challenges are to find that balance between being able to help our Newcomer community and having the fortitude to say to people in the community, 'This isn't cool, this isn't the way it is.' To also say, 'Your kids are involved in gangs. I didn't stop them because they're Black, I stopped them because I know this kid and he's in a gang...'"*

The WPS has taken a number of initiatives to address the challenges surrounding the delivery policing services to the aboriginal, ethnic, and Newcomer communities. The officer in the unit responsible for the Newcomer groups described her activities:

> *"I try to get out into different communities and do presentations, but I think it would be done so much better by their own community. Community leaders could say 'we're going to have a forum tonight. We're losing our children to gangs.' People don't want to hear the police say that. People expect the police to say that. But, if you have a community member that has no agenda behind him or her stand up and say, 'We're losing our kids here. This is what we have to do. You can't beat them up any more and, guess what? They might be running drugs.'"*

WPS members and community resource persons interviewed for the project identified a number of initiatives that could be taken to strengthen the relationships with the Newcomer communities in the City. These included:

A Shift to Community-focused Proactive Policing

Most interviewees agreed that police need to be more active at the community level. At the moment, contact is only made with police when circumstances are dire. While the police are highly visible, they are generally not interactive in terms of making contact with citizens on a proactive basis. This would be enhanced by foot patrols in specific areas of the City.

Several officers who were interviewed spoke in favour of re-introducing community police officers and re-opening police storefronts as a way to build relationships with the Newcomer communities. This was also viewed as a way to shift toward a more proactive style of police work.

A number of officers stated that re-introducing Community Police Officers would assist in addressing the issues that surround policing the Newcomer communities. One officer commented:

> "When I got on in the North End they had community policemen that took care of many of the issues that came up. We would go to a call and, for example, if there was a neighbor dispute, we would still go and take a quick report and then we'd say, 'Okay I'm going to forward this to your community officer and tomorrow they're going to stop by and have a coffee with you guys and you guys can sit down and discuss him putting the snow on your driveway and work it out.' At least I felt, whether you were paying your taxes or not, somebody was showing up. Socially we all just want to be acknowledged and at least a car would show up, but now we've said, 'If that's happening just go on the computer and do it", which causes a major issue for our Newcomer community. Because if you are moving here as a refugee, you don't have a computer. So, if you are a victim of a crime, first off you don't know how to report it to the police because you can't speak English. So, [that's] another failure or a roadblock that we've set them up for, I think. In addition, our new system of the 911 and 6222 phone numbers, one is for an emergency in progress and the other is a non-emergency line. So, if you are a Newcomer or anyone, for that matter, you'll wait on that line forever and now it also has a numbered prompt. Well, if you don't speak English and you phone that and it says, 'press two if you've just been robbed', you don't know what that means. We've made it impossible for them to see the police."

Support was indicates for a return to community policing. In the words of one officer in the ADP section:

> "I would like to see community policing back. I would like to see people being in charge of a couple of streets [or] a couple of blocks, even if it was like a partnership where you had a two-man unit working out of the services centre and they could walk the beat. We're walking the beat downtown and we're walking the beat in the North End and grandma who's paying our taxes that lives on Henderson Hwy or that lives in South St. Vitale and never calls for the police or is afraid to call the police cause she thinks we're working too hard is getting zero service from the police and it's embarrassing to me. So, I think if you're going to treat a community a certain way and we are expecting the city to act as a better community, then everybody has to be on the same page. Why should we be walking the beat downtown, but people on Henderson Hwy are getting jacked and we don't care cause they have a safe home or their home is safe now? So, I would like to see community policing come back where someone is actually in charge of walking down the street and going into a business. Things that we're doing in the North End, like the beat guys, it should be done service-wide. That's when calls for service go down, because those would be the buffers."

The executive director of Spence Neighbourhood Association offered a number of observations on relationships with the WPS.

"So, they just kind of try and police away when issues arise and they're not really there to address situations where they could be more preventative or work with restorative justice or other approaches that would really benefit youth. They're really just interested in coming and either arresting kids and taking them away and that's their response".

He noted that historically there had not been good relations between the police and the community. Officers were placed in a difficult position as the only came into the community when there was a crisis and to arrest people:

"In last eight years, engagement with the community has been generally non-existent. Most of what was done was token. The Police Chief might have come down to talk to the community about one issue or we might have been able to get a meeting or something like that, but nothing that was really engaging the community in what they do. And then, there was operation Clean Sweep. When they released that it was really, really bad for the neighbourhood because basically they were just like, 'We're coming to the community [and] we're arresting everybody.' It's really been just responding when there's been crisis or issues."

In his view, this has contributed to negative views of the police. He noted that his and other community organizations had made numerous unsuccessful efforts over the years to have the police on the street doing foot patrols and engaging with the community rather than just responding to crises.

However, his view was that that during the Spring of 2013, things began to change, "There was the perception that the newly appointed Chief of Police had brought a new approach,

"They're here. Really they're here. They're visible. The Police Chief came down and did a community meeting, which was great. We've heard this for years, that they care about the community and they want to be in the community, but unless there was an increase in gang activity or something like that, you don't see them. [Now] We get a cop in here every day now popping in on their walk."

Re-Instating the Community Police Officer Program

Speaking in support of a return of Community Police Officers, the executive director of Spence Neighbourhood Association stated,

"We could probably stop 40% of the issues in the neighbourhood quickly if we had regular beat cops engaging with the community, engaging with youth especially, in a positive way. If kids felt safe going up to cops and talking with police and they were seen from a young age in a positive way, I think it would change a lot of the little things. Like, if you knew your community police officer and you were having a problem, I don't know, domestically or something like that maybe you'd be able to approach them and not have it escalate to a point

*where it's a 911 call. I know a lot of our youth who have guns or weapons and they don't
really want them and if they could just turn one in to a community officer and not face
charges or whatever, they'd probably get a lot of weapons of the street. If kids felt that they
could go to them in a time of crisis, then I think that would be really beneficial and I think it
would make the police safer in the long run."*

Creating Neighbourhood Police Stations

Suggestions were made to increase the accessibility of the WPS, including neighbourhood storefronts. The
executive director of Spence Neighbourhood Association observed:

*"If you want to go and make a complaint you have to go all the way down to the Public Safety
Building. It's a daunting thing, so a lot of people aren't going to go there. If there was
somewhere in the community that was accessible it would go a long way. Even partnering
with an agency and having a police presence on occasion would make a huge difference."*

Improving Police-Community Relations/Getting Officers Out of "Reactive" Mode

There was interest among community resource persons in building more positive relationships with the WPS
and, in the words of one: "To make their job easier. We know that when you deal in crisis all the time it's not a
fun job and it's not easy. No one is discrediting the valuable work they do and how important it is to maintain
law and order, but it could be done in a better way."

There was a view that, while suppression of gang activity was important, an equal amount of attention should
be given to intervention and prevention work in a partnership framework. One stated, "When they're arresting
our gang kinds, they're not at all thinking about if there is a way to redirect the kid to community service or if
there is a better way. This makes it difficult to find a solution."

Extending Outreach Activities to a Broader Audience

Due to limited resources, WPS outreach activities currently involve only a small portion of the Newcomer
community. There are a select few individuals who are invited to take part in events, or are fortunate enough to
have the ability to attend. There is a need for the WPS to extend their efforts to involve greater numbers of
residents.   This would include specific initiatives to involve children and youth. Also, efforts to broaden
community participation should recognize that many residents are not part of the "iPhone generation",
requiring alternative strategies for publicizing events and opportunities. This extended outreach could also come
in the form of increased liaison work between the WPS and the various Newcomer communities, something that
a member of the Diversity Unit stated is not currently happening.

There was a general consensus when speaking to both police and representatives of Newcomer communities, that progress is being made (albeit at a slow pace) in developing positive and productive relationships. Both the ISSA and IRCOM stated that they had a very good relationship with the WPS and would like to see it continue to and strengthened. These relationships have been enhanced by WPS members doing outreach work, including community events, holding special events (e.g., Skates and Badges, an ice-skating event involving youth and the police), and engaging with community leaders. The WPS also has a relationship with Altered Minds Inc., a Newcomer entry program, in which a member of the ADP section attends classes and provides a workshop on the role of the police and the legal system.

Developing Capacities and Defining Parameters

The Inspector in charge of Community Relations noted that there were many areas that require attention, including the school resource area, crime prevention, and victim services. These are areas that, in his words, "have really have been left in the doldrums for many, many years."

A key theme that emerged in interviews with supervising officers was that, similar to other police services across North America, the Winnipeg Police Service had traditionally undertaken many initiatives that were good ideas, but that were one-offs. And that WPS did not always give attention to the resources that were being expended. In the words of one inspector,

> *"Initiatives in and of themselves look very good and then we commit to that and then, as they say, the next shining object comes up and we sometimes go after that too. And we've become like many police agencies – spread too thin – and we're trying to fulfill everyone's wishes and desires. Sometimes as a police agency we haven't necessarily taken those strong positions to say, 'No. There's no value to the taxpayer here or there's not enough value to the taxpayer. Here's what we're committing to and that's it.' Sometimes as a large organization we've really, kind of, diffused our energies and, I think if we are able to pull some of that back we would be able to do a few lesser things better. I think we're getting better, but I'm not so sure we're the best we can be yet. That's on a service-wide level."*

Education

A key point made by officers and community resource persons was that the WPS needs to do a better job of educating Newcomers about their role and function. This was viewed as a key component of establishing trust that, in turn, would assist in the development of effective crime prevention and crime response strategies.

Identifying Community "Gatekeepers"

One community resource person interviewed identified the need for the police to identify the 'gatekeepers' within the community. This would facilitate the development of relationships that would empower these

individuals to act as a connector between police and community members. Accomplishing this will require that the WPS understand the culture and social dynamics of Newcomer communities.

Increasing the Accessibility of the Police

Several persons in the Newcomer community indicated that it often took a significant amount of time for community groups to reach police and to secure them for functions and initiatives. Creation of a civilian liaison position that would manage requests for officers and the involvement of the WPS could enhance Newcomer community access to the police.

Recruitment and Training

Both police and community representatives acknowledged that the WPS must do a better job of recruiting officers from diverse communities. To date, the WPS has not effectively targeted specific communities or been sufficiently proactive in attempting to diversify its membership. One suggestion was that the WPS expand its recruiting efforts to other regions of the province with the objective of increasing the number of Aboriginal applicants.

There was also the view that the current model of cultural sensitivity training provided to officers, which is composed of four days of general diversity materials, was inadequate. The result is that officers are deployed on the street with limited or no information about the specific communities with whom they have contact.

As previously noted, there was concern expressed however, that this limited training was not particularly useful for the recruits once they got out onto the street. As one officer in the ADP stated, "When the recruit leaves the Academy, it never comes up again. The diversity piece of things gets lost."

A number of community representatives interviewed for the study suggested that recruit training should include different cultures and traditions that are specific to where the population is coming from. That is, cultural sensitivity training cannot be a catch-all for every culture – there needs to be some degree of specificity and that officers need to be immersed in the culture as opposed to simply learning about it in a classroom. Both WPS members and community groups also emphasized the need for some level of mandatory in-service cultural training. This was viewed as critical in overcoming stereotypes and enhancing interventions and interactions that officers have with community residents.

Patrol Officer Perceptions of Diversity Training

New recruits currently received four days of cultural sensitivity training: two on Aboriginal issues and two for "everyone else." Officers in the ADP viewed this training as inadequate. While having speakers from different

Aboriginal and Newcomer communities was not feasible, one officer who was interviewed felt that academy training could include a rudimentary course on basic customs of each of the major Newcomer groups so as to avoid offending individuals during encounters.

The need for in-service training drew a mixed reaction from the officers. According to one officer, the problem with academy training was that, "When you train in the academy, there is no ability to make practical decisions and apply the information when it is first learned." As such, he believed that in-service training would be more useful as it is directed at officers that have practical experience, know what questions to ask, and have concerns predicated on experience. However, when asked if the in-service training should be mandatory, he felt it should not be. His reasoning for this was that mandatory was unnecessary because only officers in the North End and Downtown have significant interaction with Newcomers and Aboriginals. He felt that if training were voluntary, then most officers in the North End and Downtown would take advantage. Indeed, both officers were in favor of voluntary in-service training. One inspector indicated that this training should be mandatory for officers who were seeking promotion.

Better Coordination Among Agencies and Organizations

The Inspector in Charge of Division 51 stated, "It's not just a matter of providing 100 different organizations with 100 individual programs because everyone works with a silo mentality. There's often little cooperation and this affects the outcomes. What we'd like to see, is having organizations start working together so their goals all line up together. Then, we are truly working together."

Spence Neighbourhood Association: A Community-Based Program

The Spence Neighbourhood Association (SNA) is illustrative of the community-based programs that are operating in the inner city of Winnipeg and could be a potential partner for the WPS. Funded largely by the provincial government, the SNA has been in existence for over a decade and works with both Aboriginal and Newcomer communities. While technically a "neighbourhood renewal corporation", SNA operates as a community development agency. It takes a holistic approach to community development. The focus is the community. There is an elected community board. To be on the board a person must live, work or volunteer in the neighbourhood. The SNA is involved in housing work, community economic development, youth and family work, and environmental open spaces, including community gardens. Attention is also given to other issues in the community, including issues with housing , safety , mental health, gangs, violent crime, drug trade, and sex trafficking.

The SNA focuses much of its efforts on youth and has youth staff that are involved in a variety of initiatives, including a basic afterschool program and gang prevention/gang exit. The executive director noted that the SNA sponsors "community walkabouts" which are "audits" that involve "getting community members out and giving them the ability to identify where's unsafe [and] where's safe. And then, we actually have funds to make small changes, like whether it's lighting or stuff like that. It's had a huge impact."

Building Capacities in the ADP Section

There are numerous and increasing demands on this unit and on the ADP section. Two additional officers were added to the ADP unit in spring 2013. The heavy workload and a lack of resources have made it difficult for the officers and for partnerships with the Aboriginal community to be developed and sustained. Officers in the unit expressed a keen interest in working with the community but have not had the time or the resources to do so. This requires them to be selective in their involvement and to manage their time appropriately. Given that the aboriginal community is such a predominant component of the city and the high rates of contact between aboriginal peoples and the police, it is important that the Aboriginal and Diversity Relations section be sufficiently resourced.

Summary

The Newcomer community in Winnipeg is diverse and growing and presents a number of challenges for the WPS. Lack of long-term support for newly arrived persons, language barriers and challenges in adjusting to life in a new country and city all have a significant impact on Newcomers, the police and other agencies in the city. WPS officers perceive that cutbacks in programs and services have increased the workload of the police. The ADP section does not appear to have sufficient staff to meet demands and to initiate and sustain proactive initiatives. There is considerable potential to develop partnerships with community groups and organizations if sufficient resources are directed toward this most important component of policing in the City of Winnipeg.

Recommendations

RECOMMENDATION: the Aboriginal and Diversity Policing Section should develop a business plan setting out goals, objectives, and performance measures. This plan should include consultation with all of the relevant stakeholder groups. In addition, the section should develop a mechanism for recording its activities and a procedure for ongoing assessment of resource allocation and impact.

RECOMMENDATION: The WPS should consider allowing officers to remain in the Aboriginal and Diversity Policing Section for longer than three years, should the officer wish to continue working in the unit. A mechanism should also be developed to solicit feedback from stakeholder groups in the community with respect to the performance of officers in the unit.

RECOMMENDATION: the WPS should develop a strategic plan for informing members of the existence activities of the Aboriginal and Diversity Policing Section and to provide information to officers on the ongoing activities of the unit.

RECOMMENDATION: The WPS should work with Newcomer communities to build capacity within those communities to educate their residence. This could be facilitated by obtaining federal monies through the Canadian Crime Prevention Centre.

RECOMMENDATION: The Aboriginal and Diversity Policing Section should develop a Business Plan setting out goals, objectives, and performance measures. This plan should include consultation with all of the relevant stakeholder groups. In addition, the section should develop a mechanism for recording its activities and a procedure for ongoing assessment of resource allocation and impact.

RECOMMENDATION: The WPS should develop a multi-language social media strategy for reaching out to Newcomer communities, including youth.

RECOMMENDATION: The Aboriginal and Diversity Relations section should be expanded by another two officers who would focus on Newcomer communities.

RECOMMENDATION: The Aboriginal and Diversity Relations section should develop a social media strategy and capacity that is directed toward Newcomer groups. This would include multi-lingual capacities designed to reach specific segments of the Newcomer communities, including youth.

Chapter V: Downloading And The WPS

A feature of policing in the early 21st century is downloading onto the police by governments; that is, the police being required to fill gaps in service that are the mandated responsibility of other agencies and organizations. For example, when governments cut the number of social workers, mental health workers, funding for shelter beds and for specialized facilities for the mentally ill, there is a direct impact on the demands placed on police resources. As a consequence of this, police services across the country are spending an increasing portion of their time responding to high risk and vulnerable populations, including the mentally ill.   Also, in many cities, the police are confronted with the needs of various Newcomer groups, in the face of absent or limited federal and provincially-funded programs and services.

A key finding of the project team is that the WPS is experiencing downloading which is having a significant impact upon the ability of the police service to meet the demands of the community and to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of its operations. Downloading is also a major contributor to the high workload of officers, patrol car response times that are far beyond international best practice standards, and the inability of WPS officers to engage in proactive policing activities. During the project, downloading was observed by the field researchers accompanying WPS officers, emerged as a key theme in interviews with police personnel, and was a key finding of the statistical analysis.

Vulnerable Groups and Downloading on the WPS

WPS personnel interviewed during the project identified vulnerable and at-risk groups as a major demand driver for the service. The vulnerable groups that were identified as consuming considerable time and resources of the police were missing persons/runaways, persons with mental illness (PwMI), and at-risk youth.

A major demand-driver on the WPS is downloading. This occurs at a number of levels and has resulted in the WPS being given de-facto responsibility for addressing a wide range of issues that are within the purview of other agencies and organizations. This expansion of the mandate of the WPS has been caused, in part, by cutbacks in provincial and municipal programs and services. One inspector commented on the downloading that has occurred:

> *"In reality the main cause for increased costs for policing is the ever-expanding scope of police mandates and responsibilities which diverts police resources from our core responsibilities. In many cases this is the result of other agencies reducing their services and either using legislation, or the fact that we are the agency of last resort, to ensure police are responsible*

for the gaps that have occurred as a result of policy changes, or service reductions in other agencies."

In his view, there has been a slow erosion of services offered by third party agencies involving Child and Family Services, the Winnipeg Regional Health Authority, Social Services for low-income persons, and other components of the criminal justice system, including corrections, probation and Victim Services. He stated, "Over the last 26 years these agencies have implemented so called 'enhancements' or 'efficiencies' generally resulting in increased need for police resources to fill the gap created by these agencies reducing their services."

A patrol constable echoed this view, stating:

> *"We are a catch-all for everything. If you were to call Animal Control Service right now do you know what their message would say? It would say if you are having an emergency, call the police. Even some of the stuff they should be dealing with, they call the WPS instead."*

There are multiple sources of downloading, including:

The Federal Government

The federal government's immigration policy has a direct impact on the numbers of Newcomers that are arriving in Winnipeg as well as their countries of origin. This study has documented the lack of long-term support for Newcomers that makes these groups susceptible to victimization, mental health issues, and, in some instances, involvement in youth gangs and other criminal activity.

In addition, many of the Aboriginal persons who are in Winnipeg and who may have contact with the WPS have "treaty" status with the federal government. Although the federal government does provide some funding for programs and services for Newcomers, this is generally left to the province and to the city to develop the requisite infrastructure and programs for these groups. In the absence of sufficient funding, there is an increased workload placed on WPS members. As well there may be few alternative, community-based resources to which WPS members can refer Newcomers to when they are in need of assistance.

The Provincial Government

That there are cutbacks in programs and services at the provincial level due to the fiscal crises of government has been well documented. This has had a major impact on the workload of the WPS. More specifically, the absence of community-based resources for at-risk and vulnerable groups has placed increased demands and stressors on WPS members. Similar to their counterparts in other major urban centers, WPS members spend an inordinate amount of time responding to incidents involving persons with mental illness. The absence of

community based services for this group results in police officers having tens and hundreds of contacts with the same individual over the course of a year. In addition, WPS members are required to spend a considerable amount of time escorting persons in crisis to hospital and remaining with them until they are officially admitted. This has a number of very significant consequences, including a lack of availability of patrol units and a decrease in the amount of time the WPS members can be involved in proactive policing activities.

It was noted that the provincial government has made efforts in recent years to create more partnerships between provincial Justice agencies and the police. There was a widely-held view among the WPS officers interviewed, however, that these partnerships were very one-sided: in the words of one inspector, "More work for police, more liability for police."

In 2006 the Province created the Criminal Organization and High Risk Unit (COHRU). This unit was to monitor the 100 highest risk individuals on Provincial Probation. The province wanted police involvement and wanted a 24-7 individual that they could contact when one of these high risk clients was at risk of offending. The WPS did not have sufficient resources to accommodate this request. The perception of the officers involved in this was that probation services was attempting to avoid its liability to protect victims and the community.

The issue has surfaced again most recently with probation services exploring the potential use of electronic monitors on individuals who are on probation for Domestic Violence-related occurrences. One inspector noted the challenges associated with this and the police resources that would be required,

> *"Probation had suggested that the police should have the Duty Office notify the victims. When I heard about this I immediately told the inspector of Division 41 this was just the thin edge to the wedge. There is no such thing as a simple notification. Phoning victims and saying 'Hey the guy who terrorized you is within two hundred metres of your house, just letting you know', and then hanging up. This is not realistic. That victim wants someone to give them directions and to stay on the line with them until help arrives and then put them in a safe place. Each of these victims will likely disclose additional information which then becomes part of the investigation. Then once probation has access to the Duty Office they will be phoning to discuss new information which in reality is code for "How do I off load responsibility" and it becomes a never ending stream of provincial justice officials and workers trying to off load their liability. The real agenda is that Provincial Justice sees that they cannot control high risk victims which is their mandate and high risk victims tend to put themselves in extremely high risk situations so how can we off load this on the police?"*

Winnipeg Municipal Government

The City of Winnipeg also downloads onto the WPS. For example, unlike most major urban cities in Canada, the City of Winnipeg has no special events budget, which means that whenever there is a public event such as a

parade, provisions must be made to provide policing services within the existing WPS budget. Another example is the requirement that the WPS provides one patrol unit from each division for every Winnipeg Jets home game. This patrol unit is not backfilled, which means that on those dates when the hockey team is playing at home, patrol resources are diminished throughout the city. This includes high demand areas such as the downtown core and North Winnipeg. The implications and impact of this on the ability of the WPS to respond to calls for service and to engage in proactive policing activities is significant.

There is a widespread perception in the WPS that social services agencies, including Child and Family Services and mental health services, have shortcomings in service delivery that result in downloading onto the WPS, in particular members of general patrol. This leads to a drain on resources and manpower. According to members of Division 11, a general patrol division in District 1, the number of mental health cases is growing and becoming an increasing issue for the police. There is growing frustration of officers with the mental health system and metal health service providers and there is a widely-held view that the policies and practices of the mental health system have an adverse effect on the WPS. Similar complaints were also made with respect to the Ministry of Children and Family services.

Missing Persons and Runaways

The issue of missing persons is high profile in Manitoba due to the number of missing and murdered women in the province. There have been some recent changes in specific police department policies on responding to calls for missing persons relating to marginalized populations. The general response for missing adults is a 24-hour waiting period. This creates unique challenges for the WPS.

When asked during an interview about missing persons one patrol officer simply stated, "Oh my goodness" and hung his head in despair. When the issue of missing persons was raised with a patrol constable in District 3 (North End), the response to the interviewer was "You're gonna need another pen. Missing persons consume so much of our time. It always seems to be the chronics." In years past, missing persons calls were only for legitimately serious cases (e.g., a missing child); however, in the view of patrol officers, in recent years many missing persons calls are extremely minor in which the person is not really missing at all[89].

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[89] Examples they gave were of a young person having missed curfew by a few hours or a mentally challenged adult who was late returning home or to his/her care facility.

Runaway and Missing Aboriginal Youth

In 2003 The Canadian Incidence Study of reported Child Abuse and Neglect[90] found that Aboriginal children represent 40% of children in the care of government ministries across Canada. There is some evidence to suggest that in some instances where the WPS is asked to respond to calls of missing Aboriginal youth, for example, they have either run away from foster homes to stay with friends or to locate their biological parents and are, by definition, not "missing." Youth often do not want to remain in a foster home.

Responding to calls of missing youth is very resource-intensive for the WPS and occurs on a reactive basis. The WPS are not generally involved in developing intervention plans for at-risk youth, for example, and are only tasked with locating the missing individual. Ideally, the WPS would be involved in a multi-agency initiative to address the issue of missing and runaway Aboriginal youth. There are a number of best practice examples that could provide the basis for a strategic plan.

Child and Family Services

Both police members and community resource persons expressed serious concerns about Child and Family Services. The executive director of Spence Neighbourhood Association quite bluntly stated that the activities of CFS are ineffective:

> *"They don't respond to crisis. They don't deal with crisis well. They function from a place of fear. They're just scared of making a mistake, so all their policies are driven around protecting themselves and not about what kids need or what families need. They're focused more on protecting themselves than actually protecting the kids that need to be protected. In our program we see a hundred kids a day at our drop-ins and we make at least three or four calls a week to CFS. Maybe one of these calls results in an answer or a response. And even then it's nothing that really benefits the kids. It puts us as a service provider in a really tough situation because we're dealing with a lot of really, kind of, complex issues with youth and when you start getting into abuse or different things like that it gets really tough and we don't get any support. The best CFS will do is take a kid away from a family and then that's it. We don't hear any more about it. They don't connect with the community. They don't work with the community. They're not interested in community solutions. The model doesn't work."*

A reduction in resources has resulted in a closing of secure facilities for "high risk" clients. A number of years ago, there were several locked facilities within the City of Winnipeg (Knowles Centre, Marymount, and Stewart School), places where the staff were capable of restraining and dealing with violent, high risk, and very vulnerable children who were chronic runaways. Now, as one WPS officer noted:

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[90] Canadian Incidence Study (CIS), 2003

> *"It is not uncommon to have clients who have been reported missing to police over 100 times within a calendar year. This does not include the 100 or so clients that run away 30 to 40 times a year. Child and Family Services has resorted to housing children in hotels and now there are no facilities within the City that are capable of housing what are now referred to as "high risk" clients. The main change over the last 26 years is staff that are not capable of restraining, controlling, or dealing with unruly, or violent individuals who are not 'Missing', but are chronic runaways."*

General patrol officers and CSU officers indicated that group homes for youth were a major source of missing persons and a significant demand driver for the WPS. A GP officer in District 3 indicated that "group homes are the worst" in terms of being the source of runaways. It appeared to the patrol constables who were interviewed that the CFS staff has been instructed to make no attempt to stop clients from leaving or damaging property. Rather, that facility staff has been directed to call the police. Legislation requires that police officers provide any and all assistance necessary to CFS.

Group home workers have a "hands-off" policy, which essentially means that if an individual decides to leave the group home, the workers permit it to happen and then call the WPS. Furthermore, as soon as an individual is deemed "high-risk" by staff, police must dedicate a car to locating the individual. According to one officer, in certain cases a "high priority" or "high risk" designation is given to fairly minor cases.

The vast majority of youth voluntarily return to the facility. However, police unit must be dispatched in every instance in which a youth runs away from a facility. The police are required to investigate and enter clients as "missing" on CPIC. As one patrol constable stated,

> *"These clients tend to actively evade police until they are hungry, or feel the need to return to their stable environment, or they want to sleep in a clean bed. Child and Family Services have now raised the specter of liability or "scare factor" to compel the police to devote more resources. It is more the norm than the exception to get a report that the child is "high risk of exploitation", and operates at a diminished capacity (usually around a seven to 10 year old level). In other words is likely to make very bad decisions."*

Once a youth walks out of the group home and is designated as high-risk by group home staff a WPS car is dedicated to finding him or her. In some instances police have 10-12 addresses that they must check and in some cases there are more. Officers stated that once dispatched, finding the missing persons is extremely difficult because they are not given a good description by group home staff and have few leads to go on. Essentially, a car is dedicated to finding the missing person until they are found or returned to the group home; however, in some cases group home staff neglects to inform the police that the individual has returned.

According to one officer, once members search every possible location, they "time-hold" the call and then try again later – the call remains in the queue. While searching for a missing person, the assigned unit is prevented from responding to any other calls[91]. In the view of the patrol officers interviewed, this was a huge drain on resources and police personnel and takes time away from engaging in opportunities for proactive policing and performing other duties. While searching for the missing person, the assigned unit can pre-empt the search to respond to a high priority call if necessary, but the missing person call remains in the queue. In most cases, the officers stated that they remain on the call until it is resolved or until all known addresses are checked. If the individual is not found after all the addresses are checked, the call is held and another car takes over the search at a later time.

One GP officer characterized the situation surrounding missing persons/runaways as "a lose-lose situation for us." That is, if the WPS do not respond, they will come under criticism should any mishap befall the missing person, but if they do respond then they are, in many cases, on a wild-goose chase.

Developing a New Approach for Responding to Missing Persons/Runaways

These findings suggest that there is a need for the provincial government to create facilities in order to address the issue of chronic runaways. And, for Child and Family Services to increase the resources available to search for and apprehend children who are runaways. As well, Child and Family Services should develop the capacity to determine whether current resources are being effectively utilized and how any additional resources would be deployed. Overall, there was the perception that CFS should explore best practices that could be adopted to reduce the need for police intervention. This might include expanding the scope of activities for cadets to include missing and runaway youth and/or creating a civilian unit with that mandate.

One GP member suggested creation of a specific entity focusing on chronics and "high-risk" runaways. He also suggested equipping group home residences with some form of location device, either a bracelet or a GPS-equipped cell phone.

Persons with Mental Illness (PwMI)

WPS officers interviewed for the project indicated that there has been a significant increase in encounters with PwMI due in large measure to the closing of facilities such as the Brandon Mental Health Centre and the

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[91] One officer stated that they can remove themselves from the search, but the call "doesn't go away." Officers must return to it eventually, so in most cases they continue the search until it's resolution.

absence of community-based programs and services. [92]. Responding to incidents involved PwMI is time-consuming and resource-intensive and contributes to the inability of WPS officers to engage in proactive policing activities.   In the view of the WPS officers who were interviewed for the project, the majority of PwMI whom they encounter have stopped taking their medication. Critically, a large percentage of encounters with PwMI occur in the evening hours, when mental health services are not available.

A GP constable in Division 13, District 3 (the North End) estimated that 30% of the calls he responded to involved PwMI. The constable stated that the PwMI that the officers come into contact with most often are schizophrenics and bi-polar disordered that have gone off their medication.

A preliminary analysis of the CAD files indicates that there have been approximately 1900 mental health calls during the period 2007-2012. However, this figure only includes "arrests" and it can be assumed that the number of interactions between patrol officers and PwMI is much greater. During this time period, the median time for "completion" of the call, including transport to and waiting at the hospital for the person to be admitted, was 3.5 hours. This calculates out to nearly $100,000 per year in "sitting" costs, calculated on two officers x $40 per hour. One constable related an instance in which the wait time to admit a person with PwMI was three days.

Response Options for PwMI

The time that officers spend on a case involving a PwMI depends to a degree on the process that occurs once a PwMI is in custody. PMWI encounters are either voluntary or involuntary. If the detention is voluntary (i.e., the person wants to be taken to the hospital) the officers are "basically a chaperone." They escort the individual to the hospital, wait with them in triage and if officers do not have to fill out a "Form 3", then the individual can wait for assistance on their own; although, officers to try to get a family member to wait with them if possible.

There are two main alternatives for police when responding to PwMI – hospital and the Mobile Crisis Unit. The Mobile Crisis Unit is run by the Winnipeg Regional Health Authority and is similar to Car 87 in Vancouver; however, there is no police involvement. When responding to a call involving a PwMI, the police have two options, the hospital or the Mobile Crisis Unit, a 24-hour/day service. Mobile crisis perform assessments of PwMI and individuals in mental distress – usually over the phone. They do not go to residences and will not go an incident without the WPS if there are safety concerns. According to the GP officer, Mobile Crisis is extremely helpful and is able to resolve upwards of 80% of mental health crisis situations. A major shortcoming of the

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[92] This is a product of De-institutionalization similar to what occurred in the Lower Mainland of BC. In fact one officer stated that the increased in PwMI on the street coincided with the closure of Brandon Mental Health Centre.

Mobile Crisis Unit is that they are limited in staff and cannot deal with cases in which the individual is overtly dangerous or violent. As one officer stated, "Other than that, you're, kind of, on your own"[93].

If the individual is involuntarily detained under the Mental Health Act the officers must they must escort the individual to the hospital and wait with that person until they are admitted. According to the officer, "Wait times are atrocious." This is partly due to the lack of security at Winnipeg hospitals. Only one hospital in Winnipeg has security guards (Health Sciences Centre), so police are almost always required to remain with PwMI until they are admitted. According to both officers the wait time can range from two hours – three days. –WPS officers cited instances in which they took a PwMI into custody, transported the person to the hospital, were relieved from duty, and retuned to monitor the same the next day. Hospital wait times are due in large measure to the fairly complex and lengthy admission process.   WPS officers perceive that hospital staff avoids admitting patients because this means they are taking full responsibility, something they do not prefer to do. As one officer stated, "They only ever say, 'we're probably going to admit them', so we have to maintain responsibility." A CSU member referred to the process as a "turnstile system": there are few to no long-term care facilities for PwMI. This results in a cycle of the person being prescribed medication, failing to take the medication, and coming into contact with police.

GP members agreed that there were currently insufficient police resources to effectively respond to PwMI. It was suggested that there be more Mobile Crisis workers and the introduction of call screening to reduce the dispatch of patrol units to situations that did not require a police presence. This was viewed as a major drain on the officers' time and on police resources. Officers indicated they would like to see more screening of PwMI calls so that appropriate agencies other than the police would respond.

Several Canadian police services have developed innovative approaches to responding to PwMI. These include creating special patrol units, staffed by a police member and a mental health worker.

Mental Health Services

Over the past two decades, the Province has moved to a Community based Mental Health model. This essentially means clients are rarely institutionalized. In contrast to the era in which mental health patients were confined in mental health facilities, the community-based model relies on clients to assume responsibility for following their regimen of medication and accessing programs and services. However, there are serious issues

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[93] According to on PC, police are only able to take PwMI into hospital for a medical assessment. They are not permitted to take someone in for a psychological assessment. That decision must be made by a doctor, which only increases police wait times.

when patients do not take their medication. In some instances this results in critical incidents with the police or situations in which it is a policing responsibility to locate the client, make an assessment, and transport them to the appropriate facility.

When the client is transported to a facility, Section 15 of the Mental Health Act requires the officers to remain with the client until they are admitted. This can often take hours and means that the officers are not available for patrol.

There are also instances in which clients walk away from secure facilities while on temporary leaves without supervision and are reported "missing" and are deemed high risk to be exploited or be violent. The WRHA relies on the police to locate and apprehend these individuals. When these individuals are located they may have to be re-admitted via a hospital emergency which requires re-assessment for a medical issues, then an examination by a mental health professional, who are not available 24-7.

In June 2013, the City of Winnipeg opened a 24 hour Mental Health Intake Centre. It is hoped that this will reduce the time that GP officers spend with PwMI issues. However, this facility will only receive voluntary patients, not the patients apprehended under the MHA, who must still be taken through emergency. It is anticipated that the 24-7 clinic will reduce the police workload by 30%, but will not address the inordinate amount of time that police officers spend with those patients who are apprehended under the MHA, nor does it address the issue of the need for additional resources to prevent clients from running away.

Changing the Dynamic: Strategies For Reducing Downloading

There was the view among the officers who were interviewed that the WPS needed to be more proactive and strategic in addressing the factors that contribute to downloading onto the service. In the words of one officer, "We need to suggest solutions, or modify the equation so the liability is at least shared or the resources needed are supplied by the third party." Officers also suggested that from the perspective of strategy and messaging the Service needs to look at what works for other agencies: "We need to start messaging with this in mind. We need to use accurate data, which will encourage these agencies to meet their obligations and enter into agreements to improve their response or contribute funding for the police resources."

Specific suggestions included:

Focusing on CFS

The Child and Family Services Act section 7(1) states every agency shall:

(a) work with other human service systems to resolve problems in the social and community environment likely to place children and families at risk;

(b) protect children

Several of the officers who were interviewed felt that attention should be given to the extent to which CFS was meeting their mandate and developing the necessary infrastructure to respond effectively to high-risk situations involving youth and families. This includes initiatives that CFS could take to prevent children from becoming "high risk"; creating high security facilities in Winnipeg to house chronic runaways and staffing the facilities capable of controlling high risk Individuals; ensuring there is sufficient secure bed space to house the number of high risk clients; and, putting into place systems to monitor the number of, and response to, run-away children.

The Winnipeg Regional Health Authority (WRHA)

With respect to the WRHA, the issues to be addressed include: the initiatives taken to prevent high-risk mental health patients from walking away from facilities; considering the issue as to why the regional hospitals do not have locked facilities like HSC and Selkirk; and putting into place monitoring systems to determine whether the escape record of mental health patients is improving.

The Victims of Crime

Issues to be addressed with respect to crime victims include: the initiatives taken by Victim Services to ensure that crime victims have proper safety plans; whether there are resources in place to assist victims of crime and whether there is the capacity to relocate at-risk victims to shelters when required. There are also concerns surrounding the potential of electronic monitoring of probationers, including:

- whether the electronic monitoring station will be in Manitoba or outsourced to a U.S.-based company
- whether the capacity will be developed to monitor the effectiveness of electronic monitoring in reducing re-offending and breaches of probation and
- the workload implications if WPS monitoring is implemented.

Tracking Downloading

To more effectively address the issue of downloading, one suggestion was that WPS and the WPA should collaborate in the development of systems to document and to analyze the activities of patrol officers. As one officer stated, "The WPS and the WPA need data to demonstrate that third-party issues are causing police resources to be diverted toward issues that should be addressed preventatively by the relevant agency and not left to police as the agency of last resort." To this end, it is important that the WPS develop the capacity to "tell

its story" – to, proactively, publicize the challenges that it faces in responding to the demands and needs of vulnerable and at-risk populations in the city.

More specifically, it was noted that data are required on the number of missing person calls that the WPS responds to annually, broken down into a number of categories including group homes, primary residence, and others; the number of multiple calls for the same missing child or youth; the time spent by police officers searching for these missing children; and the number of children and youth who return on their own versus being found by the police.

There is also a need for the Winnipeg Police Service to systematically record the number of MHA calls taken annually; the number of MHA regarding clients that walk away due to a lack of supervision; the number of MHA Form calls; the total police time spent on MHA calls annually; and on the availability of the MSP.

There was general agreement that the WPS and WPA should be available as a partner with other agencies to address these issues. However, it also should be recognized that participation in such partnerships, to the extent that activities extend beyond the core responsibilities of the police, might compromise police service delivery.

The police are only one of the myriad agencies and organizations that have responsibilities to these groups. Going forward it will be important that discussions be held to create collaborative frameworks that will ensure the effective and efficient use of police and agency resources. In the absence of functional, collaborative frameworks, and a clear delineation of the roles and responsibilities of the Winnipeg Police Services and other agencies and organizations, it is likely that the downloading onto the police will continue with a consequent impact on the delivery of police services in the city.

Recommendations

> *RECOMMENDATION: That the WPS consider expanding the cadet program to include a focus on Missing Persons or create a civilian unit with the specific mandate to locate missing persons.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: The WPS should document the nature and extent of contact with PwMI and consider adopting best practice models of practice that are used other jurisdictions*

Chapter VI: Civilianization Within The WPS

Civilianization can be defined as the practice of assigning to non-sworn (civilian) employees police department work that does not require the authority, special training, or credibility of a police officer[94]. Civilianization focuses on positions within a police service rather than on individual personnel who occupy positions.

This chapter presents the findings and recommendations from a study of the potential for civilianizing positions in the WPS. The objective of the study was to identify whether there were positions in the WPS presently held by sworn police officers that could be filled by trained civilians and, conversely, whether there were positions currently filled by civilians that would more appropriately be filled by sworn members. The project is designed as a study of positions, not personnel. Another objective of the study was to generate recommendations for the WPS with respect to the development and use of a protocol for determining whether positions are best held by sworn officers or civilians.

The research activities for the study included 1) a review of the literature on civilianization in policing in North America; 2) retrieval of HR position descriptions in the WPS; and 3) the development and application of a decision making tree to positions. In several instances, interviews were conducted with WPS officers to clarify the roles and responsibilities associated with specific positions in the organization.

Civilianization in North American Police Services

Civilianization has historically been a contentious issue in policing and raises fundamental questions about the nature of policing and police work, the activities that are most appropriately carried out by sworn police officers, and the overall responsibilities of a police service. There has been resistance to civilianization from senior police management as well as from police unions and associations. Concern has been expressed by some police services that civilianization will threaten the job security and promotion opportunities of sworn members and that civilianization is a precursor to privatization of policing[95]. This resistance is grounded, in part, by the absence of a research-informed dialogue and the experience in many jurisdictions in which civilianization has been imposed on the police service without consultation with the affected stakeholders, most notably police associations[96].

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[94] Griffiths, Palmer, Weeks, and Polydore, 2006
[95] Griffiths et al., 2006
[96] Griffiths et al., 2006

Civilians are filling a wide variety of positions in North American police services that were traditionally occupied by sworn police officers. Among the more common sections in police departments that have been partially or fully civilianized are IT, Finance, Human Resources, Evidence, Forensic Identification, Research and Planning, Fleet and Facilities Management, Crime Analysis, and Media Relations. There are police services with sworn members in charge of mixed sworn/civilian units and in which sworn members report to civilian managers.

In Canada, the ratio of sworn members to civilian employees in police services (2.5 officers per civilian member) has remained fairly constant in recent years, although there has been a significant increase in civilianization over the past several decades.[97] Civilianization has become a hallmark of best practice police services, although most police services do not have a formal civilianization policy. Neither is there generally a research protocol for identifying positions in the police service that could be civilianized, how to measure the impact of civilianization, and what metrics could be used to determine whether civilianizing positions results in cost-savings and increased effectiveness and efficiency in the delivery of police services.

Civilianization as a Best Practice

Civilianization is a key feature of best practices police departments and the role of specially trained civilians has increased significantly with the professionalization and specialization of police services. As Forst[98] notes, "Police departments have become increasingly reliant on civilians to perform critical tasks as the needs of these departments have become increasingly diverse and specialized." Civilianization has been identified as one of the "boundary changes" that is occurring in the criminal justice system[99]. Positions held by civilians that were traditionally filled by sworn officer include:

- media relations, crime scene investigation, AFIS
- fleet facilities, human resources, financial services, records management
- latent fingerprint technicians
- media relations unit
- firearms officers
- forensic video analysts and forensic evidence technicians
- traffic investigators
- burglary investigation (investigated until identification of suspect and then turned over to sworn members)

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[97] Burczycka, 2011
[98] Forst, 2000:55
[99] Samuels, Jefferis, and McDonald, 2000

In many police services, there are "mixed" units composed of sworn and civilian members, including:

- crime scene and criminal history unit
- forensic analysis
- human resources
- planning, audit and accreditation

There are civilians in executive and senior management positions in North American police services, including:

- Finance, infrastructure and supply services
- Administrative Services
- Fleet and facilities
- Finance, Information Systems, Public Affairs, Human Resources
- Forensic Crime Lab

There are police services with sworn members in charge of mixed sworn/civilian units

- IT, HR, Research and Development

There are police services in which sworn members report to civilian managers. Significantly, most police services in North America do not have a formal policy on civilianization.

The Drivers of Civilianization

Civilianization has generally occurred as part of the movement toward professionalism and has been a key component of community policing. It is widely acknowledged that having civilians in key positions in a police organization enhances the general organizational environment, brings specialized expertise, and, as well, produces numerous benefits for sworn police officers. As Forst[100] notes, "[I]t has become increasingly clear that civilians tend to perform certain specialized roles more effectively than sworn officers, who are selected and trained as generalists and then rotated from one assignment to the next accordingly."

In recent years, the issue of civilianization in police services has assumed heightened importance in discussions of the economics and sustainability of policing. Civilianization is presented as a way to reduce policing costs while at the same time increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of police service delivery. It is anticipated that, through civilianization, there will be an increase in the number of front-line officers.

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[100] Forst, 2000:24-25

In a comprehensive review of civilianization in policing conducted over two decades ago, Parrett[101] identified a number of change agents driving civilianization in policing. These include:

- the general pressures to control expenditures on public services.

- an emphasis on the requirement for effective and efficient management of resources.

- pressure on police organizations to be sensitive to and responsive to community needs.

- innovations in police technology.

- increased functional specialization within the police organization.

- development of an ethos directed towards examining alternative service delivery systems.

Civilianization can be viewed as both a managerial practice and as a strategy to remove barriers between police and the communities they serve.

Civilianization Initiatives in North American Police Services

"I'm pretty much of the philosophy if it doesn't require a badge and a gun, with rare exceptions we should be looking for opportunities to have civilians do that...Using civilians for non-dangerous positions frees up police officers to do what they do best…to put them in the best position where they can partner with the citizens in an effort to meet our long-term goal, which is the continuation of the prevention of crime." - Chief Robert White of the Denver Police Department commented on the trend toward hiring civilians for positions traditionally held by sworn police officers[102].

There have been a number of studies conducted on the potential to civilianize positions currently staffed by sworn members. These studies vary considerably in the methods used, whether the study was conducted "in house" or by external parties, and the specific criteria that were used to determine whether a position should be "sworn" or "civilian."   The questions asked of positions generally revolve around whether law enforcement powers are required to perform the job description; whether the skills, training, or experience of a sworn member is required to perform the job duties; and, as well, questions about any statutory requirements that the position be held by a sworn member.

Table 2 presents studies of civilianization conducted in selected North American police services, number of positions identified as amenable to civilianization, and the anticipated cost savings.

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[101] Parrett, 1992:X
[102] Burke, 2012:2

Table 2: Civilianization Studies and Cost Savings

Police Service	Position ID'd as Civilian	Projected Cost Savings
Vancouver, B.C.[103]	11 positions, including Director of Policy and Planning; Head of Quality Assurance; and a number of crime analyst positions	@$570,000.00
RCMP[104]	up to 350 positions	est. $10 million
Toronto, Ont.[105]	as many as 227 positions; specific positions redacted in report	up to $3.7 million
State of Florida Enforcement Agencies[106]	83 positions, including background investigations; evidence custodian; fleet and property management; regulatory investigations	not indicated
San Jose[107]	88 positions in Administration, Field Operations, Investigations, Technical Services; and Office of the Chief	$5.1 million
Los Angeles[108]	656 positions; including Public Information Office positions; Office of the Chief Employee Relations Group; OIC Use of Force Review Division; Commanding Office, Jail	$16 million annually
Maryland State Police[109]	79 positions; administrative and support	$1.3 million savings and $4.6 million to hire new civilians

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[103] Griffiths et al., 2006
[104] CBC News, 2012
[105] Ernst & Young, 2011
[106] Hildreth, 2011
[107] Officer of the City Auditor, San Jose, 2010
[108] Arroyo Associates, Inc., 2009
[109] Office of Legislative Audits, 2004

The Potential Benefits of Civilianization

Civilianization within police organizations has been variously viewed as supporting the philosophy of community policing, realizing cost savings, improving the delivery of services and as a way to enhance organizational efficiency and effectiveness[110]. It is also viewed as a way to increase diversity in police services[111]. The hiring of civilians in key administrative and technical positions in the Portland Police Bureau was found to have produced positive results, including:

> *"Civilianization brings more stability to the position and a greater knowledge of the specialty. The technology in these specialty areas changes rapidly … it is hard to keep up with those changes unless one is dedicated to the specialty field … this is not to say that the sworn members in those positions have not performed satisfactorily in the past. However, their expertise is in policing, not in research, data processing, communications, personnel, finance, or other administrative and technical positions"[112].*

Civilianization is, however, much more than simply an economic measure. Radical re-examination of the role of police officers and civilians can lead to increased efficiency and effectiveness quite independent of any direct salary savings. Appropriate civilianization can have economic, organizational, and operational benefits[113].

- *Increasing "Blue on the Street"*: Civilianizing positions in the police services may free up sworn officers for more important duties on the street.

- *Broadening the Talent Pool*: Sworn members have an opportunity to work closely with specially trained civilians and, in so doing, improve their own skill sets. This "hybrid" model of police practice is increasingly being adopted in North American police services. Civilianization increases the number of potential applicants for positions in the police department and provides an opportunity to access specialized skills and expertise.

- *Increasing Opportunities for Civilian Members*: An expansion in the number of civilian positions in a police department will provide more opportunity for civilian staff to be promoted to new positions or to transfer laterally to other civilian positions in the department. This will contribute to retaining civilian employees and ensuring that their expertise and skill sets will continue to be available to the department. In addition, there would be more opportunities for lateral transfers for civilian members.

- *Increasing Diversity in the Police Department*: Civilianization is also a mechanism whereby women and minority groups can be integrated into the organization and to further engage the community in policing. In turn, some of these civilians may apply to become sworn officers, thus enhancing the agency's ability to reflect the community it serves.

- *Increasing Productivity*: Hiring civilian employees with educational backgrounds, experience and expertise in functions currently being performed by sworn personnel, who do not typically have the same level of expertise in these areas, would improve productivity.

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[110] Griffiths, et al., 2006
[111] Institute for Law and Justice, 1999:19
[112] Institute for Law and Justice, 1999:19
[113] Addison, 1988:2

- *Increasing Continuity and Consistency*: Many sworn police officers lack specialist training and credentials and are often transferred between sections every few years. To this end, civilianization is viewed as a strategy to improve police effectiveness, productivity, efficiency, and continuity of knowledge. With the increasing specialization of certain police functions, it is likely that a highly-trained civilian will have more appropriate skills, knowledge, and experience for certain positions in the department.

The Challenges to Civilianization

Despite the myriad potential benefits of civilianization, there are a number of challenges, particularly when considering this strategy as a way to reduce policing costs and to increase the sustainability of policing. A key challenge is the absence of findings from research studies that would identify the optimal conditions wherein civilianization might achieve its intended objectives. It is simply not known how cost savings are to be achieved; how to ensure that civilianizing positions results in more sworn officers on the street; and, how to recruit and retain civilians, many of whom may have high levels of expertise.

Police observers have identified a number of challenges that need to be addressed and monitored in relation to civilianization, including: pay issues, the relationship between the sworn and non-sworn personnel, personnel turnover, and opposition from bargaining units and training. A review of the published literature and the experiences of police departments in North American indicate that there are a number of arguments that have been offered against increasing the civilian component of police departments beyond the traditional role of volunteers and clerical support. These include, but certainly are not limited to, the following:

Resistance From Senior Police Management

In order for civilianization to be successful, there must be a commitment from the rank and file, senior management and the police board. In addition, the lines of responsibility and reporting between sworn and civilian members must be clear to everyone within the organization. A concern frequently expressed among senior police executives is that civilianization will result in the loss of sworn positions.   Among the general principles of civilianization is that an increase in civilianization should not, in itself, affect the determination of the authorized sworn strength of a police department.

As Frazier[114] notes:

> *"[T]he success of any initiative to increase the numbers and role of civilians in a police department is predicated upon an organizational philosophy which will not only accept and support the decision but, more importantly, a culture willing to relinquish managerial oversight of these positions to a non-sworn supervisory chain of command. It is generally the*

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[114] Frazier, 2003:12

latter, transition to civilian management, to which many agencies are unwilling, or unable, to commit."

Opposition from Police Unions and Associations

There is a general concern that any efforts to increase the numbers of civilians in a police department will meet with resistance from police unions and associations. This, however, has not generally been the experience of police departments in North America or in the UK. With assurances that the staffing levels of sworn members are not directly tied to the number of civilian positions in a department, police unions and associations are likely to view the addition of specially-trained civilians as contributing to the overall quality of the police workplace and as a benefit to sworn members who have an opportunity to work with these civilians. However, there is also concern that civilian employee positions are much more susceptible to budget cuts and this could undermine the objectives of civilianization.

The Need for Police Officer Expertise and Experience

Critics of civilianization argue that those with police experience and training best perform the majority of inside positions within a police organization[115]. It is further argued that civilians lack sufficient training and expertise. However, it is often pointed out that this is not the case in other professions. As one police administrator stated, "You don't have to be a pilot to be an air-traffic controller"[116]. Another counter to the argument is that the extensive training undertaken by police officers equips them to work effectively on the frontline, not in such positions as "finance, general administration or human resource development or management"[117].

The success of specially-trained civilians in police forces across North America and in the UK suggests that concerns that civilians are unable to fully comprehend the culture of policing and meet the unique demands that are made on police departments are unfounded. That said, it is important to carefully consider the professional and personal attributes of potential civilian employees to ensure that they have the requisite skills sets to work in a highly demanding organizational and community environment.

Civilianization as a Threat to Officer Job Security and Promotion Opportunities

Some individuals and professional associations claim that civilianization is a threat to police job security. However, the data do not support the belief that civilianization leads to an erosion in police officer job security or a reduction in ranks[118]. Similarly, concerns about civilians negatively impacting the potential for career development have proven to be unfounded. Sworn officers are unlikely to have the requisite expertise to fill

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[115] Crank, 1989
[116] Snow, 1989:60
[117] Pricewaterhousecoopers, 2001:45
[118] Crank, 1989; Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, 2004

many of the positions that are occupied by specially trained civilians. And, in many sections in police departments, there are mixed teams of sworn members and civilians, preserving opportunities for police officers to move laterally or vertically in the organization.

Civilianization as a Precursor to Privatization of Policing

 Critics of civilianization have warned that it could " begin to take on the features of a Trojan horse by being, in effect, the first stage of a process in which the ultimate destination is privatisation"[119].

Civilianization and Collective Bargaining Agreements

While an assessment of whether any one position in a police department should be identified as a sworn or civilian position can be based on established protocols, there may be factors specific to each individual police department, e.g. collective agreements that prohibit certain positions from being civilianized.

Civilianization and Statutory Requirements

There are certain positions in a police department that require that the incumbent have the powers of a sworn police officer.

The Need to Have Sufficient Numbers of Sworn Officers to Respond to Large-Scale Events

An additional concern that has been raised regarding civilianization is that the department retain sufficient number of officers to respond to large-scale events. While all police organizations must ensure that there are sufficient numbers of officers available to be deployed, there is no evidence from the police literature that civilianization has negatively affected the ability to deploy sworn officers. As the majority of personnel in the police department will always be sworn officers, deployment rather than civilianization would seem to be the primary issue.

The Duty of the Police Service to Accommodate Officers

Discussions of civilianization often include the issue of "accommodation": the requirement of a police department to provide positions for sworn police officers who, for whatever reason (e.g. medical) must be assigned to light duties." There is the often-expressed concern that, as a result of civilianization, positions will no longer be available to accommodate light-duty officers.

Civilianization, however, is an assessment and classification of a position, not the staffing of it. In other words, while a position can be identified as one best filled by a civilian, a sworn officer on light duties can still fill the position on a temporary basis. All police agencies face the issue of accommodation, and this fact of

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[119] Loveday, 1989:94

organizational life has not prevented many departments from implementing a proactive civilianization policy. Need for accommodation includes the requirement that the accommodation position be one of substance and not of the "make work" variety. There is the potential that accommodated persons could be placed in a developmental position.

The Need for Developmental Positions for Sworn Officers

Developmental positions are a key component of career planning and of leadership succession in police departments. There are concerns that civilianizing positions will reduce the number of developmental positions available for sworn members. However, in most instances, increasing civilianization has resulted in mixed teams of sworn officers and civilians, providing the sworn member in a developmental position an opportunity to collaborate with and learn from highly-skilled civilians. This is currently the situation in the VPD Planning and Research Section, where sergeants in developmental positions work with specially-trained civilians having skill sets unlikely in a sworn officer.

Retention of Civilian Staff

Concerns are often expressed that police departments will have difficulty recruiting, and retaining, highly-skilled civilians in specialized positions. There are a number of initiatives that can be taken to increase the retention of civilian staff, including articulated career progression stages, access to in-service training opportunities, and providing opportunities for lateral or vertical movement within the department. Similarly, remuneration that is commensurate with specialized knowledge and skills will reduce staff turnover. Of equal importance is the development of an organizational culture within the police department in which civilian members are able to work seamlessly with sworn members and have their contributions recognized and valued by the organization.

Fiscal Savings

Generally speaking, police officers receive higher pay and benefits than civilian staff[120]. Additionally, there is the higher costs associated with training and equipping a police officer. Civilians tend to arrive in a specialist position with established skill sets. However, although a primary driving force in civilianization in policing is the effort to reduce policing costs, there is no certainty that civilianizing positions currently performed by sworn members will result in cost savings in every instance. As a report in one California municipality stated: "[R]eplacing sworn members with non-sworn members can free up substantial resources, since the cost of salaries and benefits for officers are substantially higher than the cost of other employees. Note, however, that

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[120] Forst, 2000

for certain highly specialized positions, e.g. crime analyst, the cost to recruit, and retain, such expertise may exceed that of a sworn member"[121].

Much depends upon the specific position that is being re-classified from sworn police officer to civilian. For example, re-classifying the position of head of a planning and research unit will require the police department to compete on the open labour market for a person with specialized skills, expertise, and experience. To recruit, and retain, a person with these credentials may cost more initially and going forward than filling the position with a sworn member. The same may hold true for a civilian doing motor vehicle accident investigations or reconstruction. Again though, that individual would likely be more capable in the position than a police officer who may transfer in two to three years.

Although civilianization is primarily viewed as a strategy for reducing the overall costs of policing, other benefits are anticipated, including increasing "blue on the street", broadening the talent pool, and increasing opportunities, diversity, specialized skills sets and productivity in the police service. Despite the myriad potential benefits of civilianization, there are a number of challenges, particularly when considering this strategy as a way to reduce policing costs and to increase the sustainability of policing.

Table 3 sets out several of the more commonly stated benefits of civilianization with associated challenges.

Table 3: Potential Benefits and Challenges to Civilianization

Potential Benefits	Challenges
reducing the costs of policing (a)	civilians with specialized skills may cost more than a sworn member; challenges of competing for talent with the private sector
broadening the talent	potential civilian employee should have knowledge of policing and the unique demands on police services
increasing "blue" on the street	unknown whether civilianization increases # of officers on the street; if sworn officers retained, additional expense to hire civilians
more civilianized positions = more opportunity for civilian career track in the police service	limited potential for upward mobility and limited positions available for lateral movement[122]
increased continuity in selected positions	retention of highly-skilled civilians; the lure of the private sector; less commitment to the police service?

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[121] City of Berkeley, 2005:18
[122] Berkshire Advisors, Inc., 2003

Potential Benefits	Challenges
strengthening the police service	police service must optimize the skill sets of civilians; strong sworn officer culture may undermine the efforts of civilians[123]
enhancing learning opportunities for sworn members[124]	functional hybrid teams must be created
the police service as a learning organization	police service should have a civilianization policy through which all new employees (except patrol and clerical), should be vetted
increased effectiveness and efficiency in civilianized positions[125]	absence of metrics to assess performance of civilians
enhancing community policing[126]	depends upon role and activities of civilians
improve service delivery[127]	depends upon effectiveness of police operations

Assessing the Impact of Civilianization

While many police services have civilianized positions previously held by sworn officers, a major challenge is assessing the impact of civilianization. To date, a protocol for evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of civilianization has not been developed. Significantly, there are no published evaluations of the impact and outcomes of civilianization in police services. It is exceptionally difficult to operationalize effectiveness, efficiency and other facets of police work, and even more so in attempts to link civilianization to specific, measureable outcomes. This has hindered the development of best practices and the compilation of "lessons learned."

Whether there are cost savings associated with civilianization depends to a great degree upon the specific position that is being re-classified from sworn police officer to civilian. For example, re-classifying the position of head of a planning and research unit will require the police department to compete on the open labour market for a person with specialized skills, expertise, and experience. To recruit and retain a person with these credentials may cost more initially, and going forward, than filling the position with a sworn member on a rotating basis. The same may hold true for a civilian doing motor vehicle accident investigations or reconstruction. It is also difficult to assign a cost-benefit measure to the continuity that a civilian in charge of a section might bring, in contrast to sworn officers who would rotate through the position.

[123] Arroyo Associates, Inc., 2008
[124] Addison, 1988
[125] Drake and Simper, 2001
[126] Crank, 1989
[127] City of Berkeley, 2002

Key Questions about Civilianization

Key questions that remain to be answered about civilianization include:

- What challenges do police services encounter in recruiting, and retaining, highly skilled civilians?
- What challenges do civilian members have in integrating into the organizational culture of the police service?
- Do civilian members encounter difficulties in establishing their "legitimacy"
- What are the measureable benefits of sworn officer-civilian teams?
- What is the rate of turnover of highly-specialized civilians in police services, what strategies can be utilized to reduce turnover, and what are the quantitative and qualitative costs of civilian personnel turnover?
- How does the actual cost of highly-specialized civilians compare with sworn officers?
- If the civilian member is more costly, is the additional cost justified in terms of the productivity and "value-added" contribution of the civilian?
- In what instances, if any, would contracting out to the private sector be more cost-efficient than recruiting highly specialized members for the police service?
- Does civilianization result in more "blue on the street?"
- Are any cost-savings incurred by civilianization sustained over the long term?

The (Often Unsubstantiated) Assumptions of Civilianization

Discussions of civilianization make a number of questionable assumptions. One, as noted in the city of Winnipeg civilianization audit, is that "The cost of employing a sworn officer compared to a civilian employee is significantly higher, taking into account salary, benefits and pension." The audit also states that, "in most cases, a civilian position can be performed at a lower-cost by a civilian." This is not necessarily the case. The experience of police services is that it is often more costly to recruit and retain highly trained civilian personnel then it would be to have the position occupied by a sworn officer. This is particularly the case in highly specialized areas such as IT and analytics.

The experience of police services generally is that *civilianizing positions does result in cost savings*. An issue is how these cost savings are manifested, whether the cost savings accrue to the police service, and whether governments utilize these cost savings to authorize additional sworn positions.

It is stated in the audit report, for example, that "The average salary and benefits expense for a sworn staff member of the WPS in 2011 was $96,644 versus $63,612 for a civilian staff member of the WPS. This means that for every position that can be civilianized, the WPS can potentially realize a savings of $33,032 (34%). This is

significant, and is why, from a financial perspective, it makes sense to ensure sworn officers are not performing duties that could be performed by civilian staff"[128]. However, this is a false calculation. Much depends upon the *specific position* that is being civilianized and the requisite skills that are required for the position. Increasingly, police services are being required to hire highly trained civilians with expertise in crime's analytics, forensics, and other specialty areas.

Among the assumed benefits of civilianization are increased efficiency and effectiveness, an increase in the number of police officers on the street, and more effective administration. However, there are no Canadian and few US studies that have documented these outcomes of civilianization. There is *no* evidence that civilianizing positions in police services across North America has resulted in more "blue on the street." Nor is there evidence that police services with smaller sworn/civilian ratios are more effective and efficient. These are assumptions that have, to date, not been affirmed by empirical research.

The audit also notes that sworn personnel often rotate through units and this creates a lack of continuity. Civilian staff "tend to become the background of these units and are relied upon for their historical knowledge of the units administrative processes"[129]. However, this assumes that the police service is able to retain these highly trained civilian personnel. If the police service is unable to compensate civilians at the market rate, it is likely that there will also be turnover among civilian personnel. It should also be noted that there may be internal organizational obstacles in any police service that limit the potential value-added contribution of civilians. This includes an entrenched culture among sworn members that may result in civilian members having difficulty making contributions to the police services overall operations.

It should also be noted that there might be positions in the police service that are currently being performed by a civilian but that upon closer examination should be performed by a sworn officer. This often occurs when the nature of a position has changed.

CIVILIANIZATION IN THE WPS

A WPS staffing review conducted in 2005 noted that "Senior management in the WPS are committed to attracting and retaining highly qualified civilians in key positions throughout the Department"[130] and recommended that the WPS develop a policy on civilianization. It further recommended that the WPS conduct a study of sworn and civilian positions in the department that would include "a detailed review of all positions to

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[128] City of Winnipeg, 2012:14
[129] City of Winnipeg, 2012:11
[130] Winnipeg Police Service, 2005:48

determine the potential for increasing the role of civilians in all sectors of the Department and how the integration of civilian staff can assist in improving the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the delivery of policing services"[131]. It was noted that the most recent study of civilianization had been completed in 1990 and resulted in the civilianization of 11 positions.

Another audit of civilianization in the Winnipeg police service, published in October 2012, provides insights into civilianization in the department. As of 2012, the Winnipeg police service employed 423 civilian Full Time Equivalent (FTE) staff and 1443 sworn FT to carry out its mandate[132].

This audit compared the sworn officer to civilian staff ratio, and concluded that, "The WPS lags behind other jurisdictions in this performance indicator. The WPS ratio of 3.80:1 is the second least favourable out of 19 jurisdictions. Toronto has a most favourable ratio of 2.05 and the average was 2.90"[133]. During the present study, one inspector stated, "We don't have the civilian support that other police agencies have. When you are that strapped in the civilian sector, it really causes a lot of problems."

However, comparing sworn officer to civilian ratios across police services is not a good indicator as to whether an individual police service is making maximum use of civilian staff or requires that additional positions be civilianized. There are considerable differences across police services on a variety of factors, including the specific policing ("task") environment, the demands for service, and other dimensions of the police organization that may determine whether or not a specific position is sworn or civilian. Extreme caution should be exercised in comparing the ratios of sworn officers to civilian staff between Canadian police departments. Individual departments vary in how positions are classified and counted; for example, the Calgary Police Service and the Toronto Police Service both count civilian dispatchers, while the Vancouver Police Department does not, even though there are civilian dispatchers working at ECOMM.

The audit report subsequently appears to acknowledge this consideration by stating that there is "no set optimal mix of sworn to civilian staff that can be applied to all jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction has a unique environment that requires a different mix of staff to successfully address the issues it faces"[134]. This is a more accurate depiction of the discussion that should surround civilianization. The most productive and valid framework within which to assess civilianization in any one police service is to consider the specific police service, it's challenges and demands, and how it's policies and operations can become more effective and efficient.

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[131] Winnipeg Police Service, 2005:48
[132] City of Winnipeg, 2012:2
[133] City of Winnipeg, 2012:2
[134] City of Winnipeg, 2012:21

The discussion of civilianization in the WPS has most recently occurred against the larger debate over the economics and sustainability of policing. The audit conducted by the City of Winnipeg stated that "Civilianization is seen as a critical part of the solution" to the increasing cost of policing"[135]. However, the previous review of the policing literature indicated that civilianization should not be viewed solely as a strategy to reduce costs of policing, but rather as a strategy to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the police. In fact, as the following discussion will illustrate, civilianizing certain positions in a police service may result in increased costs associated with attracting and retaining highly trained civilian personnel. The City of Winnipeg audit noted that the Winnipeg police service has identified 27 positions that could be performed by civilian staff. It is estimated that the cost saving would be $890,000.00 annually[136]. The audit also states that "This would also lead to the re-deployment of those sworn officers to perform core police duties that they were trained to perform"[137].

Among the other findings of the 2012 audit were the recommendation that the WPS develop a civilian staffing strategy that would include:

1. a plan for civilian staffing supported by clearly defined and measurable goals;
2. criteria to determine whether a position should be performed by a sworn officer or a civilian;
3. a formal process to review all current and new positions against these criteria;
4. a workload analysis to determine the optimal number of sworn or civilian staff to deliver the desired level of service;   and,
5. a performance management system in place that would monitor progress against established goals.

The audit also noted that there are two ways to determine ""the right number of people are doing the right jobs at the right cost"[138]. One is to conduct a "comprehensive review of positions within the police service against set criteria." The other is to "review the ratio of civilian to sworn staff to determine if it is reasonable"[139]. As previously noted, the latter technique is problematic and is not likely to produce valid results. For purposes of this review, a comprehensive review of positions in the Winnipeg police service was conducted utilizing a set of best practice criteria.

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[135] City of Winnipeg, 2012:2
[136] City of Winnipeg, 2012:3
[137] City of Winnipeg, 2012:3
[138] City of Winnipeg, 2012:9
[139] City of Winnipeg, 2012:10

It should also be noted that the primary component of any police service will always be uniform patrol conducted by sworn police officers and investigative units staffed predominantly by sworn members. These are positions that cannot be civilianized. Thus, these positions would not be subjected to civilianization even with the application of a best practice set of criteria in an assessment.

Increasing Capacities in the WPS Through Civilianization

A notable trend in North American police services is the development of enhanced capacities to increase effectiveness and efficiency. A number of police services have identified attracting "the best and the brightest' civilians into specific sections, including research and planning.

This includes the hiring of specially trained civilians that can contribute to intelligence led policing, the provision of real-time crime analysis for police operations, and expertise in management. A notable attribute of best practice police services for example is a strong analytical component. The Vancouver Police Department, for example, has 26 civilian crime analysts. The average annual salary of a crime analyst for the Vancouver Police Department is $80,000.

Should a police service such as the WPS be required to enhance its analytical capacities there will be a considerable cost to this. In this case, civilianization will be value – added, but will also result in increased expenses. In its report, the city of Winnipeg states that the WPS senior management has indicated a greater need for civilian staff than for sworn members[140]. However, it is significant that this discussion relates to administrative support staff where positions are generally much less costly than for a sworn member. No mention is made of specialized civilian positions, including crime analysts, whose annual salary may be equivalent to, or higher than, that for a sworn officer.

The Auxiliary Cadet Program

The WPS Police Cadet Program has 40 full time positions, however they recruit from the community on the basis of full time and part time participants, so the numbers may vary. Applicants are screened for criminal background, good character, driving records and overall reputation upon application. If accepted they undergo eight weeks training at the Police Academy. They are paid an hourly rate for hours worked, beginning at $13-15 per hour.

Once training is completed, the cadets work in teams throughout the city. They are on probation for two years after graduating. They have Peace Officer status and perform community-based duties such as foot patrols,

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[140] City of Winnipeg, 2012:23

traffic direction, and guarding crime scenes. They are also trained to take minor property offence reports as well as minor traffic accident reports. The members regard them as an excellent resource.

There seems to be widespread support for the cadet program throughout the police service. Patrol constables interviewed for the project expressed support for the cadets, one stating that they are "awesome." She stated that they free up a lot of time for General Patrol and CSU by responding to low-level calls such as intoxicated persons and traffic incidents. She went on to state that she thought it would be useful and helpful to expand the cadet program to District 3.

The audit report notes that the addition of the Auxiliary Force cadets to the WPS workforce is improving the composition in terms of civilianization"[141]. Although the cadet program was not examined as part of the WPS Operational Review, several points should be raised. To date, there has not been a rigorous evaluation of the cadet program by outside experts. While there is anecdotal evidence that the cadet program has been "value added" to the WPS, the impact of the program on officer call load remains to be determined. There is no analysis that would allow a determination of whether the cadet program has reduced the cost of policing in Winnipeg or resulted in more "blue on the street." The audit states "The cadets have furthered civilianization efforts of the WPS in as far as it is designed to free up sworn officers to concentrate on core policing duties and has provided a lower-cost alternative to providing these non-core policing services"[142]. However, the qualitative and quantitative analyses presented in this operational review call this statement into serious question. Generally speaking, the demand load on WPS officers is so high as to preclude any significant proactive activities. As valuable as the cadet program is, there is no indication that it has reduced the workload of WPS officers. It could be argued that without the cadets, the workload would be even higher, so in this sense the program can be viewed as "value-added." On the other hand, one WPS officer who was interviewed noted that the cadets have also indirectly created an increased workload for officers, in that they tend to fill up the drunk-tank[143] and issue citations to people who clearly cannot pay, resulting in a warrant requiring further police intervention.

The most experienced cadet (over three years) is paid $29,120 annually while a constable, with less than one year experience, is paid $43,057 annually. This is an annual difference of $13,937 per person excluding benefits.

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[141] City of Winnipeg, 2012:16
[142] City of Winnipeg, 2012:16
[143] Essentially, the officer stated that because cadets are very eager, they have a habit of arresting/detaining intoxicated individuals that most police would simply ask to, "Move along." The consequence is that the drunk-tank becomes full faster and this increases wait times for officers.

Based on the current 50 authorized cadet positions, the annual savings is estimated at $696,850"[144]. However, given the differences in training, mandates, and activities of the sworn officers and the cadets, this is an inappropriate comparison. Cadets, for example, are not armed, and are specifically limited in the types of activities in which they can become involved. The cadet program was designed to support rather than replace sworn officers. It has yet to be determined whether the cadet program is achieving its stated objectives.

The WPS Civilianization Project Method

Police departments that have taken a systematic approach to civilianization have primarily utilized a basic macro-level approach to position classification. Rather than scrutinize the specific duties and tasks of a position, the position is challenged by a series of core questions. In a review of civilianization in Britain, the United States, Australia and New Zealand, Parrett[145] identified a number of common guiding principles that have been used to determine whether a specific position should be classified as sworn or civilian. These include:

- the exercise of police powers
- the requirement for police training, experience and skills
- the need to provide both career development opportunities and for officers to acquire administrative skills. Balancing this against cost factors and the career needs of civilians
- the need to contain any risk of disruption from industrial action by civilian personnel
- the ability to recruit civilians in sufficient numbers, and of sufficient calibre, to fill the posts designated as suitable for substitution
- the availability of civilian personnel to carry out the tasks required outside of normal working hours
- the need to accommodate officers unable to undertake operational duties
- in general terms, civilian numbers should not be increased at the expense of sworn strength

Discussions about the potential of civilianization in any police service should be informed by an evaluation of the sworn and civilian positions in the police service with the exception of uniformed patrol and clerical support. The assessment should involve an analysis conducted by an outside expert with extensive policing experience based on position descriptions provided by the police service's Human Resources Section.

The activities of the external police expert involve the application of a decision-making tree to each position to determine whether the position is most appropriately classified as sworn or civilian. An initial "turnkey" question

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[144] City of Winnipeg, 2012:17
[145] Parrett, 1992

is asked, and then, depending upon the response to this question, a subsequent question is either asked or not asked. Three core questions are asked, in the following order:

1. Does the position require law enforcement powers? (I.e. powers of arrest, use of force, statutory requirement, carrying a firearm)

2. Are the skills, training, experience, or credibility of a sworn police officer required to fulfill the duties of the position?

3. Can a specially trained civilian fulfill the requirements of the position?

If the response to question #1 is "Yes", then the position is classified as "Sworn." If the response to the question is "No", then the second question in the decision making tree is asked: "Are the skills, training, experience or credibility of a sworn police officer required to fulfill the duties of the position?" If the response to the question is "Yes", then the position is classified as "Sworn." If the response to the question is "No", then a third question is asked: "Can the requirements of the position be fulfilled by a specially-trained civilian?" If the response to the question is "Yes", then the position is classified as "Civilian."

The intent of this method is to ensure that there is objectivity in assessing positions in the police service. However, it is important to note that there is a measure of subjectivity involved, particularly with respect to questions #2 and #3. There are qualitative dimensions to many positions in a police service that may not be captured by these two questions. These include the "credibility factor", e.g. if a sworn member is respected by his or her peers, this may be "value-added" to the position that a civilian member coming from outside the police may not have. Similarly, a sworn member's personal and professional networks in policing may enhance performance. The extent to which these factors are impactful for any one position in any one police service is difficult to determine, but should be considered. There may also be instances where an "override" of either the external assessment or the response of a police manager is justified. In such instances, the reason for that should be articulated.

Results of the Position Review

A review was conducted of the job classifications and the organizational chart provided by the WPS for both civilian and sworn personnel. An attached Excel spreadsheet sets out the number of positions for each position description. Note that these numbers may not be consistent with actual positions. Some difficulty was encountered in applying the research protocol to the sworn positions in the WPS. Notable among these was that HR did not have descriptions for a number of positions. These are noted in the discussion below. As well, some position descriptions provided by HR were outdated and not reflective of the actual activities of the incumbents. These have also been noted. Also, there were a number of positions for which there were major discrepancies

with the job descriptions for sworn members supplied in relation to the organizational chart. The organizational chart was described by the WPS as "fluid." This requires attention going forward.

The review is based on the organizational chart supplied by the WPS on August 8, 2013.

Review of Civilian Positions

The review of the civilian positions (Excel Sheet 1) found no job descriptions that would require a sworn peace officer to perform them.

REVIEW OF SWORN POLICE POSITIONS

A review of sworn positions in the WPS identified **94 officers** in **26 positions** that do not meet the best practice criteria for requiring a sworn police officer. There are some positions, however, that present special circumstances requiring a separate discussion. Eighteen of these positions are constable/patrol sergeant "Readers" in Division #31. This will be discussed below. None of these positions require that the incumbents supervise police officers, which may be a major consideration, at least in the initial steps toward civilianization. At least one would require changes to the patrol sergeant's responsibilities.

The following discussion identifies the positions that are currently occupied by sworn officers that can be converted to civilian personnel. For each position, a summary of responsibilities of the position, as provided by HR, is set out as well as the basis for the finding.

Autonomous Units

<u>Title:</u> **Wellness Coordinator** –one sergeant or staff sergeant

There is one regular member working in this position. The job summary includes:

- Works closely with the police psychologist and Human Resources manager, division commanders and other key resources.
- Acts as the Service's representative in attending to members in need of support or assistance.
- Leads and manages the Wellness Program, Peer Assistance Program, and the Post Traumatic Incident Program.
- Ensures the Chief of Police, Police Psychologist and Manager of Human Resources are informed of incidents for their attention.
- Works closely with internal and external resources to refer members and their families to the appropriate resources.
- Develops designs and delivers in-service training to educate and increase awareness of the program.

Recommendation: Civilianize. This is a position that does not require a sworn member. The duties are those of a mental health/counseling professional.

Title: Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act Coordinator (FIPPA) –one position (constable)

There is one regular member working in this position at the present time.   The job summary includes:

- Establishing and implementing effective WPS operational procedures and guidelines to ensure WPS compliance with FIPPA, the terms of court orders for production of records, and for providing recommendations, support and expert interpretation of the FIPPA as it applies to matters involving the WPS

- Being the primary contact for members of the public seeking access to information

- Being responsible for providing quality customer service, prompt response times and efficient processing of requests and court orders for the production of records

- Developing and administering the response process to court orders for the production of records, applications for access to information received under the FIPPA

- Assisting all divisions in complying with the protection of privacy as defined by the Act

- Drafting written responses, preparing and maintaining statistical reports, preparing and maintaining a compliance tracking system, preparing estimates of costs, gathering and preparing responsive records

- Liaising with investigators from the office of the Manitoba Ombudsman. This position must ensure that applications and court orders are responded to within required time frames

 The position requires contact with the public, Crown counsel, outside police and public agencies. There is also a training component.

Recommendation: Civilianize. There is no supervisory responsibility attached to the position. This is purely an administrative function that does not require a sworn member.

Title: Patrol Divisions – three positions – administrative sergeants

These positions exist at three of the patrol divisions and are primarily assistants to the inspector in charge of the division. Interviews with management revealed that these officers are responsible for areas such as equipment and building maintenance.

Recommendation: Civilianize. This position does not require a sworn member. A civilian can perform the duties.

Division. #30 - **Services Division** – four Positions (One inspector, one sergeant, two patrol sergeants)

This division, with an inspector and a civilian manager, is responsible for vehicle maintenance, janitorial services, as well as Special Projects and Document Services. On the organizational chart, "Special Projects" indicates two positions, one a sergeant and the other a patrol sergeant. Document Services shows a patrol sergeant position. WPS HR was unable to provide job summaries for this division.

> *Recommendation: Civilianize. However, it appears that these positions are primarily administrative and do not require sworn members.*

Division #31 - Records and Report Management

According to the Organization Chart, this section employs one inspector, one staff sergeant, three sergeants, eight patrol sergeants and 95 constables. The Service Centre positions, which staff the front counters at the various district offices and the main police building, and the Report Car positions definitely require sworn members to perform these duties.

> *The only job summaries provided by WPS HR are those noted below, all of which are recommended for civilianization.*

<u>Title</u>: **Evidence Control Supervisor** – sergeant

The job summary for this position includes:

- Escorting drug processors to various locations
- Servicing Notices of Intent
- Disposing of drug exhibits
- Transporting drug samples to and from Health Canada.

The job description lists the above duties, noting that they require an armed person to perform them. This position could be performed by a special provincial constable. There presently are two exhibit technicians shown as civilian positions.

> *Recommendation: This position could be performed by a special provincial constable. Police services in other jurisdictions have a protocol for evidence control that eliminates the need for a sworn member to do these duties. These include:*

- The investigating officers take the drug samples to the appropriate laboratories for analysis purposes.

- The investigating officers are responsible for service of documents on counsel for the accused.

- The special provincial constable, under the supervision of a senior management designate, can conduct the disposal of drug exhibits.

Title: – **Criminal Property Forfeiture** – one position (constable) – No job description was supplied for this position.

> *Recommendation: Civilianize. This appears to be an administrative position requiring no investigative or enforcement duties.*

Division #34 – Human Resources

<u>Title</u>: **Health and Safety Coordinator** – one position (constable)

The job summary includes:

- Providing workplace health and safety services directly to WPS employees and the public using WPS facilities.

- Ensuring that systems are continuously updated, so as to provide safety services of the highest possible quality in promotion, prevention, protection and maintenance of safety and health within the WPS.

- Coordinating and communicating the Safety Management Program to all WPS employees. This program includes the development of:
  - safe work practices and safe work procedures
  - personal protective equipment
  - inspection and training policies
  - incident/injury prevention strategies
  - emergency preparedness
  - hazard assessment
  - preventative maintenance
  - development of departmental safety guidelines.

> *Recommendation: Civilianize. This is purely an administrative position reporting to the Manager of Human Resources, with no supervisory requirement. This is a position that could be filled by a civilian.*

Division #37

<u>Title</u>: **Records Management System (RMS) Support Analyst** – one position (constable)

The RMS Support Analyst is responsible for the identification, planning, implementation and support of the Niche RMS system and to deliver and support improvements and updates as required for the Winnipeg Police Service.

The job summary for this position includes:

- The unit is a liaison between the members of the Winnipeg Police Service and Niche Technologies in implementing various changes to the RMS.

- Responsible for identifying database, maintenance and security issues.

- Daily monitoring of the RCS to ensure stable performance and uniformity in report writing by members of the Winnipeg Police Services.

- Identifying business processes within the Winnipeg Police Services using the Niche RMS in the most efficient way to benefit all members entering and extracting data.

- Responsible for writing, or advising on, training manuals, handouts and lesson plans for the Winnipeg Police Services.

- Responsible for notifying the Organizational Development & Support Unit of any changes to policy and procedure in regards to the RMS and advise of change requirements to the Winnipeg Police Service Manuals.

- Maintain and update the RMS Briefing File on Police.Net.

- Host and meet with individuals from various police departments, worldwide, interested in purchasing Niche RMS and answer questions these individuals have in relation to the day to day use of Niche RMS.

Recommendation: Civilianize. According to the job description, this position reports to a patrol sergeant within Records Management. These duties can be performed by a civilian with technical training.

Division #40 – Criminal Investigation Branch

40 (2)

Title: **Community Correction Liaison Officer** – one position (constable)

This position is a secondment of the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC). The Job summary includes:

- Performing liaison activity between the CSC, WPS and other government, community and police agencies.

- Collecting, collating, analyzing and distributing CSC information to police, CSC and other agencies pertaining to parolees, recent releases, parole suspension, and half-way house placement.

- Providing information to Criminal Investigation Bureau and General Patrol members pertaining to parole, warrant and suspension status.

- Assisting officers in obtaining and/or providing offence details of revocation.

- Responsibility for the identification of high-risk offenders as is applicable and to assist agencies in the apprehension of offenders who are unlawfully at large.

Recommendation: Civilianize. The job is performed under the supervision of the staff sergeant, Organized Crime. While it entails access to sensitive information and dealing with several other agencies and police forces, there are no supervisory responsibilities. A qualified civilian can perform these duties.

Title: Violent Offender Risk Analysis – one position (constable)

The job is performed under the supervision of the staff sergeant, Organized Crime. No job description was supplied for this position.

> *Recommendation: Civilianize. The position does not appear to involve an operational role. It can be filled by a trained civilian analyst.*

Division #41 – Criminal Investigation Branch

Title: Domestic Violence Coordinator – one position (sergeant)

The job summary includes:

- Re-writing policy to ensure it meets the current WPS legal and procedural responsibilities
- Liaising with policy analysts in ODS Division to ensure policy is completed and approved.
- Creating policy to deal with emerging trends.
- Preparing reports on policy issues, reporting to WPS Domestic Violence Steering Committee
- Dealing internally with officers and members who need policy guidance
- Sitting member of numerous committees, which include Family Violence Intervention Team Resource Committee, various other committees relating to violence against women, high-risk offenders
- Deal with Women's Shelter regarding police policy
- Deal with policy conflicts with Family Violence Prevention Branch
- Deal with policy compliance issues with Provincial Prosecution Branch

> *Recommendation: Civilianize. The person in this position reports directly to the inspector, Div.# 41.   It is an administrative position. While it has many responsibilities relating to family violence, it does not require a sworn police officer. A suitably trained civilian, most appropriately a person with expertise in family violence and counseling, could carry out the duties of this position.*

Title: Child Abuse Intake/Youth Crime Coordinator – one position (constable)

The Job summary includes:

- Responsibility for reviewing and logging all submitted Child Abuse referrals by Child & Family Service (CFS) and other police agencies
- Determining whether the referrals require follow up investigation
- Monitoring and recording all WPS contact with young offenders under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA)

- Reviewing all Niche reports involving Youth Warn, Caution, Arrest or Turnabout referrals and entering these in database for statistical purposes.

- Monitoring changes to youth related legislation

- Ensuring compliance with existing and/or changed legislation

- Acting as a resource on issues related to the YCJA

The position also includes:

- Forwarding child protection concerns from general patrol members to Child & Family Services

- Liaising with CFS when additional police information is required

- Providing guidance to WPS members pertaining to YCJA issues

> *Recommendation: Civilianize. This position is supervised by the sergeant, Support Services, from this division. There are no supervisory responsibilities. A properly trained civilian, most appropriately a person with training in social work and with expertise in child abuse, could fulfill the requirements of this position.*

Division # 42 – Criminal Investigation Branch

42(2)

Title: **Technological Crimes** – eight positions (constable)

The job summary includes:

- Being responsible for the delivery of Computer Forensic services within Winnipeg Police Service

- Conducting forensice examination of seized computers and related equipment

- Conducting 'hacking' investigations

- Providing investigative support when technology is used to commit crimes

> *Recommendation: Civilianize. This position(s) is supervised by the staff sergeant, Operations, Division #42. The job description does not require any enforcement duties. This position could be filled by trained civilian technicians[146].*

Title: Police Forensic Imaging Analyst –2 positions (constable)

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[146] Note: Although this report considers significant civilianization in a number of units, many jurisdictions and agencies modify units based upon a hybrid model, having both civilians and police working closely in order to maximize effectiveness. The recommendations herein contemplate outright civilianization opportunities; however, given the legal complexities and continual evolution of policing, particularly in highly skilled and specialized units, changes should be carefully considered to ensure that hybridization models are applied when appropriate to ensure best practices in policing.

The job summary includes:

- Scientific recovery, examination comparison and evaluation of video in legal matters. This includes analogue or digital surveillance footage, or still digital images obtained from CCTV security surveillance systems, or other sources that have recorded crime images

- To recover, clarify and analyze suspect images, using specialized forensic computer workstations, providing a means to identify suspects through witnesses and the public via the Internet and news media resources

- To render expert scientific opinion on evidence gathered.

According to the Duties and Responsibilities section of the job description provided by HR, 55% of the time is spent on technical issues, including:

- Repairing damaged videotape
- Trouble shooting and identify adjustments, repair and replacement needs for malfunctioning equipment
- Using the Forensic Image Analysis workstations, digitize original videotape or other digital mage evidence
- Produce hardcopy still images for investigators
- Produce edited electronic still images for Crime Stoppers
- Produce edited working copy video for investigators
- Produce edited court video with titles.
- Testify in court

> *Recommendation: Civilianize. Trained civilians can perform these duties.*

Division #42 – Criminal Investigation Branch

42(3) – Forensic Services

Title: **Forensic Identification** – 16 constables

No job description was provided for this unit. These positions are forensic technicians who provide scene-of-crime services including:

- Photographic services.
- Identification and retrieval of physical evidence at scenes of crime.
- Plan drawings, mapping crime scenes.
- Fingerprinting and examination of seized items for evidentiary purposes.

Recommendation: This position(s) is supervised by the staff sergeant, Division #42, as well as two sergeants and two patrol sergeants. While technical training is required to perform these duties, it is not exclusive to a sworn police member[147].

Title: Forensic Artist – one position (constable)

The Job summary includes:

- On the request of investigators, responsible for interviewing victims or witnesses and where suitable, draw composites of suspects and objects to assist in criminal investigations

- With suitable training, work in conjunction with a medical examiner's office with skull reconstructions and post-mortem drawing to assist in identification of persons

- Assist in age progression drawings of missing persons for the purpose of locating that person.

Recommendation: Civilianize. This position is supervised by the staff sergeant, Division #42. This position does not require a sworn member and the responsibilities can be performed by a civilian artist retained on a contract basis.

POSITIONS REQUIRING SPECIAL CONSIDERATION

In the review, several positions were identified as requiring further discussion.

Executive

Position Title: Public Information Officer – two positions (constable)

At present there are two sworn officers in media liaison positions. The position description includes the following:

- Being the main spokesperson for the WPS and the key police resource to the media, establishing and maintaining positive working relationships with members of the media, other police agencies and various other outside agencies

- Screening and releasing official information and responsibility for scheduling interviews, daily news briefings, and arranging interviews with members of the executive, divisional commanders or specialty unit members

- Developing and assisting with communications strategies pertaining to WPS initiatives contentious issues, and predictable contentious issues. Serving as a resource for all WPS members dealing with the media and providing ongoing media training to members

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[147] Note: Although this report considers significant civilianization in a number of units, many jurisdictions and agencies modify units based upon a hybrid model, having both civilians and police working closely in order to maximize effectiveness. The recommendations herein contemplate outright civilianization opportunities; however, given the legal complexities and continual evolution of policing, particularly in highly skilled and specialized units, changes should be carefully considered to ensure that hybridization models are applied when appropriate to ensure best practices in policing.

- Establishing and reviewing media policy, highlighting new WPS initiatives, member achievements, assisting specialty units with media briefing arrangements and attending major incidents or other scenes where media congregate and the controlled release of information is required

Although many police services have sworn officers in this position, others utilize highly trained civilian personnel[148]. This position does not require a sworn police officer; however, an argument could be made that having a uniformed, sworn member appearing before the media increases the legitimacy of the WPS.

On the other hand, the position can be viewed as increasingly challenging given the dynamic nature of media and the need for specialized skill sets that would only be possessed by persons with specific training in public relations, media relations, and communications. This is another position that may be adversely affected by the tenure policy for sworn officers. Civilianizing these positions would provide continuity and the development of relationships with key players in the media. This, in turn, would facilitate the development of proactive (as opposed to reactive) media strategy. It could be argued that a person specially trained in public and media relations should occupy at least one of the positions.

Division #31 - Records and Report Management

Title*:* **Reader** – 18 positions (constable/patrol sergeant)

The job summary for these positions includes:

- Responsibility for reviewing all submitted reports to ensure thoroughness of the investigation, quality and completeness of the report, as well as accuracy of the relevant information and statistical data
- Readers are accountable for all reports reviewed and forwarded, ensuring that the reports comply with the WPS standards pertaining to quality and completeness
- The integrity of any subsequent court process is dependent on the reader's ability to identify and remedy potential problems with submitted reports
- The reader is also responsible for liaising with the Court Unit and identifying potential disclosure issues

Other responsibilities include:

- Ensuring appropriate charges are laid
- Compiling UCR statistics and ensuring accuracy of those created by other units
- Working with Court Liaison and Arrest Processing Unit

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[148] See The City of Alexandria, Virginia Police Department and the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, Tampa Florida

The present practice in Winnipeg is that all initial reports submitted by patrol personnel are routed electronically to the reader's office, where they are read to ensure proper investigations have been conducted that comply with policy. if there are problems, the report is routed back to the district supervisors for action by the assigned member. According to the job description, the persons in these positions are constables, receiving sergeant's pay. The report on the patrol division identifies challenges associated with this process, a major issue being that this precludes patrol sergeants reviewing the performance of personnel they supervise in the first instance, which review would facilitate operational and policy guidance prior to reports going forward.

If the system were to be changed so that the patrol sergeants or the station sergeant in each district read the reports, the reader positions should be considered for civilianization. These personnel would still work under the supervision of a sergeant. Note that in municipal and RCMP detachments throughout the Greater Vancouver Region, the readers are municipal employees, often retired police officers. If the patrol sergeants were dealing with the reports in the first instance, it would then be a matter for the readers to concern themselves with the actual mechanics of the reports, i.e. were the necessary attachments such as B&E profiles, sex offender info, modus operandi info properly submitted, diary dates and the routing to support units. The readers would not be required to give operational guidance to sworn officers. Another option would be to attach these positions to each district office, or more ideally each shift, allowing for direct contact with individual officers and their supervisors.

WPS personnel in the patrol division indicated in interviews that the NICHE system could be adjusted so that the reports are routed to the in box of the patrol sergeants and/or sergeants in each district.

Recommendation: Civilianize. These positions are further evaluated later on in the report.

Title: Arrest Processing Unit – one sergeant, four patrol sergeants, 20 constables

The job summary for this position includes:

- Facilitate Judicial Justice Hearings for accused persons
- Compile police reports to be forwarded to Justice Partners
- Transport detained prisoners to correctional institutions within the City of Winnipeg
- Generate appropriate court documents to lay charges
- Swear Informations before Judicial of the Peace
- Ensure police reports are complete prior to forwarding

- Search/secure accused persons

The organizational chart indicates that one sergeant and six patrol sergeants supervise these positions. Provincial Corrections staff or civilians with special provincial constable status could fill these positions. There are changes to this process planned with the anticipated move to a new police headquarters building in 2014; however, the extent of these changes is unknown.

Recommendation: These positions should be re-evaluated following the move in 2014.

Civilians In Forensic and Crime Scene Investigation Units

This study has recommended that 20 sworn positions in the Criminal Investigations Branch, Forensic Services, be civilianized. This would place the WPS at the leading edge of best practices in this area in Canada. Although sworn officers staff Canadian police forensic identification units primarily, if not exclusively, there is extensive civilian involvement in forensics and crime scene investigation in many police departments in the United States and in the UK. And, the available evidence suggests that specially trained civilians can make a significant contribution to forensic and crime scene investigation working alongside sworn officers. Civilian personnel also provide continuity in crime scene skills and case investigation, since these staff are not subject to tenure policies.

Civilian personnel can bring skill sets that don't exist in a police service or that would take extensive training and experience to acquire. As the Chief of Police of Worcester, Massachusetts stated in praising the two civilians working in fingerprint unit: "They've performed beyond our expectations. They are quickly acquiring the expertise that would take many more years, if we were training officers that didn't come on the job with the background and training these individuals have"[149]. The positive results obtained to date indicate that mixed teams of sworn officers and specially trained civilians are emerging as a best practice.

There is a defined trend toward the increasing civilianization in police services with specially trained civilians filling positions traditionally occupied by sworn police officers. A recent example is the Oklahoma City Police Department, which deployed four new civilian crime scene investigation specialists in June 2013. The new civilian personnel have degrees in criminal justice or forensics. The stated intent of the department is to ultimately replace the entire CSI unit with civilian personnel[150].

Following are several illustrative examples from other jurisdictions:

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[149] Croteau, 2012
[150] Manwarren, 2013

Niagara Regional Police Service. Among the civilian positions are forensic technicians and video technician.

San Bernardino (CA) Sheriff's Department. Criminalists, including crime scene investigators; fingerprint examiners; and video technicians.

Lake County Sheriff's Office (Florida). The department's Investigation Bureau, comprised of Crime Scene Investigations Bureau is staffed with 17 positions: a lieutenant, 16 full-time civilian employees, one part-time employee and one civilian volunteer. The Bureau is responsible for property evidence, the forensics laboratory, the photographic laboratory, fingerprinting, and crime scene response[151].

City of Miami Police Department Crime Scene Investigations. The City of Miami Police Department utilizes the various disciplines of the forensic sciences in order to conduct crime scene investigations and aid in the prosecution of criminal cases. The Crime Scene Investigation Unit is an element of the Criminal Investigation Division's Criminal Investigations Section, and is comprised of two units.

The Crime Scene Investigation Unit, the real "Miami CSI", is comprised of civilian technicians and is on call to support criminal investigation activities throughout the City of Miami 24 hours a day and seven days a week. Whenever a crime occurs in the City of Miami police officers or investigators arrive at a crime scene, secure the scene and make an assessment, and if the situation requires further support, they request the services of the Crime Scene Investigation Unit. The technicians are "on scene" within two hours.

The unit's technician staff are an experienced cadre with an average of 12 years of expertise and training. They are well qualified to handle any and all types of crimes, either conducting their analysis on their own or as part of an investigative team. They are extraordinarily skilled in photography, evidence collection, fingerprint processing, sketching, and giving expert testimony in criminal court proceedings.

Much of the work conducted by these professionals is absolutely critical in determining the guilt or innocence of the individuals under investigation. Once collected and analyzed, the evidence gathered at crime scenes tells the story of how the crime evolved.

The career path for a crime scene technician includes a formal education curriculum of Criminal Justice, Criminology, Physical Science, or coursework in the Natural Sciences. Several colleges and universities are also offering courses tailored to crime scene technology, addressing the fieldwork aspect of the profession. The Crime Scene technician frequently operates in extremely harsh environments and is often exposed to very

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[151] https://www.lcso.org/bureaus/CSI/

gruesome crime scenes. At times the work is quite strenuous, and the successful technician must be mentally and physically capable of overcoming the stress that is part of the profession.

The other element of the Crime Scene Investigation Unit is the Technical Services Unit. The personnel in this unit are highly specialized professionals focused on fingerprint collection technologies and imagery processing[152].

Grand Prairie (Texas) Police Department. The Grand Prairie Police Department has a staff of civilian investigators and police officers that are specially trained, equipped and assigned to collect physical evidence at the scene of a crime. This includes the recovery of latent fingerprints and prints; recovery of foot, tool, and tire impressions; photographing crime and collision scenes; preparing crime and collision scene sketches; collecting, preserving, and transmitting physical evidence, including biological materials; and comparing latent fingerprints and palm prints[153].

San Antonio (TX) Police Department. The Evidence Unit of the San Antonio Police Department is in the Major Crimes Section of the Investigations Division. The Evidence Unit is under the direction of a lieutenant and is staffed by four sergeants and 52 evidence investigators, of which 21 are evidence detectives (sworn positions) and 31 are evidence technicians (civilian positions). Personnel assigned to the unit assist the Police Department's follow-up units by conducting investigations at crime scenes and by special processing of evidence in the Evidence Unit's lab. The Evidence Unit is a 24-hour-a-day operation, which conducts thorough searches of crime scenes, documents the scenes, and collects and preserves any physical evidence.

Aside from crime scene investigations, Evidence Unit members organize presentations for schools and groups throughout San Antonio. Members frequently use the Internet to develop their skills and introduce new techniques to the unit. Evidence Unit personnel have developed training programs for the unit, the department and other agencies.

Personnel assigned to the Evidence Unit are constantly working to keep up with rapid advancements in scientific methods of evidence detection and processing of evidence. This requires continuous training for personnel of the Evidence Unit to remain current. New evidence detectives are required to successfully complete a comprehensive eighty-hour formal training program. Evidence technicians (non-sworn) must complete a 320-hour training program. Forensic light source, laser technology, and the Coleman vacuum chamber are some of the most recent and exciting breakthroughs in forensic science currently used by the unit.

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[152] Miami Police Department website: http://www.miami-police.org
[153] http://www.grandprairiepolice.org

Civilianization of the Evidence Unit began September 20, 1997, with the hiring of seven "evidence technicians". The unit has created 24 civilian positions since September 1997. Newly hired civilian personnel receive 320 hours of training, certified by the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and Education (TCLEOSE). Upon completion of the course, the evidence technicians experience one month of riding with an Evidence Unit detective or an evidence technician. *The non-sworn members have brought to the unit a tremendous amount of knowledge and experience, along with a fresh approach to crime scene investigation. The cooperation between detectives and evidence technicians has produced an excellent working environment along with a higher quality work product* (emphasis added)[154].

Dallas (TX) Police Department Crime Scene Response Unit. The Crime Scene Response Unit is responsible for collecting and processing of evidence at crime scenes and for searching for fingerprint matches using the automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS). The squad conducts crime scene searches by identifying, collecting and preserving evidence to support criminal cases and for presentation in court. The unit has authorized 36 sworn personnel (three lieutenants, six sergeants, and 27 senior corporals) and 29 non-sworn personnel (one forensic video specialist, 22 crime technicians, five office assistants, and one photographic technician). Of these staff 21 sworn and 18 civilians are assigned to process crime scenes[155].

The United Kingdom - There is also extensive involvement of civilian personnel in crime scene investigation in the United Kingdom. A common position is that of scenes of crime officers (SOCO's) who work alongside patrol members and sworn investigative officers.

Scenes of crime officers (SOCOs), sometimes called crime scene investigators (CSIs) or crime scene examiners, work with police in the investigation of serious crime. They are usually civilians but in some police forces may be police officers in uniform or plain clothes. They are among the first to arrive at a crime scene and their job is to retrieve, examine and investigate physical evidence that may help to trace and convict criminals. They determine from the crime scene whether assistance from specialists, such as a forensic scientist, is needed. The scenes worked on can vary widely, from 'volume crime' such as burglary and vehicle crime, and 'major crime' such as rape or murder.

The main elements of the work are photography, fingerprinting, forensic examination and the collection of evidence such as blood samples, hair, fibers and paint samples. The evidence is collated and recorded by the SOCO and is used by an investigating officer to determine the facts of the crime. They may have to give evidence

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[154] http://www.sanantonio.gov/sapd/
[155] http://www.dallaspolice.net

in court and are often required to attend post mortems. These materials suggest that a mixed sworn and civilian team of forensic specialists and crime scene investigators may be appropriate for the WPS. To this end, this report will recommend that a more detailed examination be conducted of the forensic identification and crime scene investigation personnel and activities in the WPS.

The Issue of Missing Position Descriptions in the WPS

The relatively large number of positions for which HR did not have a position description hindered the assessment of positions in the WPS for the civilianization study. While it was possible in many instances to deduce the mandate and activities of incumbents of specific positions, the absence of positions descriptions for every position in the service is a notable problem.

Going Forward

The focus of this component of the operational review was on the opportunities to civilianize positions within the WPS. A number of positions currently occupied by sworn officers have been identified as being most appropriately classified as non-sworn, civilian positions. The potential cost savings to be achieved by converting these positions from sworn to non-sworn have also been calculated. Embracing the notion of civilianization will build capacities in the WPS and produce a myriad of benefits. Any cost savings that are achieved by civilianizing positions should be directed toward hiring additional sworn members, given the challenges that are currently being encountered by the WPS in the delivery of policing services.

Recommendations

RECOMMENDATION: The WPS should ensure that there is comprehensive, up to date description of the mandate and scope of duties of every position in the organization.

RECOMMENDATION: The WPS should develop a written policy on civilianization that is based on best practice and on vetting every non-patrol position in the organization through the use of a decision making tree that includes the questions: 1) does the position require law enforcement powers; 2) does the position require the skills, training, experience or credibility of a sworn police officer; and, 3) can the requirements of the position be filled by a specially-trained civilian.

RECOMMENDAITON: The WPS should conduct a review of the Public Information Officer position. This should include the skill sets that are required to manage the demands and challenges of this position, in particular those presented by the media and social media.

RECOMMENDATION: The WPS should examine the current structure of report reviewing, centered on readers and consider whether this is a best practice. In the discussion, consideration should be given to having patrol sergeants and sergeants assume the primary role of review reports submitted by patrol members.

Chapter VII: Overtime In The WPS

Overtime in Policing: A Brief Review

The management and monitoring of overtime is a predominant issue in North American policing and police services and municipalities are giving increasing attention to this issue. In many jurisdictions, there have been significant increases in police overtime at a time when governments are facing fiscal crises. A report for the U.S. National Institute of Justice pointed out that it is not unusual for a police department to spend up to six percent of its budgets on overtime[156]. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) has noted that historically, "Overtime has been viewed as a sacred cow issue with the police community"[157].

In the new fiscal environment and against the backdrop of discussions of the economics of policing, there are increasing pressures on police services to develop the capacity to monitor and control overtime usage as well as to continually explore ways to reduce overtime by becoming more effective and efficient in the delivery of police services.

Still, even with improvements in overtime management, it is in many instances an unavoidable cost of policing. A previous audit of overtime in the WPS states: "Many of the causes of regular overtime are directly related to police work. The unpredictability of crime, the need to maintain continuity and crime investigations and the need to deal effectively with victims of crime during times of crisis all contribute to overtime that will not be controllable"[158].

The Study of Police Overtime

There are numerous difficulties in attempting to study overtime in a police service. Most often there is no examination of the specific activities and outcomes associated with overtime. Neither is overtime usage tied to the performance of officers or to the effectiveness of their efforts. In an Overtime Status Report produced by the WPS in 2012, it was noted that overtime represented 5% of the WPS total budget in each of the previous four years. This report noted that comparing overtime in the WPS with other police services had only limited value, in that "it does not account for the size of the agency, calls for service, or collective agreement rates"[159].

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[156] Bayley and Worden, 2004
[157] IACP, 2000:1
[158] City of Winnipeg, 1999:2
[159] Winnipeg Police Service, 2012:6

A report[160] on police overtime prepared by the U.S. National Institute of Justice found that:

- There were significant differences among police departments in the amount of attention given to the issue of overtime, the capacity to produce information on the use of overtime, and how overtime was managed.

- Overtime should be viewed, within limits, as a fixed cost of policing. It is not possible to completely eliminate overtime due to the unpredictable nature of policing.

- A reliance on overtime has harmful costs other than monetary, including officer stress and exhaustion, lower morale, and an expectation of overtime pay.

- Overtime practices represent substantial possibilities for savings if properly controlled.

- Management is the key to the effective control of overtime.

- Overtime can be successfully managed by analyzing expenditures with respect to work performed, the rate and amount of payouts and payments to specific individual units and individuals.

Key Questions About Overtime

There are a number of key questions that must be asked with respect to overtime costs in a police service:

Are overtime expenditures justified in terms of the work being done? Police managers need to know how much of the department's work is being performed on an overtime basis, what the specific activities are, and what the specific reasons were for the incurrence of overtime.

Do the police service and the municipality have the capacity to pay for overtime? This requires police managers to know, on an ongoing basis, whether they are "on budget" through the year, so as to avoid cost overruns and the subsequent conflicts that this may cause with city officials and municipal councils.

Is overtime being abused? Police departments need to gather information on, and analyze the patterns of overtime expenditures by individuals, units, and by the nature of the work performed.

Sources of Overtime

The potential sources of overtime in police services include:

- An excess of large public events and visits by high-profile personalities in conjunction with a shortage of patrol and investigative officers

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[160] City of Portland, 2000:5

- Ineffective deployment of patrol and investigative resources

- Excessive sick time

- Off-duty court appearances. In 2012, RCMP members in Halifax spent 3,857 hours of overtime on court appearances in 2012, although they were called to testify in less than one-quarter of the cases[161]

- Understaffing. The primary driver of overtime in the Portland Police Bureau was the lack of personnel to meet minimum staffing needs and the need to extend shifts so that officers could complete emergency calls and write incident reports[162]

- Inefficient shifting of patrol officers[163]

- A spike in resource-intensive case investigations

- Managing mentally ill persons and other responsibilities that have been downloaded on police services as a result of funding cutbacks in health and social services

- Special events

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) has noted that overtime is affected by the multiple mandates assigned to police departments:

> *"The police agency must perform certain tasks as well as any specially mandated programs or initiatives arising from political and community demands or internal enterprises. This includes for example, joint task forces, special sting or undercover operations directed toward abatement of target crimes, or any number of other community initiatives that have political and social urgency attached to them"[164]*

As well, the IACP[165] points out, there are mission requirements that create special staff demands, including demonstrations, crowd control at special events, natural disasters, and emergencies. The issue becomes one of how the police department balances the need to provide services for these situations with the need to control overtime expenditures.

Strategies for Managing and Controlling Overtime

Reviews of police services have found significant differences in police services in the protocols for monitoring and controlling overtime[166]. A number of strategies have been proposed for managing overtime. These relate to court appearances, shift extensions, staff size, emergency mobilizations, and special events.

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[161] Fraser, 2013
[162] City of Portland, 2000:ii
[163] Amendola, 2013
[164] IACP, 2000:1
[165] IACP 2000:1
[166] Bayley and Worden, 1998

- *Court appearances*: agreements between police and court personnel could improve overtime usage by scheduling court appearances to coincide with an officer's usual workday rather than day off. As well, prosecutors could be asked to subpoena only those officers listed on arrest reports whose testimony might be important.

- *Shift extensions:* procedures can be put in place to monitor the decisions to extend the shifts of officers.

- *Staff size:* the extent to which "backfilling" is used to meet minimum shifting levels should be documented and, if necessary, used as the basis for a request for additional new officers.

- *Emergency mobilizations:* the department can ensure that plans and deployment strategies are in place to respond to emergency situations effectively and efficiently.

- *Special events:* the department should ensure that, whenever possible, the provision of officers for special events is reimbursed by event sponsors[167].

In addition, there are several questions that police managers should ask about the use of overtime in their respective sections:

- Are overtime expenditures justified in terms of the work being done?

- Is overtime being abused, in that it is being used in ways that cannot be justified or withstand scrutiny?[168]

Police managers must gather the following types of data on an ongoing basis:

- the department's total obligations and payments for overtime;

- obligations and expenditures for overtime;

- the uses of overtime;

- circumstances of overtime use; and,

- sources of overtime payments[169].

Even with this, observers have pointed out that "Overtime is not a discretionary category that can simply be managed out of existence"[170].

Observers have cautioned, caution, however, that, "It is also important to be realistic about what management can achieve in controlling overtime"[171]. Sensational events, natural disasters, an increase in visits by VIPs, among other factors, are difficult or impossible to predict. Interestingly, some municipal officials in the U.S. have argued

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[167] Bayley and Worden, 1998:5
[168] Bayley and Worden, 1998
[169] Bayley and Worden, 1998:4
[170] Bayley and Worden, 1998:5
[171] Bayley and Worden, 1998:5

that using overtime is more cost-effective than hiring additional officers, one mayor stating: "When you include the benefits, it's not fiscally prudent to hire more officers, because in the long run, you're going to pay more money"[172]. Other municipal officials note that police overtime allows for flexibility in the deployment of officers.

It has been noted that it is the police managers in the middle ranks that are often responsible for making overtime decisions, yet note that "Most of the factors that determine overtime are beyond the control of any middle-rank manager, such as contract regulations, calls for service, crime emergencies, vacations, injuries, retirements, and approval for special events"[173].

SELECTED REVIEWS OF POLICE OVERTIME

Over the past decade, there have been a number of reviews of overtime in police services, the majority of them sponsored by municipal councils.

Of concern is that studies of overtime often reveal that individual police officers are making two or three times their base salaries in overtime payments. This not only has fiscal implications, but also raises a number of concerns about the impact of high rates of overtime on the physical and mental health of officers. Stress and fatigue associated with working long hours can impact an officer's judgment as well as their personal and family life. This, in turn, may result in additional costs. There is also the concern that overtime has for many officers become a relied-upon source of income for living expenses. And there is concern that some officers have become accustomed to overtime as part of their occupation, a public policy expert stating, "Police have come to expect that extra 20, 25% in pay. It's become a part of the culture of public safety"[174].

Edmonton Police Service

 Among the recommendations of a review of overtime in the Edmonton Police Service were the following[175]:

1. A police service must have a comprehensive policy that clearly communicates senior management's expectations regarding the use of overtime, and provides an appropriate framework for monitoring, managing, and controlling the use of overtime.

2. A police service benefits from consistently applied overtime authorization and approval practices.

3. It is critical that all time committed by officers in addition to their regular shift be tracked and monitored to provide a clear picture of the days/hours they are working and to determine the potential impacts on officers work/life balance, health and effectiveness.

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[172] Buote, 2005:2
[173] Bayley and Worden, 1998:7
[174] Horstman, 2009:5
[175] City of Edmonton, Office of the City Auditor, 2004

4. An important step in managing and controlling overtime is an understanding of the work being done on overtime and what is driving overtime usage. Because overtime represents work performed at premium rates, managers need tools they can use to assist them in determining whether the same work could have been performed at less cost.

5. A variety of factors contribute to the use of overtime. A Service must examine the impacts of staffing decisions made (e.g. loans, secondments, banked time, and training) and develop a plan to mitigate these impacts over the long term.

6. Clearly defined and consistently applied overtime claim processes, including criteria for supervisory approval, and claim form completion, review and processing are critical to facilitating the effective use of overtime.

7. Sufficient information on overtime usage must be captured to provide an adequate audit trail to support overtime expenditures. Management should perform regular audits of overtime claims to ensure claim validity.

8. Recognizing that there will always be unforeseen circumstances that cannot be planned for or reasonably controlled, budget planning processes should take into account environmental changes and organizational practices that will likely require overtime, and consider these to project more accurately the overtime hours and costs for each unit.

9. The effectiveness and efficiency of planned overtime to supplement staffing in high needs areas or during peak activity periods should be carefully assessed, and when utilized, regularly reviewed to explore alternatives to minimize overtime use.

A key point made in the review was that the efficient use of overtime minimizes the number of members deployed on overtime and maximizes their use of core time. The Review noted: "Because overtime represents police work that is performed at premium rates, managers need the ability to determine whether the same work could have been performed at less cost on straight time"[176].

The Ottawa Police Service

A review of overtime in the Ottawa Police Service set forth a number of recommendations "to improve policy, process and information systems to ensure that overtime resources were adequately monitored and managed in an efficient, effective and economical manner"[177]. These included:

1. changing the culture towards overtime;

2. developing and implementing detailed overtime management policy;

3. changing shifts to meet workload demands;

4. including overtime management and performance reviews;

5. preapproval of overtime and,

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[176] City of Edmonton, Office of the City Auditor, 2004:10
[177] Ottawa Police Services Board, 2009:2

6. tracking reasons for overtime usage[178].

The Portland Police Bureau

A review of overtime conducted in the Portland Police Bureau in 2003 recommended that the Bureau explore additional ways in which to increase patrol officer availability, including increasing civilianization, reassessing minimum staffing levels and the deployment of available officers between precincts, and the reassignment of as many officers as possible from non-patrol to patrol duties[179]. A more recent review recommended that the Bureau more tightly control overtime, transfer officers from special units to fill gaps in patrol, and assign a person to manage overtime[180].

Winnipeg Police Service (1999)

A review of overtime in the Winnipeg Police Service, produced in 1999, found the following[181]:

- the WPS lacked detailed overtime budgets;

- monitoring and reporting of overtime use was inconsistent and inadequate;

- court overtime accounted for approximately 41% of overtime;

- in 57% of cases of court appearances, the officer did not testify;

- management information systems did not provide adequate information to allow effective monitoring of overtime;

- there was no policy on limits for individual rates of overtime; and,

- many of the causes of police overtime were beyond the direct control of the WPS and were due to "the unique nature of police work in the need for officers to respond to incidents that are unpredictable and which require continuity in their investigation … the obligation for officers to appear as police witnesses and to respond to changes in provincial and federal laws and systems."

The audit report concluded that the environment in which the WPS operates precludes the WPS from eliminating overtime. However, there is opportunity for improvement, given comparisons to levels of overtime experienced by other police services"[182].

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[178] Ottawa Police Services Board, 2009:3
[179] Portland Police Bureau, 2003:39
[180] Bernstein, 2013
[181] City of Winnipeg, 1999:4
[182] City of Winnipeg, 1999:4

The audit report recommended that the WPS executive develop a formal comprehensive policy that deals with all causes of overtime. This policy should outline the objectives of the policy, set standardized controls that are to be in place in each division, list the responsibilities and accountabilities with respect to controls and results and provide guidelines for operational decisions including the maintenance of service standards. The policy should specify appropriate uses of overtime the risks associated with high individual rates of overtime should be reviewed criteria to be considered when authorizing overtime should be established and included in the policy"[183].

Senior management of the WPS agreed with these recommendations and committed to addressing the issues. The extent to which these recommendations are implemented and substantial changes in the monitoring and use of overtime in the WPS is not apparent.

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[183] City of Winnipeg Audit Department, 1999:4-5

The WPS Overtime Study

The review of overtime in the WPS was completed as part of a larger operational review. Overtime data covering the three-year period from the beginning of 2010 to the end of 2012 were secured from the WPS and subjected to detailed statistical analysis. The objective of the analysis was to determine the nature and extent of overtime use, the primary drivers of overtime, and the variables that were associated with overtime use.

GENERAL STATISTICS

The dataset provided by the WPS contained overtime data for 1994 employees (unique EmpID's) over a three year period, from the beginning of 2010 to the end of 2012. Overall, these 1994 employees had 156,531 instances of overtime. There was a range in the number of employees who claimed overtime during this period. Forty-six employees had one overtime occurrence, as compared to the other end of the overtime continuum, occupied by one employee who recorded 466 instances of overtime. Ten employees had more than 365 instances of overtime, which indicates there was an overtime occurrence, on average, once every three days. These ten employees collectively earned $1,376,870.27 in overtime over the three years, with the highest earning individual collecting $192,360.83 in OT. Overall there were 647,787.7 hours of overtime worked through the three years. The overall average pay-factor was 1.57.

When looking at the workforce, based on the overtime information provided for this report, the number of employees within each rank were counted in order to estimate the proportion of each rank that make up the workforce. Figure 15 shows the top 10 largest rank of employees. constables make up the largest portion (52.17%) of the workforce, with 1200 employees[184].

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[184] Counting number of employees within each rank, if a person moved from one position to another, they're counted once for each position. If an employee has never taken OT, they would not be included in the underlying data, and hence would not be included in these numbers.

Figure 15 – The Top 10 Largest Employee Ranks

Rank	Count of Employees	Percentage of Employees
CONS	1200	52.17%
PSGT	185	8.04%
SGT	130	5.65%
DSGT	127	5.52%
CADET	102	4.43%
PCO	76	3.30%
CLKB	62	2.70%
SSGT	41	1.78%
DVEOP	33	1.43%
CPICO	30	1.30%

Employee Rank

Figure 16 shows the top 10 highest ranks with the highest worked hours. By far, constables work the highest number of hours of overtime (72.44%). Their overtime hours as a group is approximately 2.6 times the amount of all other WPS employees *combined*. Considering that constables compose 52 percent of the employee workforce (see footnote 184), it is evident that they work a disproportionate amount of OT. This remains the case even when pay-factor is taken into account. Translating this into dollars earned in OT, constables earned, over the three years, a total of $25.5 million, again by far the largest portion of the total with about 2.2 times the remainder of the employees *combined*.

Figure 16 – Ranks Having the Top 10 Highest Worked Hours

Rank	Total Worked Hours
CONS	469,231.63
DSGT	51,583.74
PSGT	38,108.45
SGT	37,321.82
ICONS	10,003.05
PCO	8,434.67
CADET	4,132.01
SSGT	4,057.01
RCONS	2,816.88
DVEOP	2,694.51

Figure 17 – Ranks Having the Top 10 Highest Overtime Hours, Taking into Account the Pay-Factor

Rank	Total Worked Hours x Pay Factor
CONS	707,135.40
DSGT	80,207.23
PSGT	54,886.37
SGT	54,781.58
PCO	13,391.37
ICONS	13,084.30
CADET	7,319.00
SSGT	5,903.02
DVEOP	4,349.50
CLKB	4,178.25

Figure 18 – Ranks Having the Top 10 Highest Earned in Overtime

Rank	Total Amount Earned in Overtime
CONS	$25,547,893.79
DSGT	$3,686,382.42
SGT	$2,656,562.57
PSGT	$2,507,444.14
ICONS	$578,436.92
PCO	$419,143.00
SSGT	$305,159.25
RCONS	$175,242.60
CLKB	$114,177.62
DVEOP	$112,242.98

Overtime Assignment

A further analysis of overtime was conducted by breaking down the Executive Unit the overtime was assigned to. The largest section of overtime was charged to 'Uniform' both in terms of total hours worked overtime (295,115.49 hours), and the total number of instances (85,761) of overtime. This represents $15.4 million spent on overtime, or 41.62% of the resources spent on overtime. The finding that patrol officers incur the greatest amount of overtime resources is reaffirmed later in this report.

Figure 19 – Overtime Broken down by Respective Assignments

Assignments	Total Worked Hours	Total Worked Hours x Pay	Total Amount
Charged to Uniform	295,115.49	447,784.25	$15,408,758.79
Charged to Invest	135,773.45	207,668.77	$8,970,885.59
Charged to OSS	68,446.63	100,344.80	$4,248,288.94
Charged to Support	67,435.44	97,914.25	$3,669,457.35
Charged to Executive	58,113.90	87,733.23	$3,550,143.87
Charged to DSS	22,898.79	32,650.44	$1,173,060.43

Overtime by the Employee's Division

When the overtime is broken down by the division to which it is allocated (Figure 20), it can be seen that the top 10 divisions incurred 85.64% of the overtime occurrences, despite having only 64.78% of the employees. The top four users of overtime make up 48.31% of the overtime hours worked. These proportions are consistent even

when pay factor (Figure 21) is taken into account, or the dollar figures associated to the overtime are used (Figure 22).

Figure 20 – Divisions Having the Top 10 Highest Worked Hours

Division	Total Worked Hours
Div 40	82,256.54
Div 11	79,415.96
Div 50	76,475.22
Div 13	74,806.16
Div 14	53,556.71
Chiefs Off	51,636.65
Div 12	37,049.90
Div 42	35,325.41
Div 16	32,438.08
Div 51	31,788.91

Figure 21 – Divisions Having the Top 10 Highest Overtime Hours, Taking into Account the Pay-Factor

Division	Total Worked Hours x Pay Factor
Div 40	129,953.27
Div 11	120,588.72
Div 13	113,809.43
Div 50	111,732.82
Div 14	79,963.52
Chiefs Off	78,473.73
Div 12	55,951.55
Div 42	50,132.58
Div 16	48,321.92
Div 51	46,443.68

Figure 22 – Divisions Having the Top 10 Highest Earned in Overtime

Division	Total Amount Earned in Overtime
Div 40	$ 5,645,634.18
Div 50	$ 4,604,525.33
Div 11	$ 4,126,989.82
Div 13	$ 3,995,985.53
Chiefs Off	$ 3,162,238.29
Div 14	$ 2,695,824.22
Div 42	$ 2,144,385.65
Div 12	$ 2,023,082.62
Div 51	$ 1,963,855.55
Div 16	$ 1,654,637.55

When the number of hours worked in each division is broken down by year, the percentage of overtime worked is relatively consistent across the various divisions. There are two notable exceptions: Divisions 50 and 51 (Figure 23).

- Division 50 saw an increase in the number of worked hours between 2010 and 2011, but a dramatic decline from 2011 to 2012. In 2010 and 2011 Division 50 was *the* highest user of overtime by a not-so-small margin, but in 2012 it dropped to being the 7th largest user of overtime resources. This finding may be due to various reorganizations that have occurred over the years.

- Division 51, however, didn't seem to exist, at least as far as overtime was concerned, in 2010, and then quickly became the third largest user of overtime worked hours and amount earned.

Figure 23 – Annual Breakdown of Worked Hours for Divisions 50 and 51

	2010	2011	2012	% of Total
Div 50	13.34%	15.39%	6.54%	11.81%
	$1,652,839.78	$2,061,998.50	$889,687.05	
Div 51	0.00%	2.87%	11.93%	4.91%
		$393,667.97	$1,570,187.58	

OVERTIME IN EMPLOYEE UNITS

Breaking down the total worked hours by the unit the employee belongs to, it can be seen that General Patrol is by far the largest contributor to the worked hours, with approximately 30% of the worked hours going to that unit alone (Figure 24). This even though only 17.52% of the employees are in that unit. 82.8% of the total overtime worked hours goes to the top 10 units with overtime hours worked. The pattern is similar when pay-factor is taken into account (Figure 25), and is still consistent when the dollar expenses associated with the overtime are calculated (Figure 26). However, putting the overtime earned in dollar amounts, it can be seen that General Patrol only uses 25.4% of the overtime resources, still a much higher proportion when compared to the distribution of employees, with General Patrol having only 17.52% of the employees. This indicates that General Patrol is working overtime at a much higher rate than the average WPS employee.

As noted, constables use a disproportionally large amount of overtime when compared to other WPS employees. Since within General Patrol 95.33% of the overtime is incurred by constables, it is reasonable to conclude that the constable group is also driving the disproportionally large amount of overtime in the General Patrol unit.

Figure 24 – Units Having the Top 10 Highest Worked Hours

Unit	Total Worked Hours
Gen Patrl	194,579.80
Group 2	72,559.39
Investign	51,438.04
Specl Proj	49,470.31
Group 1	46,147.29
Traffic	43,602.05
Comm Supp	23,191.84
StreetCrme	21,924.91
Forensics	17,273.17
Training	16,040.00

Figure 25 – Units Having the Top 10 Highest Overtime Hours, Taking into Account the Pay-Factor

Unit	Total Worked Hours x Pay Factor
Gen Patrl	289,774.82
Group 2	111,530.36
Investign	82,253.67
Specl Proj	75,840.73
Group 1	71,693.99
Traffic	62,488.47
Comm Supp	34,773.15
StreetCrme	33,697.55
N/A	24,263.71
Forensics	22,909.84

Figure 26 – Units having the top 10 highest earned in Overtime

Unit	Total Amount Earned in Overtime
Gen Patrl	$ 9,429,060.00
Group 2	$ 4,759,457.69
Investign	$ 3,211,730.33
Specl Proj	$ 3,028,301.97
Group 1	$ 2,839,493.72
Traffic	$ 2,633,767.97
StreetCrme	$ 1,372,335.79
Comm Supp	$ 1,341,534.40
Forensics	$ 1,006,987.64
Training	$ 841,443.13

These patterns were consistent throughout the three years. When broken into the three separate years, each of the units used approximately the same percentage of overtime year-to-year. Some variation could be seen

however, with Tactical using no overtime resources in 2010, but using 1.76% and 2.83% of the resources in 2012 and 2012, respectively. However, no other significant change was observed.

OVERTIME AND THE COST CENTER OF THE EMPLOYEE

The Cost Center column of each employee's overtime data contained errors, with 5.61% of the entries in the WPS dataset containing either a blank value (1.47%) or a code for which there was no associated category or description (4.14%). These were removed from the analysis.

Looking at the top 10 users of overtime worked hours, the top 10 Cost Centers collectively had assigned to them 72.5% of the overtime hours while having only 47.73% of the employees assigned to them.

These patterns were consistent when taking pay-factor into account, or even when looking at the dollar amount spent on overtime. The largest Cost Center in terms of overtime dollars, PO-Division #11, used 11.68% of the total WPS dollars spent on overtime, while having only 7.95% of the workforce.

Figure 27 – Cost Center having the top 10 highest worked hours

Cost Center	Total Worked Hours
PO-Division #11	78,214.72
PO-Division #13	73,998.95
PO-Homicide/MajCrimes/Analyst/Hate Crimes/NWEST [Retired Code]	53,798.67
PO-Division #14	52,887.01
PO-Special Projects	49,338.64
PO-Traffic Division/Impaired Driving/Collision/Inspect	32,805.43
PO-Division #16	31,987.22
PO-Division #12	30,504.68
PO-OrgGang/Green Team/IPOC	23,636.87
PO-Forensic Identification	15,457.59

Figure 28 – Cost Center having the top 10 highest overtime hours, taking into account the pay-factor

Cost Center	Total Worked Hours x Pay Factor
PO-Division #11	118,749.34
PO-Division #13	112,574.16
PO-Homicide/MajCrimes/Analyst/HateCrimes/NWEST [Retired Code]	85,453.52
PO-Division #14	78,956.38
PO-Special Projects	75,641.22
PO-Division #16	47,600.90
PO-Traffic Division/Impaired Driving/Collision/Inspect	46,277.71
PO-Division #12	46,141.41
PO-OrgGang/Green Team/IPOC	37,183.25

PO-Tactical Support Team	22,054.46

Figure 29 – Cost Center having the top 10 highest earned in OT

Cost Center	Total Amount Earned in Overtime
PO-Division #11	$ 4,062,955.64
PO-Division #13	$ 3,950,889.90
PO-Homicide/MajCrimes/Analyst/Hate Crimes/NWEST [Retired Code]	$ 3,764,685.39
PO-Special Projects	$ 3,020,127.81
PO-Division #14	$ 2,658,183.37
PO-Traffic Division/Impaired Driving/Collision/Inspect	$ 1,949,836.45
PO-Division #16	$ 1,627,704.86
PO-Division #12	$ 1,606,955.00
PO-OrgGang/Green Team/IPOC	$ 1,560,408.15
PO-Sex Crimes/ChildAbuse/ViClas	$ 937,008.08

These numbers were consistent over time, with no notable exceptions.

TYPE OF OVERTIME

There two types of overtime: EDL (Earned Days Leave) and PAY overtime for extra pay). Of the 648 thousand overtime worked hours over the three years, 503 thousand (77.72%) were paid as part of overtime pay, translating into a cost of $30 million (81.77% of total). The remaining 144 thousand (22.28%) worked hours were "paid" to the employee as paid time off from work, having a monetized cost of $6.75 million (18.23%). This is shown in Figure 30.

These results were relatively consistent over the three-year period studied.

Figure 30 – Breakdown of overtime figures by type of overtime.

Pay type	Total Worked Hours		Total Converted Hours		Total Amount in $	
EDL	144,319.04	(22.28%)	191,714.53	(19.68%)	$6,749,756.47	(18.23%)
PAY	503,468.66	(77.72%)	782,387.21	(80.32%)	$30,271,096.42	(81.77%)
Grand Total	**647,787.70**	**(100.00%)**	**974,101.74**	**(100.00%)**	**$37,020,852.89**	**(100.00%)**

REASON FOR OVERTIME

When examining the reasons for overtime, it can be seen that the majority of hours worked in overtime is due to continuing investigations (28.58% of total hours worked and 29.26% of total expenses towards OT). This was followed by callouts for 'other reason' and a category called 'other' which do not reveal any details as to what

the reason was, but in total consumed 29.11% of WPS employee's time and 28.72% of overtime expenses in dollar terms.

Reason	Worked Hours		Converted Hours		Amount Earned	
Continuing Investigation	185,138.33	(28.58%)	298,577.63	(30.65%)	$10,830,778.06	(29.26%)
Callout for Other Reason	95,092.67	(14.68%)	154,276.79	(15.84%)	$6,315,166.54	(17.06%)
Other	93,483.69	(14.43%)	113,363.34	(11.64%)	$4,315,665.71	(11.66%)
Court attendance	87,891.35	(13.57%)	132,370.36	(13.59%)	$4,893,358.73	(13.22%)
Project	64,048.51	(9.89%)	99,115.55	(10.18%)	$4,027,712.27	(10.88%)
Callout for Min Strength	28,213.84	(4.36%)	43,112.89	(4.43%)	$1,667,106.98	(4.50%)
Standby	27,713.67	(4.28%)	27,719.00	(2.85%)	$1,275,502.87	(3.45%)
Court Attendance Traffic	21,146.97	(3.26%)	32,016.84	(3.29%)	$1,278,123.99	(3.45%)
Incident in progress (Civilian)	17,180.00	(2.65%)	27,370.20	(2.81%)	$895,137.51	(2.42%)
Heldover per Duty Inspector	11,567.50	(1.79%)	19,537.71	(2.01%)	$559,004.03	(1.51%)
Heldover per Supervisor	8,000.50	(1.24%)	13,559.79	(1.39%)	$396,980.62	(1.07%)
Callout for Specialty Unit	6,016.17	(0.93%)	9,557.27	(0.98%)	$413,312.50	(1.12%)
Callout for Project	2,294.50	(0.35%)	3,524.37	(0.36%)	$153,003.08	(0.41%)
Grand Total	647,787.70		974,101.74		$37,020,852.89	

These values were consistent year-to-year over the three year time period with only a few notable exceptions. First, in 2010 Continuing Investigation took 25.20% of total overtime hours worked, while that increased to 28.66% then to 31.88% in 2011 and 2012 respectively. Second, another reason with this scale of change was 'Callout for Other Reason', which increased from 11.46% in 2010 to 16.30% in 2011 and finally to 16.21% in 2012. Finally, most interestingly 'Incident in Progress (Civilian)' experienced a drop in hours of overtime worked from 7.59% in 2010 to 0.30% in 2011 and finally to 0.16% in 2012.

This large change also translated into a similar size change in terms of the dollar amount of overtime, with Continuing Investigation using 26.17% of dollar expenses in 2010, 29.01% in 2011 and then 32.35% in 2012. 'Callout for Other Reason' meanwhile increased from 13.35% in 2010 to 18.83% in 2011 and finally to 18.69% in 2012. 'Incident in Progress (Civilian)' meanwhile went from 7.10% (2010) of expenses to 0.34% (2011) then 0.20% (2012).

The other categories experienced only slight fluctuations of several percentage points, but nothing significant. This is summarized in Figure 32.

Figure 32 – Breakdown of overtime by reason then by time

	Worked Hours (% of total)			OT Amount Earned (% of total)		
Row Labels	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Continuing Investigation	25.20%	28.66%	31.88%	26.17%	29.01%	32.35%
Callout for Other Reason	11.46%	16.30%	16.21%	13.35%	18.83%	18.69%
Other	15.09%	14.96%	13.23%	12.53%	12.36%	10.15%
Court attendance	14.77%	12.72%	13.25%	14.43%	12.32%	13.01%
Project	10.87%	10.07%	8.72%	12.18%	11.01%	9.55%
Callout for Min Strength	4.81%	5.07%	3.16%	4.79%	5.26%	3.48%
Standby	4.21%	4.23%	4.40%	3.41%	3.38%	3.54%
Court Attendance Traffic	2.17%	3.55%	4.05%	2.14%	3.74%	4.38%
Incident in progress (Civilian)	7.59%	0.30%	0.16%	7.10%	0.34%	0.20%
Heldover per Duty Inspector	1.45%	1.90%	2.00%	1.34%	1.57%	1.61%
Heldover per Supervisor	1.29%	1.42%	0.99%	1.22%	1.20%	0.82%
Callout for Specialty Unit	1.10%	0.82%	0.88%	1.36%	0.98%	1.04%
Callout for Project	0.00%	0.00%	1.08%	0.00%	0.00%	1.21%
Grand Total	**100.00%**	**100.00%**	**100.00%**	**100.00%**	**100.00%**	**100.00%**

ACTIVITY FOR OVERTIME

Investigating overtime through the various activities they were flagged as, it was found that 10.07% of the overtime worked hours were not categorized into an activity, that is, it was not possible to determine which activity that overtime event was responsible for. These events were removed from the dataset. Of the rest, most of the overtime activity was spent on general patrol (88,220 hours, or 15.14% of the total overtime for WPS)[185], with the top 10 activities being responsible for 73.53% of the overtime worked hours and 73.45% in terms of dollars earned. Figure 33 and Figure 34 respectively show the top 10 activities in terms of hours worked, and the top 10 activities in terms of dollar equivalent.

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[185] General Patrol's overtime will be examined further in the Patrol chapters.

Figure 33 – Top 10 Highest Activities For Overtime Worked
Hours

Figure 34 – Top 10 Highest Earned in Overtime Activities

Activity	Total Worked Hours
General Patrol	88,220.68
Arrest	68,556.50
Court - Did not Testify	66,094.10
Investigation general	53,936.00
Fitness Appraisal	49,469.67
Project	39,805.34
Arrest and Report	24,700.67
Court - Testified	15,183.91
Traffic Collision Investigation	11,352.85
Search Warrant	11,040.67

Unit	Total Amount Earned in Overtime
Arrest	$ 4,358,541.14
General Patrol	$ 4,332,360.31
Investigation general	$ 3,842,412.73
Court - Did not Testify	$ 3,621,225.65
Project	$ 2,565,645.27
Fitness Appraisal	$ 1,854,167.70
Arrest and Report	$ 1,526,588.22
Court - Testified	$ 890,283.42
Search Warrant	$ 725,177.55
Surveillance	$ 598,098.63

When broken down to annual numbers, the number of hours worked was very consistent year-to-year. The biggest change in worked hours was a decrease from 8.28% in 2010 to 5.76% in 2011 of overtime as a result of projects (identified simply as project in the list of activities from the dataset). This same decrease carried over to the amount earned in terms of dollars. No other significant change was found.

INCIDENT TYPE

The type of incident causing overtime was also investigated. Unfortunately 38.70% of the events did not have an incident associated with it, and hence were removed from the analysis. Of the remaining 99 identified incident types, the top incident type was murder, taking 27,654 overtime hours, or 9.57% of the total worked overtime hours in WPS. The top 10 incident types were responsible for a total of 147,255.72 hours (50.98% of total) and a total of $9,277,029.49 (52.61% of total) of costs. This is summarized in Figure 35 and Figure 36.

Figure 35 – Top 10 Highest Incident Types For overtime Worked Hrs

Figure 36 – Top 10 Highest Incident Types In overtime Activities

Incident	Total Worked Hours
Murder (Occ Type)	27,654.00
Warrants - To Arrest/Search	24,009.85
Robbery - Commercial Premise	18,089.00
Domestics	13,348.68
All Assaults/No Wpn/Non Sexual	11,527.84
All Aslts With Wpn / Non Sexual	11,115.00
Robbery – Person	10,760.33
Stabbing	10,357.85
Sexual Assaults - Adult	10,275.67
Drug Offence	10,117.50

Unit	Total Amount Earned in OT
Murder (Occ Type)	$ 2,048,579.21
Warrants - To Arrest/Search	$ 1,459,695.27
Robbery - Commercial Premise	$ 1,189,100.62
Domestics	$ 680,016.12
Sexual Assaults – Adult	$ 665,325.75
All Aslts With Wpn / Non Sexual	$ 663,478.89
Drug Offence	$ 660,551.55
Robbery – Person	$ 658,458.57
All Assaults/No Wpn/Non Sexual	$ 644,519.84
Stabbing	$ 607,303.67

Disaggregating by calendar year, it was found that overtime as a result of cases involving murder jumped from 8.17% in 2010 to 12.12% in 2011. This rate fell back to 8.48% in 2012, but the increase in 2011 was the largest increase (then decrease) of all the categories for overtime. This could possibly have been as a result of Winnipeg having "the highest rate of homicides per capita of any major city in the country in 2011, with 39 deaths"[186]. Comparative statistics for 2010 and 2012 were not available, but according to Statistics Canada, the Crime Severity Index of Winnipeg increased 6% in 2011[187]. This increase in murders could have resulted in an increase in overtime as a result of murder investigations, and an additional $323,313.05.

OVERTIME USAGE BY TIME

Annual Breakdown of Worked Hours

As seen in Figure 37, the total number of hours worked in a year by the 1994 employees of WPS stayed relatively consistent across the three years of this study, between 212 and 222 thousand hours. This led to a total overtime payment of approximately $12 million of each of the three years, for a total of $37 million over the three years. Year-to-year, there did not seem to be any significant fluctuation between the years.

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[186] CTV News, 2013
[187] Statistics Canada, 2013

Figure 37 – Annual Breakdown Of Worked And Converted Hours For Officers, Along With The Associated Dollar Cost

Year	Sum of Worked Hours	Sum of Converted Hours	Sum of Amount
2010	212,927.92	320,005.61	$11,648,530.21
2011	221,772.96	334,372.26	$12,723,324.19
2012	213,086.82	319,723.87	$12,648,998.49
Grand Total	**647,787.70**	**974,101.74**	**$37,020,852.89**

Quarterly Breakdown of Worked Hours

For each three month period, the number of hours worked stayed relatively consistent between 46 and 59 thousand hours (total for the quarter). There does not seem to be any consistent seasonal fluctuation. For example, in 2010 and 2012 the fourth quarter has the lowest amount of overtime hours, but this same quarter is relatively high in 2011. Similarly, the third quarter has the highest amount of overtime in 2011 and 2012, but the same is not true for 2010. Thus, there does not seem to be any indication of seasonality for overtime earned. The same pattern holds when the pay-factor is taken into account.

Figure 39 shows the overtime as the amount earned by the employees, broken down by quarters. The trends are similar to those in Figure 38, with no apparent pattern visible. It seems that WPS employees do not follow quarterly patterns in their overtime usage.

Figure 39 – Quarterly Breakdown Of overtime Earned

Figure 39 – Quarterly Breakdown Of overtime Earned

Monthly Breakdown of Worked Hours

Disaggregating the overtime into monthly numbers (Figure 40) shows that the number of worked hours consistently falls in between a total of 15,000 and 20,000 hours worked force-wide every month. Two notable exceptions are August of 2011 and September of 2012. The average number of hours worked in overtime in a month was 17,994.1.

Two months with the lowest overtime numbers are December of 2010 and December of 2012. This might indicate that employees take on less overtime during the holidays, or that certain employees take on less overtime than others when compared to any other month. However, when looking at the distribution of rankings for those that took overtime in Dec 2010 or Dec 2012, when compared to the distribution over the three years, no noticeable pattern was found. Approximately 75% of the overtime instances were by constables (CONS), 4% by sergeants (SGT), 4% by patrol sergeants (PSGT) and 7% by detective sergeants. It seems that the distribution of the various ranks taking overtime does not vary with holidays.

There did not seem to be a pattern when looking at seasonal variation. There was no pattern in the summer months, expected to have less overtime due to holidays, or more overtime due to summer activities, which require more police presence. In 2010 the summer months show a decline of overtime as opposed to spring of 2010, while the opposite is true in 2011 and 2012.

Monthly Breakdown of Converted Hours

Figure 40 also shows the amount of overtime taking into account the pay-factor of the employee. The patterns are the same month-to-month as the worked hours. In fact, looking at the pay-factor itself, the average pay-factor for each month is very close to the average pay-factor over the entire three years. This, in addition to the similarity of rankings month-to-month seems to indicate that the same types of employees are taking OT, and there is no discernible difference in the type of employee taking overtime.

Figure 40 – Monthly Breakdown Of Worked And Converted Hours For Officers

Monthly Breakdown of Amount Spent on OT

WPS spends, on average, $1.03 million dollars on overtime a month (Figure 41). This number varies between $800,000 and $1.28 million with a pattern similar to that seen in Figure 40. Month-to-month, there did not seem to be any specific individual driving the overtime amounts. For example, in September 2012 (the month with

the highest overtime costs), the employee with the highest overtime earned $12,077.35, a significant amount, but not unique, and an overall small portion of the total amount paid in overtime for that month. Similar patterns were observed in other months, with the highest paid employee earning $13,337.96 for the month of August 2011, for example.

August 2011 was disaggregated further looking at how many individual employees earned various amounts of OT. As seen in Figure 42, most employees (60.5%) earned less than $1,000 in overtime, and 90% of the employees earned less than $3,000. The top 14.7% (158 of 1070) of employees earned half of the overtime.

Breakdown of Worked Hours Per Day of Week

When breaking down the number of worked hours by their corresponding day-of-the-week (Figure 43), the amount of overtime worked was consistent from Monday to Thursday at very close to 100,000 hours. This value however decreases Fridays, and further on Saturdays, before increasing yet again on Sunday. The pattern is almost identical when pay-factor is taken into account, or when the dollar amount earned is examined (Figure 44).

Breaking this pattern down over the three years, the patterns observed above remain consistent (Figure 45), with Saturdays consistently having the lowest amount of overtime, followed by Sundays. Monday through Thursday consistently have the highest number of worked hours of overtime. This is likely due to court appearances (whether the officer testified or not), and the number of units on duty that may result in an extended tour or additional hours for an ongoing investigation.

Figure 43 – Breakdown Of Worked And Converted Hours Per Day Of Week

Breakdown of Worked/Converted Hours per Day-of-Week

Figure 44 – Breakdown Of Amount Earned, By Day Of Week

Worked Hours Broken Down per Day-of-Week

Breakdown of Worked Hours Per Day of Week, Per Division

Breaking the hours worked down further to identify how the distribution varies across different divisions, Figure 46 shows when various divisions use overtime. In general, each of the divisions is consistent with the overall pattern. However, a notable exception to this is Division 34: while the overall pattern indicates that Saturdays are consistently the days when overtime is least used, Division 34 clocks in the highest overtime amount (approximately 15,000 hours) on Saturdays, while the lowest on Sundays (approximately 9,500 hours). While the overall pattern indicates that Wednesday and Thursday are the highest overtime hours, Division 34 has those two days as one of their lowest.

The Chief's Office has a similar pattern with Saturday showing their highest number of worked overtime hours.

Similar to Figure 46, which shows the divisions with the highest overtime figures, Figure 47 shows the worked overtime for each division that has the lowest overtime. The patterns in Figure 47 are similar to those of the overall pattern, albeit with a little more variation in values.

Worked Hours Broken Down per Day-of-Week per Division

Daily OT

Due to the large number of days in a single year, and the desire to keep the data at the daily level (aggregating to the weekly level would have hidden much of the fluctuation), the analysis was done on the daily level, but focusing on each Quarter of the year.

2010Q1 - Figure 48

The graph shows that, on general, during Q1 of 2010, the number of worked overtime hours fluctuates approximately between 400 to 800 hours, with some certain exceptions. The lowest amounts of overtime are usually on a Saturday (519 hours on average) and Sunday (393.87 hours on average), as opposed to the other days, where the number of overtime hours varies between 600 to 800 hours each day on average.

There is one very large spike, February 11, lasting approximately two days. This spike could be as a result of several robberies, which occurred the night before[188]: three commercial robberies, one stabbing, one vehicle robbery and one attempted residential robbery. For those two days, constables recorded 2617.38 hours of overtime, which is 86.21% of recorded overtime for the two days. This is significantly higher than the usual share of constables' OT, which is 72.44% of all overtime for that day. During these two days, the "Chiefs Off" division took 62.75% of the OT, while this same division only took 7.97% of the overtime over the entire three years. Similarly, the Special Projects Unit was responsible for 62.62% of the overtime during those two days, while they are usually responsible for only 7.64% of the overtime during the entire three-year period, and while general patrol is responsible for 30.04% of the OT, during these two days they were only responsible for 17.87% of the OT.

Figure 48 – Breakdown Of Worked overtime Per Day – 2010Q1

2010Q2 - Figure 49

The graph shows that, on general, during Q2 of 2010, the number of worked overtime hours was similar to that in Q1. There are perhaps some more days where the number of overtime hours is greater than 1000, but the

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[188] Winnipeg Police Service Media Release, Feb. 2010

patterns are similar. However, the fewest number of overtime hours still occur on Sundays (456.14 hours on average).

The only discrepancy seemed to be the two consecutive days of higher-than-average overtime worked on Tuesday, May 25th and Wednesday, May 26th with approximately 1200h of overtime each day (the average overtime for the quarter was 748.70 hours and 687.71 hours for Tuesdays and Wednesdays, respectively). The overtime seemed to be a one-time event, which could have been as a result of National Missing Children's Day[189].

Figure 49 – Breakdown Of Worked overtime Per Day – 2010Q2

2010Q3 - Figure 50

Q3 of 2010 was, in general, very similar in pattern to 2010Q1 and 2010Q2. The only discrepancy seems to be August 7th, with an unusually high spike of 1,128 hours of OT. The spike in overtime only lasted a single day, but it seemed to have been a busy day for WPS, with a homicide, a shooting, and three stabbings occurring on that day[190].

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[189] Winnipeg Police Service Media Release, May 2010
[190] Winnipeg Police Service Media Release, Aug 2010

Figure 50 – Breakdown Of Worked overtime Per Day – 2010Q3

Figure 50 – Breakdown Of Worked overtime Per Day – 2010Q3

2010Q4 - Figure 51

2010Q4 had no unusual patterns or fluctuations, and the quarter seems generally average, with the exception of the holiday (Christmas) towards the end of the Quarter, where the amount of overtime drops off very significantly, where, for seven days straight, there are very low numbers of overtime worked hours posted by WPS employees.

Figure 51 – Breakdown Of Worked overtime Per Day – 2010Q4

Figure 51 – Breakdown Of Worked overtime Per Day – 2010Q4

2011Q1 - Figure 52

Q1 of 2011 follows the patterns as usual, with Saturdays and Sundays having the least amount of overtime worked. There were three consistent days of relatively high overtime between February 8th and 10th, but no apparent reason was found for this, but since the three days weren't that out of the ordinary, it is possible that there is no specific reason for the spike.

Figure 52 – Breakdown Of Worked overtime Per Day – 2011Q1

2011Q2 - Figure 53

Q2 of 2011 follows the patterns of the other quarters. The only exception seems to be a spike on May 16[th,] which could be as a result of the events of the previous day: capsized boat, a homicide investigation and a commercial robbery[191]. When investigating that date, no unusual activities were found, or significant differences when compared to the average over the three years.

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[191] Winnipeg Police Service Media Release, May 2011

Figure 53 – Breakdown Of Worked overtime Per Day – 2011Q2

Total Worked Hours in 2011Q2

2011Q3 - Figure 54

Q3 of 2011 seems to be similar to the previous quarters. However, as the previous quarters seemed to have Saturdays and Sundays as the days with the lowest overtime worked hours. In Q3, Sundays and Thursdays had the lowest overtime hours, with Saturday having the highest.

Figure 54 – Breakdown Of Worked overtime Per Day – 2011Q3

Total Worked Hours in 2011Q3

2011Q4 - Figure 55

Q4 of 2011 is similar in pattern to Q4 of 2010. The entire quarter follows the patterns of other quarters, with a significant period of low overtime worked by WPS employees around the Christmas holidays. However, on the last day of the year (Saturday, December 31), a very significant spike in overtime worked can be seen, almost double the average number of hours of overtime worked on other Saturdays.

Figure 55 – Breakdown Of Worked overtime Per Day – 2011Q4

2012Q1 - Figure 56

Q1 of 2012 did not yield any interesting patterns or underlying causes of overtime. The general pattern was found, with Saturdays and Sundays consistently having the lowest overtime numbers.

Figure 56 – Breakdown Of Worked overtime Per Day – 2012Q1

Figure 56 – Breakdown Of Worked overtime Per Day – 2012Q1

2012Q2 - Figure 57

Q2 of 2012 did not yield any interesting patterns or underlying causes of overtime. The general pattern was found, with Saturdays and Sundays consistently having the lowest overtime numbers.

Figure 57 – Breakdown Of Worked Overtime Per Day – 2012Q2

2012Q3 - Figure 58

Q3 of 2012 followed the patterns established above, with a range of 400 to 800 hours per day of OT. During this quarter, the day with the least amount of overtime seemed to have been Monday, but the difference between Monday and the other days did not seem to be significant.

Figure 58 – Breakdown Of Worked Overtime Per Day – 2012Q3

2012Q4 - Figure 59

Q4 of 2012 seems to be similar to all other quarters above, with the exception of the last week of the year. Christmas, like in 2011 and 2010, was the week with the lowest amount of overtime worked by WPS employees. For eight days, the average overtime was approximately a third of the usual volume.

Figure 59 – Breakdown Of Worked Overtime Per Day – 2012Q4

ANALYSIS OF OVERTIME USE PER EMPLOYEE

Continuous Overtime Usage

Looking at the number of *continuous overtime* reported would help answer the question that "If someone worked OT, how much overtime would they work?" This is shown in Figure 60 and Figure 61. Due to the large-scale differences between hours 0-10 and 10+, the data was split into two.

As seen in the figures, when people work overtime, many (26.08%, or 40,819 instances) people work four hours of OT. 13.62% (or 21,318 instances) of the time people worked one hour of OT, while 12.47% (19,516 instances) of the time people worked two hours. While 10 hours of continuous overtime (6.31% of overtime instances) is understandable, the data indicated that there were 2,688 instances (1.72% of all instances) of continuous overtime that were 20 hours or longer. The longest recorded instance of overtime was 80 hours (3 and 1/3rd days) and was recorded by a sergeant within Division 50 for "Meetings" and yielded $3763.77 in overtime expenses.

The next-longest continuous overtime lasted 54 hours (2 and 1/4th day) and was also charged to a (different) sergeant within Division 50 for being on "Standby", yielding an overtime expense of $2604.06).

While such large overtime figures could represent a data problem, there were 13 other instances of 40 hours of overtime, indicating two days (40 hours OT, plus the eight hours of regular employment) of expected working

time. These numbers do not take into account the pay-factor, and represent the raw number of hours of overtime indicated in the data. In total, there were 97 instances of overtime lasting 24 hours or more.

Figure 61 – Number of Continuous Overtime Hours [continued]

TOTAL OVERTIME PER EMPLOYEE

Focusing on the individual employee, Figure 62 shows the distribution of worked hours per employee. Most of the employees (79.47%) worked less than 500 hours of overtime over the three years 2010 - 2012. Only 7.76% worked 20 hours or less over the three years. There were 12 employees however at the other end of the spectrum, working 2000 or more hours, and 94 worked more than 1000 hours.

The distribution of worked hours per employee indicates that a few employees work a considerably large number of hours, while many work few overtime hours. This analysis does not include those employees who worked no overtime hours.

Figure 62 – Total Worked Hours per Employee

Figure 63 shows similar data, but having the worked hours converted into dollar amounts. The ranking of employees in Figure 63 is different from Figure 62 (the top 10 employee rankings are displayed in Figure 64 and Figure 65). The top 10 earners collectively earned 4.2% of the total overtime for the employees of WPS, although they only comprise 0.5% of the workforce. 141 employees earned more than $50,000 over the three years.

The top earner, earning $192,360.83 in OT, spent most (39.21%) of the overtime on murder investigations.

Figure 63 – Total Amount Earned per Employee

Figure 63 – Total Amount Earned per Employee

Figure 64 – Top 10 Employees in terms of Worked Hours

Employee ID	Total Worked
320321	2,748.14
4219	2,666.00
898687	2,638.61
199895	2,426.50
221950	2,237.23
619933	2,214.50
389267	2,178.13
156437	2,107.34
191705	2,038.87
117258	2,030.50

Figure 65 – Top 10 Employees in terms of Amount Earned

Employee ID	Total Amount Earned
4219	$192,360.83
320321	$180,171.04
898687	$174,267.83
199895	$158,011.32
619933	$155,391.06
327935	$147,767.93
156437	$146,681.24
221950	$145,187.91
313691	$142,634.46
389267	$142,286.68

Figure 66 shows a histogram of the number of employees earning various overtime amount (grouped into ranges). There were 655 employees of WPS that earned less than $5,000 over the three-year period, while 271 employees earned between $5,000 and $10,000. There were 34 employees earning more than $100,000 in overtime over three years. These 34 employees worked most of their overtime as constables (53.18% of overtime instances), and detective sergeants (DSGT – 30.66% of the overtime instances). six members earned a portion of their overtime while in multiple positions (for example, one member worked 87.02% of their

overtime as sergeant, while the rest 22.98% as detective sergeant), with one member earning their overtime while in three positions (96.10% as detective sergeant, 0.81% as sergeant and 3.08% as constable). In total, these 34 members are responsible for 64,743.37 hours of overtime, collectively earning $4,324,257.64.

For these 34 employees who earned more than $100,000 in overtime, the majority (37.03%) of the costs were charged to investigation, and were within Division 40 (36.72% of overtime instances), and were the result of Homicide investigations (30.88% of the instances).

Figure 66 –Number of Employees and the Amount Earned in OT

While Figure 66 shows the types of overtime earnings employees achieved, Figure 67 shows the number of overtime hours the employees worked. There were 605 employees (30.01%) that worked less than 100 hours in OT[192] across the three years. 347 (17.21%) worked at least 100 but less than 200 hours. Twelve employees (0.59%) worked more than 2,000 hours over the three years, roughly two hours for each and every day of the year.

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[192] Employees who did not work any overtime were not included in this count, since they were not part of the underlying dataset.

Figure 67 –Number of Employees and Overtime Hours Worked

GAME NIGHTS

Overall Statistics

The Winnipeg Jets hockey team played a total of 41 games at home over the years 2010 to 2012[193]. The dates are listed in Figure 68. There were a total of 6192 overtime incidences on those 41 days, or an average of 151.02 incidents a day, as compared to the 150,340 incidents over the three years when there was no NHL game, or 142.50 overtime incidents a day. In total, 622,065.02 hours of overtime were worked during the 1055 non-game days (for the three years), for an average of 589.64 hours per day. Compared to that, a total of 25,722.68 hours were spent on overtime during game days, averaging 627.38 hours over the 41 game days. This difference of 37.74 hours was much lower than expected. However, only a total of 13 hours were classified as "Sports Events", falling onto days when the Jets played at home.

Interestingly enough, there were days when game nights resulted in fewer overtime worked hours than the average non-game night, for example, on November 19, 2011 when the Jets played the Philadelphia Flyers, or December 29th, 2011 for the Jets game against the Los Angeles Kings. However, on other days, the number of overtime hours was much higher than the average, such as on December 31st, 2011. Interestingly, one of the lowest overtime days (December 29th) was followed by one of the highest overtime days (December 31st).

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[193] http://jets.nhl.com/club/app

Overall, there did not seem to be any pattern to the overtime hours for the times when the Jets played at home. However, as many games occurred during the week, the service demands may have been lower naturally due to the timing.

Figure 68 – Winnipeg Jets Home Games

Type of Incident

For some incident types, sports days, on average, require more overtime than days when the Jets are not playing at home. For example, Figure 69 shows that on days the Jets play, on average, WPS puts in 6.35 more hours of overtime dealing with Traffic Pursuits than on days when the Jets do not play at home. Similarly, on average, 3.85 hours of overtime is spent on Alarms and Found Persons on game days, than on non-game days. Similarly, Figure 70 shows the top 10 incidents where WPS spends *less* time on game-days than on non-game days. For example, on game-days, WPS spends 4.51 hours less (on average per game-day) on Family Trouble investigations than they do on non-game days.

Incident	Difference in Average Hours worked on Sports Days vs. Non-Sport Days
Traffic Pursuit (Field Units)	6.35h
Alarm - Distress	3.85h
Found Person - Adult	3.85h
Physical Child Abuse	3.38h
Graffiti Vandalism	3.33h
Warrant Execution	2.84h
Robbery - Person	2.57h
Missing Persons Assist	2.52h
Insecure Premises	2.50h
All Fraudulent Offences	2.46h

Incident	Difference in Average Hours worked on Non-Sports Days vs. Sport Days
Family Trouble	4.51h
Investigations	3.97h
Subject Pursuit	3.60h
Shots Heard	3.20h
Sudden Deaths	2.98h
Strikes/ Labour Disputes	2.83h
Gun – Seen	1.64h
Shoplifter - Person Being Held	1.59h
All Assaults/No Wpn/Non Sexual	1.55h
Intimidation	1.40h

While there were a few types of incidents that were expected to require significantly more overtime on game-days than on non-game days, the analysis indicates that there was no significant difference between the amounts of overtime required on either type of day. Below is a list of 10 incidents which required the same overtime commitment from WPS regardless of whether the Jets were playing at home, or not:

- Follow of Vehicle
- Robbery - Home Invasion
- Alarm - Commercial Burglar
- Hazardous/Disaster Situations
- Mischief or Damage
- Stolen Vehicles - Located
- Warrants - To Arrest/Search
- Attempt Murder
- Arson
- Traffic Stop

As seen above, traffic stops or mischief (for example) would be expected to be more common on game-days, hence require more overtime commitments, but in reality this was not the case.

Difference in Rank

It is unsurprising that certain types of employees need to work more on game-nights than on regular days, due to the difference in policing needs when a large number of people congregate in one location. The overtime details are consistent with these expectations. Constables, for example, work 36.03 hours more as a group, on average, per day on game-nights than when the Jets are not playing at home. Similarly, patrol sergeants work 9.81 hours more as a group on average on game-days than when the Jets are not playing. However, detective sergeants work 10.63 hours *less* on overtime on game-days.

Figure 71 – Top 10 Incidents Which Require More Overtime On Sport Days When Compared To Non-Sport Days

Rank	Difference in Average Hours worked on Sports Days vs. Non-Sport Days
CONS	36.03h
PSGT	9.81h
PCO	4.91h
CADET	2.27h
SSGT	1.79h
CLKB	1.20h
ICONS	1.03h
PET1	0.78h
CT	0.65h
ISP2	0.41h

Figure 72 – Top 10 Incidents Which Require More Overtime On Non-Sport Days When Compared To Sport Days

Rank	Difference in Average Hours worked on Non-Sports Days vs. Sport Days
DSGT	10.63h
SGT	4.54h
DVEOP	1.29h
CH	1.00h
CPICO	0.70h
CLKC	0.65h
INSP	0.59h
SPCO	0.55h
SUPT	0.50h
SRC	0.36h

Difference in Assignments

During game-days, overtime is charged more frequently to Operations Support and Uniform, by a total of 64.56 hours and 33.19 hours on average per game-day, respectively. On non-game days, an average of 63.92 hours are charged to Operations Support, while on game-days, there are *no overtime* hours charged to Support.

Difference in Divisions

For each of the 41 game days, Division 51 has 82.31 hours of associated overtime . This is approximately 200% higher (55.38 hours) than the average overtime during non-game days (26.93 hours). This was by far the highest difference in overtime found between game-days and non-game days.

Division 50 in the meantime has 70.85 hours of overtime for each non-game day, while on game-days, they "only" work 42.29 hours of overtime on average.

Difference in Units

It was expected that certain units of WPS work a lot more overtime on game-days, than on non-game days. For example traffic and general patrol are expected to be more available on game-days due to the large number of people congregating in one place. This expectation was found to be true in the overtime dataset. Over the three days, General Patrol worked 34.78 hours *more* overtime, and Traffic worked 16.69 hours *more* overtime, on game days than on non-game days. Interestingly, Investigation and Special Projects worked 13.31 and 13.99 hours *less* on game days versus non-game days. Why the significantly less overtime on those specific hours was not determined from the data.

Difference in Section

Figure 73 shows the top 10 sections, which have the largest average differences in overtime when comparing days when the Jets play at home, versus when there is no Jets game. Safety and Administrative sections of WPS use 7.49 and 7.03 *more* hours of overtime on game-days than on non-game days. Safety usually uses 8.03 hours on non-game days but 15.52 hours on game-days, while Administrative uses 5.68 hours on non-game-days, but 12.71 hours on game-days.

Unexpectedly, there were several sections that use *less overtime* on game-days than on non-game days. Homicide for example, uses 5.86 hours *less overtime* when the Jets play at home, than when there is no home game. The relationship between Jets playing at home, and Homicide investigations cannot be assessed from the data. The top 10 sections, which work less on game-days than on the average non-game day, is shown in Figure 74.

Section	Difference in Average Hours worked on Sports Days vs. Non-Sport Days
Safety	7.49h
Admin	7.03h
Drugs	3.86h
Recruit	2.41h
Evidence	2.37h
PVO	2.35h
Commercial	2.18h
Arson	2.14h
Investigtn	1.78h
Arrest	0.92h

Section	Difference in Average Hours worked on Non-Sports Days vs. Sport Days
Homicide	5.86h
General	3.72h
Org Crime	2.91h
Firearms	1.50h
ColdHate	0.96h
DVE	0.90h
Recrt 150	0.74h
CPIC	0.69h
Auto	0.66h
Diversity	0.54h

Difference in Cost Centers

Similar to the differences presented above, some cost centers are more involved with overtime than others on game-days. For example, Division #14 uses 11.93 hours more overtime on game-days than on non-game days, similarly for the Communications Division using 9.87 hours more of overtime. However, the fact that Special Projects uses 13.87 hours *less* on game-days than on any regular day was unexpected.

Cost-Center	Difference in Average Hours worked on Sports Days vs. Non-Sport Days
PO-Division #14	11.93h
PO-Communications Division	9.87h
PO-Traffic Division/Impaired Driving/Collision/Inspect	9.33h
PO-Street Crime Unit [Retired Code]	8.57h
PO-Duty Office	7.91h
PO-Traffic Safety	7.56h
PO-Airport Unit	7.46h
PO-Division #11	5.06h
PO-Division #12	4.38h
PO-OrgGang/Green team/IPOC	3.59h

Cost-Center	Difference in Average Hours worked on Non-Sports Days vs. Sport Days
PO-Special Projects	13.87h
PO-Homicide/ MajCrimes/ Analyst/ Hate Crimes/ NWEST [Retired Code]	5.65h
PO-Sex Crimes/ChildAbuse/ViClas	5.45h
PO-Chiefs Office/Legal Services	1.63h
PO-Surv Unit/Aerial Support	1.52h
PO-Firearms/Cadboro/PSB Range/Officer Safety	1.49h
PO-Bomb Unit	1.48h
PO-Central Service Centres	1.35h
PO-Training Unit/Video Production	0.95h
PO-Direct Voice Entry Unit	0.89h

Difference in Overtime Reason

Figure 77 shows the various reasons for overtime, calculated both for non-sport days and sport days. Continuing Investigations used an average of 167.70 worked hours on non-sport days, while averaging 200.44 working hours of overtime on sport days. This implies that on sport days, Continuing Investigation needed 32.74 more hours of overtime than on non-sport days. Similarly, incidents in progress use almost no overtime (on average, each day) on sport days, while using 16.25 hours of overtime (average a day) on non-sport days.

OT Reason	Average Hours on	Average Hours	Difference
Continuing Investigation	167.70	200.44	(32.74)
Other	84.80	98.10	(13.30)
Callout for Min Strength	25.46	33.12	(7.67)
Heldover per Duty Inspector	10.32	16.49	(6.16)
Court Attendance Traffic	19.11	23.96	(4.84)
Heldover per Supervisor	7.32	6.73	0.59
Callout for Specialty Unit	5.51	4.88	0.63
Court attendance	80.22	79.46	0.76
Callout for Other Reason	86.81	85.62	1.19
Callout for Project	2.17	-	2.17
Project	58.53	55.98	2.56
Standby	25.42	21.85	3.57
Incident in Progress (Civilian)	16.25	0.76	15.50

Difference in Type of Incident

Certain types of incidents would be expected to be more frequent during game-days than on non-game days. Thus, the types of incidents in Figure 78 are all surprising. For example, drug offenses required, on average, 6.35 hours more of overtime per day on game-days than on non-game days. This would be understandable on days the Jets are in town and a lot of people tend to congregate in a single location. Similarly, on such sport-days, it would be expected that the increased consumption of alcohol would result in more impaired driving, which would explain the 3.85 hours of additional overtime required on game days when compared to the average required on non-game days. We would expect similar results for motor vehicle collisions.

Figure 79 shows the top 10 activities, which require *less overtime* hours (averaged per day) on game days than non-game days. The reason for these types of incidents requiring less overtime could possibly be explained through the increased presence of WPS required during game-days, leaving less time for other types of investigations.

Type of Incident	Difference in Average Hours worked on Sports Days vs. Non-Sport Days
Drug Offence	6.35h
Fires (Working or Not)	3.85h
Impaired Driving Offences	3.85h
Robbery - Home Invasion	3.38h
Motor Vehicle Collisions	3.33h
Arson	2.84h
Warrants - To Arrest/Search	2.57h
Shots Heard	2.52h
Investigations	2.50h
All Fraudulent Offences	2.46h

Type of Incident	Difference in Average Hours worked on Non-Sports Days vs. Sport Days
Sexual Assaults - Adult	4.51h
All Assaults/No Wpn/Non Sexual	3.97h
Robbery - Person	3.60h
All Aslts With Wpn / Non Sexual	3.20h
B&E'S ATT/Commercial Property	2.98h
Gun - Seen	2.83h
Type Of Complaint Unknown	1.64h
B&E'S Att/Residential Property	1.59h
Weapons - Not Firearms	1.55h
Robbery - Commercial Premise	1.40h

Observations

An analysis of the overtime data from the WPS indicates that constables, who comprise 52.17% of the employees in the organization, incur 72.44% of the recorded overtime. Further, their overtime hours as a group is approximately 2.6 times the amount of all other WPS employees *combined*. During the three-year period 2009-2011, constables earned a total of $25.5 million, again by far the largest portion of the total with about 2.2 times the rest of the employees *combined*.

Constables also make up 95.33% of the set of employees who work in General Patrol and take overtime. As such, General Patrol also exhibits similar characteristics, with that unit using approximately 30% of the overtime worked hours even though only 17.52% of the WPS employees are within that unit.

In 2010, Division 51 recorded very little overtime; however it quickly became the third largest user of overtime worked hours and amount earned in 2012.

The vast majority of employees took overtime pay rather than Earned Days Leave. Overall, however, the majority of people (79.47%) worked less than 500 hours of overtime over the three years, with only a small portion (34 employees) who earned more than $100,000 in overtime over the three years. Of those, consistent

with previous findings and representative of the population who takes OT, approximately half (53.18%) of the overtime for these 34 employees was in the role of a constable.

"Continuing an investigation" was the source of 28.58% of overtime hours, while 13.57% of the overtime hours was for court attendance. Disaggregating the categories by years revealed that most of the patterns are stable each year, with only some small categories having wild changes year-to-year.

Finally, investigating those days when the Jets were playing at home, it was found that, on average, WPS employees work 37.74 hours more hours those days than when the Jets are not playing. Since WPS usually works 589.64 on non-game days, working 37.74 more hours of overtime is not a significant difference. Overall, no consistent pattern was found between the various game days.

A Note on Missing Data

Missing data, or inaccurate data, presented a significant challenge to some of the analysis. When examining the Cost Centers for example, the Cost Center identified as "PO-Homicide/MajCrimes/Analyst/Hate Crimes/NWEST [Retired Code]" had 53,798.67 total overtime hours charged to it, or 8.30% of the total, but the name of the Cost Center itself indicated that the entry should perhaps be deleted.

A total of 29.11% of the reasons identified (14.68% for "Callout for Other Reason" and 14.43% for "Other") were labelled too generically to be of any value to the analysis. The analysis for reason of overtime could have been significantly different if the "Other" category did not exist, but was disaggregated into the actual reason.

10.07% of activities were not categorized at all, not as significant as the "Other" categorization for the reason of OT, but still representing 16,004 records, or 93,483.69 hours of overtime across three years.

However, the most notable instance of missing information is the category Incident Types, where 38.70% of the records were not at all classified. This means that the results within the remaining 61.30% might be significantly different in case the events that were actually classified into the various incidents are not representative of the entire population. Given that within the dataset that was classified into an Incident Type the largest Type was 9.18%, a missing dataset portion of 38.70% might skew the results.

The findings from this review indicate that patrol constables are the primary source of overtime in the WPS. This is in contrast to the findings of a similar review in the Vancouver Police Department, where it was found that investigation sections were the primary drivers of OT.

Activity	Total Worked Hours
General Patrol	88,220.68
Arrest	68,556.50
Court - Did not Testify	66,094.10
Investigation general	53,936.00
Fitness Appraisal	49,469.67
Project	39,805.34
Arrest and Report	24,700.67
Court - Testified	15,183.91
Traffic Collision Investigation	11,352.85
Search Warrant	11,040.67

Unit	Total Amount Earned in Overtime
Arrest	$ 4,358,541.14
General Patrol	$ 4,332,360.31
Investigation general	$ 3,842,412.73
Court - Did not Testify	$ 3,621,225.65
Project	$ 2,565,645.27
Fitness Appraisal	$ 1,854,167.70
Arrest and Report	$ 1,526,588.22
Court - Testified	$ 890,283.42
Search Warrant	$ 725,177.55
Surveillance	$ 598,098.63

Summary of Findings

Overtime generally can be thought of as being comprised of malleable and static drivers. Malleable drivers may be related to shifting, staffing, internal or external policies, and any other areas that may require overtime, but can be offset with modifications to how the officers fulfill that overtime. Static drivers are less controllable, and may include emergency incidents or other threats to public safety that necessitate officer time.

Some general observations can be gleaned from the above analysis. First, is that the primary user of overtime within the WPS is Patrol. As a 24/7 operation, generally excessive overtime usage in Patrol is directly related to staffing and/or shifting issues, and is therefore relatively malleable. It will never be completely offset with modifications to the resources, but ensuring the supply of officers meets the demand can go a long way to reducing the need for overtime for Patrol Units. This will be explored further in " WPS Patrol - Quantitative Analysis".

The finding that patrol officers are the primary consumers of overtime in the WPS suggests that patrol staffing levels may not be adequate to meet the demands that are being made on the WPS. This possibility is given credence by the field observations, interviews with WPS personnel, and in the quantitative analysis that is presented later in this report.

What also becomes apparent is the enormous amount of time and money spent on job requirements that are conducted on an overtime basis. These appear to include testifying in court, regardless of whether an officer testifies. The reasons for having to utilize overtime for court activities are generally due to shifting. As court is generally mandatory (save for some discretion in traffic court), the officer will need to testify when called,

regardless of whether he or she is on shift at the time of the court date. While this is not necessarily modifiable in the concrete sense, efforts may be made with the Crown to diminish the number of occasions when an officer appears at court when ultimately not required to testify.

The other observation revolves around fitness appraisals. As part of the Collective Agreement, officers are offered 20 hours of overtime (taken as EDL) for successfully completing their fitness appraisals as part of the mandatory policy. While this is an issue to be taken up in Collective Bargaining, the impact of this benefit should not be understated. Although granting EDL for the fitness appraisals does not necessarily make an impact on cost, it can make an impact to staffing levels and may necessitate overtime and callouts for other members to cover the extra days day off by the member who is granted the EDL. While maintaining fitness standards and good health are all worthy goals of this policy, the impact should be closely monitored and considered going forward.

Recommendations

> *RECOMMENDATION: The WPS should conduct a review of the protocol for recording overtime and ensure that the gaps that have been identified in this study be addressed.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: The WPS should conduct a review of the top overtime earners in the service to determine the sources of OT, hours worked, and the potential impact of high overtime on their professional and personal lives.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: The WPS should review its current protocol for monitoring and controlling overtime to ensure that all incidents requiring overtime are properly recorded, to ensure that overtime is being used judiciously and that there are metrics in place to measure the outcomes of overtime usage.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: The WPS should ensure that all overtime hours are property categorized.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: The WPS should work with Crown Counsel to take steps to alleviate the number of instances whereby officers have to attend court when they are ultimately not required to testify.*

Chapter VIII: Uniformed Operations in the WPS

A key component of the operation review was an examination of patrol in the WPS. Patrol officers are the core of a police service and it is on the front lines of policing that one can gain insights into the demands that are made on a police service and on the response to community needs.

UNIFORM PATROL DIVISION OVERVIEW

Until mid-2013, the WPS patrol division worked from six district offices (two districts have recently been combined into one 'super district' and two more are slated for amalgamation in the near future). The districts report to the Superintendent in Charge of the Patrol Division at Winnipeg Police H.Q.

Each district is a stand-alone operation, operating from a district office, located in various regions of the city. Each district is commanded by an inspector assisted by a staff sergeant. Each office has a front counter staffed by sworn members.   There is a detective office located in each district office. The detective office is run by a senior NCO who reports to the district inspector.   The Detective Unit is responsible for the investigation of day to day crimes that while not sufficiently serious to refer to specialized plain clothes unit at police H.Q., are not handled by the patrol division, i.e. break-ins, robberies and assaults. The Detective Unit is staffed with personnel from the districts who are assigned to the unit for two-year periods.

There is also a Domestic Violence Unit operating from each district office, allowing patrol members to refer files for follow-up. This allows for further referrals to legal/social/community services for persons involved in these matters.

Patrol Function

The patrol function of each district is composed of platoons or shifts, divided into 'A' and 'B' sides of the roster. Each shift works 10 hours shifts, rotating from days to afternoons and nights on a 28-day cycle.   The day shift begins at 0700, an afternoon shift at 1630, and a night shift at 2100. A six-hour overlap between the afternoon and night shift allows for extra staffing for the heaviest period of calls for service. The shift schedule is designed so that during each 28 day cycle there are two-three 'overlap days', that is a double shift on duty, allowing for training, extra leave or other activities.

The supervisory personnel on each shift are composed of a senior sergeant who is the Station NCO and in charge of each shift. Each district has one or two patrol sergeants, depending on the number of cars assigned to a

district.   The patrol members are assigned to two person patrol cars[194]. It takes 18 personnel to 'staff' a two-member patrol car for a 7-day period, 24 hours a day. This allows a 'cushion' to account for leave, illness, or other reasons while maintaining the minimum staffing levels for each shift.

In addition to the two member patrol units, each district has the following cars staffed from the uniform personnel on each shift:

- An '89' car with two members, tasked with tracking known offenders. Their work consists of dealing with persons at large who are subject of court orders, i.e. curfews, no contact orders, the subject of outstanding warrants or of specific interest to the district. This car is not assigned to calls, but will assist if required.

- A Community Support Unit, staffed by two members who deal with concerns specific to each district. In District 1, the downtown core, this is primarily street level crime suppression, aimed at keeping public order, targeting bars, street level drug dealers and ensuring public safety.   This car is not assigned to calls, but will assist if required.

- A report car with a single member who responds to lower priority calls reporting incidents with no suspects present, i.e. thefts from vehicle, break-ins, etc.

The primary functions of patrol, as set out in the WPS Procedure Manual) are:

- To protect the life and property of the citizens in the City of Winnipeg

- To provide emergency service

- To respond to calls for service

- To enforce the laws

- To provide traffic control and enforcement

- To investigate crime, provide for prevention, and detect and process offenders

- To promote and attain good community relations.

Patrol members work on a response-to-calls-for-service basis, assigned by a central dispatch office. Calls are assigned on a priority basis, with priorities ranging from one through 9. The highest priorities, one and 2, are major crimes or active incidents where officer or public safety is at risk. Calls in priorities one through five are usually those assigned to the two member patrol units. Calls of a lower priority may be routed to the 'report car' in each district unless things are very quiet.

The WPS call priority system utilizes 10 categories, ranging from 0 for officer down to 9:

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[194] This is established by the Collective Bargaining Agreement

- Priority 0: Major Disaster; Officer in Need of Assistance

- Priority 1: Danger to Life or Grievous Bodily Harm

- Priority 2: Impending Danger to Life or Grievous Bodily Harm

- Priority 3: Urgent Person Incident

- Priority 4: Urgent Property Incident

- Priority 5: Non-Urgent Person Incident

- Priority 6: Non-Urgent Property Incident

- Priority 7: Low Risk or Threat

- Priority 8: Telephone Response

- Priority 9: Planned Response

This priority system is cumbersome and contains many more categories than most police services in North America and it appears it is confusing to patrol officers as well. One patrol sergeant who was interviewed officer could not recall what types of calls were in all of the 10 categories. A recommendation is that this call priority system be restructured in line with established best practice call categories.

Each occurrence has a car assigned as a 'prime' car, meaning that the members in that vehicle are the unit responsible for dealing with the incident, including submitting the report. Other units may assist as required. The patrol sergeant may attend the call in a supervisory capacity, should he/she deem it necessary, or is assigned by dispatchers.

Patrol Districts, Staffing and Population Served

Figure 80: WPS Patrol Districts and City Neighbourhoods

The authorized strength[195] for each of the divisions is set out in the following tables.

Table 5: Authorized Strength in Division 11

Division 11	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Patrol			6	12	143	
Div. Detectives			1	4	10	
Dom. Violence					4	
CSU			1	2	16	
Foot Patrol				2	14	
Administration	1	1	1			1
Total	1	1	9	20	187	1

Division 13	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Patrol			6	12	121	
Div. Detectives			1	2	10	
Dom. Violence						
CSU				2	10	
Foot Patrol					4	
Administration	1	1	1			1
Total	1	1	8	16	145	1

Division 14 (East)	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Patrol			6	12	119	
Div. Detectives			1	2	10	
Dom. Violence						
CSU				2	8	
Foot Patrol						
Administration	1	1	1			1
Total	1	1	8	16	137	1

Division 12 (West)	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Patrol			6	12	119	
Div. Detectives			1	2	10	
Dom. Violence					4	
CSU				4	18	
Foot Patrol						
Administration	1	1	1			
Total	1	1	8	18	151	0

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[195] According to the Human Resources organizational chart, August 2013

District Populations

The following figures depict the Division Districts in the city.

Figure 81: D1 Boundary

Figure 82: D1 Population by Dissemination Area (2011)

Figure 83: D3 Boundary

Winnipeg Police Service
District 3 Boundary

Figure 84: D3 Population by Dissemination Area (2011)

Winnipeg Police Service
D3 Population Counts
2011 Census

Figure 85: D4 Boundary

Winnipeg Police Service
District 4 (East) Boundary

CruiserAreas
PUAR
1
2
3
4
6
Districts

Miles
0 0.75 1.5   3   4.5   6

Figure 86: D4 Population by Dissemination Area (2011)

Winnipeg Police Service
D4 (East) Population Counts
2011 Census

Population (2011 Census)
0 - 496
496 - 690
690 - 1,022
1,022 - 1,808
1,808 - 3,269

Miles
0 0.75 1.5   3   4.5   6

Figure 87: West District Boundary

Figure 88: West District Population by Dissemination Area (2011)

WPS PATROL: FIELD OBSERVATIONS

During the project, field researchers accompanied WPS patrol supervisors and patrol constables on a number of ride-a-longs. The research team received excellent cooperation from all police personnel. WPS members were accompanied in District 6, District 3, and in District 1. Accompanying patrol officers provided us an opportunity to observe the activities of patrol officers and their decision-making in encounter situations, which allowed us to better understand the challenges that patrol officers in Winnipeg face on a day-to-day basis. Ride-a-longs also provided an opportunity for the field researchers to discuss various issues with patrol members and supervisors and to solicit their observations and opinions on various issues surrounding the delivery of policing services.

Research team members on ride-a-longs mostly experienced calls for service in Categories two through 5 (stabbings, domestic issues, assaults, public drunkenness and issues surrounding keeping the peace). Alcohol consumption was an accompanying factor in the majority of incidents observed.

District 6 is an affluent suburban area, District 3 the 'North End' and District 1 the downtown core. Districts 3 and 1 are best described as high crime areas with a heavy volume of calls for service. District 3 has a very large Aboriginal population, while District 1 has become the centre for the immigrant population in addition to a large Aboriginal clientele many of whom often travel in from other districts. Gang-on-gang violence is common as is street level crime in Districts 1 and 3. The discussion in this section will focus on Districts 1 and 3 as these districts present the WPS with significant challenges.

Field observations confirmed that there are specific areas in the city that are afflicted with poverty and deep seated social problems. There are many empty storefronts in the downtown core, both on the main streets and in shopping malls. Police personnel indicated that the public perception is that the downtown is not a safe area due to the street crime. This includes the inter-connected shopping malls in the downtown core, where street level drug trafficking is prevalent, especially during the cold weather. People avoid the area and business suffers as a result.

The police are under pressure from civic officials and the business community to deal with the problem. They are attempting to do so by cracking down on street level drug dealers and poorly run liquor establishments. However, in the absence of any programs focused on dealing with social problems, their efforts may merely displace the problems.

District 1

Geographically, District 1 is small when compared to the other patrol districts. It is an area of concentrated socio-economic disadvantage that WPS members compare to Vancouver's highly troubled and high profile Downtown Eastside. A major difference is that the area in Winnipeg is much larger. Among the challenges facing residents in District 1 are a high degree of substance abuse (both drugs and alcohol), a large percentage of individuals with a criminal record, and a high level of gang activity. Officers emphasized the significance of substance abuse. According to one constable, "Alcohol abuse is rampant" and is the most heavily abused substance. The other PC interviewed stated that drugs are at the root of many of the issues demanding police attention. Drugs drive most street and gang crime, which subsequently, require a police response and the direction of significant resources. There are special challenges in responding to the needs of the Newcomer communities that are concentrated in District 1.

WPS members working in the downtown core are faced with a high call volume. General patrol responds to a wide spectrum of crimes including prostitution, substance abuse related offences, domestic abuse, intoxicated persons, and assaults. Subsequently WPS members also come into contact with a wide spectrum of individuals, including members of the city's large Aboriginal population, the growing Newcomer community, and PwMI. In the view of the officers in this district, short staffing leads to an increased workload. One patrol constable in District 1 stated that a lack of manpower is particularly problematic on night shifts, when more critical incidents occur. This is less of a problem during the day. Each unit and shift is required to put a minimum complement on the road; however, a minimum complement means there is far less time for proactive policing and officers have less "breathing time" between calls. According to another constable in District 1, a greater complement of officers would allow for more proactive policing and officers "don't feel guilty" about being proactive instead of responding to more calls in the queue. Officers interviewed in this district indicated that officers often feel pressure from dispatchers to get to each call in the queue. As one officer stated, "Dispatch is always bugging ya, asking why haven't you gotten to this call or that call."

District 3

Ride-a-longs were conducted in District 3 which comprises the area of the city known as the North End. This patrol district is very busy and WPS officers respond to a wide range of calls, including family issues, domestic violence, intoxicated persons, mental health, thefts, assaults, gangs, and drugs. In their work, officers encounter a broad spectrum of people – various cultures, ethnicities, and social circumstances – in a variety of different situations. Unlike the downtown area of Winnipeg, Aboriginals are the dominant population in the North End

with a much smaller Newcomer population. The core area of District 3 commands the most police attention and most of the patrol resources are directed there. One constable noted that because the core area demands so much attention, some of the surrounding areas of District 3 are often neglected: "They probably don't get the attention from us that they deserve, patrol-wise."

In the view of constables who were interviewed, a major challenge for the WPS in District 3 is manpower. The high call volume results in patrol officers becoming frustrated. As one officer in District 3 stated, "We always make do, but it puts a strain on the membership." In addition to having an impact on response time, the lack of manpower also has a detrimental impact on quality of life. One constable stated that "The lack of manpower makes it difficult for officers to take a day off here or there and this is especially difficult for officers that have families." An additional challenge facing patrol is that many specialty units take officers off the streets. Many of these specialty units do not focus a lot on what GP does, and thus, do not offer much support. The constable estimated that 80-90% of the workload of the WPS falls on general patrol.

As with PC's in Division 11, a constable in District 3 stated that there were a lot of "stop and go" or "code 2" type calls that do not require a lot of paper work. When asked if there is time to engage in proactive community relations work, the PC stated that they seldom have time for proactive interaction of that nature. "We try to keep an eye out on places and see how people are doing. Time just doesn't permit us to do much of that." He went on to say that he would like to have more time to engage in proactive work and in many cases it is on the officers' shoulders to engage in that kind of work. In his view, it was also incumbent upon leadership to encourage and permit officers to engage in that kind of work.

Another officer stated that he preferred to go call-to-call, as those calls did not require much paperwork or time commitment. One way that officers catch up on paperwork is on "overlap days". Because GP shifts are only 10 hours, police officers quite often work five days and have an overlap day where all members of both platoons are scheduled to work. These overlap days are intended to be used for training, catching up on report writing and other administrative functions, but officers can also use them to take the day off. In most cases, it appears that officers come in to catch up on work, meaning that in many cases members will have worked 5-6 shifts in a row before taking their scheduled four days off.[196]

A constable in District 3 admitted that when there is a high call volume, the work is largely reactive. He stated that, "When it's quiet, we try our best to do proactive work like spot checks and stuff." Furthermore, the PC felt

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[196] For officers working Downtown and in the North End one could see how they could be burnt out pretty fast doing this kind of work.

that the officers in District 3 try to be as proactive as possible when time permits. He expressed satisfaction with engaging in proactive work. He also made the point that officers need to learn how to be proactive as time progresses and that many young officers are, at first, hesitant to be proactive.

When asked if there is time to engage in more proactive community relations work, this PC stated that they seldom have time for proactive interaction. "We try to keep an eye out on places and see how people are doing. Time just doesn't permit us to do much of that." He went on to say that he would like to have more time to engage in proactive work, and that in many cases the decision is on the officers' shoulders, rather than incumbent upon leadership to encourage and permit officers to engage in that kind of work.

Patrol Supervision

The level and quality of patrol supervision was observed to be very good. There appeared to be good rapport between the supervisors and patrol members. Members attend a pre-shift briefing where they received information on persons of interest or issues involving their districts. They were then required to get out of the office and begin their duties. The supervisors are on the road the majority of the time and attended calls that they felt warranted their attendance. They were supportive of the personnel they supervised.

The capability exists for the district supervisors to electronically read the incident reports submitted by their personnel although it is not apparent that this is done. This results in the loss of a supervisory opportunity, but is also a developmental issue. Although the district receives notifications of work not properly submitted or poor investigations from the Reader's office, there is a missed opportunity for the line supervisors to identify and rectify inadequate investigations and report writing problems at the district office level. Positive reinforcement in the first instance may well be developmental as opposed to remedial, which is more likely the case when files are returned from an external review.   In the discussion of civilianization, it is recommended that consideration be given to transferring the "reader" function back to the line supervisors.

Patrol Officer Morale

Field observations conducted during ride-a-longs suggest that, overall, the morale of patrol officers is quite high. Officers came from a variety of backgrounds and seemed to enjoy their jobs and displayed an enthusiasm to be getting on with the tasks at hand. The length of service of constables who were encountered during the field observations ranged between one to 13 years and 15 to 28 years for the patrol sergeants. The officers who were interviewed all enunciated a clear appreciation of the patrol role within the Winnipeg Police, regarding it

as the basic job from which their careers developed. They saw it as something to which the majority of them would return at various points throughout their careers.

This suggests that there is a strong foundation upon which to build a patrol capacity that is intelligence-led and in which the constables play an active role in setting enforcement priorities for the districts in which they police. There is also unlimited potential for developing multi-agency partnerships and other problem-solving initiatives if patrol officers have the opportunity to engage in proactive policing. At present, they are confined in a reactive policing "box" that precludes innovation and the use of the talents of patrol members.

Despite the seemingly high morale of the patrol officers, a number of the constables expressed frustration surrounding their role in the WPS. These are reflected in the following comments:

> -*"The general patrols are only going to calls for service from one's to five – I'm not really sure any more – they don't really do those seven, eight, nine calls, like you got robbed while you were at the lake. Because we're not doing those calls, we don't see regular people. So, you've got officers who are getting jaded, they're getting run-down because they're not having any communication and you're getting taxpayers who are gonna be backlashing at the police when they're the voters. All they want is an acknowledgment where you can go by and say, "Hey I heard you were having trouble with your neighbor because he put snow on your driveway. Let's go over there for coffee and we can all talk together." There is now no call for service. It's done."*

> -*"The officers – I can only speak from the constable level cause that's all I am – in the service are tired of it. They're jaded. They don't give a crap. I would say the quality of service would go way up if officers would get an acknowledgement from the higher ups in the service. Like we're so based on what constables in the office and in the car are doing all the time. Where are you what are you doing? Where are you what are you doing? Even when you're in the car you're like, "I'm working! I'm doing paperwork." Whatever it is, we're just so focused on the management of people that we're not caring about the service that we're providing to the citizens."*

One constable stated that the biggest gap is that the service is short on manpower and that General Patrol is constantly going, "call to call" and do not have the time to be proactive, which means they are unable to provide total service to the district. She went on to state that in spite of the lack of manpower, "…everyone still does it. General Patrol works so hard."

This is a key finding of the operation review: WPS patrol members are nearly 100% reactive and have little, if any, time for proactive policing activities. This has a significant impact on the quality of police services that are delivered to the community and hinders the ability of patrol officers to develop relationships with the community and to take initiatives to problem solve. It is a best practice of police services that patrol officers

should have 30 to 40% of their time available to engage in proactive activities, including problem-solving. The response of patrol officers to seemingly endless calls for service not only affects the quality of the services that are delivered but also takes a significant toll on the officers themselves. This may include increasing cynicism and a perception that the police service does not value patrol members.

There are a number of best practice strategies than can be used to create opportunities for patrol officers to engage in proactive policing. In addition to considering whether additional officers are required, the use of Telephone Response Teams (also commonly referred to as Alternative Response Teams) is an effective strategy for reducing the call load on patrol officers. It is noted that the WPS lists an Alternative Response Team in the organizational chart; however, this unit appears not to have any authorized strength.

Community Support Unit (CSU)

The CSU is a specialized (uniform/plainclothes) tactical team that is attached to the General Patrol sections of all divisions[197]. Their shifting is similar to that of General Patrol. The CSU is a purely proactive unit. They are not dispatch-able and choose where to direct their time.

The mandate/function of the Community Support Unit (CSU) is to identify the problem areas in the district and focus attention on them. This information is gathered through speaking to the community – business owners, in particular. Part of this includes liaising and interacting with local community organizations such as the Downtown Biz (Downtown Winnipeg Business Improvement Zone), the West End Biz, and the Exchange Biz. The CSU also interacts with local Youth Centres. According to one CSU constable, the officers go into local businesses and youth centres to, "see how they're doing." "We just go by and say high." For the officer, this has benefitted the police as it provides them with good information and intelligence and it is very popular with business owners as it provides them with a sense of safety and "gives them a chance to vent."

The CSU engages in activities that General Patrol does not or cannot perform as a result of their largely reactive mandate. They engage in directed patrols, high-visibility policing, spot checks, hotspot policing, targeted drug and gang enforcement, serving warrants and firearms interdiction. According to one CSU officer, "There is lots of spot checking, lots of curfew checks, talking to members of the public, establishing a relationship with business owners, and trying to address the key issues in the area." A major part of the mandate of the CSU is drug enforcement. In Division 13, District 3, drug houses are a major problem point and there is a significant number of crack dealers in the downtown core area.

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[197] Previously this was only in the North End and Downtown

Additionally, the CSU is active in the community, meeting with business owners and discussing their concerns and needs, conducting safety checks, and completing crime-stopper reports. Members of the CSU perform surveillance activities, work with informants, and engage in beat policing. CSUs also act as escorts during Parades and as support during protests and demonstrations. As this information is obtained, it is consolidated and put on file. For example, the CSU in Division 13 currently has a working file that lists the top ten most wanted people in District 3 as well as the top ten problem addresses. According to one constable, a benefit of the CSUs is that the units can hit hotspots all day if necessary (i.e., remaining in high-crime, problem areas for the duration of the shift).

A CSU constable in District 1 (downtown) indicated that the CSU directs most of its time to policing the West End of the Downtown area and the downtown core itself. These areas have a high level of drug activity: "Everything revolves around drugs. Drugs drive petty crime, robberies, break-ins, and gang activity. There are crack-shacks everywhere downtown." In addition to narcotics, the officer emphasized that alcohol abuse is also a significant issue, especially in the Martha Street/Salvation Army area.

Field observations by the project team revealed that the Salvation Army building is a major hub of illegal and potential illegal activity – loitering, heavy alcohol use, and assaults. There are a significant number of heavily intoxicated individuals congregating in this area that creates the potential for many violent encounters.

The patrol constables in District 1 who were interviewed felt that the number of CSUs should be increased in order to do more proactive policing, in particular the number of beat patrol officers. It is important to note that while their work is largely proactive, the CSU is not a "community police" entity. Their proactive work can be characterized as predominantly investigative for information-gathering purposes. There is no outreach in the sense of attending community events and community service work. In fact, when one CSU constable was asked if he felt the CSU should engage in this kind of work, he stated that it was not necessary.

Although the CSU units are a core component of police service delivery in Districts 1 and 3, there has been no evaluation of their effectiveness or efficiency. Field interviews suggest that these units are engaged in proactive policing, but narrowly focused on directed enforcement and crime suppression. As for community policing, one CSU member stated, "Leave the shaking hands and kissing babies stuff to the suburbs."

A major challenge for the CSUs and one that may significant impact their effectiveness is that they are not intelligence-led; that is, these units do not have access to real time crime data and criminal intelligence analysis that would assist them in their operational strategies. The lack of analytical capacity is a major issue in the WPS.

Ideally, the WPS should be data-driven and the CSUs, general patrol, and other units in the police service would have the services of crime analysts.

Parade Duty

A CSU member in Division 11 indicated that one of the responsibilities of the unit is "parade and protest" duty. When asked about this duty, the constable stated that this was the part of the CSU mandate that members do not like as it tied up resources that could be better used elsewhere. The view was that this responsibility should be given to the traffic section in the WPS other than GP and CSU.

Beat Policing

The primary objective of the beat policing is to provide police visibility in the community. Beat officers are able to have more extensive interaction with the general public than patrol officers. Beat officers patrol in pairs and do not go out in District 3 after 9:30 PM unless with a partner or in a group. In the view of the CSU members, beat policing provided "great intel." Officers are able to get information from business owners and key informants and are able to get a better feel for the area because they are immersed in it. Further, beat officers are more easily approachable for citizens, for example, the one constable stated that, "A lot of people that wouldn't normally talk to the police will come and talk to us." Businesses have expressed great satisfaction with this practice. In addition to intelligence gathering and community interaction, beat officers are able to reduce the number of intoxicated persons (IPTAs) congregating on the street by, as the constable puts it, "shuffling the IPTAs off the main streets." Each of the Community Support Units (on both the A-side and B-side) is assigned foot patrol or Beat police officers. When at full complement, the CSU for D1 has four foot patrol officers for each shift (day and evening); however, at the moment two of the four CSU teams are short one officer.

Beat patrols are considered a positive component of the WPS. They facilitate high visibility policing, information gathering and interaction with residents and merchants. There was among the constables a view that Beat patrols should be expanded, specifically, the number of officers doing foot patrols.

CRITICAL ISSUES AND CHALLENGES FACING PATROL

Field research identified a number of challenges currently confronting patrol in the WPS.

Patrol Officer Workloads

In general, the patrol members are not required to carry an investigative caseload. The primary duty of the district patrol units is to be available for dispatched calls. In the busier districts, this accounts for the majority of their time on the road. There is an expectation in less busy districts that members will engage in traffic and bylaw enforcement.

Any patrol-attended incident that requires follow-up is usually sent to the District detective office, or a specialized unit. The exception to this is when members apprehend suspects involved in an offence. A determination is made by the Station NCO In these circumstances; he may direct that the members attending investigate the case. This occurred in two incidents observed during ride-a-longs, both involving stolen vehicles where suspects were apprehended in the vehicles. This effectively removed a two-member car from service for several hours while the investigation was completed, and reports written to support charges. Suspects are lodged in holding cells at the district office pending the completion of the investigation and released or taken to more permanent cells in the headquarters building.

Insufficient Number of Patrol Officers

A number of the patrol constables who were interviewed lamented the lack of manpower in General Patrol. When asked if he felt there were a sufficient number of officers in patrol, one PC responded with an emphatic, "NO!" According to the same officer, general patrol is the "backbone of the service" and handles upwards of 90% of police work. While General Patrol is perpetually short-staffed, the many specialty units of the WPS are always full. Members leave for specialty squads, but the vacancies that are created in GP are not being filled. Patrol members indicated that many officers are attracted to specialty units because of the preferable work schedules, not having to wear a uniform, a slower pace, more prestige, and, as one officer stated, "not having to deal with as much aggravation." This lack of manpower has manifested itself in a number of consequences that will be briefly outlined below.

Another constable stated that the lack of patrol members resulted in officers "going from call to call" with no time to engage in proactive policing. As previously noted, this is also perceived by members to have an adverse effect on the personal lives of officers.

The Patrol Officer Reporting Protocol

In the WPS, the reports of patrol officers are generally submitted from their vehicles. Each vehicle has a mobile data terminal, allowing reports to be submitted electronically. Members do not return to the office to submit reports unless they have a person in custody or it is a major occurrence. The expectation is that a file will be written up before a car clears to take another call; however the volume of calls on a busy night may interfere with this. However reports must be submitted prior to the end of a shift.

In contrast to the practice in most urban police services, patrol reports are not read by the district supervisors. Rather, once completed, the reports are electronically routed to a Reader's office in the headquarters building where a senior police member, receiving a supervisory premium, reviews each file to ensure it is properly investigated and the necessary information submitted.   This is the first level of quality control, with the reader providing feedback to the district offices, in terms of the quality of the written work, investigative shortcomings or failure to comply with policy.

Reports for in-custody matters or recommended criminal charges are completed in the district office by patrol members and are perused in the first instance by the sergeant in charge of the shift before being sent to the court unit. They are also examined by the Reader's office. In Manitoba, the charging decision rests with the police.

Redeployment Of Patrol Units To Other Districts/Events

The City of Winnipeg issues directives that patrol units must be redeployed from their district to other districts and for special events, including Winnipeg Jets home games. There appears to be no Special Events budget in the City that would provide for back filling of these patrol units. Given the public perception (supported by crime statistics) that the downtown area is unsafe, the City views a high visibility police presence in the downtown core as essential.

Downloading

This Operational Review observed the downloading that has occurred on to the WPS as a consequence of cutbacks in programs and services previously offered by other agencies. The sources of the downloading include the federal government, the provincial government, and the city of Winnipeg municipal government. A good illustration is the Holiday Season Check – Stop Program. During the holiday season check-stop program, the Traffic Unit takes one unit from each district for the duration of the holiday season. A staff sergeant in the Central Traffic Unit provided the following information:

> *"During our Festive Season Checkstop Program we pull one 2-man general patrol unit from each of the four districts. There is no evening traffic shift in Central Traffic so we utilize General Patrol for manpower. Central Traffic still provides supervisors for the program. No particular GP unit is seconded to the program for the duration (month of December), but each district is required to send one unit each night, manpower permitting."*

This is but one example of a situation where patrol units are seconded from the districts to work on special projects or to assist in managing special events.

General Patrol in the WPS is the catchall for virtually every social issue in Winnipeg. The demands/expectations places on WPS members are significant and, in many ways, unrealistic. The Aboriginal and Newcomer community expect officers to be social workers and to be able to respond to their unique set of needs; however, many of the complaints that these communities have should be directed towards government. The WPS lack the time, resources, and ability to address many of the deeper social issues in Winnipeg.

Apprehensions under the Mental Health Act

A two-member unit is required to take an apprehended person to the hospital where the officers must wait until such time as they are seen and either released or admitted. This can take up to several hours, or in some instances, the better part of a day, as these persons are assigned a low priority at the Emergency Ward.

Responding to Intoxicated Persons

The large number of intoxicated individuals has put a strain on both General Patrol and Community Support Units. According tone officer, this is exacerbated by the fact that the "drunk tank" at 75 Martha is too small (19 rooms) and rapidly reaches capacity. This results in waiting times for officers of up to three hours while they wait with the intoxicated individual in the back of their cruisers. This prevents them from responding to calls for service that are in the queue. This officer felt that, "the service should have our own drunk tank that is segregated for adults and youth and has a full-time paramedic onsite, like they have at 75 Martha." Indeed a number of officers, including this constable, lamented the size (two cells) of the youth intoxication facility. When it becomes full, officers have very few other options beyond taking the individual to the hospital.

For patrol members, the paperwork required for impaired driving is onerous. Because of this, patrol officers are inclined to deal with impaired drivers by way of license suspensions, except in incidents such as accidents. The motor vehicle legislation provides for fairly severe penalties for repeat offenders under the license suspension sections.   Transporting intoxicated persons to the detox facility and prisoners to the main gaol is time-consuming and, again, removes a two-car unit from service. Unlike most urban police services, the WPS does not

operate a "wagon" that can be dispatched to pick up persons who are intoxicated for transportation to the appropriate facility.

Patrol Officers in the WPS

A key feature of best practice policing in the early 21st century is the active involvement of patrol officers in identifying priorities and setting goals in their areas of operation. This appears not to be the case in the WPS and is an area that requires the attention of the organization.

The Role Of Patrol Officers

Field observations revealed that WPS patrol officers do not appear to be involved in setting goals and priorities for their districts. Rather, their role seems to be confined to 'take a call', then 'take another call'. Officers indicated that there was little or no access to the departments' crime analysts and that it would be unusual for them to contact an analyst. The primary source of information about specific details about crime trends in their districts is the NCO in the detective office.

As noted, this is not a "best practice" arrangement. Leading-edge police services have recognized the value of involving patrol members in the planning and implementation of initiatives in their respective districts. In Vancouver, for example, patrol supervisors work with patrol members to identify chronic offenders and hotspots, and utilize analytical data provided by crime analysts to target areas and offenders with directed patrol. Each of the four districts in Vancouver has a dedicated crime analyst and the districts also have access to analyses conducted by other analysts in the Research and Planning section.

Even with patrol officers focusing nearly exclusively on calls for service, an analysis of the CAD data presented later in this report indicates that the response times to calls for service are way beyond what would be considered best practice and much lengthier that in comparable Canadian police services. This suggests that the WPS does not have a sufficient number of officers to allow its members to engage in proactive policing and, as well, that the activities that patrol officers are engaged in are not intelligence-led.

An Absence of Support for Patrol

Beyond spending the large majority of their time responding to calls for service, WPS patrol members appear to have access to few supportive resources. Patrol officers do not appear to be involved in any multi-agency initiatives in the districts. Officers who were interviewed could not cite any specific relationships with Child and Family Services that would assist them in responding to the needs of at-risk youth. The officers who were interviewed, for example, were not able to identify any diversion programs or restorative justice programs to

which youths could be referred. Patrol districts do have access to translation services provided by a local company, Language Bank but, again, this is in the context of a reactive rather than proactive role for the patrol officers.

Officers in the Community Support Unit in the downtown core did mention working with a resource dealing with slum landlords and drug houses. They can call The Manitoba Justice Public Safety Investigators, for assistance in dealing with these problems. They will be given assistance in bringing together fire and bylaw investigators to assist them. Their goal is to shut down the crack houses or slum buildings under the provincial legislation or city bylaws.

The Assignment of Detectives to Each Patrol Division

A key feature of the organization of the WPS is the assignment of several detectives to each division to provide follow-up investigative services. It should be noted that other police services, including the Vancouver Police Department, have previously attempted a similar approach with little success. The VPD, for example, decentralized the traffic section and assign them under the command of the district, attaching several traffic officers to each squad. This experiment was not successful and the Traffic section was re-centralized.

The major challenge with the centralizing the detective function is that there is not one centralized command structure overseeing the deployment, prioritization and coordination of investigative work. Rather it would depend on the view of each NCO or perhaps the inspector in each division. This runs the risk of creating investigative silos between the various divisions, i.e. each division is focusing on its own work and no one is responsible for coordinating and prioritizing the follow-up work that's being done. A detailed examination of the operations of the detectives in the divisions was beyond the scope of this operation review. This is a core component of the WPS that should be examined in detail going forward.

Call Screening

The multi-layered call priority system has previously been identified as problematic and requiring reform. Another inefficiency is the call priority system. There are so many categories of calls that one patrol sergeant could not recall all of them. Many of the calls in the queue are low priority and, in many cases, do not require a police response. The absence of "call screeners" results in a de facto "no call too small" policy that, in turn, leads to the inefficient use of patrol resources.

Several inspectors noted there was a need to devise a system that would screen out calls that did not require a patrol unit. This is particularly important for the WPS, which, with a few exceptions, operates two-officer patrol units at all times.   The WPS Status Report on Response to Calls for Service stated that, "The continued

development of the APR unit would be of considerable value to both the public and the members of General Patrol. The members of APR can respond to calls faster and with greater frequency, over the phone, then it is possible to do by car. More calls removed from the queue means fewer calls that General Patrol members have to respond to – leaving more time for proactive policing or investigation[198].

Lack of Access to Criminal Intelligence Analysis

Best practice police services in the early 21st century are evidence-based and intelligence led. WPS patrol members do not have access to crime analysts or to information that would allow them to be intelligence led. This is due to a glaring lack of capacity in the research and analysis section of the WPS. It is recommended in this report that the WPS immediately undertake to build analytical capacity. At present the WPS appears to have only two persons who are actively involved in data analysis. As previously noted, it does not appear that patrol officers have access to analytical data. This hinders their effectiveness and efficiency.

In contrast, the Vancouver Police Department, which has a lower sworn strength than the WPS, has 26 crime analysts. Each of the four districts in the city of Vancouver has a crime analyst attached to it. In addition there are highly trained crime analysts who are using sophisticated analytical programs to generate both long-term and real-time analyses and information that is made available to general patrol members and to officers in special units. To improve its effectiveness and efficiency, it is critical that the WPS given immediate attention to building analytical capacity. There are a variety of resource persons who would be available to assist the WPS in this endeavour and, as well, provide in-depth training for the new crime analysts.

Assigning Rookies to Staff the Service Counters

Concern was expressed by a number of officers about the practice of staffing the front counters at police headquarters and district offices with recruits who have recently graduated from the training academy. They felt that this was detrimental to the new officers on at least two counts: first, recruits did not have a chance to utilize their recruit training by putting it into practice on the road and, second, this practice does not result in good public service as new officers are not conversant enough to dispense advice to the general public. The general consensus was that there are many senior personnel who were close to retirement or on limited duties that could adequately fill these roles, allowing recruits to go directly to a district and gain the necessary policing experience with their peers.

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[198] Winnipeg Police Service, 2012:6

The Absence of Custody Wagons

Patrol members apprehending a person are responsible for caring for that person until such time as they can either be released or taken to another facility. A major deficiency in WPS patrol operations is that there are no custody wagons to transport these persons to a holding cell. Each district office has limited cell facilities where prisoners may be lodged on a temporary basis, pending investigation. Prisoners held in custody for charges or other court processes are taken to the main headquarters building where they are detained until the court process is started. This results in a two-officer unit being out of the district for an hour or longer. It is Winnipeg Police policy that only two member cars will transport prisoners given the potential for claims of abuse against a single member. Responding to intoxicated persons is also time-consuming, as patrol units must take the person to a downtown detox facility.

It is standard practice in urban police services to utilize custody wagons to transport prisoners, allowing patrol units to remain in their districts to respond to calls for service. The absence of alternative transportation is even more debilitating to patrol given the size of the city of Winnipeg and the distances that must be travelled.

Quality of Life/Work Environment

WPS Officer Safety and Security

A number of the officers Division 11, District 1 identified the absence of secure, accessible parking near the Public Safety Building as a key issue. None of the officers who were interviewed explicitly stated that they feared for their personal safety. However, the field researchers did sense that safety was a legitimate concern for patrol members. Contributing to this is the absence of secure parking for patrol members in District 1 and District 3. Their police stations, particularly the Public Safety Building at 151 Princess, are high crime areas and officers are at risk talking to and from their vehicles. Two officers had recently been assaulted walking back to their cars at night during a two week time period in May 2013. And there have been instances of officers being followed home in the North End. The lack of secure parking has a major impact on officer morale in addition to placing them at risk of physical harm.

Moreover, officer safety is not restricted to off duty. As previously noted, Beat or foot patrol officers will not go out after 9:30 PM in Downtown or the North End unless in pairs or groups of three or more. The perception is that it is simply not safe enough for officers to be on the streets alone. In my opinion, this is a major issue. The fact that officers have legitimate safety concerns when walking a beat or being alone in certain areas of the city is, quite frankly, very disconcerting.

Training and Promotion

Officer Tenure in Districts

Upon completion of 36 weeks recruit training personnel are assigned to a district with a field trainer. Recruits are on probation for a two-year period and remain in the district for five years. They will remain within this district for five years, generally in patrol. Transfers from the districts are either to a specialized unit in headquarters or to the patrol division in another district.

While in a district, a member may apply to work in the district detective office where the tenure is two years. This policy was viewed as an impediment by a number of officers in that suitable candidates for the detective office are precluded from consideration if they have less than two years left to serve in a district.

The constables who were interviewed generally felt that a five-year term in the district was a good policy. It allowed them to become well acquainted with the district and the issues in the community. This was viewed as being particularly important for new recruits coming out of the training academy as it provides them with a good working knowledge of the Criminal Code, general police duties and department policies before moving into specialty units. Even in districts with a high level of calls for service, patrol members felt they developed a good knowledge of their districts and residents during this period.

The Promotional System

The promotional system in Winnipeg Police begins with the patrol sergeant rank. Although there is a designation for senior constable, with a pay increment, this is not a supervisory position, rather an acknowledgement of service. The senior constables fill in for the patrol sergeant in their absence. The entry into the promotional system begins with a constable asking to write the sergeant's exam. Members are not allowed to do this until 10 years' service, with many waiting longer before writing it. There are no training courses to prepare them for this, although many of the senior constables have had 'acting time', performing the patrol sergeant's job from time to time. Should they pass the exam; candidates enter into the promotion process with interviews and panels. If they are successful, their names are placed on a list and promoted as vacancies occur.

A central feature of the promotion system is that officers who are promoted to sergeant are expected to return to patrol duties for at least two years. This brings officers into patrol with specialized skills gained working in specialized units, which is of value to junior members in patrol. This also reinforces the value of patrol in the organization. Some concerns were expressed about instances in which this protocol was not enforced, allowing newly promoted officers to remain in specialized units and not requiring them to return to patrol.

Patrol Officers Perceptions of Academy and In-Service Training

In-service training was a contentious issue among the patrol officers who were interviewed. There was a widely shared view among the members that the initial training they had received in the police academy had prepared them to begin their careers in policing. This, along with the initial five year posting to a district, formed a strong basis for a career. One junior female constable stated that she felt that the academy staff went out of their way to show her how to compensate for her lack of strength and size, and that she felt confident she could do the job properly.

With respect to in-service training, however, the patrol officers who were interviewed commented that the patrol shift system and staffing requirements hindered their ability to access in-service training courses offered by the training academy. They indicated that it was difficult to get free from the shift schedule to attend a week-long course, and that they were often restricted to finding one and two day courses that they could attend on their 'overlap' days. This was a source of frustration, as in-service training is viewed as a pre-requisite for career development and advancement. Although the patrol sergeants indicated that they attempted to secure in-service training courses for members who requested them, it was often difficult due to the need to ensure that the shifts were adequately staffed.

Of concern is that there do not appear to be any opportunities for patrol members to access leadership courses prior to being promoted to the rank of sergeant. As noted, senior constables often "cover" for patrol sergeants and yet have no formal training for this role.

Patrol Officers Priorities Going Forward

Patrol officers interviewed for the study identified a number of priorities going forward. These included:

- filling the vacancies in general patrol and then in the specialty units;
- more proactive policing; bringing back call screeners to ensure that police units are not dispatch to situations that are not–related;
- eliminating what one officer referred to as "useless units", e.g. the Mounted Unit and the Green Team (marijuana enforcement), in order to free up personnel for more pressing needs;
- targeting the youth in the downtown and North End and involving the police proactively with youth to reduce gang involvement; and,
- more 189 cars and more Community Support Units.

WPS Patrol and Community Policing

Relationship with the Community

When asked to assess the relationship of the WPS with the community, one constable bluntly stated that the relationship is poor. She went on to state that this was a consequence of policing in some areas where the WPS is dealing with persons in crisis and persons who are usually being arrested. Several of the constables who were interviewed noted that the police did have a good relationship with business owners in the community. This was largely due to the fact that CSU members regularly visit these locations to speak to owners and patrons.

The Return of Community Police Officers?

There was widespread support among the officers and community resource persons who were interviewed for the project for re-introducing Community Police officers. The view among some officers was that these officers would be best utilized in the suburbs or outlying districts. As one officer put it, "To make them feel like they're getting attention and value for money."[199]

The response to the suggestion of introducing beat officers in areas other than the downtown core was mixed. One officer felt that while the interaction and visibility provided by walking the beat was beneficial, this was offset by the fact that beat patrol are not really able to respond to many incidents due to their lack of mobility. As such, he questioned its practicality. For this officer, the WPS did not currently have the manpower to dedicate more individuals to beat policing.

When asked about the return of Community Police officers, a CSU constable expressed some desire to have them back. He felt they would be especially useful in the suburban areas or areas that do not receive a great deal of police attention. For him, having an officer in the community in some capacity (e.g., a storefront or an office in a community centre) would provide that segment of the population to talk to a police officer. Currently, if people need to talk to the police or visit the duty office, they must do so during the day as the duty offices of the service centres outside of downtown are only on day shifts. So, if someone needs to report something after work, they have to travel downtown where the duty office at 151 Princess is open 24 hours. As a result the duty office at 151 Princess is over-subscribed during certain hours. Having community officers would possibly serve to reduce this backlog.

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[199] This was another example of the urban/suburban dichotomy.

Partnerships

The WPS is involved in many partnerships with agencies and organizations. Some of these relationships are mandated by legislation, others by policy (see Table 70: Division 41 External Agency Contacts). The extent to which these partnerships are effective in addressing outstanding issues in the community cannot be determined, be it the challenges faced by Aboriginals, Newcomers, families in poverty, or PwMI. A review of the chart does indicate that the WPS has responsibilities to maintain contact (in a number of instances, on a daily basis) with over 90 agencies and organizations, such contact being as frequent as daily. The information in Table 71 illustrates the exponential growth in the obligations of police services, in this instance the WPS, and raises the question as to whether these requirements increase the effectiveness and efficiency of police service delivery. While collaborative partnerships are a hallmark of best practice policing, these must be evidence-based, have a clear mandate and objectives, and have measurable outcomes. In the absence of such a framework, the "relationships" may be merely administrative.

Views of Community Policing

The majority of the patrol officers who were interviewed during the project expressed support for proactive policing. However, a number of them really only saw the value in proactive enforcement such as spot checks, serving warrants, hotspot policing, and directed patrols. The notion of community outreach was less enthusiastically discussed, even among officers in the CSUs. A number of the officers who were interviewed seemed to view law enforcement and crime suppression and the notion of community policing as mutually exclusive, i.e. that it was a matter of choosing between the two approaches particularly in high-demand areas such as District 1 and District 3. However, in the early 21st century, there has emerged a model of policing that incorporates both approaches, each benefiting the other. That is, developing relationships with the community assists the police in their enforcement and suppression efforts. This is the notion of "strategic focused community policing" which also relies heavily on crime analysts and predictive policing, two capacities that are lacking in the WPS. It is the responsibility of the leadership of the WPS to take the steps necessary to build the necessary capacities, which will enable the development of a comprehensive policing model that incorporates community policing. This will require additional resources and reform to patrol to move officers beyond "call takers".

This attitude may be due, in part, to an ingrained culture of "call taking" among patrol members. One constable mentioned that "Officers are jaded, and don't see the value of building deeper relationships with the community." To the field researchers, many of the patrol officers also seemed to be fatigued from the workload and from the verbal abuse they receive from residents in the high demand/high trouble Districts 1 and 3.

Another impediment to the inclusion of community policing in patrol operations is the invisible line that seems to have been drawn between the core of the city and the suburbs where the "taxpayers" live. Many of the officers who were interviewed felt that the high level of crime and disorder in the core areas of the city had lead the WPS to neglect the suburbs and outlying areas.

In 2008, a report produced by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives argued that, "The Winnipeg Police Service needs to find a better balance between investing in the community and law enforcement functions" (p. 18). The report further stated that "The 'war on crime' approach of the WPS and the Mayor does not solve social ills and it increases costs in the long run"[200]. A suggestion was that more resources be committed to programs such as the SRO program and less to responding to relatively minor issues of disorder in the community. Note that since this report was produced, there has been a change in police Chiefs.

The Need for Strategic Community Policing

> *"When you go call to call to call, people don't really get a chance to see you."* **–** *GP officer*
>
> *"The only time you really deal with the people that support us is when you are giving them a ticket. To me, that is like cutting our own throats." GP officer*

The need for proactive policing has been noted throughout this report was a major theme among the officers interviewed for the project. One stated, "For the majority of the day officers bounce from call to call and nothing more." A widespread concern among patrol officers was the inability of the WPS to be more proactive**.** Officers felt that they lacked the time to engage in proactive policing. When the shift is busy, and resources are lacking, virtually all officers' time is spent on responding to calls. As a result, officers felt that the WPS is not getting at the root causes of the problems plaguing the city.

A number of officers did indicate support for enforcement strategies such as target hardening, hot-spot policing, and directed patrols. However, the absence of continuous access to crime analysts and information on crime patterns and offenders, limits the ability of the WPS to engage in these activities. This highlights the core role that crime and intelligence analysis play in the modern police service and the deficiencies of the WPS in this area.

One GP officer stated that there was a need for more outreach work in the community. He provided the example of "Cop Shop", a WPS initiative in which members are paired up with troubled youth, who are taken to a local shopping mall and allowed to spend $100 on themselves or gifts for others during the holiday season.

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[200] CCPA, 2008:18

This same officer lauded a former district inspector who was a strong proponent of proactive community involvement. This inspector would tell his officers to forget the minor calls in the cue and spend some time engaging in proactive police work, to stop by community centers or events and to "Fly the Flag." This particular PC was a big proponent of "Flying the Flag", getting out of the car and interacting with the public. For him, "It shouldn't just be about responding to calls. More proactive policing means you address the problem before it happens."

According to one officer, one barrier to an increase in proactive policing is that officers simply don't know *how* to be proactive. Many of the officers in GP at the moment are junior members and are being taught by senior members who have become set in their ways as "call takers", which makes it challenging for junior members to learn how to be proactive. Additionally, it was noted that when it is busy, there is no time to think about proactive policing. As noted above, there is pressure (real or perceived) from dispatchers.

The Public and Community Policing

The Winnipeg Police General Survey, conducted in 2010, provides key insights into community expectations of the police and public perceptions of the WPS. Among the findings of the study (N=800) were the following:

- 61% of the respondents rated the WPS as excellent or good compared with 5.2% who rated it as poor – very poor

- 60% of the respondents believe that crime was on the increase in the city and almost ½ of the respondents believe that Winnipeg had much more crime than other Canadian cities

- when asked about the visible presence of the police in their neighbourhood, only 2% said they were too many officers and almost 50% thought there were too few officers in their neighbourhood

- when asked the open – ended question: "What improvements would you like to see made in regards to policing in your community?", the responses were: There should be "more patrols and surveillance" (35.5%), followed by "More officers needed" (9.8%)[201]

Reflective of the reactive model of policing and the call for service pressures on patrol members was the finding that of those respondents who reported an incident 73.3% said the police did not provide them with any information concerning the outcome of their investigation at a later date. This was the highest percentage reporting a "lack of communication" since the survey began[202]. Police services use a number of strategies to address this issue, including having a robust Telephone Response Team that maintains contact with the victims of crime to provide updates on the case investigation.

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[201] Wyman, 2010: 5-6
[202] Wyman, 2010: 28

General Impressions of WPS Patrol

The field observations and interviews revealed that WPS patrol officers carry out their activities professionally and with a high level of commitment to their craft. This, despite the challenges of being engaged primarily in reactive policing with little or no time for proactive activities, as well, patrol officers do not have access to crime analysts and information that would facilitate intelligence-led policing and problem-solving. Officers in many of the districts, particularly in the downtown core and in the North End, are confronted with numerous challenges as a consequence of myriad social issues, poverty and crime in these areas.

Patrol members are generally not involved in determining priorities in their respective districts or developing specific interventions to address crime hotspots or to apprehend chronic offenders. This, combined with a heavy focus on "call taking" may have a major impact on the morale of patrol members. The absence of evidence-based policing and of multi-agency partnerships means that patrol officers are most often left to their own devices in responding to calls for service without the resources to effectively address the larger issues that give rise to crime and disorder. These and other realities of the WPS patrol officers should be addressed by the organization going forward. This will require that the patrol function be adequately resourced both with respect to ensuring that there are sufficient numbers of officers to respond to calls for service in a timely manner and to engage in proactive policing activities. It will also require that patrol officers be freed up from transporting prisoners and providing officers with access to information generated by crime analysts.

Centering patrol activities on responding to calls for service and working within a reactive model is a zero-sum game. There are limited opportunities to problem-solve, to partner with community organizations and with agencies, and to target chronic offenders. One officer expressed the feeling that the majority of his time was spent, "Putting a band aid on a larger problem." That is, he felt that police are not actually addressing the root causes of the issues that they are faced with. He felt that officers are responding to the crimes, but are unable to prevent them from recurring. Indeed both officers lamented the fact that that they could not engage in more proactive policing.

Best practice police services recognize that patrol is the core of the police function and that patrol officers can be considered the most valuable asset in a police service in not only responding to calls for service, but also taking initiatives to reduce crime and disorder. In short, a "call taking " role for patrol officers is both ineffective and inefficient.

WPS patrol officers should be at the centre of strategies for ensuring the safety and security of the community, rather than being relegated to a reactive role. The officers who were interviewed did not seem to have any ideas

of opportunities for involvement in working toward setting any goals for programs or projects within their districts, nor did they seem to have much in the way of knowledge of alternative resources available to them. Perhaps these programs do exist, but it seems that this information is not being effectively communicated to the patrol level. This should be part of any internal communication strategy that is developed going forward.

The Restorative Resolutions Program

There is considerable potential for the WPS to develop and enhance partnerships with community-based organizations. A good example is the Restorative Resolutions Program, which has operated in Winnipeg for many years. Restorative Resolutions is funded by provincial corrections and is operated in conjunction with the John Howard Society. Restorative Resolutions is the only government funded adult restorative justice initiative.

Restorative Resolutions is an offender-driven program that works with offenders that have pled guilty and are seeking alternative sentencing. It also prepares alternative prison plans for offenders that involve diversion into the community. In this respect, Restorative Resolutions does a lot of front-end work with offenders. Restorative Resolutions only becomes involved with offenders who are motivated and want to participate. They conduct a risk assessment of the offender using scales such as the SCMI and follow the Department of Corrections' case management model.

In addition to working with offenders, Restorative Resolutions provides a comprehensive opportunity for victim participation. They provide the victim with access to information on the court process, the outcome, and the event. They will help the victim to draft a victim impact statement and a probation officer will meet with the victim and act as a facilitator or go-between for victim and offender. Restorative Resolutions will arrange victim/offender mediation if the victim is interested in pursuing that route. However, if the victim does not wish to participate, Restorative Resolutions continues to proceed with the offender.

According the Director of Restorative Resolutions, the current relationship between Restorative Resolutions and the WPS is "limited." Restorative Resolutions currently "works in pockets" with police on special initiatives, but a lot of the interaction is based on personal relationships and there is currently no formal arrangement. The Director noted that there is a great interest in increasing both community and police involvement in the restorative justice realm.

The staff of Restorative Resolutions is very interested in partnering with the WPS and strengthening that relationship, but this involves having WPS officers who are open to the RJ process. That is, if police see an individual that they believe would be best served going through RJ, then they need to have the input necessary

to allow that to happen. And they need to have some amount of participation in the process also, working with Restorative Resolutions to find the best solution.

The involvement of the WPS is critical for Restorative Resolutions, in that if Restorative Justice wants to participate in more serious offences, it is important to have the necessary partners in place. This would involve building relationships at the grassroots level and increasing police visibility in the community. In turn, this would increase the residents' comfort level with the police. This is especially important for at-risk youth who need to see the police in a proactive and positive sense.

It was the Director's view that there are many opportunities for inter-agency cooperation and that multi-system case management is optimal. The Director noted that many of the organizations work in isolation and that there needs to be more open communication and better networking between stakeholders and key groups. The Director is also interested in establishing a working relationship with WPS Victim Services. The inspector in charge of Division 51 also spoke about the need to improve Victims' Services and the critical role that they can play in improving the relationship between the WPS and the community.

A pre-requisite for improving the relationship between the WPS and Restorative Resolutions and other community-based programs is a return to a more community-oriented approach. It should be noted that while the Restorative Resolutions program has been operating for many years, this program is note directed specifically toward Aboriginals or Newcomer groups.

> RECOMMENDATION: The WPS should explore re-starting the Community Police Center program on a pilot project basis.

WPS PATROL - QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Assessing Workload Demands

Before displaying analytic data, it is important to consider what the data is saying and what nuances may be present that should be considered. As the CAD data represents officer-activity from numerous angles, care must be taken to ensure the picture is as accurate as possible. Therefore, simply counting activity is often not appropriate without some modifications to what is included. To illustrate this, the question of "how many calls do District 1 officers receive" can be answered in numerous ways (using 2012 D1 data as an example):

Table 6: D1 Service Events (2012)

1	Number of events in CAD originating in District 1:	58,651
2	Number of events that had a D1 PUAR location	57,854
3	Number of events City-wide that noted D1 officers as the "Primary Unit"	41,038
4	Number of events in D1 with D1 officers as the "Primary Unit"	38,589
5	Number of events in D1 with a queue time (excludes on-view)	35,401

Which metric to use will depend on what the question is, and how best the answer should be presented. For instance, if the objective were to measure how many calls from the public originated in D1, then using #5 would be most appropriate to measure citizens who phone the police. However, if the objective were to measure community demand, simply limiting 'need' to those who phone the police would not be appropriate. In that case, using #1 or #2 would be more accurate to assess what issues the community required police assistance on, regardless of whether they phoned 9-1-1 or not. In terms of workload, the answers become somewhat more difficult. CAD will only ever give a proxy of an officers' workload and the time spent. There are also numerous caveats with using this type of data, such as entry errors and omissions. In addition, analysis must be mindful of these different nuances above, so as not to misrepresent the demands on officers' time.

Workload can be measured in several ways. One way is to use the amount of community demand, and match the staffing levels to that demand. This method would use both 9-1-1 and on-view calls to infer community demand, for the reasons outlined above. Another method is to look at the overall workload pressure on current units in order to ascertain whether staffing is appropriate. This is where metric #3 and #4 may come into play. Looking at metric #1, the data tells us that there were over 58,000 service entries from the community in District 1 in 2012. However, these service demands were not all placed on D1 officers. Looking at metric #4, D1 officers were noted as the primary unit in D1 activities only 38,000 times.   In addition, D1 officers were utilized as the primary unit both inside and outside D1 over 41,000 times in 2012. That means that not all events in D1 were

assigned to D1 officers, and not all D1 officers only dealt with files within D1. This nuance comes from workload pressures throughout each shift – at times it may be necessary to have officers from outside the district come in to take calls, as officers within the district are already occupied. This 'borrowing and lending' requires that data analysis be sensitive in which metric it utilizes for what purpose. For instance, if one wanted to assess how many files D1 officers were in charge of in 2012, it would be inappropriate to use only those files originating out of D1, as there were 3,000 additional instances where they were utilized outside of their district.

The 'community demand' here is based on all calls, both on-view and 9-1-1, in 2012. The reality of what unit handled the calls is not important at this point – this is to represent the needs, not the response. In addition, although Patrol members are rarely the primary unit on Priority 0 and 1 calls for service[203], it is not appropriate to assume they do not devote time to those calls. In reality, likely every available unit will respond to a Priority 0 or 1 call. Therefore, although technically the City-denoted units are designated as the primary units, these calls should not be omitted from the Patrol workload/community needs assessments.

Analysis should also consider the number of cancelled calls, which may indicate workload that is required, but has not been assigned for various reasons. The foregoing analysis is only based on the dispatched calls; however, the nature and extent of cancelled calls should be monitored and assessed on a regular basis to ensure that calls that should be assigned are. As an example, the number of cancelled calls in the CAD compared to the dispatched calls is as follows:

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[203] PRIORITY LEVELS

Priority 0: Major Disaster; Officer in Need of Assistance
Priority 1: Danger to Life or Grievous Bodily Harm
Priority 2: Impending Danger to Life or Grievous Bodily Harm
Priority 3: Urgent Person Incident
Priority 4: Urgent Property Incident
Priority 5: Non-Urgent Person Incident
Priority 6: Non-Urgent Property Incident
Priority 7: Low Risk or Threat
Priority 8: Telephone Response
Priority 9: Planned Response

Table 7: Dispatched vs. Cancelled Calls

2012	Dispatched Calls		Cancelled	% of Calls Dispatched
	call	on view		
D1	32,578	26,073	6,981	82%
D3	28,649	15,453	5,894	83%
D4	25,365	10,817	4,800	84%
WEST	26,823	13,686	5,948	82%
(not specified)	7	918	146	5%
Grand Total	113,422	66,947	23,769	83%

There is no reason noted in the data as to why the call has been cancelled. Analysts in the WPS should investigate further whether there is a way to track these data and to determine why calls were cancelled.

As stated above, the foregoing analysis does not include the cancelled calls, and bases findings only on those calls dispatched. Again, this may be a source of discrepancy within the Service in terms of why calls are cancelled and the resultant impact on workload statistics; however, at the present time there is no reliable way to assess the nature of these cancelled calls.

As such, officer workload will most appropriately be a function of both the community demands, as well as their own workload both inside and outside their district. Community demands are most appropriately characterized by the instances of officer-activity in that area, both dispatched via 9-1-1, and created on-view.

GENERAL TRENDS

Patrol services are the backbone of any police department. They are the first-responders, and the presence that the community sees responding to calls. Therefore, assessing whether there are adequate patrol resources must start with assessing what the community demands are, and the nature of the demands placed on patrol services. To begin, the amount of workload demand placed on WPS officers since 2008 is shown below:

Figure 89: Workload Demands - 2008-2012

While this trend appears to be increasing significantly, many nuances within the data must be considered before making decisions or policies based simply on the number of workload demands. Another view is to examine the nature of these workload demands. As is shown below, a great deal of patrol officer's time is spent on Traffic Stops, other Traffic-related incidents, and motor vehicle collisions. These are often areas where a police service may examine policy surrounding who should be dealing with these types of calls, and whether a patrol response is required.

Table 8: Types of Calls - 2008-2012

INITIAL CALL TYPE	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	TOTAL	%	Cum %
TSTOP	19,051	19,727	18,412	16,836	20,036	94,062	11%	11%
DOMEST	17,119	17,397	16,975	17,240	15,721	84,452	10%	22%
SPAT	6,166	9,256	8,995	10,036	12,126	46,579	6%	27%
DIST	8,964	8,701	8,979	9,124	8,553	44,321	5%	33%
WELLBEING	6,711	8,241	8,605	9,396	9,804	42,757	5%	38%
TRAFFIC	6,169	6,716	6,473	5,888	5,890	31,136	4%	42%
SUSP	5,980	5,998	6,269	6,061	5,911	30,219	4%	45%
ASSAULT	5,152	5,257	5,513	5,489	5,580	26,991	3%	48%
FAMILTRBL	3,862	4,034	4,439	4,597	4,636	21,568	3%	51%
MVC	4,659	4,578	4,636	4,131	3,061	21,065	3%	54%

The priority of calls also assists in ascertaining workload, with higher priority calls generally requiring more personnel response, as well as a faster response. Most of the calls in Winnipeg were classified as Priority 3, being an "urgent person incident". This may include assaults or situations where there is a danger to another's safety. What is notable about the data below is that the most urgent and emergency situations appear to be increasing in Winnipeg. While some increase with a growing population can be expected, the nature of the calls should be examined regularly to ensure any trends could be spotted immediately.

Table 9: Number of Calls by Priority - 2008-2012

PRIORITY	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	TOTAL	%	Cum %
0	798	764	707	608	600	3,477	0%	0%
1	1,221	1,231	1,290	1,582	1,900	7,224	1%	1%
2	8,242	10,693	11,542	11,559	12,078	54,114	7%	8%
3	64,939	68,392	69,011	68,681	65,784	336,807	41%	49%
4	8,427	8,509	8,375	7,554	7,341	40,206	5%	53%
5	22,196	20,419	20,507	21,819	19,627	104,568	13%	66%
6	4,515	3,197	3,350	3,289	2,722	17,073	2%	68%
7	31,269	35,238	34,528	40,503	56,914	198,452	24%	92%
8	5,804	5,858	5,983	4,992	6,073	28,710	3%	96%
9	6,686	8,093	7,385	6,534	7,330	36,028	4%	100%

Winnipeg and Canada Population Change and Forecast from 2000 to 2015

Source: Conference Board of Canada, Metropolitan Outlook Winter 2012

As is shown, Winnipeg's population shows a steady increase each year, fluctuating between 1.2% and 1.5% as a high in 2010/2011. While these population increases might naturally lead to increases in crime in some areas, the increase in Priority 1s and 2s between 2008 and 2012 is far above any population increases:

Table 10: % Increase in CFS by Priority - 2008-2012

PRIORITY	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	% change 2008-2012
0	-	-4%	-7%	-14%	-1%	-25%
1	-	1%	5%	23%	20%	56%
2	-	30%	8%	0%	4%	47%
3	-	5%	1%	0%	-4%	1%
4	-	1%	-2%	-10%	-3%	-13%
5	-	-8%	0%	6%	-10%	-12%
6	-	-29%	5%	-2%	-17%	-40%
7	-	13%	-2%	17%	41%	82%
8	-	1%	2%	-17%	22%	5%
9	-	21%	-9%	-12%	12%	10%

Priority 1s recently saw an increase between 2010 and 2012; however, Priority 2s saw their large jump between 2008 and 2009. While Priority 7 calls also saw a large increase since 2010, as many of these can be considered proactive duties, they do not necessarily mean that requests for emergency assistance are increasing from the public. Regardless, all call types should be examined to ensure the Service is well aware of the crime trends in the City, and what the public is requesting assistance for.

Along with the number and types of calls, the timing of calls for service should always be examined on an ongoing basis. This may dictate changes in deployment or other operational realities, and should be led by community need. Figure 20 shows the distribution of service demands throughout the week. Not surprising is that weekends show a slightly higher percentage of calls, with Fridays dispatching 6% more calls than the weekly average, and Saturdays dispatching 12% more calls than the weekly average.

Figure 90: Service Demands by Day of the Week

Also of interest are the monthly trends throughout the year. Again, the finding is that summer months result in higher service demands than winter months. The nature and types of calls will often dictate these trends, but with warmer weather encouraging more outdoor activities and socializing, the increase in conflicts and opportunities plays a large role in these trends.

2012 Percentage (%) of Dispatched calls by Month

What becomes clear is that calls for service and officer-initiated 'calls' have been steadily increasing since 2008. While many of these may be due to an increase in cadet or beat activity (or other lower-priority, proactive activities), the increase in Priority 1 and 2 calls demonstrates that the level of urgency and citizen need is high. While weekly trends and monthly trends demonstrate some reasonable variations, it may necessitate adjusting deployment and shifting to better match these service demands.

The following sections examine those workload demands on a more micro-level, utilizing 2012 as the reference year for district-specific trends.

CITY AND DISTRICT HOT SPOTS

As is undoubtedly well known, crime is not spread out uniformly throughout the City. Some districts are much 'busier' than others, while some areas are relatively quiet in terms of service demands. In an ideal scenario, all areas of the City would receive an equal amount of attention from police, and their assistance requests would all be met within the same timelines. However, as Departments struggle with how to balance community needs with logistical constraints surrounding staffing and budgets, hard decisions must be made which may see some areas receiving less service in lieu of higher-priority areas needing a greater proportion of the resources. Making those decisions should not be made by intuition or anecdotal evidence. One officer's experience in an area will be only that – their experience. A holistic picture should be created which looks at the entire area and uses all the data available to make out the trends and drive deployment and policy. Hot spot maps are one tool that may be utilized to assist Patrol with deployment in the areas with the most need. There are many ways of displaying a hot spot, and many definitions that may be used. A well-trained crime analyst will be able to provide this valuable information to officers and senior managers in order to best deploy resources to meet demand. Demands from the community (both on-view and officer-initiated) can be visualized using a kernel density technique as shown below:

WPS Hot Spot of Community Demands (CFS 2012 data)

As can be seen, most activity is concentrated around the City core. That is not to suggest that all events occur downtown, but the farther out from the core one moves, the fewer crime events occur on average. Density will also be important on a district-wide scale, however, and trends not visible on a City-scale may emerge.

The demands from the Community in D1 can be visualized as follows[204], with red areas displaying the highest density of community demands, and blue or green areas showing a low density of calls for service or officer-initiated activity:

For another view, the density of Priority 0 through 6 better demonstrates the community demands in D1, and eliminates activities of the cadets and the lowest priority calls or beat activities (self-directed). This feature is somewhat unique to D1, as other districts do not share these features to the same extent.

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[204] Although 58,651 CAD events were noted as originating in D1, when geocoded and selected out geographically, only 96% actually fell within the D1 border. As this is an error rate of less than 5%, it is unlikely to skew the results from the data. However, care should be taken when basing policy or deployment decisions on small numbers.

In D3, events are denser closer to the City core, with areas of tight concentration. This represents clustering in the more urban areas. These areas are also highlighted by being language-diverse, either in the dissemination area, or in the surrounding areas. As this may be an area of greater ethnic heterogeneity and/or immigration, this may result in conflicts.

In D4, concentrations are seen along the district divisions (alongside the river), and closer to the City core.

In the new "West" District (here taken from both D2 and D6), a similar pattern closer to the City core is seen.

Winnipeg Police Service
West District
Kernel Density Hot Spot
2012 CAD (all events)

Coordinate System: NAD 1983 UTM Zone 14N
Projection: Transverse Mercator
Datum: North American 1983
False Easting: 500,000.0000
False Northing: 0.0000
Central Meridian: -99.0000
Scale Factor: 0.9996
Latitude Of Origin: 0.0000
Units: Meter

N. Pollard
June 2013
data provided by:
Winnipeg Police Service

West Kernel Density
CAD CFS
Low Density
Medium Density
High Density

Miles
0   0.75 1.5   3   4.5   6

These hot spot maps (or similar analysis) can guide efforts for deployment, as placing officers closest to the areas that have a typically higher demand will ensure more efficient service, and more opportunities for problem solving and proactive activities in those high-demand areas.

DISTRICT-SPECIFIC DISTRIBUTION OF EVENTS

The types of events captured by the CAD varied in both priority and how it was received. As is shown, it is not reasonable to simply ignore those calls assumed to be 'on-view', as they may emerge just as urgent as those that were called in. For the foregoing analysis, on-view calls will only be excluded when it is reasonable to do so in order to ascertain staffing and shifting levels.

As shown in Table 6, many events may occur 'on-view', including serious incidents involving Priority 0, 1 or 2 events. While the determination of on-view activities is inferred from the data, it is reasonable to conclude that many events requiring officer attendance do not originate from the public dialling 9-1-1.

Table 11: On-View vs. Called In w/ Priority

Type of Call	DISTRICT 1	%	DISTRICT 3	%2	DISTRICT 4	%3	WEST	%4
Priority 0 1 2								
call	2,953	92%	2,649	94%	1,801	94%	1,845	93%
on view	259	8%	179	6%	113	6%	129	7%
Priority 3 4 5 6								
call	21,487	96%	19,023	97%	17,080	98%	17,515	98%
on view	894	4%	645	3%	267	2%	349	2%
Priority 7 8 9								
call	486	11%	386	11%	792	18%	884	19%
on view	3,924	89%	3,232	89%	3,614	82%	3,819	81%

To assess workload, therefore, it is not always appropriate to exclude on-view calls. The foregoing analysis will use both methods, and will stipulate which is being utilized. Viewing workload from several angles will assist in obtaining a clearer picture of the demands on Patrol's time, as well as the nature and type of these demands.

Looking at the nature and number of calls in each area from another angle, the 'beats' (or PUAR) can be used to see whether some areas are requesting service more often, and/or have more serious call types more often.

In 2012, 33% of the community demands came from District 1 (including on-view and caller-initiated). D1 also initiated 37% of the Priority 0 events, and nearly half of the Priority 1 events. With four districts, an ideal balance would be to see each district contributing approximately ¼ of the demands for service. While this is not often attainable, the discrepancies in each area can require different staffing levels to maintain equality of service across the entire City. As is shown below, D1 is above that ¼ benchmark for most of the higher priority calls. This indicates that not only are they dealing with a higher percentage of calls, but they are also dealing with a higher percentage of emergency calls, which has different impacts on officer time and service

requirements. In addition, some beats see much more activity than others. The beats with the most serious calls for service appear to be 1101, 1102 and 1103. Deployment considerations should take this into account.

Table 12: D1 CFS by PUAR and Priority

BEAT	PRIORITY									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
DISTRICT 1	37%	46%	32%	31%	21%	35%	20%	39%	26%	17%
1101	50%	24%	8%	12%	12%	21%	6%	24%	39%	15%
1102	7%	23%	13%	15%	16%	17%	12%	24%	13%	15%
1103	12%	25%	20%	20%	24%	18%	17%	19%	13%	15%
1104	11%	10%	15%	15%	9%	17%	18%	8%	9%	11%
1105	6%	9%	21%	18%	17%	12%	19%	12%	9%	18%
1106	4%	4%	13%	11%	14%	10%	17%	5%	8%	17%
1107	9%	5%	9%	8%	8%	6%	11%	5%	9%	9%

District 3 contributes a larger portion of Priority 2s, but appears relatively balanced among the beats, save for 1305 and 1306, which appear to garner fewer demands from the community. Beat 1301, however, does sit relatively high in more serious calls, and again, should be considered when shifting.

Table 13: D3 CFS by PUAR and Priority

BEAT	PRIORITY									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
DISTRICT 3	22%	19%	30%	26%	21%	23%	23%	24%	13%	21%
1301	22%	31%	31%	30%	23%	26%	23%	29%	14%	16%
1302	23%	25%	23%	21%	15%	20%	19%	26%	15%	17%
1303	11%	15%	20%	20%	18%	18%	16%	17%	9%	18%
1304	22%	14%	10%	10%	16%	12%	13%	12%	44%	15%
1305	7%	8%	9%	10%	15%	15%	16%	7%	10%	18%
1306	12%	6%	8%	10%	12%	9%	13%	6%	7%	15%

District 4 shows a relatively lower call load among all the priorities. Overall, D4 only generates 18% of the Priority 0 calls and 15% of the Priority 1 calls. This trend does appear slightly higher than expected for beat 1405, which shows a significant jump in both Priority 1s and Priority 8s.

BEAT	PRIORITY									
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**
DISTRICT 4	18%	15%	19%	21%	26%	21%	28%	17%	26%	30%
1401	7%	11%	19%	16%	13%	15%	14%	15%	8%	12%
1402	11%	10%	15%	16%	11%	15%	16%	13%	7%	10%
1403	22%	13%	11%	12%	18%	13%	13%	15%	20%	16%
1404	17%	18%	14%	13%	12%	14%	15%	11%	8%	15%
1405	17%	28%	14%	15%	15%	17%	15%	18%	29%	13%
1406	10%	10%	15%	15%	12%	15%	11%	14%	12%	16%
1407	16%	10%	13%	13%	18%	12%	16%	13%	14%	18%

The new West District, shows a great deal of variability. Care must be taken when looking at these 2012 numbers, however, as trends may smooth out once the amalgamation has occurred and deployment has been considered as a whole. Overall, the West District's contribution in terms of the most serious events appears slightly below the average, although above D4s. While some percentages are similar to those of D3 for Priority 0 and 1, the number of Priority 2s and 3s in D3 will necessitate more response and a greater workload as Priority 0s and 1s are much fewer in number.

Table 15: West District CFS by PUAR and Priority

BEAT	PRIORITY									
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**
WEST	23%	20%	20%	22%	31%	22%	29%	20%	35%	32%
1201	7%	9%	10%	10%	15%	7%	11%	9%	9%	9%
1202	13%	23%	15%	15%	18%	13%	12%	10%	15%	12%
1203	15%	7%	16%	18%	14%	19%	17%	10%	13%	15%
1601	22%	20%	20%	19%	12%	21%	15%	25%	11%	12%
1602	7%	24%	11%	11%	14%	12%	13%	18%	21%	18%
1603	6%	9%	14%	13%	11%	13%	13%	11%	15%	12%
1604	24%	7%	15%	15%	15%	14%	18%	17%	14%	21%

To see the overall impact of each district, the percentage of events within the nine priority levels per district are shown. What is clear is that D1 and D3 are both dealing with a higher-than average number of higher priority calls for service, with D1 clearly originating the majority of Priority 0 and 1 calls. Again, while these types of calls would not necessarily see D1 officers being the primary unit on the call, their initial response is most likely needed and at least some contribution to policing the event will be necessary.

	PRIORITY									
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**
DISTRICT 1	37%	46%	32%	31%	21%	35%	20%	39%	26%	17%
DISTRICT 3	22%	19%	30%	26%	21%	23%	23%	24%	13%	21%
DISTRICT 4	18%	15%	19%	21%	26%	21%	28%	17%	26%	30%
WEST	23%	20%	20%	22%	31%	22%	29%	20%	35%	32%

The differentiation in terms of workload can be quantified in many ways, with the caseload per officer being just one of them. The table below displays a rudimentary comparison, and shows that officers in D1 are responsible for far more Priority 0s and 1s than other officers, while D3 officers carry the burden of the most Priority 3s.

Table 17: Priority Calls per Officer by District

District (2012)	P0 per Cst	P1 per Cst	P2 per Cst
District 1	1.4	5.3	23.9
District 2	0.8	2.5	16.5
District 3	1.0	2.6	26.6
District 4	0.8	2.2	17.7
District 6	1.1	2.9	19.1

THE NATURE OF THE CALLS

The table below represents an aggregation of the types of calls[205] that officers in each district (with D2 and D6 separated for this historical analysis). As can be seen, D1 and D3 hold the majority of violent events, or events that involve threats of violence towards others. The majority of property events occur in D4 and D3, although D1 also figures high in property crime. Sexual offences are highest in D1 and D3, while those involving custody are generally filtered towards 'floater' cars or citywide units. Weapons offences occur primarily in D1 and D3 as well.

Table 18: Category of Calls by District

Category of Calls	1.00 DISTRICT 1	2.00 DISTRICT 2	3.00 DISTRICT 3	4.00 DISTRICT 4	6.00 DISTRICT 6	9.00 DISTRICT NOT SPECIFIED	Total
1.00 Person-Violent	31.6%	8.2%	28.5%	20.3%	11.1%	0.3%	100.0%
2.00 Property	21.4%	12.4%	23.7%	25.4%	16.8%	0.3%	100.0%
3.00 Sexual Offences	29.8%	8.5%	24.4%	17.7%	11.4%	8.1%	100.0%
4.00 Custody	15.3%	5.0%	10.0%	12.1%	9.0%	48.6%	100.0%
5.00 Provincial-Other	27.3%	9.3%	21.0%	20.3%	14.1%	8.0%	100.0%
6.00 Weapons	30.5%	8.5%	29.6%	19.9%	11.0%	0.5%	100.0%
TOTAL	28.0%	9.3%	23.6%	20.7%	13.4%	5.0%	100.0%

To take a closer look, the following table represents the Top 10 calls (both on-view and 9-1-1) that officers within District 1 (excluding cadets and traffic) were the primary unit on in 2012. Most of the community demands placed on members in D1 can be related to public safety, as well as community service. Domestic Disturbance calls are generally a high priority circumstance, and are appropriately placed within the Priority 2-6 category. However, traffic stops also appear to dominate the activities for D1. Although it is not possible to tell using the CAD data what the nature of that traffic stop was, the volume of stops, as a matter of policy should likely be examined. As this data specifically excludes traffic, the nature of the traffic stops may be an area where patrol members can utilize greater discretion and free up time to conduct other activities. Again, without knowing the nature of the traffic stops it is inappropriate to suggest these should not be dealt with by patrol members – many threats to public safety come from traffic movement, and rightfully require a response from any officer to maintain that public safety.

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[205] This aggregation was constructed subjectively using intuitive categories.

DISTRICT 1	Priority 0 1 2	Priority 3 4 5 6	Priority 7 8 9	DISTRICT 1 Total
DOMESTIC DISTURBANCE	588	3,320	14	3,922
WELLBEING	543	2,132	18	2,693
DISTURBANCE	93	2,146	151	2,390
TRAFFIC STOP			2,361	2,361
ASSAULT	493	1,655	7	2,155
FAMILY TROUBLE	100	859	2	961
THREAT REPORTED	18	925	3	946
SUICIDE THREAT	172	746	2	920
SUSPICIOUS PERSON	45	768	36	849
MISSING PERSON ASSIST	7	617	5	629
Grand Total	2,059	13,168	2,599	17,826

In D3, Domestic Disturbances again demand the most attention from patrol officers, with Wellbeing checks also in the top two. Traffic stops also figure prominently into D3 officers' workload, as do Family Trouble and Disturbance calls.

Table 20: D3 Top 10 Event Types for Patrol

DISTRICT 3	Priority 0 1 2	Priority 3 4 5 6	Priority 7 8 9	DISTRICT 3 Total
DOMESTIC DISTURBANCE	579	3,630	9	4,218
WELLBEING	453	1,819	8	2,280
TRAFFIC STOP			2,006	2,006
FAMILY TROUBLE	150	1,409	1	1,560
DISTURBANCE	54	1,296	71	1,421
ASSAULT	294	958	5	1,257
SUSPICIOUS PERSON	32	809	41	882
THREAT REPORTED	17	770	1	788
MISSING PERSON ASSIST	5	696	8	709
SUICIDE THREAT	169	517		686
Grand Total	1,753	11,904	2,150	15,807

In D4, Domestic Disturbances are the main community demand on Patrol officers, along with Traffic Stops.

DISTRICT 4	Priority 0 1 2	Priority 3 4 5 6	Priority 7 8 9	DISTRICT 4 Total
DOMESTIC DISTURBANCE	382	2,680	17	3,079
TRAFFIC STOP			2,517	2,517
WELLBEING	287	1,323	6	1,616
SUSPICIOUS PERSON	16	1,142	46	1,204
DISTURBANCE	41	1,046	49	1,136
FAMILY TROUBLE	63	900		963
TRAFFIC COMPLAINTS	13	668	114	795
SUICIDE THREAT	125	606		731
THREAT REPORTED	8	680	4	692
ASSAULT	111	568	2	681
Grand Total	1,046	9,613	2,755	13,414

And in the new West District, a similar pattern emerges much as the other districts see, with Domestic Disturbances dominating the workload demands, along with Traffic Stops and Wellbeing checks.

Table 22: West Top 10 Event Types for Patrol

WEST DISTRICT	Priority 0 1 2	Priority 3 4 5 6	Priority 7 8 9	WEST D Total
DOMESTIC DISTURBANCE	284	2,410	5	2,699
TRAFFIC STOP			2,319	2,319
WELLBEING	305	1,454	6	1,765
DISTURBANCE	38	1,408	96	1,542
SUSPICIOUS PERSON	26	1,130	41	1,197
SUICIDE THREAT	109	695		804
TRAFFIC COMPLAINTS	17	559	166	742
ASSAULT	123	611	4	738
MVA	11	675	44	730
FAMILY TROUBLE	65	644		709
Grand Total	978	9,586	2,681	13,245

ASSESSING RISK USING LOCATION QUOTIENTS

While the foregoing has shown that all districts, on the whole, tend to be dealing with similar community demands. Another way of visualizing this, however, is to assess whether the types of offences is similar to the Citywide average. This method helps spot those areas that may be suffering from higher than expected amounts of certain types of crimes by comparing their numbers to what might be expected if the City were a whole. This method is called the "location quotient".

The location quotient utilizes a formula derived from economic analysis, and substitutes crime counts in an area. This is not a crime rate; rather, it is a way to see whether a small area (the district) shows a similar distribution of the types of offences that the larger area (the City). If an area demonstrates a higher location quotient of a particular crime, it provides some nuance to the workload demands if that particular crime is relatively serious and realistically places greater workload demands on officers in that area.

To assess the location quotient, as an example, we would take the number of violent events in D1, divided by the total crime events in D1. This is then divided by the product of the total violent events in the City, divided by the total crime events in the City. If the location quotient is near "1", that indicates that the violent crime proportion in D1 (for our example) is around the same violent crime mix that is seen Citywide. A location quotient higher than 1 indicates a percentage increase that the small area shows in their violent crime mix compared to the City.

$$LQ_{ij} = \frac{E_{ij} / E_i}{\sum_i E_{ij} / \sum_i E_i}$$

$where:$

E_{ij} = economic activity in subarea i department j

E_i = total economic activity in subarea i

$\sum_i E_{ij}$ = economic activity of department j in the whole area

$\sum_i E_i$ = total economic activity in the whole area

(Brantingham & Brantingham, 1997)

Figure 28 shows the count of offences, taken from the RMS, which occurred throughout the City. Each PUAR is shaded according to the number of crimes that occurred within those boundaries in 2012. Simply using the counts, it is fairly easy to see that the downtown area within D1, as well as the south end of D3 (closest to

downtown) show the highest number of crimes within their boundaries. This count does not necessarily denote 'risk' as it is not normalized by population or targets in the environment; however, it does give a visualization of where the workload demands are emerging from, and therefore, can be used to infer what Patrol areas can expect the highest workload.

When assessing areas based on the location quotient, however, a slightly different picture may emerge.   Figure 29 below shows a comparison between using counts vs. location quotients. The inset map uses counts from the

CAD database (both on-view and caller-initiated events). As was seen with the RMS map, the areas of highest community demands for events involving violence appear to be concentrated in D1 and the south end of D3. However, when using the location quotient (method explanation in blue inset box in the map), the areas of concern expand. Those areas in dark orange depict areas that see violence rates 10-23% higher than the City average. Those areas in red depict violence rates 23-30% higher than the City average. Yellow areas in general are sitting around the City average, while green depicts areas showing violence rates below the City average. Using this method to visualize community demand can help anticipate those areas where more specialized need may be required and greater demands on patrol officers.

The use of the location quotient becomes most apparent when examining crimes that may be concentrated in areas where 'things' are, rather than where 'people' are. Figure 30 shows the counts vs. location quotients for

residential Break & Enters in the City. As can be seen by comparing the inset map of 'counts' to the larger map using location quotients, some areas may not emerge as at risk based on counts alone, and conversely, other areas may emerge as high-call areas when in reality they are sitting generally at the City average. In this figure, the red areas depict those PUAR that have residential B&E rates 26-100% higher than the City average. The areas in yellow depict those cruiser car areas that are sitting around the City average, despite perhaps showing a high count (inset map).

Figure 100: LQC B&E Residential CFS (2012)

Figure 31 depicts all property crimes (CAD) in the City.

**2012 Calls for Service
LQC vs. Counts in Cruiser Car Areas**

Figure 32 depicts the calls for sexual assaults in the City.

2012 Calls for Service
LQC vs. Counts in Cruiser Car Areas

While location quotients are not intended to replace other methods for visualizing and/or counting service demands, they do provide context and another lens from which to examine the nature and intensity of community demands they may be being placed on WPS officers.

TIMING OF CALLS

Another method of visualizing the community demands from each district is to look at the hourly call demand - both on-view and caller-initiated. D1 consistently has higher service demands, regardless of the time of day. In general, D4 maintains fewer demands for service during most hours, save for approximately 0900 to 1200, where D3 becomes the relatively 'quiet' district. For the purposes of this analysis, D2 and D6 have been merged into "West" District, and generally have one of the lowest community demands throughout the day.

Figure 103: Average Events per Hour

As the nature and type of community demand will fluctuate throughout the day, so will the service demand on officers. While the shift schedule allows for a certain amount of overlap to compensate for busier periods, it is likely that some shifts and some time periods will be more onerous for the officers than others. As Figure 34 shows, officers are experiencing heavier workloads in general between the hours of 1400 and 2200 (generally).

Figure 104: Average Calls and Service Demands per Hour

Hour	Ave # of Demands (City-wide)	D1	West	D3	D4
00:00-01:00	27.0	8.1	3.1	6.9	5.9
01:00-02:00	22.7	6.9	2.5	6.0	4.7
02:00-03:00	17.4	5.2	1.9	4.6	3.7
03:00-04:00	14.2	4.4	1.4	4.1	2.8
04:00-05:00	12.1	3.7	1.3	3.3	2.3
05:00-06:00	9.0	2.8	0.9	2.7	1.6
06:00-07:00	7.3	2.4	0.8	1.9	1.4
07:00-08:00	12.6	5.2	1.3	2.5	2.1
08:00-09:00	18.7	6.7	2.1	3.9	3.4
09:00-10:00	19.0	5.8	2.4	4.3	4.0
10:00-11:00	20.5	6.3	2.5	4.7	4.4
11:00-12:00	19.4	5.9	2.4	4.5	4.2
12:00-13:00	19.2	6.0	2.2	4.4	4.2
13:00-14:00	22.0	7.7	2.6	4.9	4.3
14:00-15:00	23.6	8.0	2.7	5.4	4.6
15:00-16:00	25.7	9.6	2.8	5.8	4.5
16:00-17:00	23.0	8.3	2.6	5.1	4.3
17:00-18:00	25.8	9.0	2.8	6.0	4.9
18:00-19:00	26.4	8.7	2.9	6.4	5.3
19:00-20:00	25.7	7.9	2.8	6.6	5.5
20:00-21:00	25.1	7.9	2.8	6.4	5.0
21:00-22:00	24.8	8.1	2.7	6.4	4.8
22:00-23:00	29.6	9.2	3.2	7.8	6.0
23:00-00:00	30.5	9.1	3.4	8.0	6.6

What is most apparent is the difference in the service demands by district. D1 shows the highest level of service demands, a result not entirely surprising given its downtown location and target density. D3 also shows a high level of service demand, although generally 1-2 calls less than D1. The West District, as envisioned simply by merging D2 and D6, shows the lowest level of service demands. What is most apparent as well is the difference in the timing of the calls. All districts show a 'quiet time' in the early morning hours; however, D1 shows a very marked increase in the evening/night hours of service demands. A similar pattern is seen in D3. While an increase in service demand during evening/night hours is not unexpected, it should be compared to the West District, which maintains a low call load throughout most hours of the day when compared to the other districts. The workload, therefore, for the West District officers is likely relatively lighter than those in other areas.

Table 18 shows only the call demand from the public, calculated per car on the road (using the current shift schedule). This excludes any on-view activity, and would just represent how many actual citizen calls each car would be responding to on average each hour. This would represent the absolute minimum service level to reach, and would require the avoidance of policing any on-view behaviour or responding to requests outside of

citizens calls for response. Obviously this is not desirable nor recommended, but assists in visualizing the service demands on Patrol:

Table 23: Average Calls (no on-view) per Unit per Hour

Hour	Ave # of Calls (City-wide)	D1	WEST	D3	D4
00:00-01:00	16	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.2
01:00-02:00	14	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2
02:00-03:00	13	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2
03:00-04:00	11	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.3
04:00-05:00	9	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.2
05:00-06:00	7	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2
06:00-07:00	6	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2
07:00-08:00	6	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
08:00-09:00	8	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
09:00-10:00	9	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3
10:00-11:00	11	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
11:00-12:00	11	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
12:00-13:00	12	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.4
13:00-14:00	13	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.4
14:00-15:00	14	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.5
15:00-16:00	14	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.4
16:00-17:00	16	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.5
17:00-18:00	16	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.5
18:00-19:00	16	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.5
19:00-20:00	16	0.7	0.5	0.7	0.6
20:00-21:00	16	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.5
21:00-22:00	18	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.6
22:00-23:00	19	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3
23:00-00:00	18	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3

Although it is not reasonable to speak of a unit taking "0.6 calls per hour", this is intended to depict those times where the caseload is the heaviest for Patrol officers, based on the assumption that deployment will be at minimums[206]. If deployment is above minimums, then the caseload will be slightly less. If it is below minimums, then the caseload becomes more onerous. What this is useful in displaying, however, are the busiest times for Patrol officers on average throughout the day. As the caseload simply from public calls gets closer to one per unit per hour, this becomes extremely detrimental to the Patrol officers' ability to conduct any proactive activities or attend to on-view incidents that may occur. This is not only a public service concern, but a public safety concern as well. This workload issue is discussed in greater detail in the next section.

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[206] The general shifting of minimums is discussed in the next section of this report.

Shifts and Workload Patterns

As a basis for comparison and workload, a common shift pattern is shown below[207]. For this analysis, D2 and D6 are separated to show what 'was' the reality in those districts in terms of workload.

Table 24: General Shift Pattern w/ Minimums

Hour	D1 Days	D1 Eve	D1 Night	D1 total	D2 Days	D2 Eve	D2 Night	D2 total	D3 Days	D3 Eve	D3 Night	D3 total	D4 Days	D4 Eve	D4 Night	D4 total	D6 Days	D6 Eve	D6 Night	D6 total
00:00-01:00		7	7	14		3	3	6		6	6	12		7	7	14		4	4	8
01:00-02:00		7	7	14		3	3	6		6	6	12		7	7	14		4	4	8
02:00-03:00		7	7	14		3	3	6		6	6	12		7	7	14		4	4	8
03:00-04:00			7	7			3	3			6	6			7	7			4	4
04:00-05:00			7	7			3	3			6	6			7	7			4	4
05:00-06:00			7	7			3	3			6	6			7	7			4	4
06:00-07:00			7	7			3	3			6	6			7	7			4	4
07:00-08:00	7		7	14	3		3	6	6		6	12	7		7	14	4		4	8
08:00-09:00	7			7	3			3	6			6	7			7	4			4
09:00-10:00	7			7	3			3	6			6	7			7	4			4
10:00-11:00	7			7	3			3	6			6	7			7	4			4
11:00-12:00	7			7	3			3	6			6	7			7	4			4
12:00-13:00	7			7	3			3	6			6	7			7	4			4
13:00-14:00	7			7	3			3	6			6	7			7	4			4
14:00-15:00	7			7	3			3	6			6	7			7	4			4
15:00-16:00	7			7	3			3	6			6	7			7	4			4
16:00-17:00	7			7	3			3	6			6	7			7	4			4
17:00-18:00		7		7		3		3		6		6		7		7		4		4
18:00-19:00		7		7		3		3		6		6		7		7		4		4
19:00-20:00		7		7		3		3		6		6		7		7		4		4
20:00-21:00		7		7		3		3		6		6		7		7		4		4
21:00-22:00		7		7		3		3		6		6		7		7		4		4
22:00-23:00		7	7	14		3	3	6		6	6	12		7	7	14		4	4	8
23:00-00:00		7	7	14		3	3	6		6	6	12		7	7	14		4	4	8

This denotes the minimum number of cars[208] mandated to be deployed throughout the current five districts. Once D2 and D6 merge, the new West District will deploy a minimum of seven cars per shift. Using this estimate of the number of cars on the road at any one time, the number of calls for service can be used to estimate the workload demands of each of those cars based on the time of the call and the number of available units.

Using all the community demands as the estimator, the number of service demands (on-view and caller-initiated) per unit (car) per hour is shown below:

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[207] This shift pattern, as outlined in the Collective Agreement, can be modified slightly in terms of start times to respond to changing needs and staffing levels. This pattern is used to represent an approximation of the current shift structure.

[208] Although patrol sergeants may take calls from time to time, they should not be used in workload or staffing analysis. As their role should be focused on supervising, to count them as a patrol resource for community demands would be problematic. If sergeants are responding to calls because the constables are unable to handle the workload, then staffing levels must be assessed. Similarly, if patrol sergeants find a minimal amount of time per shift is spent supervising, then the span of control for Patrol supervision should be looked at.

Table 25: Average Number of Service Demands per Car per Hour (including on-view calls)

Hour	D1	D2	D3	D4	D6
00:00-01:00	0.58	0.51	0.57	0.42	0.48
01:00-02:00	0.49	0.42	0.50	0.33	0.40
02:00-03:00	0.37	0.32	0.38	0.27	0.33
03:00-04:00	0.62	0.48	0.68	0.41	0.55
04:00-05:00	0.53	0.44	0.55	0.33	0.53
05:00-06:00	0.40	0.30	0.44	0.23	0.42
06:00-07:00	0.34	0.26	0.32	0.20	0.38
07:00-08:00	0.37	0.22	0.21	0.15	0.26
08:00-09:00	0.95	0.72	0.64	0.49	0.80
09:00-10:00	0.83	0.79	0.71	0.57	0.85
10:00-11:00	0.91	0.82	0.78	0.63	0.84
11:00-12:00	0.84	0.80	0.75	0.60	0.81
12:00-13:00	0.86	0.75	0.73	0.60	0.73
13:00-14:00	1.10	0.85	0.81	0.61	0.89
14:00-15:00	1.14	0.91	0.90	0.66	0.90
15:00-16:00	1.37	0.93	0.97	0.64	0.88
16:00-17:00	1.18	0.86	0.85	0.61	0.84
17:00-18:00	1.29	0.94	1.01	0.70	0.89
18:00-19:00	1.24	0.96	1.07	0.75	0.90
19:00-20:00	1.13	0.93	1.11	0.78	0.87
20:00-21:00	1.12	0.95	1.07	0.72	0.89
21:00-22:00	1.16	0.90	1.07	0.69	0.83
22:00-23:00	0.66	0.54	0.65	0.43	0.49
23:00-00:00	0.65	0.57	0.66	0.47	0.53

Similar in nature to Table 18, what this demonstrates is the number of demands per car (on-view and caller-initiated activity) that occur on average throughout the day. As is shown, in general, officers on shift between 1200 and 2200 are responsible for a higher proportion of calls per car than officers during other times. This clearly shows the burden placed on those officers on days and evenings, with relief coming once night shift arrives around 2200. Taking the amount of time (on average) each call takes, the amount of allocated vs. unallocated time can be estimated. The 'reactive time' is based on the average travel time + on call time per call (no on-view) when Patrol is the primary file holder[209]. This comes with a certain level of error, but can be used to infer whether officers have any time to conduct proactive activities in general during their shift.

The calculated average reactive times are shown below:

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[209] The calculation of these times excludes calls where travel times were over 40 minutes, as a way to minimize error.

Table 26: Average Reactive Times per Hour per District

Average Reactive Time (in hours)					
Hour	D1	D2	D3	D4	D6
00:00-01:00	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.6
01:00-02:00	2.0	1.8	2.0	1.9	1.8
02:00-03:00	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.9
03:00-04:00	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.9	2.0
04:00-05:00	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.6
05:00-06:00	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.6	1.7
06:00-07:00	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.7
07:00-08:00	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.3
08:00-09:00	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.0	2.0
09:00-10:00	2.4	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.1
10:00-11:00	2.5	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.2
11:00-12:00	2.4	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.3
12:00-13:00	2.2	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.2
13:00-14:00	2.2	2.2	2.0	2.0	2.2
14:00-15:00	2.1	1.8	1.9	1.8	2.0
15:00-16:00	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.8
16:00-17:00	2.2	2.5	2.2	2.2	2.0
17:00-18:00	2.2	2.5	2.3	2.3	2.1
18:00-19:00	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.3
19:00-20:00	2.3	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.3
20:00-21:00	2.4	2.5	2.3	2.3	2.3
21:00-22:00	2.2	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.1
22:00-23:00	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.8	1.8
23:00-00:00	2.1	1.9	2.0	1.7	1.6

Using the average 'reactive times', the available proactive time can be calculated on average per hour. To minimize error, this analysis is done using only the average number of calls per unit, and not the total service demands per unit per hour. This will be a significant underestimation of the actual free time per unit per hour, but as a minimum standard, will be less prone to error. Based simply on calls for service[210], the number of calls per car (as the 'car' is the unit of measurement) is as follows:

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[210] The minimum workload statistics can be taken simply by the number of calls for service from the public. This excludes on-view calls or any other officer-initiated activity. Obviously, this is not desirable for a police force, but as a starting point for assessing staffing and shifting it can serve as the worst-case scenario. It should be noted that this is an under-count of the minimum service levels to the public.

Table 27: Reactive and Proactive Time per Hour per Car

Reactive and Proactive Time per Car per Hour	D1 Allocated	D1 Unallocated	D2 Allocated	D2 Unallocated	D3 Allocated	D3 Unallocated	D4 Allocated	D4 Unallocated	D6 Allocated	D6 Unallocated
00:00-01:00	42.8	29%	30.7	49%	38.6	36%	24.3	59%	27.0	55%
01:00-02:00	36.8	39%	24.4	59%	35.3	41%	23.3	61%	26.6	56%
02:00-03:00	32.6	46%	26.1	57%	33.3	44%	25.1	58%	26.6	56%
03:00-04:00	56.3	6%	35.4	41%	57.7	4%	36.4	39%	41.9	30%
04:00-05:00	43.4	28%	24.3	59%	42.7	29%	24.9	58%	25.7	57%
05:00-06:00	31.1	48%	21.3	65%	36.7	39%	16.1	73%	18.8	69%
06:00-07:00	32.6	46%	21.5	64%	29.0	52%	16.9	72%	16.0	73%
07:00-08:00	20.5	66%	15.7	74%	18.3	69%	13.3	78%	15.6	74%
08:00-09:00	42.3	30%	46.1	23%	46.5	23%	35.2	41%	37.7	37%
09:00-10:00	48.0	20%	50.3	16%	52.5	12%	48.5	19%	43.8	27%
10:00-11:00	61.2	-2%	49.7	17%	62.1	-4%	55.5	8%	57.6	4%
11:00-12:00	56.9	5%	48.1	20%	60.6	-1%	52.2	13%	61.2	-2%
12:00-13:00	61.0	-2%	48.0	20%	66.6	-11%	57.6	4%	60.3	-1%
13:00-14:00	70.8	-18%	56.5	6%	65.6	-9%	52.6	12%	63.1	-5%
14:00-15:00	73.3	-22%	48.7	19%	65.1	-8%	49.8	17%	57.1	5%
15:00-16:00	71.5	-19%	59.0	2%	72.0	-20%	50.2	16%	54.8	9%
16:00-17:00	82.7	-38%	74.9	-25%	84.9	-42%	65.7	-10%	64.0	-7%
17:00-18:00	86.3	-44%	85.4	-42%	93.1	-55%	72.0	-20%	65.8	-10%
18:00-19:00	85.0	-42%	77.0	-28%	92.6	-54%	75.2	-25%	72.9	-22%
19:00-20:00	91.2	-52%	81.5	-36%	99.3	-65%	78.9	-32%	72.6	-21%
20:00-21:00	95.1	-59%	85.3	-42%	95.0	-58%	73.5	-23%	78.2	-30%
21:00-22:00	96.6	-61%	79.4	-32%	97.7	-63%	68.7	-15%	69.1	-15%
22:00-23:00	49.4	18%	36.6	39%	49.9	17%	33.2	45%	34.1	43%
23:00-00:00	45.5	24%	33.1	45%	44.3	26%	28.9	52%	31.6	47%

What the above analysis shows is that again, during most of the shift hours, officers have no chance to conduct proactive activities as their time (and in most cases, more than all of the available time within an hour) is dedicated to calls from the public only. Those hours that show more than 100% utilization are likely the times when officers from other districts are called in, or other modifications to workload are made. As this analysis is based on averages, it will not represent all days or all calls, but will provide a general basis of the reality of officers. As this is also based on minimum deployment, the reality of deployment in any one day (either over or below minimums) will modify this result. Again, while this is an average estimate, as it is based on calls only, it is likely that it continues to be an underestimation of the actual time demands on officers during the busiest portions of the day. The realization that officers are spending all of their time (and usually, more than their available time) simply answering calls from the public is concerning. Without any time for proactive activities, the ability to prevent crime and solve problems will be significantly impaired. This crucial aspect of patrol activities cannot and should not be left solely in the hands of specialty squads.

A similar issue is the existence of what appear to be calls that are either not responded to, or can be classified as "stop and go's". These calls have a queue time, a travel time (for "stop and go's") or zero travel time (for "not attended" calls), and zero "on call" time. While it is reasonable to assume that some calls will not require a great deal of officer time, these types of calls should be tracked as they represent times where the community has requested assistance, but for whatever reason, that assistance was not provided.

Table 28: Stop and Go's

% of Total Service Demands	DISTRICT 1	DISTRICT 3	DISTRICT 4	WEST DISTRICT	Grand Total
attended	95.97%	95.03%	96.00%	95.79%	95.71%
not attended/stop & go	4.03%	4.97%	4.00%	4.21%	4.29%

TYPES OF CALLS IN 2012 AND THEIR PRIORITY

As is reasonable, the primary file holders (and designated responders) on Priority 0 and 1 calls were specialty units from the City. This may include helicopters or other emergency responses outside of general patrol. This does not, again, necessarily mean that patrol resources were not required in the response to those incidents – this simply means that they were not the primary file holders. General patrol officers were dispatched as the primary responders primarily to Priority 2 through 6 calls, which include very serious incidents (particularly Priority 2s). Priority 7, 8 and 9 were again handled mostly by citywide units, most often cadets.

Table 29: Primary File Holders by Priority

PRIORITY	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Other (City, etc.)	65%	69%	24%	16%	22%	27%	29%	73%	76%	96%
GP DAY SHIFT	7%	8%	22%	24%	25%	25%	29%	7%	10%	2%
GP EVENING SHIFT	12%	11%	26%	30%	28%	24%	19%	9%	7%	1%
GP NIGHT SHIFT	17%	13%	27%	30%	25%	24%	22%	11%	7%	1%

Viewed another way, Priority 2 through 6 can be considered the largest workload drivers for Patrol.

Table 30: Primary File Holders by Priority (grouped)

PRIORITY	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Other Units	65%	69%	24%	16%	22%	27%	29%	73%	76%	96%
General Patrol	35%	31%	76%	84%	78%	73%	71%	27%	24%	4%

This does not mean that Patrol members are not being utilized for Priority calls outside of 2-6, this only means they are not the primary unit assigned to the call in CAD.

RESPONDING TO AND/OR FROM OTHER DISTRICTS

At times, Patrol members are called in from other districts to assist with the call load. Just how often this happens can be estimated using the number of occurrences that a primary unit for a file is from outside the district in which the file originated. This does not include those calls in which "City" units were designated as the primary member – this only includes calls that were taken by other Patrol units from outside the district:

Table 31: Borrowing and Lending in Districts

Responding Officer	Origin of Call			
	WEST DISTRICT	DISTRICT 1	DISTRICT 3	DISTRICT 4
West District	94%	6%	1%	1%
District 1 officers	4%	89%	2%	1%
District 3 Officers	0%	2%	94%	1%
District 4 Officers	2%	2%	3%	97%

District 1 appears to be the area that needs to call in members from the outside the most often, handling only 89% of the calls within their District in 2012. These include only those calls that were designated to Patrol units, and exclude other specialty City-units or calls where a district was not specified.

The West District (and primarily the former D2) also finds they borrow cars to answer calls quite often. As they are the main source of responders for D1's overload, this could be a direct result of not having adequate coverage in their own district when some cars are re-routed to D1s calls. Obviously, the ideal scenario is to maintain the cars within their own district, in order to respond to their district's needs. While some borrowing and lending is likely inevitable, if the numbers are large (as in the case of D1 and West District), this generally points to staffing level inadequacies.

This may also affect response times, which will be examined in the next section.

Response Times

The calculation of response times can be replete with issues of data integrity, as well as user-error that may introduce extreme values into the results. There are many methods for dealing with this, although each carries with it a certain amount of subjectivity. For this analysis, a slightly different method will be used.

1. ***On-View calls are omitted***

   As the determination of whether calls are 'on-view' or officer-initiated is also a function of inference from the data, there will always be a certain amount of error with whatever method is chosen to determine which calls come from the public, and which originate from officers. As there is no field code available to ascertain this, all calls with five seconds or less of queue time have been coded as "on-view". Understandably, this may include some calls where the dispatch time is mere seconds, but this will at least allow consistency into the analysis.

2. ***Extreme Values omitted***

   As some calls may have extreme values due to user error, it is important to try and isolate those from the analysis. Some errors in the "travel time" field may come from officers forgetting to indicate they are on-scene. These numbers should rightfully be omitted, as they will skew the analysis. However, determining which are errors is problematic. Therefore, a consistent (albeit relatively arbitrary) cut-off will be used for this analysis. All travel times of over 40 minutes will be excluded. In general, getting from one end of Winnipeg to the other, driving through the center of the City, will take approximately 40 minutes. Again, this cut-off is relatively arbitrary; however, it does allow for a more reasonable view of response times.

As with all statistics, low numbers must be taken with some caution when interpreting the results. The lower priorities, as they represent more proactive work (special attention files[211]) and other activities not necessarily stemming from issues of immediate public safety needs. Therefore, it is likely a better barometer of the response from officers to look primarily at the higher priority events.

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[211] "Special Attention" = persistent neighbourhood problem that needs to be solved or calmed by a police presence. These are generally self-generated by police officers. Also applies to personnel attending special events as a visible presence. These would be assigned through normal tasking procedures.

PRIORITY	DISTRICT 1	DISTRICT 3	DISTRICT 4	WEST
0	3.3	2.2	7.1	7.7
1	2.8	7.0	5.2	7.0
2	10.5	11.6	12.5	11.7
3	72.2	78.0	47.8	56.0
4	89.7	92.4	56.9	58.4
5	500.0	714.0	253.4	258.8
6	818.6	869.0	293.1	296.7
7	685.6	649.5	230.8	221.4
8	24.9	19.7	19.7	28.0
9	775.4	1158.4	1225.6	1858.3

In general, all districts appear to be at or under the seven-minute best practices standard for emergency calls (generally Priority 1 in many jurisdictions, but Priority 0 and 1 in this case). However, when looking at Priority 2s, the time it takes to respond is much higher. As Priority 2s represent "Impending Danger to Life or Grievous Bodily Harm", they are more likely appropriate to include within the typical Priority 1 (emergency) best practices standard. Therefore, with between 10 and 13 minutes being the average response time for this level of call, this may indicate a staffing issue, as there are not enough units to adequately respond to the highest priority calls.

Understandably, however, when officers from other districts are called in to handle calls that the home district officers cannot, the response times are increased. In D1, outside officers' response times are approximately 3.6 minutes longer on average for Emergency calls (Priority 0-2) and nearly nine minutes longer for Urgent calls (Priority 3 and 4). Outside officers, however, show a much faster response time to non-urgent and low-risk calls, presumably because D1 officers are rarely able to respond to those calls at all given their already heavy workload.

Table 33: D1 Incidents Response Times - Inside and Outside District Officers

Response Times to District 1 Incidents	Emergency Calls	Urgent Calls	Non-Urgent	Low Risk/Planned Response
District 1 officers	9.7	72.8	548.5	717.5
Outside District	13.3	81.4	304.7	160.6
District 2 officers	11.6	81.0	292.5	342.5
District 3 Officers	12.8	80.6	315.1	114.7
District 4 Officers	17.4	85.4	310.0	76.5
District 6 Officers	14.6	78.1	296.6	66.9
Average Difference	3.6	8.6	-243.8	-556.9

As can be seen, the response to emergency calls in D1 is just outside the threshold of best practice service. The small geography (compared to other districts) of D1 assuredly contributes to the ability of officers to get to an emergency scene quickly. What does become apparent, however, is the comparatively slow response to Priority 3 and 4 calls (defined as "urgent" above). As Priority 3 represents an "urgent person incident", a waiting time of over one hour should be considered problematic. As many other police agencies use a slightly different priority scale with fewer categories, it becomes difficult to compare WPS performance to those of others. If Priority 2 in Vancouver (the second priority after emergencies) were taken as a comparator, the results would not be comparable. VPD's average response time to Priority 2s in 2005/2006 was between 18 minutes and 23 minutes (day vs. night) in D1 (a dense downtown district)[212].

A closer look at the types of calls under Priority 3 and 4 may provide additional insight into the length of the response time. Almost 30% of the Priority 3 calls in D1 were for Domestic Disturbance (16% of P3 calls, with an average response time of 96 minutes) and Wellbeing (13% of P3 calls, with an average response time of 59 minutes). While these types of incidents may be ultimately benign in nature, they do have the capability of becoming very serious incidents, and should be treated as such by the police response.

What becomes more concerning regarding the response in D1, however, are the number of calls which are likely very serious in nature and are likely more in need of a truly "urgent" response as denoted by the Priority 3 rating. A few examples of calls that are likely more serious and require a more urgent response are below:

Table 34: D1 Priority 3 Response Time Examples

PRIORITY 3	Count	Minutes
CHILD SAFETY	316	51
ASSAULT WITH WEAPON	209	77
SHOTS FIRED	112	26
STABBING REPORTED	62	53

While Shots Fired calls have a relatively short response time compared to other Priority 3 calls, the response to Assault with a Weapon and Stabbing is likely far too long when a serious injury or death could result/have resulted. Waiting over an hour for a police response that is deemed "urgent" according to call priorities is likely not acceptable in terms of public safety and satisfaction. As these calls will take priority over lower priority calls, the only way to shorten the response to these calls is to add additional officers.

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[212] Demers, S., Palmer, A., and Griffiths, C.T., (2007

Understandably, a department will also do its best to mitigate these situations when staffing is low or they find all officers tied up on higher priority calls. This is likely to result in the 'calling in' of officers from other districts, which has been expressed as a consistent reality for the WPS. This utilization of officers from other districts, while operationally-necessary from time to time, indicates one of two things if used on a regular basis – either overstaffing in one district where officers are always available, or, under-staffing in the district where officers are coming in to answer calls. The latter is likely the reality, but will be explored in future sections of this report examining each district's workload.

In D3, this discrepancy between officers responding from outside the district is even more pronounced. For emergency calls, if officers are called from outside the district, they take nearly 12 minutes longer than if D3 officers respond. In the case of urgent calls, outside officers take over 45 minutes longer on average.

Table 35: D3 Incidents Response Times - Inside and Outside District Officers

Response Times to District 3 Incidents	Emergency Calls	Urgent Calls	Non-Urgent	Low Risk/Planned Response
District 3 Officers	9.7	77.0	719.2	658.7
Outside Officers	21.3	122.7	1,090.8	833.4
District 1 officers	12.4	62.7	1223.6	
District 2 officers	71.1	132.0	1595.4	
District 4 Officers	17.3	139.5	1019.3	888.1
District 6 Officers	19.8	93.7	944.1	614.3
Average Difference	11.5	45.7	371.7	174.7

In D3, a number of "urgent" calls took an exceedingly long time to respond to. While shots fired and stabbings were faster than other Priority 3 calls, the average response time for domestic disturbances was over two hours, and reports of assault with a weapon took over an hour for an officer to respond.

Table 36: D3 Priority 3 Response Time Examples

DISTRICT 3 - PRIORITY 3	Count	Average Response Time (m)
DOMESTIC DISTURBANCE	2798	121.5
CHILD SAFETY	376	65.4
ASSAULT WITH WEAPON	182	70.9
SHOTS FIRED	125	23.7
STABBING REPORTED	38	25.9

In District 4, response times to emergency calls are noticeably slower than D1 and D3. This is likely primarily due to the size of the district, and some additional time may be an inevitable function of the geography. As with the

other districts, the response times increase if external officers and called in to take the call. However, this discrepancy is less pronounced than in other districts, likely due to a greater ability of D4 officers to handle their workload. As D4 officers take 94% of the calls within D4, the increase in response time is only happening on a small percentage of their calls.

Response Times to District 4 Incidents	Emergency Calls	Urgent Calls	Non-Urgent	Low Risk/Planned Response
District 4 Officers	11.6	48.8	258.8	268.8
Outisde Officers	19.4	54.4	324.5	93.2
District 1 officers	20.3	81.3	356.5	
District 2 officers	18.5	51.3	228.1	123.8
District 3 Officers	12.5	43.6	531.4	
District 6 Officers	23.8	52.5	155.3	62.6
Average Difference	7.9	5.6	65.7	-175.7

As with the other districts, many Priority 3 events saw callers waiting upwards of an hour for an officer to respond. However, response times were largely much lower in this district when compared to others.

DISTRICT 4 - PRIORITY 3	Count	Average Response Time (m)
DOMESTIC DISTURBANCE	1745	66.2
SHOTS FIRED	77	38.7
ASSAULT WITH WEAPON	75	48.3
STABBING REPORTED	17	41.0
SEXUAL ABUSE - CHILD	13	120.8

In the West District, this difference is less pronounced, and external units actual respond faster on average to urgent calls than West District officers do. Again, the average response times are quite high in this area; however, this is also largely due to the larger geographic area. This may also be due to the borrowing and lending that happens within D1 and D2 (amalgamated with D6). Care must be taken when assessing these data, however, as this analysis treats D2 and D6 as one district, despite them being separate during the time this represents.

Response Times to West District Incidents	Emergency Calls	Urgent Calls	Non-Urgent	Low Risk/Planned Response
West District	**11.0**	**56.7**	**260.5**	**287.8**
Outside Officers	**14.2**	**49.2**	**474.2**	**266.4**
District 1 officers	13.5	38.1	423.9	353.8
District 3 Officers	23.7	215.6	1050.9	
District 4 Officers	13.7	55.6	148.8	4.5
Average Difference	*3.2*	*-7.4*	*213.8*	*-21.3*

As with other districts, many Priority 3s took a great deal of time to get a response from officers. However, in some instances (such as with shots fired) officers from the West District were able to respond faster than those in D4, despite their similarly large geography.

Table 40: West Priority 3 Response Time Examples

WEST DISTRICT - PRIORITY 3	Count	Average Response Time (m)
DOMESTIC DISTURBANCE	1516	81.3
ASSAULT WITH WEAPON	90	65.1
SHOTS FIRED	69	25.9
SUICIDE THREAT	692	55.5

Overall, response times to emergency situations are above the best practices threshold of approximately seven minutes. In this calculation, Priority 2s were included in the 'emergency' calls, which may not have been common practice within the Service when assessing response times. However, as the definition clearly falls within the emergency category, including those calls within the less serious category (here, as "urgent") would be misleading.

This borrowing may also impact response times, however. If an officer has to travel from another district to respond to a call that a local officer is unable to, it is realistic to assume their response times will be negatively affected. Therefore, this 'borrowing' becomes a public safety issue in addition to a staffing issue.

Again, this demonstrates the deficiencies in staffing numbers for some districts (notably D1 and D3), which can only be remedied by adding additional officers to this area.

Overtime

General overtime trends are examined in the section, "Overtime In The WPS". With respect to Patrol, however, a glimpse at the usage of overtime for minimum strength callouts is appropriate. The trends for 2010, 2011 and 2012 are shown below. With the increase in authorized strength prior to 2012, the overtime for minimum strength callouts decreased dramatically over previous years. However, in 2012, over $122,000 was spent on overtime for minimum strength callouts. What should be pointed out is that in 2012, D3 had the highest number of hours paid to overtime for minimum strength callouts. As D3 is already deploying one less car than the other districts (assuming the new West Districts will deploy seven cars), this is extremely worrisome due to the seriousness of the calls originating from that district and the number of community demands. In reality, this district should be staffed to a full seven-car complement, and should maintain the appropriate number of officers to fulfill those car shifts.

Table 41: Overtime for Minimum Strength Callouts (2010-2012)[213]

Reason for OT	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012		
Callout for Min Strength	**3,948**	**5,136**	**1,838**	$ 229,261	$ 316,748	$ 122,436	10,922	$ 668,445.28
Div 11	730	775	364	$ 36,284	$ 41,480	$ 23,420	1,869	$ 101,184.34
Div 12	2,046	2,689	433	$ 127,260	$ 178,111	$ 30,708	5,168	$ 336,079.28
Div 13	401	606	605	$ 23,487	$ 36,570	$ 39,814	1,612	$ 99,872.17
Div 14	319	481	190	$ 15,701	$ 25,972	$ 12,144	990	$ 53,816.36
Div 16	453	586	246	$ 26,529	$ 34,614	$ 16,350	1,285	$ 77,493.13

When examining district-specific overtime, the type and reasons for the overtime are important. Looking at the overtime charged in D1, we see that the majority was used for general patrol. However, a great deal of overtime was also charged to general investigation, likely conducted by the divisional detectives. Community Support constables in D1's use of overtime appears to be steady over the three years under examination; however, both general patrol and general investigation's overtime has increased substantially. This again speaks to the reality that officers in D1 are under-staffed, as their ability to keep up with their workload appears to be necessitating more and more overtime.

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[213] In Division 12 (D2), 54% and 58% respectively for 2010 and 2011 callout for minimum strength overtime was charged to the Airport Unit.

Table 42: Overtime within D11

Division 11 Overtime	Worked Hours			Charged ($)		
Charged To	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
General Patrol						
General Patrol	18,009.9	17,336.2	19,171.0	$ 795,019.92	$ 825,916.23	$ 963,973.53
Foot Patrol	-	-	653.6	$ -	$ -	$ 39,154.26
Investigation						
General	4,016.0	5,550.7	6,078.4	$ 236,098.61	$ 351,529.97	$ 412,093.47
Domestic Violence	314.2	337.7	236.5	$ 18,048.79	$ 20,137.60	$ 14,254.73
Community Support	2,831.5	2,256.2	2,227.9	$ 155,508.06	$ 134,672.08	$ 135,485.11
Admin	124.7	130.5	108.0	$ 7,393.10	$ 9,270.99	$ 6,803.12
Grand Total	*25,296.3*	*25,611.3*	*28,475.3*	*$ 1,212,068.48*	*$ 1,341,526.87*	*$ 1,571,764.22*

These observations must be examined in greater detail, however, so the reason for the overtime is important. As is shown below, in D1, continuing investigations garner the majority of overtime hours. This is likely a combination of follow-ups conducted by both general patrol and divisional detectives. Court attendance shows a great number of hours as well, although this has kept steady for the most part over the three years. The type of court attendance should always be examined to ensure it is necessary and the best use of the officer's time. Efficiencies in court attendance are beyond the scope of this report, although it is strongly recommended that court policies be examined for their impact on the WPS members. The "callouts for other reason" below should also be examined in more detail going forward, as there may be unnecessary overtime being used when other areas of the service would be more appropriate.

Table 43: D1 Reason for OT

Division 11 Overtime	Worked Hours			Charged ($)		
Reason for OT	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Continuing Investigation	9,126.0	12,228.0	15,315.3	$ 439,171.55	$ 633,937.29	$ 833,950.26
Court attendance	5,152.8	5,301.3	4,720.2	$ 251,514.77	$ 276,651.59	$ 260,621.88
Callout for Other Reason	1,957.0	2,799.0	3,590.0	$ 121,540.67	$ 185,185.21	$ 250,262.92
Other	3,705.5	3,202.0	3,035.3	$ 146,746.83	$ 123,559.45	$ 112,828.91
Court Attendance Traffic	699.0	975.6	1,245.3	$ 38,498.30	$ 59,084.08	$ 79,007.86
Callout for Min Strength	730.0	774.5	364.2	$ 36,284.42	$ 41,480.28	$ 23,419.64
Project	74.5	217.5	114.0	$ 3,659.04	$ 15,829.30	$ 6,977.95
Heldover per Duty Inspector	384.5	21.5	51.5	$ 16,545.37	$ 936.97	$ 2,379.64
Callout for Specialty Unit	10.0	26.0	37.0	$ 395.20	$ 1,705.03	$ 2,161.63
Heldover per Supervisor	41.0	55.0	2.5	$ 2,318.03	$ 2,530.38	$ 153.53
Incident in progress(Civilian)	3,416.0	11.0		$ 155,394.30	$ 627.29	
Grand Total	*25,296.3*	*25,611.3*	*28,475.3*	*$ 1,212,068.48*	*$ 1,341,526.87*	*$ 1,571,764.22*

The West Division's general patrol utilized the majority of the overtime over all three years. Continuing investigations, however, saw a spike in 2012, which could denote an increase in the number and/or type of crimes being committed in that area.

Table 44: Overtime within West Division

West Division Overtime	Worked Hours			Charged ($)		
Charged To	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
General Patrol	14,867.4	15,441.1	15,220.5	$ 670,459.12	$ 762,396.28	$ 784,201.08
Investigation	2,792.5	2,996.7	4,973.5	$ 168,331.12	$ 180,677.72	$ 311,472.63
Community Support	2,017.8	2,114.1	2,336.8	$ 109,334.67	$ 120,189.08	$ 140,515.53
Airport	3,226.5	2,462.5		$ 201,777.54	$ 160,523.65	
Admin	195.0	133.5	175.3	$ 12,364.07	$ 9,719.42	$ 10,974.65
Flight Ops	191.5	292.2		$ 13,255.42	$ 18,465.65	
Grand Total	23,290.7	23,440.1	22,706.2	$ 1,175,521.94	$ 1,251,971.80	$ 1,247,163.89

Looking at the new 'West' Division, similar patterns emerge with continuing investigations and court appearance. Although the amount of hours utilized for continuing investigations is less than D1, this is not unexpected given the disparity in both the number and type of crime that occurs in these two Divisions.

Table 45: West Division Reason for OT

West Division Overtime	Worked Hours			Charged ($)		
Reason for OT	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Continuing Investigation	6,341.0	8,994.0	10,519.0	$ 304,882.30	$ 465,733.99	$ 577,316.49
Court attendance	3,999.0	4,114.9	4,213.1	$ 197,914.92	$ 214,958.50	$ 235,840.70
Other	4,075.3	3,673.3	3,045.5	$ 171,041.29	$ 155,421.60	$ 118,843.51
Callout for Other Reason	1,577.5	1,489.5	2,397.5	$ 101,960.47	$ 95,536.47	$ 156,715.16
Court Attendance Traffic	1,079.9	1,588.9	1,816.1	$ 53,195.37	$ 85,822.35	$ 109,012.39
Callout for Min Strength	2,499.0	3,274.5	679.0	$ 153,788.74	$ 212,725.81	$ 47,057.86
Project	1,092.5	231.0	20.0	$ 67,851.67	$ 17,719.89	$ 1,659.31
Heldover per Supervisor	138.5	46.5	8.0	$ 8,476.81	$ 2,456.82	$ 325.12
Callout for Specialty Unit	10.0	10.0	8.0	$ 402.72	$ 619.77	$ 393.35
Incident in progress(Civilian)	2,340.5	6.5		$ 109,980.28	$ 399.36	
Heldover per Duty Inspector	137.5	11.0		$ 6,027.37	$ 577.24	
Grand Total	23,290.7	23,440.1	22,706.2	$ 1,175,521.94	$ 1,251,971.80	$ 1,247,163.89

Division 13 charged over $800,000 in overtime to general patrol for each of the three years, with the second largest amount being utilized for investigations.

Table 46: Overtime within D3

Division 13 Overtime	Worked Hours			Charged ($)		
Charged To	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
General Patrol	18,112.4	16,945.9	16,198.8	$ 871,798.26	$ 853,527.24	$ 829,547.51
Investigation	5,485.0	5,999.5	5,302.0	$ 324,296.48	$ 378,901.12	$ 346,792.37
Community Support	2,581.4	2,166.2	1,795.5	$ 144,800.30	$ 122,700.66	$ 110,098.17
Admin	58.5	15.5	67.5	$ 4,031.45	$ 948.81	$ 4,200.95
Grand Total	26,237.3	25,127.1	23,363.8	$ 1,344,926.49	$ 1,356,077.83	$ 1,290,639.00

What appears to be unique about Division 13's overtime, however, is the extensive hours charged for court attendance. This may be due partly to the recognition that some of the most serious offences occur within this Division, and therefore, may necessitate increased pressures on court time for officers as more cases would be heading to trial due to their severity. Again, the court attendance policies should be examined in greater detail.

Table 47: D3 Reason for OT

| Division 13 Overtime | Worked Hours | | | Charged ($) | | |
Reason for OT	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Continuing Investigation	10,982.5	12,762.0	12,060.5	$ 572,899.29	$ 689,803.84	$ 666,000.60
Court attendance	5,336.5	5,605.4	5,643.4	$ 280,982.32	$ 304,579.69	$ 316,416.95
Callout for Other Reason	2,406.5	2,801.0	2,215.0	$ 144,262.27	$ 181,864.80	$ 154,028.81
Other	2,719.5	2,447.0	2,616.5	$ 100,257.11	$ 91,488.49	$ 100,964.52
Callout for Min Strength	400.5	606.0	605.2	$ 23,487.35	$ 36,570.33	$ 39,814.49
Court Attendance Traffic	1,110.8	731.2	132.2	$ 60,253.66	$ 41,956.14	$ 7,425.16
Heldover per Supervisor	33.0	75.5	49.0	$ 2,382.20	$ 4,283.95	$ 3,118.98
Project	37.0	6.0	28.5	$ 2,284.54	$ 239.05	$ 2,045.25
Heldover per Duty Inspector	63.5	89.0	7.5	$ 3,457.26	$ 5,018.40	$ 437.36
Incident in progress(Civilian)	3,141.5		6.0	$ 154,394.02		$ 386.88
Standby	6.0			$ 266.47		
Callout for Specialty Unit		4.0			$ 273.14	
Grand Total	26,237.3	25,127.1	23,363.8	$ 1,344,926.49	$ 1,356,077.83	$ 1,290,639.00

Division 14 charged the majority of their overtime to general patrol, with only a relatively small amount to investigations. This is likely due to the comparatively low-crime nature of this Division as compared to Division 11 or 13.

Table 48: Overtime within D4

| Division 14 Overtime | Worked Hours | | | Charged ($) | | |
Charged To	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
General Patrol	15,157.4	13,243.6	14,747.0	$ 683,648.56	$ 632,213.32	$ 749,461.64
Investigation	2,385.8	2,399.9	2,540.2	$ 140,497.85	$ 141,351.01	$ 165,348.26
Community Support	721.4	1,107.2	1,029.8	$ 36,795.43	$ 65,772.96	$ 65,334.83
Admin	71.0	37.0	106.3	$ 4,239.38	$ 2,452.01	$ 8,126.80
Grand Total	18,335.7	16,787.7	18,423.3	$ 865,181.22	$ 841,789.30	$ 988,271.53

However, the amount of overtime charged for court attendance in Division 14 is higher than both Division 11 and West Division. Despite that, Division 14 used the least amount of overtime for Patrol divisions in the WPS.

Division 14 Overtime	Worked Hours			Charged ($)		
Reason for OT	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Continuing Investigation	6,171.5	9,109.5	9,590.5	$ 300,054.29	$ 465,335.49	$ 521,106.60
Court attendance	3,713.4	3,407.0	4,733.8	$ 177,058.98	$ 176,555.78	$ 264,583.73
Other	2,929.0	2,298.0	2,693.5	$ 110,353.32	$ 85,621.97	$ 107,864.81
Callout for Other Reason	987.0	595.5	833.0	$ 61,182.40	$ 35,902.27	$ 58,460.23
Court Attendance Traffic	730.8	738.7	329.6	$ 35,373.01	$ 42,785.38	$ 20,642.14
Callout for Min Strength	318.5	481.0	190.0	$ 15,700.60	$ 25,971.85	$ 12,143.91
Callout for Specialty Unit	18.0	59.0	24.0	$ 1,133.09	$ 4,142.63	$ 1,265.05
Callout for Project			10.0			$ 1,234.34
Project	20.5	17.5	13.5	$ 916.01	$ 799.81	$ 533.18
Incident in progress(Civilian)	3,205.0	2.5	5.5	$ 151,121.02	$ 144.67	$ 437.54
Heldover per Duty Inspector	204.5	70.0		$ 10,263.86	$ 4,151.69	
Standby	8.0			$ 492.67		
Heldover per Supervisor	29.5	9.0		$ 1,531.97	$ 377.76	
Grand Total	18,335.7	16,787.7	18,423.3	$ 865,181.22	$ 841,789.30	$ 988,271.53

Overall, the discrepancies between the divisions are most visible when looking at the type of overtime and the percentage of worked hours. As is shown below, D1 worked the majority of the hours for continuing investigations, and three other categories of overtime. Overall, D1 worked 30% of all the overtime hours in the Patrol divisions, with Division 14 working only 20% of the total overtime hours. The fact that D1 both has the highest authorized strength, and the majority of the overtime hours, points again to the reality that they are understaffed.

Table 50: Total Worked Hours per Division

	TOTAL WORKED HOURS					
Type of Overtime	Div 11	West Division	Div 13	Div 14	Total	Total Hours
Continuing Investigation	32%	22%	26%	20%	100%	44,081
Court attendance	25%	22%	29%	24%	100%	18,228
Other	27%	27%	23%	23%	100%	10,999
Callout for Other Reason	40%	25%	25%	9%	100%	8,877
Court Attendance Traffic	35%	51%	4%	10%	100%	3,257
Callout for Min Strength	21%	36%	31%	11%	100%	1,700
Other OT	58%	5%	27%	10%	100%	337
TOTAL	30%	24%	25%	20%		

Staffing Analysis

Staffing analysis should be driven primarily by community demand for service, as well as overtime usage and workload statistics. The type of community demand should also be considered as a nuanced factor within the staffing analysis, as there often needs to be a discussion surrounding whether some types of crimes are appropriate for a police response. Financial pressures and ongoing assessments of efficiency necessitate this (discussed throughout this report).

To begin, a basic analysis of where staffing should be based on community demands can be conducted using the CAD data[214]. As mentioned previously, determining the amount of community demand is largely subjective. One of the largest divisions may come with the inclusion of on-view events. As the WPS CAD system is unable to ascertain with absolute certainty what events are actually officer-initiated, some subjective assessment needs to come into play. Realistically, ignoring all the on-view events in CAD to determine community demand will not be reliable (see Table 6: On-View vs. Called In w/ Priority).

In order to determine appropriate staffing, the number of hours that the community requires must be established, along with the number of hours that workload represents. In this example, the number of events can be visualized using several metrics for comparison. In general, the community demand is best represented by the third column, which excludes "beat" and "special attention" from the analysis. That is not to suggest these activities are not useful, but if the objective is to best ascertain what 'must' be done, these activities, which are largely proactive in nature or handled by cadets should be excluded from the Patrol analysis. Similarly, using all events will include those rightfully taken by cadets or alternate call response, running the risk of overestimating the events that require a patrol response. Using "calls only" will ignore all urgent and emergency events that may occur in front of an officer and require attention. Likewise, only including those events that were dispatched to Patrol does not allow for the inclusion of events whereby Patrol provided backup to specialty or City units, despite not being the primary file holder.

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[214] The calculations above use the following assumptions:
i.   The maximum work hour per year is 2080 (40 hours x 52 weeks)
ii.   The unit is "cars", as two officers are required per car
iii.   The ideal proactive balance will be 50% reactive, 50% proactive (thereby cutting availability in half)
iv.   The 18:1 ratio is still required as the depletion of officer time is not factored into the "car" availability

The equation then takes into account other aspects of determining workload, such as the number of hours these calls represent. Using a similar method as in Table 22, the number of hours per 'event' can be calculated. Multiplying the number of hours per call with the total calls will give the number of hours required per year in the district. As the WPS deploys two officers per car to work as a team, the 'team' is used as the unit of analysis for staffing. This is best thought of as a 'car'. Each 'car' can be utilized for approximately 8,760 hours per year (365 days x 24 hours per day). As best practices advocates that half of each officers (or team's) time should be spent on proactive and problem-solving activities, the number of hours required per car doubles from simply the event hours. In addition, the number of events requiring more than one 'car' is estimated by assessing the priority levels of the calls. In general, Priority 0 through 4 (indicating both emergency and urgent calls) would reasonably require more than one car responding. In reality, there may be several cars responding to a Priority 0 or 1 call; however, for simplicity and overestimation errors, the lowest possible projections will be used. This "backup time" will add on another 50% of hours, as the CAD data shows that there is approximately a 50/50 mix between Priority 0-4 calls, and Priority 5-9 calls. Adding these together, the total number of hours required per year per district can be estimated. Taking that total number of hours and dividing by the total hours each car is available per year will produce the total cars needed per day, and per shift.

The staffing needs estimates are show in the following tables, for each district.

Table 51: D1 Staffing Estimate

District 1	All Events	P0-6 only	No Beat/SA	Calls Only
Number of dispatched calls	58,651.0	34,195.0	47,755.0	32,578.0
Hours per call (average)	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2
Call hours per year	126,686.2	73,861.2	103,150.8	70,368.5
Proactive hours added on (50%)	126,686.2	73,861.2	103,150.8	70,368.5
Backup hours needed (~ 50% of calls req' 2nd unit)	63,343.1	36,930.6	51,575.4	35,184.2
TOTAL HOURS PER YEAR	316,715.4	184,653.0	257,877.0	175,921.2
Cars per day required	37.0	22.0	30.0	21.0
Cars per shift	12.0	7.0	**10.0**	7.0
Officers needed	216.0	126.0	**180.0**	126.0

Table 52: D3 Staffing Estimate

DISTRICT 3	All Events	P0-6 only	No Beat/SA	Calls Only
Number of dispatched calls	44,102.0	28,050.0	41,331.0	28,526.0
Hours per call (average)	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1
Call hours per year	93,937.3	59,746.5	88,035.0	60,760.4
Proactive hours added on (50%)	93,937.3	59,746.5	88,035.0	60,760.4
Backup hours needed (~ 50% of calls req' 2nd unit)	46,968.6	29,873.3	44,017.5	30,380.2
TOTAL HOURS PER YEAR	234,843.2	149,366.3	220,087.6	151,901.0
Cars per day required	27.0	18.0	26.0	18.0
Cars per shift	9.0	6.0	**9.0**	6.0
Officers needed	162.0	108.0	**162.0**	108.0

Table 53: D4 Staffing Estimate

DISTRICT 4	All Events	P0-6 only	No Beat/SA	Calls Only
Number of dispatched calls	36,182.0	23,067.0	34,802.0	25,294.0
Hours per call (average)	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1
Call hours per year	74,173.1	47,287.4	71,344.1	51,852.7
Proactive hours added on (50%)	74,173.1	47,287.4	71,344.1	51,852.7
Backup hours needed (~ 50% of calls req' 2nd unit)	37,086.6	23,643.7	35,672.1	25,926.4
TOTAL HOURS PER YEAR	185,432.8	118,218.4	178,360.3	129,631.8
Cars per day required	22.0	14.0	21.0	15.0
Cars per shift	7.0	5.0	**7.0**	5.0
Officers needed	126.0	90.0	**126.0**	90.0

Table 54: West District Staffing Estimate

WEST	All Events	P0-6 only	No Beat/SA	Calls Only
Number of dispatched calls	40,509.0	24,659.0	36,304.0	26,752.0
Hours per call (average)	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1
Call hours per year	83,853.6	51,044.1	75,149.3	55,376.6
Proactive hours added on (50%)	83,853.6	51,044.1	75,149.3	55,376.6
Backup hours needed (~ 50% of calls req' 2nd unit)	41,926.8	25,522.1	37,574.6	27,688.3
TOTAL HOURS PER YEAR	209,634.1	127,610.3	187,873.2	138,441.6
Cars per day required	24.0	15.0	22.0	16.0
Cars per shift	8.0	5.0	**7.0**	5.0
Officers needed	144.0	90.0	**126.0**	90.0

The tables above show the nuances that can emerge when assessing staffing. All options slightly modify the demand placed on officers, but deciding on what route to take would necessitate a management decision on policy direction. For instance, senior management may determine that having Patrol respond to particular types of incidents may not be possible given staffing pressures (e.g., shoplifting); or, determining that alternate call responses need to be taken for all Priority 7 through 9s (for example). What should be kept in mind is that excluding these types of community demands may impact community satisfaction, so again, care must be taken when assessing what officers should or should not be doing.

Based on community demand, District 1 should be aiming to deploy 10 cars per shift in order to meet demand. This would exclude many of the activities currently taken by the cadets, as well as some of the lower priority calls within the district. This is a marked increase from the minimum of seven cars per shift currently, but would match staffing to demand much more appropriately. This would impact community safety, response times, as well as other districts insofar as the 'borrowing and lending' to and from other districts would be greatly reduced if each area was properly staffed. According to the formula, D3 should also be deploying a significant increase in cars – from six per shift to nine per shift. The number and nature of service demands in D3 (as laid out in previous sections), easily demonstrates the understaffing in this area. D4 and the West District would appear to be deploying an appropriate number of cars per shift, according to the formula. Any change in staffing in these areas (in terms of minimums) is likely unnecessary given the current service demands.

What is necessary to examine, however, is exactly the impact on Patrol's authorized strength given these staffing increase recommendations. Currently, it would appear that D1 is authorized slightly above their minimum car complement of seven (143 total assigned to Patrol, with 126 needed to staff the seven cars at an 18:1 ratio). This allows for a buffer of almost one car per shift (18:1 ratio, with 17 extra members); however, it has been conveyed that all areas deploy at minimums most of the time. Another reality is that the new West District (D2 and D6) and D4 do not even have enough officers assigned to Patrol within their districts to cover their 7-car minimum. With a necessary complement of 126 officers in both districts to cover the seven cars, their current authorized strength of 119 officers in Patrol (according to the organization chart from 2013) is not adequate. This under-staffing has the possibility of resulting in more borrowing from other districts (likely D1 or D3), who are already burdened by their workload.

DISTRICT	1	West	3	4	Min. Patrol
Minimum cars (current)	7	7	6	7	27
Current ratio (18:1)	126	126	108	126	486
Org Chart	143	119	121	119	502
Difference for current MINIMUMS	17	-7	13	-7	16
Proposed Cars per Shift	10	7	9	7	33
Proposed target (Patrol Only)	180	126	162	126	594
Additional Officers Needed	37	7	41	7	92

As is shown, while the minimum deployment of seven cars in D4 and the West District is considered adequate for the service demands, patrol officers are not currently staffed to that minimum complement. This should be remedied immediately to ensure they are able to deploy at minimums. In order to reach the recommended target of cars for D1 and D3, additional officers are needed. As D1 already has 143 officers assigned to Patrol, an additional 37 officers are needed to maintain 10 cars per shift. In D3, however, an increase of 41 officers is recommended as D3 carries a slightly lower 'buffer' complement of officers.

These recommendations, appear to fit with the general sentiments of the residents of Winnipeg, as the General Survey of 2010 noted, "Respondents in District 3 were more likely to believe there are too few officers (61.1%) compared with respondents from the rest of the city (46% average)" (Wyman, 2010).

What this is intended to convey is the delicate balance necessary, and the detrimental effects of understaffing officers, even if only in one area. The impact both on other areas of the organization and on public safety cannot be understated.

The results and recommendations from this section of the report should be considered alongside recommendations from other areas.

PATROL – NON-UNIFORM OPERATIONS

Division Crime Unit

Mandate

The divisional detectives provide investigative support to Patrol, and are responsible for handling mid-level events that necessitate a more in-depth examination than Patrol members may be able to provide, but are not serious enough to pass up to Major Crimes, Homicide, or other specialty investigative units. While the mandate is not specifically defined by crime type (rather, more so by crime severity), the typical offences include strong-arm robberies, break-and-enters, non-serious assaults, and sexual assaults outside the Sex Crimes Unit mandate. The WPS manual states "Members of Division Crime Units are responsible for the management and follow-up of general criminal investigations. Members strive to identify crime patterns within their district and employ investigative strategies to identify and arrest the persons responsible." Referrals originate from Patrol most often, although the divisional detectives also utilize surveillance and other support units for investigations (but to a much lesser degree than the specialized investigation units).

The new organization chart (summer 2013) notes the following positions in the Divisional Crime Units:

Table 56: Divisional Crime Unit Staffing

	Sergeant	Det. Sergeant	DV Constables	PC Constables
Division 11	1	4	4	10
West Division	1[215]	2	4	10
Division 13	1	2	0	10
Division 14	1	2	0	10

What should be noted is that both Division 13 and Division 14 do not have Domestic Violence constables assigned specifically to their areas. While staffing pressures may not enable all districts to have this service, it should be recognized that the majority of Domestic Violence incidents occur within Division 11 and Division 13 (see Table 14 and Table 15).   Therefore, the four Domestic Violence constables should be reassigned from the West Division to Division 13, and placed under the CSU supervisors. Due to the nature and timing of Domestic Violence incidents, these constables should be placed on evening shift, with a modified start time of 1500.

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[215] Supervises the Community Support Unit as well

Recruitment and Tenure

Tenure maximums are set at two (2) years for constables, and three (3) years for detective sergeants.

Workflow

Requests for assistance generally come by way of the sergeant at the desk or sergeant in charge of uniform. The following chart represents CAD calls (both on-view and reported) that were NOT assigned to Patrol as the primary unit, and were NOT assigned to a City unit as the primary Unit. While certainly many of these are not directly attributable to the Divisional Crime Units, it is helpful to see the distribution of events throughout the City that may fall within their mandate. As is clear, there is not an even distribution of events throughout the City, and therefore, there is likely not an even distribution of events between divisional detectives. This, therefore, is not providing the best service to the community, as some areas will be under-serviced, while others will have excess time.

Type of Event	DISTRICT 1	DISTRICT 3	DISTRICT 4	WEST DISTRICT	Grand Total
call	8.7%	7.7%	5.2%	6.9%	28.5%
on view	24.1%	19.8%	11.1%	16.5%	71.5%
Grand Total	32.87%	27.52%	16.27%	23.34%	100.00%

Crime Prevention

The primary preventative efforts of the divisional detectives include updating the Crime Suppression files that identify the hot spots within each community. This information is then passed along to general Patrol, in order to encourage monitoring on a regular basis within their patrol areas.

Infrastructure and Working Environment

The divisional detectives are noted as a learning ground for plainclothes work. While the majority of the offences are not overly serious, it has been observed that these detectives are left on their own to conduct these investigations, with little assistance or supervision. The detective sergeants are given case assignments in the same manner as the constables are, and therefore, have little chance to provide mentoring or guidance on files outside their workload. The training, in addition, is noted as being inadequate. Likely the majority of training dollars go into the regular investigation units, and not the divisional detectives.

Other issues that have been noted/observed include the problems with mandates, and the difficulties this presents for Patrol and the divisional detectives. Patrol members should have a greater responsibility in the investigation of crime events, and support of other units if the file is forwarded to them. Initial interviews and

evidence collection does not necessitate callouts of the divisional detectives or other specialty squads, so overtime and callout policies and procedures should be closely monitored to ensure they are efficient and necessary.

Recommendations

Due to the uneven distribution of events under the divisional detectives mandate, the deployment and utilization of this resource is not as efficient as it could be. Another consideration is that crime issues in one division will likely spill over to another division in many instances. By having each divisional detective office in a silo, there is less of a chance to collaborate and problem solve for the City as a whole. Still another consideration is the feelings of deficiency when it comes to training and mentoring. Placing the divisional detectives in with other investigative units may allow for greater collaboration and cooperation to accomplish common goals, while more evenly distributing training dollars and mentoring opportunities.

Therefore, in order to achieve greater effectiveness and efficiency, it is recommended that the divisional detectives merge into a single citywide unit, becoming the General Investigation Unit (GIU). This will allow for greater prioritization and coordination between division priorities, and allow for a smoother distribution of events under the GIU and other investigative unit's mandates. At the same time, the mandate for GIU should be clarified and strengthened so that once it leaves Patrol it is directed to the correct investigative unit (e.g., GIU, Major Crimes, etc.).

As a single unit, the staffing and shifting models of GIU can also be streamlined. It is recommended that this unit operate with two shifts – days and evenings, with ten constables and two detective sergeants per shift (total of 40 and eight), reporting to one sergeant (two total). This would result in an excess of two detective sergeants and one sergeant overall.

The new GIU should also be assigned a crime analyst to assist with clearing offences, crime reduction opportunities, and prevention opportunities. This analyst can assist with serial offenders and offences, help solve spree events, target known offenders, and provide support for all of the investigators under GIU throughout the City.

Community Support Unit

Mandate

Community Support consists of one-officer units working seven days per week, days and evenings, on a 10-hour shift. Their primary role is community liaison, along with problem solving activities, including chronic

complaints.   Traffic enforcement also falls within their mandate, although this responsibility is shared with members of General Patrol (Administrative Overview Status Report). The Community Support Unit (CSU) is tasked to resolve longer-term problems, locations/issues that have resulted in a multiple calls for service, and pro-actively address other areas of concern. The detectives conduct follow-up investigations on most crimes that occur in the district.

The primary function of the Community Support Unit (CSU) is to identify the problem areas within the districts and focus attention on those problem areas. This information is gathered through speaking to the community – business owners, in particular. As this information is obtained, it is consolidated and put on file. For example, the CSU in Division 13 currently has a working file that lists the top ten most wanted people in District 3 as well as the top ten problem addresses.

Each unit in CSU is assigned to a cruiser car area and it is the responsibility of CSU members to remain on top of problem individuals and locations (e.g. pawn shops, bars, drug houses). Part of their activities include curfew checking, actively looking for people wanted on warrants and actively performing spot checks. The vast majority of the CSU work is proactive and according to constables working within the unit, a major part of the mandate of the CSU is drug enforcement.

Staffing and Shifting

Unlike GP, which work in three shifts: day shift, evening shift, and midnight shift, CSU only work day shifts (7 AM – 5 PM) and evening shifts (4 PM – 2 am).

Staffing within these support units should be based on need and availability of officers. As D1 and D3 exhibit the highest need in most areas, it is natural that the more proactive, problem-solving resources should be applied in these areas. In addition, with the downtown and North End areas having a unique concentration of people and activities, foot patrol is also naturally located in these areas.

Currently, most of the Community Support Unit's resources are located in D1. Interestingly, the West Division has more resources than D3, despite having fewer crime and disorders issues.

FORMER STAFFING	Shifts	Officers per Shift (approx.)	Sergeant	Patrol Sergeant	Constables
Division 11			1		
Community Support	*Days (0700); Evenings (1600)*	*4*		2	16
Foot Patrol	*Days (0700); Evenings (1600)*	*4*		2	14
Division 13					
Community Support	*Days (0700); Evenings (1600)*	*2*		2	10
Foot Patrol	*Days (0700); Evenings (1600)*	*1*			4
West Division	*Days (0700); Evenings (1600)*	*4*		4	18
Division 14	*Days (0700); Evenings (1600)*	*2*		2	8

From the above table, it would appear that the CSU resources, as well as supervisory resources (patrol sergeants) are not uniform or evenly distributed. A better staffing and shifting model should be considered.

Although these are largely proactive units that are not officially mandated to respond to calls, metrics can still be used to estimate where resources should be put. Based on the mandate of these units, it is natural to examine the number of calls, the severity of those calls, the number of charges laid, and the number of calls devoted to non-patrol and non-City entities as a proxy for the unit's workload. Also included is consideration for the number of shifts required to maintain service and effectiveness. Using a service demand calculation, a better representation of the distribution of personnel resources is shown below.

Table 59: Proposed Distribution of CSU and FP Resources

	% of Csts	% of CAD Calls	% of Charges	Urgent Priority Calls	Non-Patrol, Non-City CAD Calls	Share of Resources
Division 11 *Community Support* *Foot Patrol*	43%	33%	34%	31%	33%	34%
Division 13 *Community Support* *Foot Patrol*	20%	25%	27%	27%	28%	28%
West Division	26%	23%	20%	22%	23%	20%
Division 14	11%	20%	19%	20%	16%	18%

As is shown, the recommended movement within this unit would see fewer constables in D1 and the West Division, but increases to D3 and D4. Although the reduction in D1 may seem counter-intuitive given the nature

and extent of the crime problem there, if Patrol units are sufficiently staffed, it is highly likely that the CSU and foot patrol can focus only on those elements within their mandate.

However, this must be taken into consideration alongside shifting realities and personnel impacts. The first reality is that only Division 11 and Division 13 have the need for foot patrol. The second reality is that the foot patrol must be adequately staffed for safety and effectiveness. As these constables become the eye on the street, they must be sufficient in numbers to fulfill their mandate and increase visibility and community presence. In addition, the Community Support Unit constables may see a decrease in their numbers if their mandate and shifts are refined to better match what their intended activities are.

Recommendations – Community Support Units

Specifically, the CSU needs to become a proactive, intelligence-led unit, while the foot patrol provides the visible street presence. There appears to be some overlap in mandates between these two units, and clarifying and strengthening the unique nature of each will assist in greater effectiveness and efficiency. In addition, it would also appear that there is some overlap between the traffic enforcement duties of the CSU, as it was noted this duty was shared with general Patrol. This type of activity should be removed from the CSU mandate, and all energy in this unit directed towards proactive, problem-solving activities.

CSU constables should work closely with the recommended new General Investigation Unit (GIU), as they will hold valuable intelligence and street information useful for solving offences. Weekly or bi-weekly meetings with other investigative units will also ensure that intelligence has the ability to solve crimes within the City. It is further recommended that district crime analysts be added to each of the districts. Under the supervision of CSU, these analysts would be a resource for all Patrol (Uniform, CSU and Foot Patrol). The CSU constables should work in collaboration with the newly recommended district analysts to ensure both intelligence and analysis makes its way throughout the Department to effect the most impact.

CSU constables should adjust shifting and staffing to respond to the community needs. Since most of their interaction is with business members, having a set dayshift for this unit makes the most sense. Dayshift, however, should be modified to 0900 to 1900 to allow for business liaison activities, as well as evening curfew checks. Also as this unit should focus entirely on being proactive and problem-solving, and will not answer calls, it should be modified to be more efficient. This will reduce the need for excessive supervision, and ensure they are able to conduct their duties when they need to. This will also move the majority of the staffing volume over to the foot patrol.

Originally the CSU were assigned a PUAR, but as some are busier than others, this does not provide consistent service. Instead, the CSU should be assigned to address problems within the division as a whole, focusing on those areas in most need on a proactive and problem-solving basis. To that end, it is recommended that the CSU constables be assigned on a district level, instead of a PUAR level, and work together alongside the units above to ensure problem-solving and prevention activities are maximized throughout their district.

Foot Patrol

More on foot patrol and the relationship with CSU can be found in the "Beat Policing" section, under the heading, "WPS Patrol: Field Observations".

According to those within the unit, the sole purpose behind beat policing (foot patrol) is visibility. It is a key aspect of high visibility policing, as beat officers are able to have increased interaction with the public, and to enter businesses and speak with merchants and members of the public. Beat officers are deployed in pairs and do not go out after 9:30 PM unless with a partner or in a group.

One of the primary benefits of the foot patrol activities is intelligence gathering and generation. Officers are able to get information from business owners and key informants, and are able to get a better feel for the area because they are immersed in it. Further, beat officers are more easily approachable for citizens. For example, a foot patrol constable stated, "A lot of people that wouldn't normally talk to the police will come and talk to us."

Recommendations – Foot Patrol

As is currently the practice, foot patrol is only viable in D1 and D3 and should only operate in those areas. If not already, foot patrol constables should be in uniform for increased visibility and community presence. Plainclothes officers, while effective for intelligence gathering, will not allow for the visible presence on the street, and thus, will not in all likelihood generate the intelligence information that may come from public citizens approaching the officers. If this practice of being in uniform already exists, it should continue.

To be effective, foot patrol should operate on both day and evening shifts. While it has been noted that deployment after 2130 does not happen unless in groups, adequate staffing of the foot patrol complements will ensure that the resource can be utilized during the most active hours without compromising safety. As the CSU officers will be the predominant presence during the day, doubling-up of the foot patrol shifts in the evening will assist in both community coverage, as well as providing extra safety and security for officers to allow them to

comfortably maintain their visible presence past 2130.   Having one day shift (two officers, A and B shift), AND two evening shifts (four officers, A and B shift) appears the most desirable. This is based on the calls for service timing (see Table 18: Average Calls (no on-view) per unit per hour) as well as logistic realities of the foot patrol and safety considerations.

In addition, the shifts of the foot patrol units should be adjusted to correspond to the calls for service demands. While the foot patrol should not directly answer calls for service, the busiest times of the day in D1 and D3 should be supported by more 'feet on the street' to assist with calming disorder, keeping the peace, and disrupting and protecting events from escalation. This in turn will have a positive spill over to the Patrol officers, and may assist in lightening their load during the busiest times of the day where they have no proactive time. Therefore, it is recommended that dayshift should be from 0800 to 1800, with evening shift being from 1500 to 0100. This should fit within the Collective Agreement guidelines.

The building up of foot patrol and providing more visibility during busier times will assist in relieving not only the Patrol constable's time, but also should provide a positive impact on citizen satisfaction and feelings of safety. As was noted from the WPS General Survey[216]:

> Predictably, respondents in Districts 2, 4 and 6 (93.4% average) feel safer during the day than do those from Districts 1 and 3 (80.6% average). Residents in Districts 1 and 3 were less likely (35.6% average of somewhat unsafe plus very unsafe, 37% in 2007) to feel safe in their neighbourhood after dark compared to residents in other parts of the city (61.4%) (Question 9).

The summary of the above recommendations is as follows:

Table 60: Summary of Divisional Non-Uniformed Patrol

PROPOSED STAFFING	Shifts (proposed)	Shift (approx.)	Sergeant	Patrol Sergeant	Constables
Division 11			1		
Community Support	*Days 0900-1900*	4		2	8
Foot Patrol	*Days (0800); Evenings (1500)*	5		4	20
Division 13					
Community Support	*Days 0900-1900*	4		2	8
Foot Patrol	*Days (0800); Evenings (1500)*	5		4	20
West Division	*Days 0900-1900*	4		2	8
Division 14	*Days 0900-1900*	4		2	8

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[216] Winnipeg Police Service General Survey, 2010

Overall, this would increase the staffing in this area by two constables (72 vs. 70), with an increase of four patrol sergeants (16 vs. 12). Having five members on each foot patrol shift will allow for a certain amount of shift relief, and if fully staffed, patrolling solo or as a group of three is possible depending on the time of day.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PATROL

RECOMMENDATION: the WPS should redesign its call priority system to be in line with North American urban police services. The total number of call categories should be reduced to a maximum of five.

RECOMMENDATION: That the WPS consider having the responsibility for parade duty shifted from Community Support Units to Traffic Section.

RECOMMENDATION: the WPS should request that the city Winnipeg create a special events budget that would provide support for additional policing for special events, including Winnipeg Jets home games. In other cities such as Vancouver, the municipal government assumes the additional costs associated with community events.

RECOMMENDATION: That the WPS explore "best practices" among police services in responding to the mentally ill and develop alternative strategies to current practice that will reduce the time officers spend on these cases and facilitate the creation of substantive partnerships with other agencies who work with the mentally ill.

RECOMMENDATION: The WPS should examine the various multi-agency models that are operating in police services across the country, such as the HUB program in Prince Albert and the Neighbourhood Empowerment Teams in Edmonton.

RECOMMENDATION: The WPS should conduct a study of dispatch and ensure that best practices are implemented.

RECOMMENDATION: The WPS should develop a protocol for call screening and alternatives for call response. This would include the creation of an Alternative Response Team that would respond to lower priority calls and provide follow-up contact with crime victims.

RECOMMENDATION: The WPS should review the practice of assigning new police officers to staff front counters and explore the potential for these positions to be staffed by civilians, members assigned to limited duties, and retired officers. (Note: it is recommended in the civilianization report that the majority of the service counter positions be civilianized)

RECOMMENATION: The WPS should immediately make a request for the purchase of at least two custody wagons. This will increase the efficiency and effectiveness of patrol, enhance the response to calls for service and, potentially, reduce the lengthy response times to high priority calls.

RECOMMENDATION: That a formal evaluation of the WPS cadet program be conducted.

RECOMMENDATION: The WPS should create secure parking for its members.

RECOMMENDATION: The WPS should conduct a review of in-service training opportunities for patrol members and identify the obstacles to, and potential, for ensuring that patrol officers have access to in-service training courses.

RECOMMENDATION: The WPS should work with various stakeholder groups to develop alternative community-based dispute resolution programs and services centered on the principles of restorative justice.

RECOMMENDATION: The WPS should conduct a thorough review of its partnerships. For those that are not mandated by legislation, the WPS should determine whether the partnership is producing positive outcomes and either restructure or withdraw from those arrangements that are time consuming and resource draining without any evidence of impact on the issues that are targeted.

Summary of Patrol Staffing Recommendations

Division 11	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Patrol					37	
Div. Detectives			-1	-4	-10	
Dom. Violence						
CSU					-7	1
Foot Patrol				2	6	
Administration			-1			1
Total	0	0	-2	-2	26	2

Division 13	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Patrol					41	
Div. Detectives			-1	-2	-10	
Dom. Violence					4	
CSU					-1	1
Foot Patrol				4	16	
Administration			-1			1
Total	0	0	-2	2	50	2

Division 14 (East)	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Patrol					7	
Div. Detectives			-1	-2	-10	
Dom. Violence						
CSU					-1	1
Foot Patrol						
Administration			-1			1
Total	0	0	-2	-2	-4	2

Division 12 (West)	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Patrol					7	
Div. Detectives				-2	-10	
Dom. Violence					-4	
CSU				-2	-11	1
Foot Patrol						
Administration			-1			1
Total	0	0	-1	-4	-18	2

Chapter IX: Investigative and Support Units in the WPS

A review of WPS investigative units was conducted using data supplied by the department and the responses of inspectors in the units to a survey questionnaire. (Attach copy of survey questionnaire). The following sections examine the work conducted by the Investigative and Support Units within the WPS. The mandates of each unit, insofar as they were available, are used to evaluate their placement and scope within the organization.

While shifting is considered, it is acknowledged that as of the 2006 contract negotiations, weekend coverage was introduced for all Criminal Investigation Bureau divisions (Status Report – Scheduling). However, this was noted as being withdrawn for a number of units due to limited manpower. The lack of coverage on the weekend has been noted as an issue for some when conducting investigations, and the ability to contact investigators. This will be considered in the reviews, as other departments have implemented rotating weekend shifts in response to similar criticisms. However, as was noted in internal reports, with e-mail and phone access available for all members (Status Report – Scheduling), the benefits to changing the shift structures may not be an essential component to finding increased efficiencies within the department. These will be noted on an individual basis as appropriate throughout the report.

It is important to note that there are no performance metrics for the majority of the investigative units in the WPS. This makes it difficult to assess their effectiveness and efficiency. In the following review, suggestions are made as to how to improve the performance of the various units. For each unit, key information is provided, including its mandate, recruitment and tenure, and relationship with other units. In addition, for many of the units, staffing and shifting information is provided as is workflow data and information on overtime.

The WPS has a significant number of specialty squads that, according to the officers who were interviewed, are largely full. These specialty squads range from investigative units to policy positions. While the necessity of some of these specialty units is unquestionable, a number of them seem to be redundant or of limited usefulness. For example, while domestic violence is a significant issue for police, the WPS Domestic Violence Unit consists of one officer who gives presentations on the topic. One question is whether this member might be better utilized in general patrol or in an investigative capacity and the presentations taken over by a civilian with expertise in the area.

Further, the Missing Persons Coordinator Position is not staffed on a 24-hour basis, a challenge since many missing persons reports are not filed until after midnight. This despite the fact that the number of missing persons, many of whom are at-risk/high-risk youth, has increased significantly in recent years.

These questions will be assessed in the following sections for divisions within the WPS.

INVESTIGATIVE DIVISIONS

Division 40 – Organized Crime Group

This division is primarily responsible for proactive investigations, focusing largely on organized crime, street gangs and narcotics. Several units are integrated with the RCMP, while others maintain autonomy while collaborating when needed. Several of these units provide support to other areas of investigation within the organization, such as with proceeds of crime or warrants. Over the past year, the variance between authorized and actual strength in this division has fluctuation by only approximately three members in 2012. However, loaning for projects or other needs throughout the organization may temporarily impact staffing within certain units. This will be highlighted in the individual business plans. As this division is largely proactive, assessing workload and staffing can be difficult. Therefore, many recommendations throughout focus on strategies for performance measurement and workload analysis going forward.

The total number of hours and charged amount for this division has dropped in the past few years, and now sits just over $700,000, which is approximately 0.3% of the budget.

Table 61: Division 40 Overtime[217]

Organized Crime Group (40)	2010	2011	2012
Total Worked Hours	15,066	14,629	10,684
Total Charged	$ 858,434.65	$ 948,960.50	$ 704,492.71
% of Budget	0.45%	0.47%	0.32%

This Division has one of the largest authorized strengths in the WPS:

Table 62: Division 40 Staffing

Division 40	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Organized Crime			2	8	18	2
Street Crimes		1	4	8	44	3
Green Team			1	1	6	
Comm. Corrections Liaision					1	
Integrated Proceeds of Crime					2	
Integ. Warrant Apprehension				1	2	
Integ. Organized Crime TF		1		2	6	
Division Management	1					
Total	0	2	7	20	79	5

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[217] City of Winnipeg, 2012

ORGANIZED CRIME

Mandate

The mandate of the Organized Crime Unit is not defined in writing; however, the following is taken from the WPS Procedure Manual – Organized Crime;

> *At the direction of the Commander, Division 40, the OCU will be responsible for development and implementation of pro-active operations against designated criminal organizations. Members of the OCU will:*

- o Conduct a pro-active enforcement of laws in relation to Organized Crime Members and Associates.
- o Initiate and coordinate Service efforts to curtail, and investigate the unlawful activities of Organized Crime Members and Associates.
- o Monitor the activities of, and conduct investigations into the illegal activities of organized crime groups (See: Section 1 A). Emphasis will be placed on criminal enforcement, intelligence gathering, asset seizure, and forfeiture.
- o Initiate, conduct and assist in the enforcement operations concerning organized crime activities.
- o Provide training for Service personnel concerning organized crime organizations.

The policy on organized crime was drafted in 2003 and has evolved since that time. Initially the unit was responsible for investigating all levels of organized crime, from unsophisticated street gangs up to well organized outlaw motorcycle gangs and sophisticated groups such as Asian organized crime. Different approaches and tactics are required to effective target each of these groups.

Despite the absence of a defined mandate, the unit and its investigations have evolved to become mainly project-based targeting high-end crime groups. Street gangs have become the responsibility of the Street Crime Unit, which has recently been realigned to fall under the chain of command of the Organized Crime Division.

Relationship to Other Units

The Organized Crime Unit works closely with many units. The distinction between various levels of crime groups is often unclear. Following the realignment of Street Crimes, the OCU will be working closely with this unit. It is important to share information and tactics with the Street Crime Unit and the Manitoba Integrated Organized Crime Task Force as well as other agencies within and outside of Manitoba. Most of the operations conducted by the Organized Crime Unit depend on continuous support from the following units: Surveillance Unit, Technical Support Unit and IPOC. A Crown agent is also assigned at the commencement of each project.

Staffing and Shifting

The OCU has a total authorized strength of 30, with the rank breakdown noted below:

Table 63: Organized Crime Unit Authorized Strength

Sergeants	2
Det. Sgts	8
Constables	17
VORA Cst	1
Clerk	2

Staffing levels have stayed constant in this unit since its initial designation.

The span of control for supervisors sits at approximately 1:4 for sergeants and 1:2.25 for detective sergeants. This is based on the assumption that the detective sergeants perform a supervisory role for the PC constables; however, if the sergeants are providing the supervision for both of these ranks, then the span of control increases to 1:13.

Shifting allows for Monday to Friday coverage, with a 4 on/3 off schedule for all teams. The staffing levels allow for two shifts with four detective sergeants and nine constables per shift. Each shift rotates between days and evenings to expand coverage. While weekend coverage would be ideal, the proactive nature of this unit does not necessarily dictate that 24/7 coverage is necessary.

Overtime Policies and Usage

Overtime is authorized by the sergeants and tracked by the staff sergeant. The amount of overtime used by this unit is shown below. While overtime has decreased significantly in 2012, members are spending a great deal of time on projects and court appearances. The drop in overtime for 'continuing investigation' would signify that this unit is properly staffed for their current mandate. However, with a proactive unit, the use of overtime as a staffing inference is problematic. A proactive unit will work to the maximum of their staffing capabilities; however, call load will be of little help to show whether that time is sufficient to meet community demand.

Organized Crime	Total Worked Hours			Total Cost Amount		
REASON FOR OT	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Project	3,212	2,600	1,360	$ 211,829.78	$173,760.79	$ 94,568.31
Court attendance	971	984	1,013	$ 61,332.74	$ 63,599.52	$ 68,667.52
Continuing Investigation	1,454	1,450	911	$ 95,395.41	$ 97,232.41	$ 65,832.22
Callout for Other Reason	766	1,025	754	$ 48,225.59	$ 68,560.36	$ 51,888.43
Other	115	16	322	$ 5,500.20	$ 688.64	$ 14,375.37
Callout for Project			256			$ 17,068.87
Court Attendance Traffic	8	21	8	$ 503.60	$ 1,378.11	$ 491.28
Incident in progress(Civilian)	2			$ 141.14		
Callout for Specialty Unit		5			$ 303.00	
Grand Total	6,528	6,100	4,623	$ 422,928.46	$405,522.83	$312,892.00

Workflow

Workflow is currently not tracked. In general it is noted that this unit completes one large-scale project within the year. Often members are assigned to conduct or assist with investigations specific to organized crime groups. Files are referred to this unit either from the Duty Officer, Central Reader, or are self-generated. There has been no noticeable increase in files since 2010.   Prioritization of files is done according to the "impact to crime groups and public safety", and many other files go un-investigated.

The effectiveness of this unit is measured by the impact on organized crime's ability to operate, and by reduced violence. Metrics such as the number of arrests and/or quantity of drug seizures are not tracked as performance measures. In addition, case clearance is not tracked; however, projects are noted as being 100% successful with nearly all guilty pleas.

The NICHE system can provide some rudimentary workload statistics. In 2012, there were 2012 events in which members from the OCU were noted as contributors. This includes over 1,200 reports and 1,300 tasks specifically assigned to members from the OCU. Many of these originated from D1 and D2 in Patrol (as noted in Niche).

Table 65: OCU Workflow in NICHE

Division of Assignment	Number of Occurrences	Total Reports	Total Tasks
11	754	453	394
12	627	487	367
13	401	200	160
14	230	83	379
Grand Total	2,012	1,223	1,300

The types of events that were noted in NICHE are shown below:

Table 66: OCU Event Types in NICHE

Most Common Event Types	Number of Occurrences	Total Reports	Total Tasks
Traffic - PON Issued	283	1	0
Compliance Check	203	1	1
Drug Offence	158	207	435
Assistance	86	23	53
Break & Enter - Residential	72	103	88
Robbery - Strongarm	62	85	50
Court Order Violation	53	61	28
Assault With A Weapon	51	109	59
Theft Under - Other	44	40	32
Assault	40	61	38

Due to the proactive nature of this unit, it is extremely difficult to say with great certainty whether they are appropriately staffed or not. In order to assist in this process in the future, the OCU should begin to track their workload and activities, as well as the types of files and events that fall under their mandate, and start yearly reporting to justify staffing modifications or the status quo.

Crime Prevention

As this unit is largely proactive, much of their activities can be thought of as crime prevention. A threat to this function will come if the number of gang-related or organized crime linked files place strain on their workload. If the members of this unit are increasingly drawn into investigations resulting from actual offences, their ability to conduct proactive and crime prevention activities will be compromised. Again, this places significant necessity on this unit to begin tracking and logging all offences and activities within their mandate, as this may become crucial in the future to demonstrate workload and shifts in focus.

Some of the crime prevention activities that were noted include Drug Expert and Gang Expert Programs that are developed internally and presented to the membership on a regular basis. These programs are also presented to other police agencies, other government and social agencies and community groups such as teachers and community clubs.

Prior to the formation of the unit, groups such as the Hell's Angels moved into Winnipeg without resistance and the Service possessed little intelligence. The result was several years of violence between rival puppet clubs (LHS vs Zig Zag Crew) where shootouts in public areas were common. After the formation of this unit, members of many groups are in jail or have restrictions, which allow monitoring and deterrence. Due to constant intelligence gathering and preventative operations, other major crime groups have been prevented from establishing themselves in the city.

Recommendations

While it does not appear crucial to add additional sworn members to this unit at this time, what is essential to put in place is a crime analyst specifically focused on organized crime activities. This analyst could be a resource for the OCU and Street Crimes, as the sharing and disseminating of all organized crime and gang related activity would be essential for both units. The addition of a crime analyst will allow for better intelligence handling, faster targeting by way of sophisticated analysis such as network analysis, and more efficient investigations. This will increase the productivity of this unit, furthering their ability to target and monitor organized crime in the City, and reducing crime. The addition of this analyst should also come with adequate equipment to allow for high-level computing and production of printed network 'webs' and maps.

It must also be strongly urged that better metrics of this unit's time and tasks be developed and regularly reported on. As one of the biggest units within the organization (second in constables only to the Street Crime Unit), it is not feasible to maintain such high staffing without validation and justification.

> *RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.*
>
> *RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.*
>
> *RECOMMENDATION: A crime analyst should be assigned (or shared) to this unit to assist with strategic analysis, trend analysis, case investigation, and target identification.*
>
> *Civilianization: The Violent Offender Risk Analysis Coordinator position should be civilianized*

STREET CRIMES & GRASP

Mandate

These two units have recently become essentially merged, although they still appear separately on the Org Chart for funding reasons. Their mandate is focused on street gang activity, and incorporates activities formerly under the Gang Response and Suppression Plan (GRASP). The plan is centered on the premise that keeping close tabs on known street gang members that are on court ordered release will curb recidivist behaviour in those individuals. The plan involves members of the SCU conducting condition checks (usually curfew) on an ongoing daily bases. This is primarily a proactive, intelligence-led unit, with 'targets' or files generated from reports, complaints or analysis of hot spots to direct their efforts. The movement of this unit to the Organized Crime Unit will assist in defining and specifying the mandate in order to become more effective. However, there is no written or formal mandate set out for this unit outside of the MOU with the GRASP portion.

Relationship to Other Units

This unit is anticipated to work closely with the OCU, following the organizational move to this division. It is also anticipated, however, that they will continue to work closely with the Division Community Support units as they have done in the past. These investigations are almost exclusively drug related and center around CDSA search warrants. This unit will also continue to work closely with the Tactical Support Unit for search warrant support. Assistance from surveillance and technical surveillance units would be desirable; however, it has been reported that this is often unavailable to the SCU due to other prioritized files in other units (e.g., Homicide).

Staffing and Shifting

Although the SCU and GRASP are shown separately on the organization chart, for the purposes of this review, they will be treated as one unit as they are informally merged. Therefore, the staffing in this unit totals 44 constables, eight detective sergeants, four sergeants and three civilian support positions (including one crime analyst). This unit reports to a staff sergeant. The span of control, assuming the detective sergeants are in a supervisory position, is approximately 1:6 for those detective sergeants, and 1:2 for the sergeants and the staff sergeant. As with the OCU, this supervisory structure may be more the responsibility of the staff sergeant and (admin) sergeant, and not the detective sergeants. Therefore, the span of control is around 1:4 and 1:12 respectively. If the former is more accurate, then the span of control is likely on the lighter end; however, if the latter is the more appropriate structure, the span of control is becoming more cumbersome.

Members of this unit work in four teams, on either A or B side. Each team would consist of a sergeant, two detective sergeants, and 12 constables. This unit is scheduled for seven day per week coverage, with shifts covering 0700 to 0230. This shift structure provides good coverage throughout the week.

The position of crime analyst is shown on the org chart; however, anecdotal reports indicate that some of these positions have not been filled as of yet. For this type of intelligence-led unit, it is imperative that the movement, deployment, and targeting be guided by analysis provided by a highly trained analyst. As this unit will be working closely with the OCU, this resource should be shared between the units and the position should be filled as soon as practical (if it has not already).

Overall, the size of this unit does not appear justifiable under current staffing and budget constraints. With a move to the Organized Crime Section, the two units should be able to better streamline their mandates and collaborate on medium and high-priority targets. With the recommended increases to Patrol and modifications to the Community Support Unit and Foot Patrol, it is likely that this unit will be in a better position to both disperse and take in intelligence to better guide their efforts. With noticeable understaffing in other areas, again, the size of this unit is not defensible at this time.

Miscellaneous Staffing Issues

It has been noted that at times members are sent to fulfil short-term projects or duties, such as background investigations for potential recruits, leaving the unit understaffed. This practice should be stopped immediately, as there are more cost-effective and less impactful options for fulfilling this duty than taking active members out of their current posts. This will be discussed in greater detail in later sections of the report.

Overtime Policies and Usage

According to the unit, there is no standby pay, and overtime is very rare. Callouts generally do not happen, save for a supervisor on occasion. However, when examining the overtime data for this unit, there does appear to be a substantial amount of overtime used for continuing investigations and court appearances. Again, as this unit is largely proactive, the amount of overtime used is more controllable. While the number of hours taken up for continuing investigations tends to point to the necessity of additional members, the new placement in the organization, the establishment of close working ties with the OCU, and the installation of a skilled crime analyst will all enable this unit to become far more productive and efficient. The amount of overtime required, therefore, may not be as substantial as in recent years; however, this will be up to the sergeant to control. This should be tracked closely over the coming year to see whether adjustments need to be made.

STREET CRIME	Total Worked Hours			Total Cost Amount		
Reason for OT	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Continuing Investigation	3,215	3,904	2,971	$ 204,162.59	$ 261,860.17	$ 204,250.61
Court attendance	1,882	1,815	1,434	$ 109,005.41	$ 109,207.77	$ 89,496.96
Other	70	1,743	606	$ 5,070.73	$ 116,647.63	$ 40,738.62
Project	767	665	608	$ 34,196.78	$ 27,709.27	$ 26,693.41
Court Attendance Traffic	1,154		6	$ 70,297.56		$ 406.84
Callout for Min Strength	36	84	208	$ 2,125.42	$ 4,960.21	$ 13,433.12
Callout for Other Reason	20	165	122	$ 1,371.90	$ 11,853.02	$ 9,094.67
Heldover per Supervisor	141	94	63	$ 7,761.62	$ 7,226.05	$ 4,428.98
Incident in progress(Civilian)	16	61	46	$ 914.61	$ 3,973.55	$ 3,057.50
Callout for Specialty Unit	9			$ 599.57		
Grand Total	9,319	8,529	6,061	$ 435,506.19	$ 543,437.67	$ 391,600.71

Workflow

As is the case with many proactive and/or intelligence-led units, workflow is more difficult to quantify. This unit, therefore, needs to begin to track their own time and tasks, along with the cases they are leading and/or assisting on. According to the unit, their effectiveness is measured by number of arrests, and amount of drugs and money seized and intelligence generated. This is in direct contradiction to the performance measures of the OCU, and while not inappropriate, it may be likely that measures aimed at tracking their collaboration and cooperation will be essential going forward in the further development of their complementary mandates.

Crime Prevention

Again, as a proactive unit, the crime prevention activities are embedded within their mandate. While this is difficult to measure, the establishment of new tracking metrics and unique performance measures will help this unit not only establish its functionality, but also allow it to track its effectiveness over time. The preventative benefits of targeting high-activity individuals should not be underscored (as identified in the GRASP mandate). These chronic or prolific offenders should be tracked in terms of how much "crime-free time" they log while under the unit's surveillance, to measure the relative impact of this unit's activities.

Recommendations

The size of this unit (assuming GRASP and Street Crimes as one) is not justifiable given the current mandate and recommendations towards better efficiency in numerous areas. Therefore, barring any outstanding evidence to the contrary, this unit would be more appropriately staffed with two sergeants, four detective sergeants, and 24 constables. This would result in one detective sergeant and six constables per shift, which should allow for adequate ability to conduct curfew checks on known offenders and gather proactive intelligence in conjunction

with the OCU and the crime analyst. This unit should also develop a closer relationship with the CSU and General Patrol, in order to share intelligence and develop better monitoring and enforcement activities.

This unit should also develop detailed time and task measures to better quantify their workload going forward. If the workload is onerous with these reduction recommendations , that could be demonstrated by using these new measures. Again, as this is a proactive unit, using traditional crime occurrence measures does not give any indication of workload.

> *RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: A crime analyst should be assigned (or shared) to this unit to assist with strategic analysis, trend analysis, case investigation, and target identification.*

MARIJUANA GROW OPERATIONS UNIT (GREEN TEAM)

Mandate

This unit's mandate specifically refers to the investigation and dismantling of marijuana grow operations in the City of Winnipeg. This includes investigation and evidence gathering in order to secure charges; and disassembling growing operations in structures according to health and safety guidelines, and in collaboration with other agencies. This unit may also initiate civil and criminal asset forfeiture seizures, and develops and utilizes informants on a regular basis. Public education activities also form part of this unit's mandate, and public information videos, brochures and weblinks are provided for those who suspect a property of operating a grow operation, or anyone else who happens to be involved or come across such activity.

This unit, during dismantling, may also recommend and/or arrange for more remediation or the teardown of the house if deemed necessary.

Relationship to Other Units

For the most part the Marijuana Grow Operation Unit conducts intelligence lead investigations. The unit prioritizes and investigates independently from other units; however, they often rely on assistance from the Tactical Support Unit for high risk building entries and arrests, and General Patrol Members for providing scene security

This unit does assist other units such as general patrol, Community Support, and/or the Street Crime Unit when they investigate or come upon grow operations. Assistance is provided in various forms such as advice for obtaining warrants and gathering information or by taking control of the investigation. All grow operation dismantling, however, is conducted by the unit itself.

Staffing and Shifting

Staffed with a detective sergeant and six constables, who are supervised by a sergeant. All on T2 schedule (rotating days and evenings)

Lending staff to Human Resources for background investigations also happens from time to time, reducing this unit's actual staffing numbers.

Overtime Policies and Usage

This unit reported only minimal overtime (< 12 hours) in the past three years.

Workflow

This unit notes it had 200 cases referred to it in 2012, primarily from General Patrol, other investigative units, or self-initiated. Crimestoppers and other tip lines often provided leads on cases. 180 of the 200 cases were cleared in 2012, while approximately 120 cases were dropped after being initially investigated. Often these were dropped because it was discovered the Grow Operation was legal, or there was not enough information or evidence to proceed with an Arrest or Search Warrant.

Crime Prevention

The crime prevention opportunities from this unit come by way of public education presentations, and industry presentations and collaborations. Due to personnel pressures, this unit notes that while presentations to Real Estate, Insurance and Hydro industries would be desirable for crime prevention impacts, there is not often enough time during the course of regular duties.

Additional Information

Some challenges include language barriers with Asian-based grow operations during investigations and dismantling activities. The primary difficulty, however, is tracking down the owners of the homes where grow operations are found, as they tend to live in other provinces or insulate themselves from the operation in other ways (despite still controlling them).

Recommendations

No need for day and evening shifts – recommended switching to straight dayshift. As dismantling is the primary mandate, this requires coordination with power and gas providers, fire, etc., it is not anticipated that these agencies will be available evenings. It is possible to seize the plants, lock up the house and dismantle the grow in the morning.

- Move to A/B side, straight dayshift, two per side (reduction of two constables)
    - 200 referrals per year = 33 per constable, or about one per seven working days.

RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.

RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.

RECOMMENDATION: A crime analyst should be assigned (or shared) to this unit to assist with strategic analysis, trend analysis, case investigation, and target identification.

POSITIONS WITHIN THE UNIT

Community Corrections Liaison Officer

This position is a secondment of the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC). The job summary includes:

- Performing liaison activity between the CSC, WPS and other government, community and external agencies.

- Collecting, collating, analyzing and distributing CSC information to police, CSC and other agencies pertaining to parolees, recent releases, parole suspension, and half-way house placement.

- Providing information to Criminal Investigation Bureau and General Patrol members pertaining to parole, warrant and suspension status.

- Assisting officers in obtaining and/or providing offence details of revocation.

- Responsibility for the identification of high-risk offenders as is applicable and shall assist agencies in the apprehension of offenders who are unlawfully at large.

The job is performed under the supervision of the staff sergeant, Organized Crime. While it entails access to sensitive information and dealing with several other agencies and police forces, there are no supervisory responsibilities.

> *Recommendation: Civilianize this position*

Violent Offender Risk Analyst

The job is performed under the supervision of the staff sergeant, Organized Crime. No job description was supplied for this position; however, it does not appear to have an operational role, and could possibly be filled by a trained analyst.

> *Recommendation: Civilianize this position*

INTEGRATED UNITS

MB Integrated Warrant Apprehension

This integrated unit was developed following the observations that there were estimated to be 30,000 outstanding and/or un-served warrants in Manitoba. This unit is a collaboration between the WPS and the RCMP, with both contributing one senior investigator (detective sergeant in WPS, corporal in RCMP), and two constables. This is a dedicated warrant squad that works primarily days and evenings (the Sierra schedule).

Warrants are prioritized for handling according to the seriousness of the offence. Warrants for violent crimes are given precedent, followed by serious property crime offences, serious drug offences, and serious driving offences. This unit works closely with provincial parole and probation services in order to locate subjects and serve the warrants.

This unit is jointly overseen by the province and the City, and operates primarily without assistance from support squads such as TST, unless the warrant is deemed high risk or forced entry.

Integrated Proceeds of Crime

This unit was formed to enable the seizures of financial assets resulting from the committing of crimes. This integrated unit is funded by the RCMP, with WPS staffing costs (excluding benefits) being reimbursed to the WPS for the contributed staff time. The WPS assigns two constables to this unit, who focus on asset seizures via criminal and civil action. This unit, due to their specialized knowledge, also provide support to other units within the WPS that may have cases that could proceed with asset seizure.

MB Integrated Organized Crime Task Force

This integrated unit was formed in 2004, primarily in response to the growing issue of drugs and gangs. This unit is a joint operation between the WPS, RCMP and Brandon forces, operating through an inter-governmental MOU. The WPS contributes a staff sergeant, two detective sergeants, and six constables to this unit. This unit has a highly complex oversight structure, coming by way of a Joint Management Team consisting of the City Superintendent, an RCMP Superintendent, and a operators crown prosecutor. There is also a steering committee in place, bringing the City, RCMP, and Provincial Deputy AG together. These groups approve operational plans and the budget for the unit. Assistance with surveillance and other tasks is brought in from other WPS units.

> RECOMMENDATION: *The duties and work of the Integrated Units should be reported on and assessed for functionality, effectiveness, impact of WPS contribution, and whether the participation is an effective use of WPS resources.*

Division 41 – Specialized Investigations

This division is mandated to conduct investigations focusing on specialized and/or vulnerable populations. Unlike Division 40, a large amount of the unit workload within this division comes from calls for service or other public requests for assistance. A common link between these units is the criminal event solving with the problem solving. Much of the efforts are directed not only at managing workload arising from victimization events, but also at mitigating vulnerable populations' risk factors and situations. This division also focuses on those who may be less able to defend themselves, such as children and domestic violence victims.

The structure of this division appears somewhat fragmented; however, as the populations served are all unique and have distinct needs, this may be a necessary feature of the organizational structure of these units. Each unit encompasses a specialized tactic for response, or a specialized population that requires a different skill set from the investigators. What should be urged, however, is the collaboration and communication between units. Although it may be reasonable to maintain the separated structure, many of the victims of one unit may become victims in another (such as Internet Child Exploitation and Child Abuse), and as such, information must flow laterally as well as vertically between investigators and supervisors. When there is a chance to collaborate, this division should pool resources and investigators to best address the problem at hand. If it is found that this information flow is not occurring, or is inefficient, it may be preferable to collapse some of the units into fewer supervisory lines in order to ensure that similar cases are linked and victims or crimes do not fall through the cracks.

The staffing is as follows in this division:

Table 68: Division 41 Authorized Strength

Division 41	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian	Total Sworn
Sex Crimes				4	8		12
Child Abuse			3	5	8		16
Vice				1	6		7
Internet Child Exploitation				1	3		4
Domestic Violence				1			1
Missing Persons				1	5	4	6
Vulnerable Persons				1	1		2
Youth Crime & Child Abuse Intake					1		1
Int. High Risk Sex Offender				1	2		3
ViCLAS - @ RCMP					1		1
Division Management	1	1	1			2	3
Total	1	1	4	15	35	6	62

The overtime usage for the entire division is as follows:

Special Investigation Division (41)	2010	2011	2012
Total Worked Hours	7,355	6,486	6,299
Total Charged	$468,772.80	$421,394.25	$412,023.61
% of Budget	0.25%	0.21%	0.19%

This Division has kept track of the community contacts and frequency of communication with various partners:

Table 70: Division 41 External Agency Contacts

EXTERNAL AGENCY	Frequency of Contact	Committee/WG In Place?	Formal Agreement in Place?
City of Wpg Community Services	daily	No	
Domestic Violence Support Service	Daily	Yes	Working on it
Criminal Organization High Risk Offender Unit Prov of MB Probation	Daily	Yes	No
Child Protection Branch	daily	Yes	
ANCR	Daily	Yes	
Geriatric Mental Health	5x/week	No	
Geriatric Program Assessment Team	5x/week	No	
RCMP	2x/week	Yes	
Community Mental Health	3x/week	No	
Employment and Income Assistance	1-2x/week	No	
Osborne House	1x/week	Yes	No
DV Crown Prov of MB Dept of Justice	1x/week	Yes	No
Mobile Crisis	1x/week		
Mama Wi	1x/year	No	No
Men's Resource Centre	1x/year	Yes	No
Canada Revenue Agency - Women's Working Group	1x/year	No	No
Norway House Women's Shelter	1x/year	Yes	No
Tamarack Rehab Centre	1x/year	No	No
Tanvir Peace Academy	1x/year	No	No
CAHRD-Canadian Aboriginal Human Resource Development Neeginan	1x/year	Yes	Yes
Combined High Risk Offender Unit	Weekly	Yes	
Child Abuse Committee	Weekly	Yes	Yes
CFS Agencies (27)	Weekly		
Salvation Army	Weekly	Yes	Yes
Prov DV&Technolgy Committee	1/month	Yes	No
Canadian Centre for Child Protection	10x/yr	Yes	
Red Cross - Respect Ed	1-2/month	Yes	No
IKWE	1x/ month	No	No
Manitoba Adolescent Treatment Centre	1x/2months	No	No
Status of Women	1x/3months	Yes	No
Resolve Prov Advisory U of M	1x/3months	Yes	No
Resolve Manitoba	1x/3months	Yes	No
WISH-Women in 2nd Stage Housing	1x/3months	Yes	No

EXTERNAL AGENCY	Frequency of Contact	Committee/WG In Place?	Formal Agreement in Place?
Prov DV Death Review Committee	1x/3months	Yes	Working on it
Child Advocacy Centre	1x/month	Yes	
Health Sciences Center (social work)	1x/month	No	
Grace Hospital	1x/month	No	
MB Association of Women's Shelters	1x/month	Yes	No
The Laurel Centrel	1x/month	Yes	No
Family Violence Protection Branch Prov of MB	1x/month	Yes	No
Fort Garry Women's Resource	1x/month	No	No
Portage Family Abuse Prevention Shelter	1x/month	No	No
Women's Place	1x/month	No	No
Prov DV Strategy Review Committee	1x/month	Yes	No
SEY-Sexually Exploited Youth	1x/month	Yes	
St. Boniface	1x/month		
Seven Oaks	1x/month		
Public Health Inspectors (Prov of Mb)	2-3x/month		
City of Wpg By-Law Officers	2-3x/week		
Provincial Crown's Office	2x/month		
Wahbung Abinoonjiiag 2nd Stage Aboriginal Housing	2x/month	No	No
Jewish CFS	2x/year	No	No
Chief Veterinarian Prov of MB	2x/year	Yes	No
Native Women's Transition Centre	2x/year	No	No
Nova House Selkirk Women's Shelter	2x/year	No	No
Interlake Regional Health Authority	2x/year	No	No
Turnabout Program Prov of MB	2x/year	No	No
Prov DV Advisory Committee	2x/year	Yes	No
Mount Carmel: Network of Organizations for War Affected Newcomers	2x/year	Yes	No
Prov DV Workplace Initiative WISE	2x/year	Yes	No
Rainbow Society	2x/year	No	No
Provincial Advisory Committee on Child Abuse	2x/year	Yes	Unknown
Provincial Advisory Committee on Child Abuse	2x/year	Yes	
Wpg Humane Society of Safe Pet	3x/year	Yes	No
University of Wpg Women & Gender Studies	4x/year	No	No
North End Women's Resource Centre	4x/year	No	No
Rainbow Resource Centre	4x/year	No	No
RCMP National Missing Children Services	4x/year	Yes	
Street Reach	4x/year	Yes	
TERF	4x/year	Yes	Yes
Family Law Crowns Office	5x/year		
Age & Opportunity	6x/month	No	
Family Conciliation Prov of MB	6x/year	No	No
Community Notification Advisory Committee	As req'd	Yes	Yes
(b) Health Sciences Centre	Bi-monthly	Protocol	Unknown
WRHA	Bi-monthly	Yes	Yes
Provincial Crown's Office	Bi-weekly	Yes	Ongoing
Winnipeg Safety Network	Bi-Weekly	Yes	
Family Services and Consumer Affairs	Every 4 wks	Yes	No
Geriatric Inquest Committee	Every 8 wks	Yes	No

EXTERNAL AGENCY	Frequency of Contact	Committee/WG In Place?	Formal Agreement in Place?
60.b CNAC	Monthly		
Combined High Risk Offender Unit	Monthly	Yes	
Provincial Advisory Committee On Child Abuse	Monthly	Yes (Education)	
Child Inquest Review Committee (Medical Examiner)	Monthly	Yes	Yes
Children's Advocate	Monthly	No	No
WCAC	Monthly	Yes	
Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners	Monthly	Yes	
Sage House (Part of Mount Carmel Clinic)	Monthly	Yes	Yes
MB Network for Prevention of Abuse in Older Adults (Age and Opportunity)	Monthly	Yes	Yes
Interjurisdictional Working Group	Quarterly	Yes	No
Adult Abuse Registry	Quarterly	Yes	
Corrections Services Canada	Quarterly	Yes	
Corrections Services Canada	Quarterly	Yes	
Winnipeg Humane Society	Sporadic	No	
Project Breakaway	Sporadic	Yes	Yes
Riverbank Committee	u/k	u/k	

This table indicates that the WPS is "partnered" with over 90 agencies and organizations. Some of these partnerships are mandated by law, others by policy, and still others could be considered to be discretionary. The extent to which these partnerships increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the WPS cannot be determined in the present analysis. It does appear, however, that these partnerships have not alleviated the downloading onto the WPS that has occurred over the past decade.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

A survey was not provided for this position; however, due to the extensive existence of Domestic Violence incidents, it is recommended that this position work closely with Patrol and the CSU to develop and implement problem-solving approaches to Domestic Violence.

Staffing and Shifting

There is one detective sergeant assigned to this position.

Overtime Policies and Usage

This unit specifically did not report any overtime usage – overtime related to domestic violence incidents appear to be related solely to the Patrol Units with Domestic Violence sub-units.

Workflow

Domestic Violence is one of the most prominent offences in Winnipeg:

Table 71: Domestic Violence CAD Events (2012)

CAD Events (2012)	No Charges	Charged	Total Calls	% Charged
DOMESTIC DISTURBANCE	13,132	2,589	15,721	16%
FAMILY TROUBLE	4,300	336	4,636	7%
Total	17,432	2,925	20,357	14%

However, it sits in the middle ground when compared to other Census Metropolitan Areas in Canada:

Recommendations

Civilianize the detective sergeant position.

VULNERABLE PERSONS

Mandate

To consult and liaise with vulnerable persons, police members, service providers and community members to diminish the risk of harm to the health and wellbeing of vulnerable persons and community.

Unit Mission:

- Act as a resource for members in dealing with occurrences involving vulnerable persons, as identified by the Service
- Coordinate service options and resources available for vulnerable person related events as identified by Police service members
- Assist vulnerable persons and service providers to access and understand the criminal justice system, including persons designated as vulnerable persons under the Vulnerable Persons Living with Mental Disabilities Act[218].

Relationship to Other Units

The foremost relationship exists with the Community Support Units, who often will request a referral and/or field visit. The productivity and operations of the unit has been hampered by the lack of a Partnership Agreement or Memo of Understanding with the City of Winnipeg's Community Services Department. This lack of working agreement has resulted in ongoing personnel issues and lack of clear authority / responsibility for the involved members.

Staffing and Shifting

This unit operates with one detective sergeant and one constable on Echo shift, along with a social worker, who is a long-term temporary assignment.

Overtime Policies and Usage

This unit uses minimal overtime hours.

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[218] as defined by WPS Procedure Manuals and G/O

Vulnerable Persons Unit	Sum of WorkedHours			Sum of Amount		
REASON FOR OT	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Other	38	24	21	$ 2,078.37	$ 1,201.81	$ 842.95
Continuing Investigation	4	10		$ 247.85	$ 705.38	
Incident in progress(Civilian)	6		4	$ 341.55		$ 210.72
Callout for Other Reason	8			$ 532.95		
Project		7			$ 454.08	
Heldover per Duty Inspector			5			$ 327.52
Heldover per Supervisor			5			$ 386.48
Grand Total	56	41	34	$ 3,200.72	$ 2,361.27	$ 1,767.67

Workflow

Assignments come into this unit internally via the NICHE system, often from general Patrol when dealing with a vulnerable person. Other tasking originates from more informal streams such as e-mail or 3-1-1 referrals, PSU members, or Service Centre members. The majority of contacts are in response to a singular generated event in form of field visit or VPC referral to outside agency. Some files are extended over many years, such as those for ongoing contact for high needs and chronic users of Police services.

Additional Information

Due to the unique nature of work performed by the Vulnerable Persons Unit and broad definition of vulnerable persons by the WPS relative to that of the Province of Manitoba- community living programs, the WPS VPC serves as a catch all to officers for public contacts which involve difficult consumers when non-criminal in nature.   VPU members struggle to educate the membership in general of the limitations of a non-dispatchable unit consisting of a police member and civilian partner. Supplemental training and the associated time to perform such training through the VPC would be great value to an improved unit response.

With the current definition of vulnerable persons utilized by the WPS, the majority of tasks are the direct result of front line contacts with persons suffering a mental illness. An expanded partnership of the VPC with a mental health clinician of the Winnipeg Regional Health Authority would assist the VPU and Service overall in response to vulnerable persons who suffer mental illness. Currently, the VPC and outreach partnership are dependent on the inputs of this outside agency for intervention on behalf of mental health consumers, non-criminal in nature.

Recommendations

Engage the City of Winnipeg's social services for the development of a formal MOU for Project Breakaway. Ensure the wording of the agreement does not signify a downloading of non-criminal responsibility for vulnerable persons to the WPS.

Engage the Winnipeg Regional Health Authority in discussions about the mentally ill in Winnipeg and contacts with police. The objective should be to create ongoing strategies for both agencies, in a collaborative fashion.

YOUTH CRIME & CHILD ABUSE INTAKE

Mandate

From the WPS job description:

> The Child Abuse Intake/Youth Crime Coordinator (CAIYCC) is responsible for reviewing and logging all submitted Child Abuse referrals by Child & Family Service and Other Police Agencies and determines whether the referrals require follow up investigation. The CAIYCC is also responsible for monitoring and recording all WPS contact with young offenders under the Youth Criminal Justice Act. All Niche reports involving Youth Warn, Caution, Arrest or Turnabout referrals are forwarded to CAIYCC to be reviewed, and entered in database for statistical purposes. In addition, the CAIYCC monitors changes to youth-related legislation and ensures the WPS is in compliance with existing and/or changed legislation and acts as a resource on issues related to the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

Relationship to Other Units

Due to the mandate above, this unit has close ties to the Child Abuse Unit and investigators involved with young offenders. In addition, this position works with the Sex Crimes Unit on a regular basis due to the overlap in many reports.

Staffing and Shifting

This position reports to the administrative sergeant, who is also responsible for the Domestic Violence constable, and the Integrated High Risk Offender Unit.

Recommendations

As per the civilianization analysis, it is recommended that this position be civilianized and all duties be maintained under a highly trained civilian with education and experience in youth crime, child abuse and/or policing processes.

SEX CRIMES

Mandate

Sex Crimes Unit members may investigate sexual assaults perpetrated on victims who are 14 years of age or older[219], where the relationship between the victim and the suspect are non-domestic and non-familial in nature, and where the circumstances of the offence(s) fall within the following parameters:

- Penile penetration of the vagina or the anus have been attempted or achieved
- Offences that are predatory, sadistic or serial in nature
- Where a weapon was used in the commission of the offence
- Where the sexual assault occurred during a break-in to a residence
- Other sexual assault investigations that require the unit's expertise, as determined by the Sex Crimes sergeant or their designate.

Relationship to Other Units

As part of the Operations Manual, the Sex Crimes Unit is also mandated with "…working closely with divisional investigators by providing feedback and assistance in investigations not assigned to the Sex Crimes Unit." In addition to this working relationship with the divisional detectives, this unit utilizes many of the investigative support functions that other major crime units do, including:

- Forensic Identification units
- Evidence control, for sending exhibits for DNA testing
- Police Artist for suspect composite drawings
- General Patrol, as they are quite often first contact with investigation
- Technological Crimes, for surveillance photos/video, and cell phone data extraction

Staffing and Shifting

This unit works in two teams (Green/Tan) with eight detectives and four detective sergeants reporting to two sergeants. Lending personnel does happen on occasion. Two investigators were sent to the Major Crime Unit for a wiretap project, while two others were sent to work on a homicide project. In addition, one investigator was loaned to Human Resources for background investigations on new recruits.

Overtime Policies and Usage

This unit's overtime has primarily been for callouts in 2012, although continuing investigations were the mainstay in 2010. This is likely due to the number of sexual assaults and sex crimes decreasing in Winnipeg, according to the RMS data. However, the callout overtime should be inspected closely as to the necessity of

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[219] The Child Abuse Unit investigates sexual offences against victims 14 years or age or younger

conducting those callouts, and the nature of the callout. With fewer offences occurring, the callouts for events (if that is the "other reason") should not be increasing.   This may also be an accounting detail, however, as the callouts for specialty unit numbers significantly decreased.

Sex Crimes Unit	Sum of WorkedHours			Sum of Amount		
REASON FOR OT	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Continuing Investigation	1,104	681	660	$ 76,514.91	$ 47,957.09	$ 47,627.58
Callout for Other Reason	486	709	1,239	$ 35,095.15	$ 53,553.82	$ 89,090.42
Standby	414	441	554	$ 19,242.99	$ 21,285.77	$ 27,988.42
Court attendance	353	243	222	$ 21,502.79	$ 14,892.61	$ 14,094.09
Other	281	257	215	$ 13,411.96	$ 13,633.07	$ 9,958.98
Callout for Specialty Unit	422	221	105	$ 32,170.16	$ 16,391.28	$ 7,701.93
Project		432			$ 29,717.34	
Incident in progress(Civilian)	238	90	16	$ 16,507.74	$ 5,758.67	$ 1,059.94
Callout for Min Strength	10		6	$ 666.19		$ 288.99
Heldover per Duty Inspector	3			$ 193.65		
Grand Total	3,310	3,073	3,016	$ 215,305.54	$ 203,189.65	$ 197,810.35

Workflow

The workflow can be examined using the unit's internal data, and the related data in the RMS. It should be noted, however, that RMS data may include offences outside of the unit's mandate. As there are many sexual assaults that fall outside of the unit mandate, care needs to be taken when examining these statistics. However, the use of the RMS statistics can assist in establishing trends for sexually related offences.

According to the unit, they were referred 372 cases in 2010, which was an increase from the 350 referred in 2010. All cases had at least some initial follow-up, although it was noted that if the victim decided not to proceed, the case would be suspended or closed.

Type of Offence (MSO in RMS)	prior to 2008	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	TOTAL	Change 2008-2012
Sexual Assault	227	594	635	622	580	569	3,227	-4%
Sexual Assault With A Weapon	4	16	9	9	13	7	58	
Aggravated Sexual Assault		6	3	3	1	1	14	
Other Sexual Crimes	14	128	140	83	72	69	506	-46%

As noted in the NICHE system, members in the Sex Crimes Unit completed the following tasks:

Sum of Occurrences	Sum of Is Dispatch	Sum of Tasks	Sum of Reports
1620	402	1023	1231

Again, from Niche, the tasks associated with this unit appeared to be focused on sexual assaults, strong-arm robberies, and break & enters:

Type of Event (top 10 events in 2012)	Occurrences	Dispatched	Tasks	Reports
Sexual Assault	212	1	359	431
Robbery - Strongarm	68	11	55	80
Break & Enter - Commercial	50	6	52	68
Break & Enter - Residential	48	6	49	64
Assault With A Weapon	45	8	43	86
Theft Under - Other	42	4	35	25
Assistance	50	40	28	14
Traffic - HTA: Driving While Suspended	51	26	19	19
Warrant	37	15	17	14
Traffic - PON Issued	460	11	8	7
Grand Total	1063	128	665	808

Crime Prevention

This unit's primary project related to crime prevention is "Project ID", which involves the voluntary collective of DNA samples of at risk street prostitutes. It is assumed that this information is collected and analyzed in collaboration with the Manitoba Missing Women's Integrated Task Force.

Recommendations

RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.

RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.

RECOMMENDATION: A crime analyst should be assigned (or shared) to this unit to assist with strategic analysis, trend analysis, case investigation, and target identification.

COUNTER-EXPLOITATION UNIT (VICE)

Mandate

The primary focus of this unit is on street prostitution, human trafficking, bawdy houses (and massage parlours), and a range of other issue such as gaming, ticket scalping, and selling sex over the Internet. Child prostitution also falls under this unit's mandate.

Relationship to Other Units

Due to the mandate of the Counter Exploitation Unit, they are involved with all the uniformed operations and various specialty units such as TSU, Surveillance Unit, Street Crimes, Marijuana Grow Operations Unit, Homicide, Organized Crime Unit and Task force for Missing and Murdered Women.

Staffing and Shifting

Staffing consists of one detective sergeant and six constables, all of whom are on dayshift. This unit notes that officers have often been borrowed to assist with background investigations through HR.

Overtime Policies and Usage

The amount of overtime charged by this unit has been minimal.

Table 75: Vice Unit Overtime

Vice Unit	Sum of WorkedHours			Sum of Amount		
REASON FOR OT	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Continuing Investigation	342	283	393	$ 21,563.18	$ 20,033.52	$ 28,077.40
Other	75	91	201	$ 4,499.14	$ 5,252.19	$ 11,057.84
Callout for Other Reason	87	183	138	$ 5,591.85	$ 12,173.73	$ 9,529.95
Court attendance	88	90	34	$ 5,221.15	$ 5,678.47	$ 2,226.74
Court Attendance Traffic			4			$ 257.92
Project	47	29		$ 2,706.82	$ 2,159.53	
Incident in progress(Civilian)	2			$ 120.82		
Callout for Specialty Unit		1			$ 60.76	
Grand Total	640	677	770	$ 39,702.96	$ 45,358.20	$ 51,149.85

Workflow

Workload for this unit is largely complaint driven (i.e., calls from the public). There is also an option for the public to make a report over the Internet, via the Winnipeg Police website (http://www.winnipeg.ca/police/ViceUnit/prostitution.stm). The unit reports that approximately 90 cases were referred in 2012, although tracking of cases prior to that was not done, so it is unknown whether this is an increase or decrease.

Crime Prevention

As events are largely complaint-driven, there would appear little focus on crime prevention activities outside of enforcement. Although this unit is small, focusing on assisted exits, vulnerable populations, victimization and safety issues would likely see more positive results than a more reaction-focused approach. The unit reports that they will be providing education to the hotel industry relating to human trafficking.

Recommendations

While some offences under this mandate can be followed up during the day (such as online activities), many may require more presence into the evening hours, such as street prostitution, trafficking, massage parlours, and gaming houses. As this unit is small, spreading over two shifts is not efficient. However, moving to straight afternoon shifts (1500-0100) would allow for daytime coverage for some initiatives, while maintaining a strong evening coverage. This will also allow for greater presence during the evening hours, when victimization may be more likely to occur on vulnerable populations.

> *RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: A crime analyst should be assigned (or shared) to this unit to assist with strategic analysis, trend analysis, case investigation, and target identification.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: Shifting for this unit should be modified to align more appropriately with either internal or external service demands.*

CHILD ABUSE

Mandate

This unit is responsible for investigations pertaining to the physical and sexual abuse of children within the following parameters:

- Any sexual assault involving a victim under 14 years of age.
- Any recent or emergent familial sexual assaults where the victim is under 18 years of age.
- Child deaths (SIDS)
- Any child or youth 16 years of age and under, or a ward of CFS, who has suffered a serious injury requiring hospital treatment.
- Any child or youth under 16 years of age and under, or a ward of CFS, who commits suicide.
- Physical or sexual assaults committed against victims deemed to be vulnerable persons.

These parameters are noted in the WPS Policy Manual. In addition to offences that fall into the categories above, this unit also investigates all suicides under the age of 18, child abandonment/neglect issues, Internet Luring, all child interviews for any/all types of crimes at the request of the investigating division, all historical familial physical or sexual assaults, and child abductions or attempts.

Relationship to Other Units

CAU works with many units on a regular basis, as children are often involved in numerous types of investigations beyond their own victimization. Any offence that occurs may have a child involved to some extent, and thus, CAU will often be asked to assist. For their own investigations, CAU utilizes general patrol, divisional detectives, and surveillance functions within the Service. The primary collaborator with CAU is ICE, as the victims often overlap between the mandates of the two units. CAU works with all units on an as needed basis as children tend to be involved in countless types of investigations. The Vice Unit also has a significant cross over as well due to the victimization of youths in the sex trade.

Staffing and Shifting

This unit shares three sergeants with the Sex Crimes Unit, and in addition carries an authorized strength of five detective sergeants and seven detective constables, as well as one intake constable.

Recruitment and Tenure

As with many other units, investigators can stay in the Child Abuse Unit for a maximum of three years. This is seen as highly problematic due to the amount of training it takes to become effective in this position. "Every agency we deal with, Child Advocate, Medicals Examiners, CFS etc. have complained that top investigators who are working well in the system are transferred out too soon." Lending also occurs within this unit, and it was

noted that one CAU constable was seconded for over six months to a project, and ongoing loans of members for background checks occurs with some regularity.

Overtime Policies and Usage

This unit uses a relatively low amount of overtime, most of which appears to be for callouts and court attendance.

Table 76: Child Abuse Unit Overtime

Child Abuse Unit	Sum of WorkedHours			Sum of Amount		
REASON FOR OT	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Callout for Other Reason	252	298	370	$ 16,661.41	$ 22,739.31	$ 25,114.68
Court attendance	188	216	334	$ 11,327.47	$ 13,505.10	$ 22,591.73
Continuing Investigation	867	361	253	$ 60,385.53	$ 25,486.42	$ 18,054.40
Other	152	108	134	$ 7,043.14	$ 5,296.06	$ 6,540.70
Incident in progress(Civilian)	91	76	73	$ 5,670.34	$ 5,437.27	$ 5,273.40
Callout for Specialty Unit	219	116	61	$ 15,820.60	$ 8,418.36	$ 4,251.20
Standby	101	54	20	$ 4,525.56	$ 2,475.52	$ 947.24
Heldover per Supervisor			2			$ 144.92
Project	10	207		$ 624.22	$ 14,545.57	
Heldover per Duty Inspector	1			$ 66.62		
Grand Total	1,879	1,435	1,245	$ 122,124.89	$ 97,903.61	$ 82,918.27

Workflow

It is estimated that approximately 400 cases were referred to CAU in 2012[220]. This has been noted as a significant increase from 2010. There are numerous non-file related duties and conversations, however, as this unit has substantial interaction and collaboration with social workers and the Ministry representatives. While these may not result in an actual case for CAU members, time is spent on advice, recommendations, and/or review.

Crime Prevention

The CAU sergeant sits on many committees that deal with crime preventions, such as the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners committee, Child Abuse Committee, and the Provincial Child Abuse committee.

Additional Information

[From the CAU survey]:

There are numerous committees and agencies that we deal with directly/answer to that make it a challenging place to work as we often alter our policies/procedures based on the needs of others. The information sharing is beneficial, but with 27 Child and Family Service agencies amongst the Child Protection Centre, the Child

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[220] The caseload in 2012 only started to be tracked in April, so the actual numbers may be higher.

Protection Branch, the All Nations Coordinated Response Network amongst others, ensuring we keep good communication with all groups can be an extensive process. The opening of the Winnipeg Children's Advocacy Centre has us working off site a fair bit for victim interviews. This is certainly good for the victim, but can make police work challenging and slightly more time consuming.

Further, recently with the Vulnerable Persons Act being passed, the CAU has learned we will be responsible for all of these investigations, as the Province has created a unit similar to CFS to specifically handle these cases. I see this steadily increasing our caseload as the public becomes aware of the charges available under the VPA.

Recommendations

> *RECOMMENDATION: A civilian coordinator is needed to establish and maintain relationships between the unit and provincial ministries dedicated to child abuse issues. This individual would work closely with the sergeant and could sit on the numerous committees and attend meetings, advocating for the child victims and discussing policy and procedure as relevant to the unit. It would be beneficial if this individual were either a specially-trained civilian with specific expertise in child abuse and exploitation, or a retired member that would be knowledgeable of the policing issues in this area. This position should not be a regular member, as there is a significant need to establish continuity in the unit and these community relationships would be lost when tenure policies came into effect. This individual would also liaise with the numerous other units with the WPS that have overlap, such as ICE, domestic violence, Diversity, and School Liaison.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: A crime analyst should be assigned (or shared) to this unit to assist with strategic analysis, trend analysis, case investigation, and target identification.*

INTERNET CHILD EXPLOITATION (ICE)

Mandate

The Winnipeg Police Service ICE Unit investigates all offences in relation to the sexual exploitation of children on the Internet, including but not limited to child pornography and Internet Luring. The ICE Unit also investigates all voyeurism and sex tourism matters involving both children and adults. This unit mandate is defined in writing by the WPS.

Relationship to Other Units

The WPS ICE Unit has a very close working relation to the WPS Tech Crimes Section. Due to the technological nature of the ICE investigations, a Tech Crimes member is required on almost every investigation to extract the electronic evidence from computers, cell/ smart phones, gaming devices, Ipod/ Ipads/ tablets, etc. There are (2) Tech Crimes Section members that are permanently assigned to ICE Unit investigations that solely work on ICE matters. The WPS ICE Unit also works with the WPS Child Abuse and Sex Crimes Unit as needed. At least a handful of files every year are worked jointly between these units.

Investigators in this unit are often requested to assist in other units' files, due to their specialized knowledge and experience with Internet investigations.

Staffing and Shifting

This unit has one detective sergeant and three detective constables on dayshift.

Overtime Policies and Usage

This unit used very little overtime over the past three years.

Table 77: ICE Unit Overtime

ICE Unit	Sum of WorkedHours			Sum of Amount		
REASON FOR OT	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Other	35	61	44	$ 1,667.73	$ 3,004.81	$ 2,067.20
Callout for Other Reason	29	28	58	$ 1,731.33	$ 1,731.40	$ 4,051.82
Continuing Investigation	35	15	55	$ 2,141.98	$ 898.53	$ 3,920.77
Incident in progress(Civilian)	52	1	29	$ 3,169.39	$ 57.87	$ 2,165.65
Court attendance	3	20	11	$ 141.14	$ 1,175.30	$ 668.82
Callout for Specialty Unit	10		12	$ 656.42		$ 783.59
Heldover per Supervisor			8			$ 515.84
Heldover per Duty Inspector			4			$ 257.92
Grand Total	163	125	220	$ 9,507.99	$ 6,867.91	$ 14,431.61

Workflow

As noted by the unit, they had approximately 120 cases referred in 2012, which represents an approximate 50% increase from previous years. Each member carries about 10-20 files at any one time, which makes any proactive activities or breach/compliance checks difficult or impossible to do.

Crime Prevention

The unit notes there is little time for any crime prevention activities; however, presentations in school to children would be a beneficial activity to protect against victimization.

Additional Information

This area of policing is increasing in scope and complexity, around Canada and around the world. There is an increasing necessity for collaboration with international agencies, and cross-border investigations. Training and education are necessary to keep up with technological changes, and tactic modifications on the part of the perpetrators.

Recommendations

RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.

RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.

RECOMMENDATION: A crime analyst should be assigned (or shared) to this unit to assist with strategic analysis, trend analysis, case investigation, and target identification.

MISSING PERSONS

Mandate

The Missing Persons Unit's general mandate is to provide a timely and coordinated response to persons reported missing, understanding that emergent circumstances require a more concentrated use of police and community resources. This unit deals with both new and longer-term files. Some time is also spent on Parental custody case where criminal charges of parental abduction are a possibility. This unit has recently expanded to also focus on high-risk persons such as those with drug issues, homelessness, etc.

Relationship to Other Units

This unit works closely with numerous community based organizations, as well as integrated task forces. At times this includes networking with the Counter Exploitation Unit – sharing information on high risk missing individuals known to work the streets or be involved in the escort business with the goal of working collectively to formulate a plan to take action and try to locate them. At times, this unit shares information with the Child Abuse or Sex Crimes Unit, passing information on for follow-up or information purposes. There are times where they will seek the assistance from the Warrant Unit on missing individuals with warrants in order to try and locate them. The MPU often discusses files of vulnerable missing individuals, (whether low IQ, onset of dementia, mental health issues) with the Vulnerable Persons unit. Our collective goal centers on working collaboratively to ensure vulnerable individuals or their related family supports have the right resources in place to assist in keeping these individuals safe and, once located, help prevent them from going missing in the future.

Staffing and Shifting

This unit operates with one detective sergeant, five PC constables, and four coordinators. The HR Organizational chart is slightly different from what the unit reported in terms of staffing, so changes or errors may be occurring. Detectives may stay with the unit for three years.

Overtime Policies and Usage

This unit utilizes minimal overtime:

Missing Persons Unit	Sum of WorkedHours			Sum of Amount		
REASON FOR OT	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Continuing Investigation	540	381	324	$ 34,678.29	$ 25,396.72	$ 22,378.99
Other	157	237	157	$ 7,837.57	$ 9,006.15	$ 6,724.50
Incident in progress(Civilian)	208	72	63	$ 12,746.07	$ 4,899.10	$ 4,947.85
Callout for Other Reason	61	76	173	$ 4,204.53	$ 4,574.88	$ 12,084.61
Callout for Specialty Unit	2		36	$ 84.68		$ 2,328.99
Court attendance	9	14	4	$ 525.32	$ 873.58	$ 210.72
Grand Total	975	780	756	$ 60,076.46	$ 44,750.43	$ 48,675.66

Workflow

Workload is noted at approximately 6,600 per year, which is moderately higher than in previous years. In 2012, there were over 10,000 CAD calls recorded for "Missing Person Assist". However, little additional information can be gathered from traditional databases. Anecdotally, dealing with high-risk and chronic runaways is noted as a significant resource drain on the WPS, and strategies should be put into place to address this issue. The unit notes that the caseload has increased by approximately 1,000 cases in previous years. Each officer is holding between 10-15 files at any one time, on a continual basis. As new priorities come in, other files fall to the bottom of the pile.

Recommendations

Of most importance is the establishment of a comprehensive database for logging and tracking both the workload and service demands on this unit. Specifically, data should be collected on who is missing, from where they went missing, the time spent by the WPS looking for these individuals, the outcome of the missing case, and external agency actions related to the file. This will better position the WPS in the future to discuss the issue with governmental and non-governmental partners, and ensure arguments have solid data to back them up. This will also help demonstrate the needs of this unit, verify workload and make the case for additional resources if needed.

> **RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.**

> **RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.**

VICLAS

Mandate

This position is seconded to the RCMP "D" Division, and as such, will not be included in the analysis here.

Recommendations

No recommendations concerning this position.

INTEGRATED UNITS

MB Integrated High Risk Sex Offender

The Manitoba High Risk Sex Offender Unit is an Integrated unit consisting of officers from the WPS and the RCMP and falls under the guidelines of a Memorandum of Understanding, which outlines the roles and responsibilities of the parties with respect to the identification, monitoring and investigation of high risk offenders with a history of sexual offences within the City of Winnipeg and the Province of Manitoba, as well as to administer and enforce the National Sex Offender Registry for the Province of Manitoba. The parties also have a duty to identify, monitor and investigate high-risk offenders other than those with a history of sexual offences that fall within RCMP jurisdiction in the Province of Manitoba. Additional duties consist of surveillance with respect to enforcing conditions that sexual offenders are bound by as a result of Probation Orders, Sec 810 CC (Recognizances/Peace Bonds) of Long Term Supervision Orders (LTSOs).

This integrated unit conducted 150 sex offender information registration act investigations in 2012. Most were referred from the National Sex Offender registry, or were self-generated by the unit. The caseload has been largely unchanged since 2010.

> RECOMMENDATION: *The duties and work of the Integrated Units should be reported on and assessed for functionality, effectiveness, impact of WPS contribution, and whether the participation is an effective use of WPS resources.*

Division 42 – Operations

The units within this division provide specialty support for investigations. These include forensic examinations of physical evidence, firearms, computers and videos, as well as surveillance, wiretapping, and polygraph examinations.

The unique nature of this work is that it requires a high level of skill and expertise, and cannot be downloaded or moved around the organization. As these units also often provide support for the most high-profile cases, their success or failure may have a direct positive or negative impact on both the clearance and conviction in a particular case.

The complement of this division is below:

Table 79: Division 42 - Operations - Authorized Strength

Division 42 - Operations	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian	Total Sworn
Crime Analysis						11	0
Technical Surveillance		1	1	2	4	6	8
Polygraph				1			1
Technology Crime				1	8		9
Forensic Imaging					2		2
Secure Operations			1	1	1		3
Surveillance			2	2	12		16
CISM			1		2		3
Total	0	1	5	7	29	17	59

CRIME ANALYSIS

Mandate

There is no written mandate for the Crime Analysis Unit; however, the guidance appears to come from CALEA:

A.   Assist members in the strategic deployment of resources for crime prevention, suppression and apprehension. This includes maintaining a crime analysis database on specific crime types imported from RMS into the i2 Crime Analysis System. [CALEA 15.3.1]

B.   Works in conjunction with the Intelligence Operations Unit.

C.   The types of requests processed by the Crime Analysis Unit (CAU) are:
1)   Analysis of criminal activity which may include information on:
a)   Patterns, trends, and clusters of activity. [CALEA 15.3.1]
b)   Possible persons of interest based on modus operandi. [CALEA 15.3.1]
2)   Geographical and temporal analysis.

As the WPS has not developed their crime analysis capabilities or staffing at the time of this report, it is strongly recommended that the specific mandates be developed alongside the implementation of this resource and these positions.

Relationship to Other Units

The Crime Analysis Unit is a support unit for all other units and provides analysis products on both an ongoing and one-time basis. Weekly support is provided to the divisional detectives and the Major Crime Unit. The products produced include hotspots, trend analysis, series analysis, and suspect pools based on MO. This information is intended to assist with active investigations and allow detectives to make tactical and strategic decisions about their proactive activity.

One-time relationships generally develop with those detectives out of Division 41 and 43, and are often for specific purposes such as mapping a crime spree, creating known associates charts, cell phone analysis, and other analysis products to assist the detectives in their investigation.

Staffing and Shifting

As noted, this unit is still in the early stages of growth. There has recently been approval to add one supervisor to the unit (civilian), as well as two additional analysts.   Although the current organizational chart indicates the complement of analysts currently sits at five as well as five clerks, it is presumed that this function is still largely in the planning stages and has not fully come to fruition.

Crime Prevention

There is ample opportunity for crime prevention information to be disseminated to both investigators and the public via this unit. However, given the historic under-staffing in this area, that was not possible. In the future, when this unit is fully implemented, the prevention role could be expanded.

Recommendations

Recommendations for these positions will be considered in conjunction with the recommendations for additional analysts in other areas. These additional analysts are noted in the recommendations at the end of each business plan for specific units. For clarity, the recommended placement of analyst throughout the organization is as follows:

Assigned to (Division)	Unit(s)	Shared With	Notes
Division 11	Community Support	General Patrol, Foot Patrol	
Division 12 (West)	Community Support	General Patrol, Foot Patrol	
Division 13	Community Support	General Patrol, Foot Patrol	
Division 14 (East)	Community Support	General Patrol, Foot Patrol	
Division 43	GIU	Stolen Auto, Pawn	*New recommended Unit*
	Major Crimes	Commercial Crime	
	Homicide	Historical Homicide	
Division 41	Sex Crimes	Vice	
	Child Abuse	ICE	
Division 40	Organized Crime	Street Crime	*Already in Org Chart under SC*
Division 42	Crime Analysis (senior)		*Supervises and mentors all other Analysts within WPS*
	Crime Analysis (junior)		*Performance Measures and Crime Statistics (Service-wide)*
	Clerk B's (2)		*Data preparation and cleaning*

An ideal structure would see the senior crime analyst acting as a liaison, mentor and collaborator on methods and products with all other crime analysts throughout the Service (as see above). A second junior crime analyst is also recommended within this unit, to focus on developing service-wide performance measures and products for regular reporting on service-wide crime statistics (for the website, senior management, Police Board, etc.). Regular collaboration with the workload analyst will also be imperative to develop staffing formulas and tracking systems going forward to evaluate workload, efficiency, effectiveness and crime trends.

The existence of five clerk B's is probably unnecessary for the functioning of this unit; however, retrieving and cleaning information out of large data systems for use by analysts is a constant workload often left to the analysts themselves. As this requires specialized data knowledge, but is focused only on 'readying' the necessary data, dedicating one clerk per day to this task should be sufficient. Therefore, it is further recommended that the five clerk B's be reduced to two clerk B's on dayshift.

POLYGRAPH

Mandate

[From the WPS job description]: This position (unit) is responsible for conducting all aspects of the polygraph examination and has the final decision whether a person can or will be examined. The unit will offer assistance to all investigators within the service as well as offer assistance to all investigators from outside agencies with respect to the conductance of Forensic Polygraph Examinations. The Polygraph Unit lends itself to lecture at Interview and Interrogation courses held at the Winnipeg Police Service Training Academy.

Overtime Policies and Usage

The single detective in this unit worked approximately 130 hours of overtime in 2012, accruing just over $7,000 in earned overtime.

Recommendations

Attention should be paid to investigative delays associated with not having access to Polygraph Examiner, as there is only one. Any vacation, sick time, training, etc., would mean that the individual would not be available for internal service if required. It could be advantageous to add an additional Examiner, and have both available to conduct background investigations if polygraph examinations are not necessary. This would ensure their workload is steady and efficient, and would offset staff deficiencies in other areas of the Service related to lending of investigators for background investigations.

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE UNIT

Mandate

The TSU is responsible for facilitating Privacy Act investigations, as well as producing verbatim transcripts of intercepts and other audio files. TSU is an electronic surveillance resource and support unit for all units/areas of the WPS, including General Patrol, Street Crime Unit, Divisional Crime Units, CIB, etc.). Generally this involves acquiring a judicial authorization (warrant). Additionally, the TSU serves as the WPS liaison for telecommunication service providers.

Relationship to Other Units

Much of the work of this unit is at the request of the Organized Crime Unit; however, specific technical expertise is often required from the Major Crime Unit and the Homicide Unit. More work is being done in collaboration with the Street Crime Unit and the divisional detectives, as well as Commercial Crime. The expertise of this unit lies on the technical side, either as a facilitator or as a resource.

Staffing and Shifting

One sergeant is the head of this unit, with two detective sergeants, four PC constables, and six monitors/transcribers reporting. Each member may be assigned to different foci, such as leading interceptions and serving as technical specialists; administering the intercept systems; operating as intelligence analysts; and the transcription and monitoring of the install and input into the CPIC database.

All staff in this unit work a straight dayshift (Sierra, G1/T1).

Overtime Policies and Usage

This unit used minimal overtime per person in 2012, with approximately 633 hours in total worked (~ 53 hours per person over the year). However, additional resources may be required for this unit should the workload continue to increase and their utility spread throughout the organization. The addition of more crime analysts should create a feedback loop between the ability to analyze intelligence and the demand for the service. As units begin to take advantage of the possibilities presented by an analyst, they will likely search other avenues of investigation, including wiretapping and other technical monitoring, in order to bolster their investigations.

Tech Surveillance Unit	Sum of WorkedHours			Sum of Amount		
Reason for OT	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Other	364	171	239	$19,660.67	$8,542.71	$13,553.30
Continuing Investigation	36	196	156	$2,129.55	$14,298.28	$11,421.35
Callout for Other Reason	68	89	133	$4,652.04	$6,101.67	$9,204.48
Other OT	381	105	106	$24,720.67	$6,788.52	$7,397.91
Court attendance	45	20		$2,919.94	$1,297.07	
Grand Total	*893*	*581*	*634*	*$54,082.87*	*$37,028.25*	*$41,577.04*

Additional Information

For the most part, a civilian manager to oversee the (civilian) monitor transcribers would be better suited to both sides (detective sergeant and monitor transcribers).

Recommendations

Closely monitor all requests for assistance that come through the unit to better quantify service demands. Of particular importance will be to assess where assistance was unavailable due to workload pressures, and/or if requests are coming in from different units or for different crimes, indicating a broader mandate.

The span of control is far too small for this unit, and unnecessary. The workload of this unit is heavily "hands-on"; and the amount of supervision vs. workers is excessive. A better structure would be to remove the detective sergeant and add a civilian supervisor for the Monitor/Transcribers (days, M-F), and keep only one detective sergeant on Sierra shift. Most days between G1 and T1 overlap, so the impact on supervision for the constables will be minimal. This will also allow the sergeant to become more involved in the supervision and mentoring of the unit.

> *RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: Shifting for this unit should be modified to align more appropriately with either internal or external service demands.*

TECHNOLOGICAL CRIME UNIT AND FORENSIC IMAGING UNIT [221]

Mandate

The Technological Crimes Section consists of the Technological Crimes Unit (TCU) as well as the Forensic Imaging Unit (FIU). The unit mandates are:

Technological Crimes Unit

The purpose of the Technological Crimes Section is to collect, examine, analyze and investigate electronic evidence. This includes evidence from computers, mobile devices, cell phones, smartphones, tablets, and other electronic storage devices. The section employs forensically sound and valid methodologies, current techniques and follows established good practices in conjunction with industry standards. The section must ensure that its members are properly trained and kept current in the field. The section is a resource for the WPS and its members in Internet related investigations and criminal activities where electronic devices are used. These units act as support with investigations involving technology and the recovery of data. The TCU can recover data from any electronic device that is capable of storing data, i.e. computers, hard drives, phones, thumbdrives, or game consoles. The range of offences that the TCU provides assistance on is vast, and may range from drug offences, to sexual assaults, child exploitation offences, and homicides.

Forensic Imaging Unit

The purpose of the Forensic Imaging Unit is to provide scientific recovery, examination, clarification, evaluation, and comparison of images. This includes taxicab images, camcorders, and surveillance footage. The section will use validated methods and techniques and ensure its members are properly trained and current with digital imaging policies and advances in technology. Members will provide expert testimony in a fair and impartial manner. The section is a resource for the WPS and its members in criminal activities where surveillance footage may have been captured.

Relationship to Other Units

As a support unit, the TCU and FIU may collaborate with any unit within the WPS having requirements within their mandate. This unit did not note that lending or borrowing of personnel was an issue at present. This is likely due to the highly specialized nature of their work.

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[221] Although separated in the Org Chart, internal surveys note the Technological Crime Unit and the Forensic Imagine Unit fall under the same section (Technological Crimes Unit)

Staffing and Shifting

According to the internal survey, the TCU operates with six constables, and the FIU operates with three constables. Both units report to two detective sergeants. However, the revised organizational chart notes eight constables and one detective sergeant assigned to TCU, with only two assigned to FIU. This discrepancy may point to mandate or scope creep between these units, or may be just a simple error due to changing organizational designs.

Recruitment and Tenure

Due to the highly specialized nature of the work, it takes upwards of a year to become fully functioning within these units. This speaks directly to a tenure policy, insofar as these units should have a lengthier tenure to avoid service interruptions and reduced effectiveness in investigations.

Overtime Policies and Usage

Both units used a moderate amount of overtime over the past three years, particularly FIU, as their authorized strength is considerably smaller than TCU. With nearly 200 hours of overtime for the two FIU investigators, this may indicate the benefit of adding additional resources to the unit.

Table 81: Forensic Imaging and Tech Crime Unit Overtime

Reason for OT	Sum of WorkedHours			Sum of Amount		
Forensic Imaging	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Court attendance	48	63	63	$ 2,944.78	$ 4,095.51	$ 4,147.38
Continuing Investigation	34	52	56	$ 2,198.80	$ 3,427.10	$ 4,075.37
Other OT	21	46	42	$ 1,350.83	$ 3,042.01	$ 2,828.95
Callout for Other Reason	26	77	18	$ 1,732.10	$ 5,333.43	$ 1,203.63
Other	20	25	14	$ 828.03	$ 1,202.50	$ 916.81
Court Attendance Traffic			7			$ 429.87
Technological Crimes	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Other	68	117	81	$ 3,647.19	$ 5,278.78	$ 4,329.93
Other OT	52	39	63	$ 3,146.36	$ 2,388.62	$ 4,422.35
Continuing Investigation	109	54	53	$ 7,127.17	$ 3,602.87	$ 3,811.26
Callout for Other Reason	115	81	26	$ 7,615.44	$ 5,456.97	$ 1,712.17
Court attendance	25	12	13	$ 1,477.19	$ 743.49	$ 839.27
Grand Total	517	564	434	$ 32,067.89	$ 34,571.28	$ 28,716.99

Workflow

Approximately 300 cases were referred to these units in 2012, and this is noted as an increase. The typical turnaround time varies considerably for the FIU from device to device, with one cell phone requiring between

one and seven days to examine, and a computer requiring 15-30 days. With only eight investigators, backlogs are common and constant. If the workload does not allow for the unit to conduct their own investigations, the device can be sent to the RCMP for analysis. However, that results in a turnaround time of between eight and twelve months.

Infrastructure and Working Environment

Of particular concern in this unit is the limited availability of the specialized software used to analyse devices. Although each member has an analytic-software program installed on their workstation, only one may use it at a time as only one license has been purchased. In addition, this unit has only one cell phone analysis workstation, shared between all investigators. As investigators are a highly trained and expensive resource, failure to supply them with adequate tools is a waste of that resource.

The unit has also mentioned that having their own server would be advantageous. This should be left for discussions with the IT Section, particularly in advance of the pending move (if applicable to this unit).

Additional Information

The reorganization and splintering of some units within Division 42 has left some supervision 'holes'. Some smaller speciality units remain without direct supervision, thereby limiting mentoring and support opportunities. Although this may be a function of physical space and location, this should be considered going forward.

Recommendations

The need for expertise in these areas will undoubtedly continue to grow. Surveillance cameras are capturing more and more interactions between people, which requires more time and effort to examine when a crime occurs. In addition, with the explosion of personal computing devices, smartphones and laptops, investigators are often faced with analyzing multiple phones and multiple computers, even from a single person.

It is recommended that technological support be brought up to an efficient level for the current investigators, and that staffing be re-assessed at that point. It is extremely inefficient to have highly paid investigators waiting around for software, when that situation can be easily remedied with a one-time capital purchase and/or an additional license purchase.

Therefore, it is strongly recommended that an additional cell phone analysis workstation be brought into the unit as soon as practicable, as well as an additional two license 'dongles' for the computer software analysis computer program in the unit. Once those mechanisms are in place, the unit can assess whether that has satisfactorily increased efficiency, or whether additional support personnel is needed.

An additional recommendation is to seek support software free or low-cost to justice agencies. The National Institute of Justice, through their grant program, often supports software development for law enforcement via academic institutions. The catalogue of programs can be found here:

http://www.nij.gov/topics/technology/software-tools.htm#lawenforcementinvestigation.

Additional Recommendations

Civilianize the Forensic Imaging constable positions (2 according to the Org Chart)

Civilianize the Tech Crimes constables (8)

RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.

RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.

Note: Although this report considers significant civilianization in a number of units, many jurisdictions and agencies modify units based upon a hybrid model, having both civilians and police working closely in order to maximize effectiveness. The recommendations herein contemplate outright civilianization opportunities; however, given the legal complexities and continual evolution of policing, particularly in highly skilled and specialized units, changes should be carefully considered to ensure that hybridization models are applied when appropriate to ensure best practices in policing.

SECURE OPERATIONS

Mandate

The Secure Operations Unit holds three distinct job functions, with mandates defined in writing by the Service as follows:

i. The Informant Control Officer provides consultation and advice to members, receives and processes requests to register confidential informants, creates and maintains a master file for each confidential informant, ensuring the safety and security of the files. The Informant Control Officer ensures safety of a confidential informant whose safety may be at risk. Liaise with outside agencies, conduct annual audits and prepare threat assessment on the use of an agent. The information supplied is on a variety of offences ranging from theft to homicide.

ii. Witness Protection facilitates the protection of certain persons who are involved directly, or indirectly, in providing assistance in law enforcement matters, inquiries, investigations or prosecutions. The investigations for Witness Protection involve matters that are usually homicides or involve Organized Crime Groups. In addition, this unit submits applications, if warranted, to the National Witness Protection Program and the Manitoba Witness Security Program.

iii. The Intelligence Officer is responsible for being the central repository for all criminal intelligence gathered from WPS members to prevent crime and investigate criminal activity. Information regarding the criminal activities of individuals or organizations is gathered, researched, analyzed and collated into intelligence. The Intelligence Officer securely stores and appropriately distributes information to authorized personnel. The Intelligence Officer liaises with WPS units as well as outside agencies.

Relationship to Other Units

The Informant Control Officer deals with members from all units and divisions within the Service. Any member that wishes to register an informant must go through this office to complete necessary documentation and receive approval. Once the informant is registered, members deal with the staff sergeant of Division 40 when requesting compensation for an informant. The Informant Control Office is then a repository for the information.

Witness Protection deals primarily with the Homicide Unit and Organized Crime Unit. This is on an as-needed basis for specific investigations. Regular maintenance between the original requesting unit and Witness Protection is required to protect the witness and assist in the witness's cooperation through the judicial process.

The Intelligence Officer receives Intelligence reports from all units and divisions within the Service and from outside law enforcement agencies, both federal and municipal. The Intelligence Officer reviews the information and ensures that is properly disseminated to the appropriate unit, so that information can be handled in an

appropriate fashion. The main units forwarding information to the intelligence officer are the Organized Crime Unit, Street Crime Unit, Homicide Unit and Green Team, although this is not an exhaustive list.

Staffing and Shifting

This unit is comprised of one sergeant, one detective sergeant, and one constable.

Overtime

The members in this unit worked just over 134 hours of overtime in 2012. This amounted to approximately $8,300 for the three positions. This amount is minimal, with little opportunity for reduction.

Recommendations

No current recommendations for any changes to this unit.

SURVEILLANCE

Mandate

As described in the WPS Operation Manual, the Surveillance Unit provides live/mobile surveillance, including aerial support, to observe and confirm the suspicion of criminal activity and gather intelligence on persons or groups involved or suspected to be involved in criminal activity.

Relationship to Other Units

The Surveillance Unit provides support to almost every unit within the WPS, including both high-profile investigative units such as Homicide and divisional detectives and Patrol. Support is also given to outside agencies such as the RCMP, OPP and Regina Police Service, as well as various integrated units.

Staffing and Shifting

This unit deploys two sergeants, two detective sergeants, and 12 constables in two teams. It is noted that this unit operates on the Sierra shift, which sees day and evening coverage, but only Monday through Friday. As surveillance of suspects is not limited to a weekday activity, moving to a November shift schedule is likely a more efficient and effective use of resources.

Overtime Policies and Usage

As is expected, callouts occur on the weekends when there is no coverage.

Table 82: Surveillance Unit Overtime

SURVEILLANCE UNIT	Sum of WorkedHours			Sum of Amount		
Reason for OT	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Weekday						
Other OT	492	538	196	$ 31,645.86	$ 36,141.03	$ 13,485.25
Other	292	188	140	$ 13,593.42	$ 8,462.50	$ 6,515.88
Court Attendance Traffic		4			$ 247.91	
Court attendance	128	86	84	$ 7,885.14	$ 5,297.03	$ 5,417.23
Continuing Investigation	1,036	349	748	$ 67,502.57	$ 23,083.37	$ 53,984.87
Callout for Other Reason	156	85	80	$ 10,150.37	$ 5,326.29	$ 5,411.31
Weekend						
Other OT	159	357		$ 10,479.48	$ 24,716.11	
Other	20		8	$ 1,407.65		$ 333.78
Continuing Investigation	14	13	3	$ 1,041.82	$ 1,008.35	$ 193.44
Callout for Project			14			$ 1,202.61
Callout for Other Reason	240	164	228	$ 16,290.39	$ 10,657.62	$ 16,050.31
Grand Total	*2,535*	*1,782*	*1,500*	*$ 159,996.70*	*$ 114,940.21*	*$ 102,594.68*

While a great deal of overtime is accumulated during the week when units are on duty, there is a moderate amount being billed for weekend callouts. The nature of this type of work often requires lengthy tails without

the option to leave a target under surveillance simply because a shift is over. Due to this, some overtime is unavoidable and shift extensions are likely more commonplace than in other units. While it is unreasonable to assume adding resources will offset all of the overtime costs, with more constant shift coverage and additional bodies, some of this overtime cost should be alleviated.

Although a November shift structure would alleviate some of the burden on the weekends, high usage during the week may actually result in greater inefficiencies if current personnel are spread more thinly over more days. What should be tracked going forward, however, is whether more requests for surveillance (or would intend to) come in on the weekends. As most units undoubtedly realize that this unit does not work weekends, they will likely not request a callout unless absolutely necessary. However, if investigative units demonstrate a need and desire for the expertise of this unit on weekends, additional personnel and a November shift schedule should be considered.

Workflow

75 new cases were requested from specialty/investigative units in 2012. At times, files may require 'stake outs', which are referred out of unit to others that may have the capability.

Infrastructure and Working Environment

The unit has noted that it would be more advantageous to have one car per member, to allow for smoother transitions during surveillance activities. Although this is likely ideal, due to the cost involved this can be set aside for future consideration.

Additional Information

The unit also acknowledges the difficulty with the current transfer policy, insofar as they are not able to necessarily select candidates who have previous surveillance experience. This in turn creates pressure for training and mentoring for the unit, and minimizes efficiency. The current tenure maximum takes members out of the unit just as they become effective.

Recommendations

No additional resources are recommended at this time. However, as stated above, requests for surveillance should be tracked and logged to get a better sense of the service demands. In particular, investigative units should be surveyed to assess what needs they may have on the weekends that are currently not being met by the shift structure.

RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.

RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.

RECOMMENDATION: The practice of borrowing non-accommodated members from specialty investigative units should be ceased. The Service should instead hire retired officers on a part-time basis, or assign injured or accommodated members only to this function.

RECOMMENDATION: Shifting for this unit should be modified (IF DEEMED APPROPRIATE) to align more appropriately with either internal or external service demands.

CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE MANITOBA (CISM)

Mandate

From the Government of Canada website description:

> *Criminal Intelligence Service Manitoba (CISM) is one of ten Provincial Bureaux operating within the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC) umbrella.*
>
> *CISM is a strategically focused organization, which ensures the timely production and exchange of criminal information and intelligence among our partner member agencies. The mandate at CISM is to be the "Provincial Centre of Excellence" in support of law enforcement efforts to detect, reduce, disrupt and prevent organized and serious crime affecting Manitoba and Canada. This mandate is achieved through the promotion of inter-agency cooperation within the Manitoba law enforcement community.*
>
> *Staffed with employees who are seconded from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Winnipeg Police Service, Brandon Police Service, Manitoba Justice-Corrections, and Canada Border Services Agency, CISM provides relevant analytical products that assist more than 34 partner agencies[222]*

Recommendations

No recommendations at this time.

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[222] http://www.cisc.gc.ca/bureaus/cism_e.html

Division 42 - Forensic Services

The Forensic Services Section has recently been slightly reorganized, moving some units to the "Operations" side, and streamlining the Forensic Services side of Division 42. Currently, the division is comprised of three primary units, with one for the seconded members to NWEST.

The staffing allotment in Forensics Services, according to the Organizational Chart, is as follows:

Table 83: Forensic Services Division Authorized Strength

Division 42 - Forensics	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Forensic Identification			2	4	16	13
Forensic Artist					1	
Firearms Investigative Analysis					2	1
NWEST				1	1	
Administration		1	1			1
Total	0	1	3	5	20	15

FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION

Mandate

The purpose of the Forensic Identification Section is to investigate, identify, collect, examine and analyze physical evidence. The section will gather this evidence impartially and in accordance with national collection and examination standards. The Identification Unit may be involved in photographing the scene, all witnesses, victims and suspects; fingerprinting the scene and all those affiliated with it; attending autopsies, submitting evidence to the RCMP for specific analysis, and working with Crown to prepare evidence for court. The specific analyses conducted by this unit deal primarily with fingerprints, footwear impressions, bloodstains, DNA, tire tracks, physical matches, gunshot residue, and firearms-related evidence. The calls this unit attends are: residential and commercial break and enters, robberies, serious assault scenes, domestics, firearm offences, sexual assaults, stolen vehicles used in serious crimes, homicides, death scenes including suicides, workplaces, and unexplained deaths, fatal motor vehicle accidents, and Internal Affairs investigations.

Staffing and Shifting

This unit is comprised of both sworn and civilian personnel. The sworn constables are responsible for attending calls around the city, and obtaining fingerprints, DNA, toolmarks, footwear/tire impressions, etc. The constables also photograph and seize all the evidence from the scene. The civilian technicians will serve as office support, and will search fingerprints received from the constables in the local and national databases. The civilians also take fingerprints at the station for suspects and photograph individuals under the Identification of Criminals Act.

All patrol sergeants and sergeants (Delta days) work days with the sergeant and patrol sergeants being on call for serious crimes. There are eight constables per shift (Delta) who work primarily days, with one constable working evenings on a rotating basis. No officers work nights in Ident but two constables and a Patrol sergeant, or sergeants are on call each night. A constable may be called out between the hours of 0100 and 0700 hours for any type of call. Three people on the call out list may be called out any time after 1630 hours for serious crimes

The Juliet shift is for the civilian forensic identification technicians, which has the following shift rotation: Days, days, days, evenings, nights.

What is observed when examining the offences that may fall under the Ident mandate, is that a large number of them happen when there is light or no coverage. While the dayshift is busier, likely driven by Break and Enters or Motor Vehicle Thefts that are discovered in the morning or early evening, the late evenings and overnight serious violent offences are likely not able to receive timely attendance due to the shift structure.

Looking at the timing, it can be seen that over 30% of the offences that may fall under this unit's mandate occur in the evening hours, when only one constable is on shift to attend a scene. Further, 22% of the offences (and a great deal of the serious violent offences) occur overnight when there are no constables on duty and when a callout is likely to occur.

Table 84: Timing of Events Under Forensic Ident Mandate

Occurrence Hour of Offences Under Mandate	% of Events	Count of Events
Light (Evening) Coverage	32%	2,872
Regular (day) Coverage	46%	4,196
OFF Shift	22%	1,956

It is, therefore, recommended that the shift structure be more in line with the service demands, and see a regular day and evening shift, with a rotating night shift (as they do currently with a rotating evening shift). This would see four on each shift (A/B side, days/evenings).

Overtime Policies and Usage

The Forensic Identification Unit is paid standby pay, which provides the primary cost associated with overtime for their unit. At over $100,000 in 2012 for standby, this is the majority of the overtime costs incurred.

Reason for OT	Total Worked Hours			Total Charged Amount		
Forensic Ident	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Standby	2,199	2,182	2,174	$ 95,478.45	$ 98,382.17	$ 101,429.92
Continuing Investigation	993	1,146	984	$ 71,727.77	$ 85,072.90	$ 76,361.36
Callout for Other Reason	655	569	691	$ 46,369.05	$ 42,445.61	$ 52,129.65
Court attendance	457	456	558	$ 28,740.32	$ 29,650.19	$ 38,522.08
Other	521	475	271	$ 25,202.38	$ 25,214.38	$ 12,421.75
Other OT	196	153	74	$ 13,574.67	$ 10,267.60	$ 5,048.54
Callout for Min Strength	12	20	10	$ 724.97	$ 1,307.82	$ 693.93
Court Attendance Traffic	14	7		$ 925.71	$ 444.66	
Grand Total	5,046	5,007	4,761	$ 282,743.32	$ 292,785.33	$ 286,607.23

Workflow

Over 4,000 cases were referred to this unit in 2012. This number has remained relatively stable in the last few years.   According to Niche, the calls for service have hovered around 4,500 since 2008:

- 2008   4,454 CFS
- 2009   4,891 CFS
- 2010   4,846 CFS
- 2011   4,597 CFS
- 2012   4,501 CFS

Most of the workflow originates from the Homicide Unit, Major Crimes, Traffic, Sex Crimes, and/or General Patrol.

According to the RMS, in terms of the offences that may fall under this section's mandate, offences of Break and Enter, Motor Vehicle Theft, and Assault Level 2 are the most prominent. While the Ident Unit will undoubtedly not attend all of these scenes, it does provide some context as to where the workload is focused.

Table 85: Forensic Ident Offences Under Mandate

Forensic Ident Offences - RMS (2012)	% of Crimes Under Mandate	Count of Crimes under Mandate
Breaking & Entering	50.3%	4,543
Motor Vehicle Theft	28.0%	2,527
Assault With Weapon or Causing Bodily Harm-Level 2	15.0%	1,358
Offensive Weapons - Possession of Weapons and Explosive Substances	4.3%	391
Aggravated Assault-Level 3	1.1%	97
Breaking & Entering - to steal Firearms	0.4%	34
Murder 2nd Degree	0.1%	13
Causing Bodily Harm	0.1%	13
Breaking & Entering MV - to steal Firearms	0.1%	8
Sexual Assault With A Weapon	0.1%	7
Murder 1st Degree	0.1%	7
Attempted Murder	0.1%	6
Manslaughter	0.1%	5
Causing Death	0.1%	5
Offensive Weapons - Weapons Trafficking	0.0%	4
Criminal Negligence Causing Death	0.0%	3
Criminal Negligence Causing Bodily Harm	0.0%	2
Aggravated Sexual Assault	0.0%	1
Grand Total	100.0%	9,024

Not all of the gathered evidence is analyzed by the WPS - some evidence is referred to the RCMP and/or other biological laboratories for analysis. These include toxicology analysis, trace evidence analysis, some firearms analysis, and blood and other biological evidence analysis.   The turnaround time for these types of external analysis can range from 90-120 days.

Crime Prevention/Future Initiatives

[From internal survey]:

Disaster Victim Identification (DVI). This is an immense, important project that requires liaison with numerous partner agencies and the development of a plan for investigating mass casualty scenes. Numerous agencies (i.e. RCMP, many municipal departments, the provincial Medical Examiner, Transport Canada, DND, Transport Safety Board) are stakeholders currently working on plans. This project requires a great deal of work but current staffing does not allow for any progress. This project has languished for a year, despite being identified as important.

COGENT/AFIS infrastructure. The single Ident person familiar with fingerprint system hardware and infrastructure has retired and another person needs to be brought up to speed on this; however, this new person does not have the time due to personnel shortages.

Infrastructure and Working Environment

There were several noted deficiencies with the lack of fleet vehicles for this Unit, as well as adequate office and workspace. With the move to the new building, the workspace issue should ideally be resolved. The fleet issue should be re-examined after the move.

Additional Information

The unit reports that in addition to slow turnaround times, the RCMP firearms section has been drastically cut, and has essentially ceased to be a resource. In addition, the RCMP has also shut down the local blood spatter analysis resource.

Recommendations

Civilianize the 16 constable positions in this Unit, and replace with highly trained specialized civilians.

Remove the four patrol sergeants and replace them with four senior identification technicians to supervise the new civilianized positions. The current two senior identification technicians should remain in place to supervise the current junior technicians.

RECOMMENDATION: Shifting for this unit should be modified to align more appropriately with either internal or external service demands.

RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.

Note: Although this report considers significant civilianization in a number of units, many jurisdictions and agencies modify units based upon a hybrid model, having both civilians and police working closely in order to maximize effectiveness. The recommendations herein contemplate outright civilianization opportunities; however, given the legal complexities and continual evolution of policing, particularly in highly skilled and specialized units, changes should be carefully considered to ensure that hybridization models are applied when appropriate to ensure best practices in policing.

FORENSIC ARTIST

Mandate

[From the WPS job description]:

Under the supervision of the staff sergeant, the police artist , on the request of investigators, interviews victims or witnesses and where suitable, draws composites of suspects and objects to assist in criminal investigations. With proper training a forensic artist may also work in conjunction with a medical examiner's office with two-dimensional or three-dimensional skull reconstructions and post-mortem drawings to assist in identifying unknown human remains. With proper training a forensic artist may assist in age progression drawings of missing persons for the purpose of locating that person.

This position notes minimal overtime. However, the job description does stipulate that there should be two forensic artists. This would allow for training and mentoring, as well as increased availability for days off, vacation, training, etc.

Recommendations

Begin tracking the requests for sketches and assistance that come in for this position. Make particular note of when requests come in after hours. Consult with other units as to their impression of the artist's availability and utility. This will dictate whether a second artist is required.

RECOMMENDATION: Civilianize this position.

FIREARMS INVESTIGATIVE ANALYSIS UNIT

Mandate

Any guns that come in to WPS come through the FIAU in one of four streams:

1. Crime Guns
   Guns associated with possible links to specific crimes. FIAS will fingerprint the gun, test fire it, determine the make and model to determine if it's a firearm under the Criminal Code, and harvest fired bullets and cartridge casings for submission to RCMP IBIS (Integrated Ballistics Identification System (IBIS))

2. Found Guns
   These are processed the same as a crime gun.

3. Seized guns in the interest of public safety
   Many guns are seize in the interest of public safety, despite not having been directly associated with an offence. For example, if guns are found in the home of an individual charged with domestic abuse, they may be seized in order to protect the spouse against future harm.

4. Surrendered for Safekeeping,
   The WPS will hold guns for 30 days for persons in possession of legal firearms who wish to relinquish that possession while other arrangements are made. If arrangements are not made within 30 days, the WPS will destroy those guns (with the owner's consent).

Relationship to Other Units

This unit is involved with any other unit that comes across firearms in the course of their workday. Priority will be given to homicides using firearms, or other violent offences in which firearms were used.

Staffing and Shifting

This section consists of two sworn constables and one civilian technician.

Overtime Policies and Usage

The amount of overtime used by this unit could not be assessed, as there does not appear to be an overtime code for the firearms portion of this unit. This should be remedied in the SAMS system immediately in order to better track usage.

Recommendations

Due to the highly specialized nature of this type of analysis, it is recommended that this unit be reconfigured. There are three major deficiencies that should be remedied. The first is that with the notice that the RCMP will no longer attend scenes, nor provide valuable expert testimony at trial, the WPS needs to establish that ability. The best way to do this will be to have both expert ballistics analysts in this unit, as well as having the equipment capabilities to conduct comparison analysis in-house (rather than sending off-site to the RCMP lab). It is still somewhat unclear whether those comparison analysis capabilities exist currently, but they should be established if not already in place.

A senior supervisory civilian position should be established, instituted at the same rate as the crime analyst (or above). This individual will act as the subject matter expert, can testify regarding evidence, attend scenes with the sworn member, and oversee all the ballistics analysis. The second civilian position should remain as is. The sworn position will collaborate and coordinate with the senior Ballistics technician, while all HR issues will go through the staff sergeant in charge of the section.

RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.

RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.

NWEST

Mandate

This is a seconded position (Firearms Support Investigator) to the National Weapons Enforcement Support Team (NWEST), Firearms Support Services Directorate (FSSD) National Police Service (NPS) Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) that is mandated to provide direct investigative support to front line policing in the area of criminal firearms enforcement. These duties include firearms identification, firearms tracing, preparing and assisting in the execution of criminal code search warrant, providing expert evidence in court, as well as a wide variety of other duties related to criminal firearms enforcement.

Relationship to Other Units

NWEST works with several units on a regular basis: General Patrol, Community Support, Divisional Detective Offices, Major Crimes, Street Crimes, Homicide, and Training Division. NWEST assists with any and all investigations involving firearms, and will write or assist in writing search warrants, help execute and search the premise during a search warrant, identify and verify the firearm involved, advise on appropriate firearm charges, trace the firearm, and give lectures and presentations on Characteristics of Armed Persons, Prohibited weapon lecture.

Recommendations

No recommendations at this time.

Division 43 – Major Crimes

This division contains all reaction-based investigative units. The focus of each unit is generally on one type of crime, or the most serious crimes committed against people or property within Winnipeg.

This is one of the most specialized, although not the largest, divisions in the WPS.

Division 43 - Major Crimes	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Administration	1	1				
Arson				1	4	
Commercial Crime			1	4	8	
Historical Homicides				1	3	
Pawn Unit				1	1	1
Stolen Auto			1	2	12	1
Homicide			2	12		
Major Crimes			2	4	13	
MMW Task Force		1	1	3	5	
Total	1	2	7	28	46	2

The overall overtime usage for this unit is very high, with the Homicide Unit and the Major Crimes Unit working the majority of the overtime hours:

Table 87: Division 43 Overtime

Division 43	2010	2011	2012
Total Worked Hours	21,709	21,923	19,211
Total Charged	$ 1,435,816	$ 1,528,525	$ 1,356,480
% of Budget	0.76%	0.76%	0.62%

Table 88: Division 43 Overtime by Unit

Div 43 - OT	Sum of WorkedHours			Sum of Amount		
	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Homicide Unit	8,236	10,974	8,668	$ 528,977.43	$ 772,401.45	$ 613,428.51
Major Crimes Unit	9,308	8,119	7,827	$ 649,676.82	$ 582,877.28	$ 570,938.52
Stolen Auto Unit	2,111	1,050	1,116	$ 130,313.82	$ 63,968.22	$ 68,888.33
Arson Unit	1,078	1,106	809	$ 67,780.31	$ 70,102.19	$ 56,550.07
Commercial Crime Unit	921	559	671	$ 56,008.11	$ 33,803.22	$ 39,626.74
Pawn Unit	56	117	120	$ 3,059.60	$ 5,372.64	$ 7,048.13
TOTAL	21,709	21,923	19,211	$ 1,435,816.09	$ 1,528,525.00	$ 1,356,480.30

HOMICIDE

Mandate

The Homicide Unit is responsible for the investigation of all suspicious deaths that occur within the City of Winnipeg and all officer-involved deaths/serious injuries.   These include all confirmed, suspected and attempted homicides, murder conspiracies, manslaughters, deaths by criminal negligence (excluding motor vehicle collisions), and all life threatening crimes. The unit investigates all shootings by Winnipeg Police Service personnel, evaluates all sudden deaths, suspicious deaths, in custody deaths and suicides to confirm the absence of criminal activities in the death, and liaises with the Crown Attorney, Medical Examiner and Public Trustee.

Recruitment and Tenure

Officers for the Homicide Unit are generally recruited by the sergeants and approved by the staff sergeant and/or inspector. Available positions are also advertised internally and subject to review by the sergeants, staff sergeants and inspector. In general, it is reported that individuals within this unit stay for approximately four years, and generally have between 12-20 years of experience while in the unit.

The relatively short tenure, of which a previous review noted was " the shortest tenure of any major police agency within North America", remains intact despite recommendations to extend it. This tenure policy, while well intentioned, may be having a negative effect on officers' productivity, effectiveness and efficiency. Studies have shown that departments with higher than average clearance rates have detectives that have spent longer in the unit (six years)[223]. Considering the length of time it takes to ensure homicide officers are fully trained and well versed in the intricacies of these investigations, it is again recommended that this tenure policy be extended to a minimum of six years.

Relationship to Other Units

The Homicide Unit works with most other units within the Service on a regular basis. On each investigation the Homicide Unit works directly with:

- The Forensic Identification Unit (scene examinations, autopsy, DNA/forensic submissions),
- General Patrol (first responders to reported crimes),
- Forensic Imaging Unit (collection and analysis of all video evidence, video canvass and seizures),
- Technical Crimes Unit (collection and analysis of computer and phone records and data) and the
- Major Crimes Analyst (preparation of search warrants and orders, analysis of intelligence information).

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[223] FBI LEB, 2008

The Homicide also works frequently with:

- The Major Crimes Unit (mandated to investigate all serious offences where death has not occurred and to assist the Homicide Unit as required/requested),
- The Organized Crime Unit (intelligence and enforcement regarding gang members and their associates),
- Surveillance Unit (surveillance of suspects, persons of interest and locations of concern),
- Technical Support Unit (installation of wiretaps etc. and monitoring of same).
- Crime Analysis Unit (statistics, link similar crimes; generally one-time use)
- Tactical Support Team (high risk take downs, surveillance)

Case Management

The Homicide Unit does not follow Major Case Management (MCM). Supervisors within the unit assign all tasks and ensure disclosure is timely. Homicide Unit members are not assigned a particular case, but rather, most members will often work on some portion of a particular case. All cases are divided between the two sergeants who take on the role of co-ordinating it, assigning and tracking tasks and preparing the final court package. Particular challenges, as reported by the unit, include gang-related cases (Aboriginal, Asian, African) and their constantly changing nature, resultant reluctance of witnesses and fear of reprisal, and the transient nature of gang members.

The unit reports a clearance rate of approximately 87% in 2012. According to Statistics Canada, this was reported as approximately 77 percent in 2010.

Police-reported clearance rates in Canada, 2010

Peel Regional Police	100
London Police	100
Ottawa Police	92.3
Durham Regional Police	87.5
York Regional Police	85.7
Montréal Police4	83.8
Québec Police	83.3
Edmonton Police	80.8
Saskatoon Police	80
Winnipeg Police	77.3
Hamilton Regional Police	75
Halifax Regional Police	72.7
Vancouver Police	66.7
Surrey, RCMP	53.8
Calgary Police	53.3
Regina Police	50
Toronto Police	44.3

Workload Demands

The following table was taken from the WPS RMS and represents some of the most prominent crimes under the Homicide Unit's mandate that occurred between 2008 and 2012. It should be noted that these are not exhaustive, as the unit carries several other case types including officer-involved shootings, and also carries several old or cold cases. This is, therefore, simply a representation of some of the most common offences this unit is mandated to deal with in a given year.

Table 89: Offences Under Homicide Mandate

Homicide Unit - crimes under mandate	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total
Murder 2nd Degree	16	7	7	21	13	64
Attempted Murder	20	12	9	5	6	52
Murder 1st Degree	7	12	5	9	7	40
Manslaughter	3	6	8	6	5	28
Criminal Negligence Causing Death	5		8	4	3	20
Conspire to Commit Murder	1	5				6
Grand Total	52	42	37	45	34	210

According to the Unit, in 2012 they handled 30 homicides, and approximately 15-20 cases of suspicious deaths, officer-involved shootings, and cold cases. This resulted in a total caseload for this unit, according to their records, of approximately 45-50 cases in 2012. In very simple terms, this results in each team possibly carrying a new caseload of four cases per year, in addition to any others they continue to investigate from previous years. While there is not set "best practices" for homicide Units[224] in terms of caseload, this would appear to be largely manageable if cold cases or cases from previous years are cleared in a timely fashion.

Staffing and Shifting

The Homicide Unit currently operates with 12 detective sergeants and two supervisory sergeants. The span of control, as experienced by those in the unit, is noted as satisfactory. Members within Homicide work in 9-hour shifts, with coverage from 0700 to 0000 (0700 – 1600 and 1500 – 0000), with a minimum of 4-day per week coverage (often five days per week). Standby pay and callout priority are done on a rotating basis throughout all members. On call pay is currently set at one hour of pay per eight hours on call. Case triage sees all

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[224] FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin indicates that successful departments (measured in terms of homicide clearance) will see members carrying no more than five cases as primary investigator per year). "Statistically, departments with detectives who handled fewer than five per year as a primary investigator had a 5.4 percent higher clearance rate than those with detectives who had higher case loads."

investigators responding and conducting initial interviews once a homicide occurs. After the initial time investment, cases are assigned for full investigation to two-member teams.

As can be seen from the offence occurrence times, in general, most offences under this unit's mandate are occurring outside of normal operating hours.

With the coverage from 0700 to midnight, this unit does ensure they have staff available for much of the day/night, despite not necessarily being on shift when an overnight homicide occurs. However, few departments have the resources to maintain a 24-hour per day investigative unit, so 16-hour per day coverage on most days is more than appropriate given the unit's size.

One of the ways to explore whether shifting is appropriate for investigative teams is to look at the overtime usage for days/times when more or less members were on staff. As can be inferred from the table below, overtime for this unit was focused more on callouts during times of low staffing levels (as would be expected). During the weekdays when all shifts overlap to a certain extent, the usage of callouts is significantly decreased. Again, this is an intuitive result; however, it does help illuminate how overtime and shifting are often interdependent.

Table 90: Homicide Unit Overtime (Shifting)

Homicide	Worked Hours	2010	2011	2012	Grand Total
Weekend					
	Standby	61%	47%	65%	57%
	Callout for Other Reason	36%	52%	35%	42%
	Continuing Investigation	3%	1%	0%	1%
Low Coverage (M/F)					
	Callout for Other Reason	36%	51%	59%	50%
	Continuing Investigation	62%	47%	35%	46%
	Standby	2%	2%	6%	4%
High Coverage (T/W/Th)					
	Continuing Investigation	87%	79%	90%	86%
	Callout for Other Reason	13%	20%	10%	14%
	Standby	0%	1%	0%	0%

When looking at the raw numbers, however, it becomes apparent that the majority of overtime for continuing investigations is spent on the high coverage times of the week. As most members are on shift during these times, this result would seem to indicate that members are working extended tours on their files. This is likely a

function of increased numbers of members on those days, thereby utilizing more overtime if they are all working overtime.

Table 91: Homicide Unit Overtime (Weekends)

Homicide	Worked Hours	2010	2011	2012	Grand Total
Weekend					
	Standby	2,594	2,535	2,528	7,657
	Callout for Other Reason	1,529	2,785	1,352	5,666
	Continuing Investigation	113	41		154
Low Coverage (M/F)					
	Callout for Other Reason	353	1,331	894	2,577
	Continuing Investigation	610	1,242	525	2,376
	Standby	22	62	96	180
High Coverage (T/W/Th)					
	Continuing Investigation	2,384	2,253	2,567	7,204
	Callout for Other Reason	352	562	275	1,189
	Standby		20	8	28

Overtime Policies and Usage

The internal survey noted that the personnel in this unit was 'increased last year' as a result of an internal review that determined more members were needed for the workload. Judging by the RMS data, the increase in officers along with the decrease in homicides falling under this unit's mandate likely account for the drop in overtime usage in 2012 from 2011, which showed a large increase in both areas over 2010.

Table 92: Homicide Unit Reason for Overtime

Homicide Unit	Sum of WorkedHours			Sum of Amount		
REASON FOR OT	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Continuing Investigation	3,107	3,536	3,092	$ 232,515.69	$ 279,177.95	$ 249,369.04
Callout for Other Reason	2,234	4,677	2,521	$ 162,419.37	$ 362,125.41	$ 211,047.03
Standby	2,616	2,617	2,632	$ 115,097.85	$ 120,834.27	$ 126,854.62
Other	24	8	200	$ 2,016.80	$ 507.34	$ 9,894.56
Court attendance	81	85	124	$ 4,997.52	$ 5,852.93	$ 8,848.01
Callout for Specialty Unit	121	22	51	$ 7,997.27	$ 1,625.17	$ 3,513.25
Callout for Min Strength			34			$ 2,549.34
Incident in progress(Civilian)		19	15		$ 1,671.60	$ 1,352.66
Project	34			$ 2,500.86		
Heldover per Supervisor	20	2		$ 1,432.07	$ 139.30	
Heldover per Duty Inspector		8			$ 467.48	
Grand Total	8,236	10,974	8,668	$ 528,977.43	$ 772,401.45	$ 613,428.51

The majority of the Homicide Unit's overtime is spent focused on continuing investigations and callouts. Standby pay also requires a large portion of the overtime worked hours and budget.

As would be expected, the majority of time spent on continuing investigations was linked to homicides. However, some investigative overtime was spent on crimes outside of the Homicide Unit's general mandate. In particular, the presence of homicide officer activity related to stolen vehicles, noise complaints, breaches and robberies could indicate that these other units were perhaps understaffed. Due to the extremely small number of hours dedicated to these other activities per year, however, it is more likely that these were one-time occurrences or perhaps even minor accounting errors.

With respect to callouts, not all were related to homicides. Numerous hours were spent on callouts for "shots heard" in 2010, although it may be appropriate to callout homicide investigators if the assumption was that a homicide could have occurred. Again, there appear to be several areas where calling out a homicide member would not at first glance be entirely appropriate, such as for robberies and break & enters. Although there is the possibility of a situation escalating and resulting in a homicide, it is more likely that other areas of the Department are utilizing these members when staff is short. Ultimately, supervisors should monitor the usage of callouts for offences outside of a unit's mandate. Usage of members due to shortages in other areas can indicate the necessity of departmental shifts, so at the very least, record keeping should continue to be detailed in order to track every member's time for future analysis.

Implications of Analysis for Staffing and Shifting

Callout hours for overtime were significantly higher in 2011; however, as can be inferred from the RMS data, this is likely due to the increase in crimes in 2011 that fell under this unit's mandate (particularly 2nd degree murder).

However, looking at the overtime usage for continued investigations, it would appear that members are spending significant hours outside of their regular shift schedule to work on files. Judging by the timing of the usage, it appears that members are likely to put in a very long shift on Tuesdays, then less and less as the week works on. What this likely shows is that members have to spend considerable time catching up on Tuesday if they were off for the weekend, then steadily use less before their next days off. While this is speculation, it does seem to follow a general trend. Also, as mentioned, with more members on duty on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays, it is not surprising that more overtime is used on those days for continuing investigations.

Using just the continuing investigation numbers as a proxy for staffing levels, it would appear that this unit needs an additional two (2) members to offset some of the overtime currently being used by members simply to work on files. Standby pay and callouts will always be a reality for many investigative units, and this unit is shifted to cover a great deal of the day. Therefore, the only option to address overtime is staffing levels.

Although a rough estimate, the approximate number of hours for a typical member per year can be examined against the hours allotted to continuing investigations per year. As is seen, at over 3,000 hours allocated to continuing investigations, members are using overtime relative to a 1.5 FTE in this unit.

Hours per year	2,000
Continuing Invest per year	3,092
members	12
Extra hours per member	258
Extra hours per day per member	1
(based on 234 working days)	

Although this approximately just over one hour per member per day (estimated), the total cost once overtime is calculated significantly inflates.

Amount of OT Claimed ($)	2010	2011	2012	Grand Total
Continuing Investigation	$ 232,515.69	$279,177.95	$249,369.04	$ 761,062.68

If each new member is expected to cost the Service approximately $77,000 per year[225], the ability to reduce the current members' workload and avoid this overtime cost would justify an increase of one team, or two members to the Homicide Unit. This will increase the workload for supervisors, but that is not identified as stretched at the moment and should be within the capacity of unit's current structure.

Crime Prevention

Strictly reactive, no crime prevention thought to be important.

Infrastructure and Working Environment

According to the unit, the internal infrastructure requires improvement to properly support investigative efforts. In particular, witness interview areas are apparently lacking, particularly with 'soft' interview rooms in which to talk to family members and other witnesses. Utilizing prisoner interview rooms for non-suspects is generally not considered best practices.

Additionally, there is apparently a lack of meeting rooms and project rooms. As most space appears to be shared with other units within the division, this may be placing unnecessary stress on investigators and may inhibit productivity and therefore efficiency and effectiveness.

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[225] WPS Finance Department estimates the cost of hiring and outfitting a new recruit at approximately $77,000 in 2013. This is used as a costing measure for increases to staff, as if members are advocated for in specialty or investigative departments, the filling of these positions would come by way of promotion, thereby necessitating the hiring of an additional recruit to backfill junior positions.

Additional Information

Other issues expressed from within the unit include the necessity of ensuring that supervisors have adequate experience and/or training in Homicide or a similar area. If tenure policies are modified, however, this should provide some relief as supervisors could remain with the unit longer. An additional element was that in-service training was not felt to be sufficient. If members are experiencing heavy caseloads, it could be that they are loathe to take time off for training. However, having adequate training, particularly in complicated investigation techniques, will ensure greater efficiency and effectiveness.

Recommendations

RECOMMENDATION: One additional investigative team (2 detectives)

RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.

RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.

RECOMMENDATION: A crime analyst should be assigned (or shared) to this unit to assist with strategic analysis, trend analysis, case investigation, and target identification

HISTORICAL HOMICIDE

Mandate

The Mandate of this unit is to investigate any unsolved homicides that occurred in the City of Winnipeg and have remained unsolved for a period of at least four years. This mandate is outlined in the WPS procedure manual.

Relationship to Other Units

Members of the Historical Homicide unit rely greatly on the assistance of other specialty units to assist with the day-to-day tasks of the unit. The unit consists of only four officers and therefore must request assistance to complete any endeavours that require multiple officers. During the course of investigating historical homicides, the investigators rely heavily on the work that was done by officers involved in the initial investigation. Therefore, collaboration is constant with members of uniform General patrol, the Homicide Unit, Ident, and in some cases the Sex Crimes Unit.

In attempting to move these investigations forward they often must think outside the box. They often utilize Criminal analysts, and Affiants to assist in writing Part VI authorizations for wiretap projects. HHU also use the Technical Surveillance Unit to help with the installation of listening/recording devices, and often call on the regular Surveillance Unit to follow targets and assist in the collection of cast off DNA. Lastly, they often liaise with members of the Missing Persons Unit, as many of their files become HHU files if a body is recovered.

Staffing and Shifting

This unit is staffed with one detective sergeant, and three constables.

Workflow

The Historical Homicide Unit added seven new cases in 2012 to the 62 other open investigations. Also several unique tips were received that required extensive follow up to determine their validity. The Historical Homicide unit as mentioned earlier spent the better part of the 2012 calendar year working as part of the Project Bridge Task Force investigating a serial killer.

Recommendations

> *RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.*

RECOMMENDATION: A crime analyst should be assigned (or shared) to this unit to assist with strategic analysis, trend analysis, case investigation, and target identification.

MAJOR CRIMES

Mandate

The staff sergeant Division 40 Homicide/Major Crimes may designate any incident for follow-up investigation to the Major Crimes Unit. The Winnipeg Police Service Major Crimes Unit evaluates serious criminal occurrences and assumes investigative responsibility. Serious criminal occurrences include, but are not limited to:

1) Robbery Investigations:
   a) The Major Crimes Unit will investigate all robberies and attempted robberies of financial institutions and commercial businesses. This also includes robberies of night deposits, armoured cars and money carriers.
   b) The Major Crimes Unit also investigates any robbery committed where a firearm is used or discharged in the commission of the offence, or a person(s) is seriously injured during the commission of the robbery.

2) Offences against Persons
   a) The Major Crimes Unit will assume investigative responsibility for the following:
   b) Abductions
   c) Kidnappings
   d) Extortions
   e) Home Invasions
   f) Hostage Takings
   g) Incidents where a firearm is discharged with criminal intent
   h) Criminal or suspicious incidents resulting in 'life threatening injuries as determined by hospital staff.' This does not include Division 41 mandated incidents or Motor Vehicle Collisions.
   i) If any of the above mentioned incidents are gang related, the Major Crimes Unit will be the initial contact and they will consult with the Organized Crime Unit to determine investigative responsibility.

3) The Major Crimes Unit will not assume investigative responsibility for incidents where the victim has sustained serious/non-life threatening injuries unless:
   a) It was during the commission of a robbery
   b) It is considered to be 'high profile' in nature. During business hours, the Major Crimes Unit will be the first contact; after hours, the Duty Officer will determine investigative responsibility.
   c) It is as a result of abduction, kidnapping, extortion, home invasion, hostage taking or where a firearm was discharged with criminal intent and is not investigated by the Organized Crime Unit.

4) High Profile Incidents
   a) The Major Crimes Unit will investigate all incidents that are considered to be 'high profile' in nature. These can include investigations that involve people in the public eye or could be viewed as garnering significant media and/or public attention with the exception of Division 41 mandated incidents or Homicides unless directed by the Homicide Unit supervisor.

5) Hate Crimes
   a) The Major Crimes Unit may assume investigative responsibility for crimes motivated by hate involving threats of death or grievous bodily harm or investigations, which are sensitive in nature.

6) Police Involved Shootings
   a) Generally, police involved shootings are investigated by the Homicide Unit
   b) The Major Crimes Unit will assume investigate responsibility of officer-involved shootings that involve members of the Homicide Unit.

7) Miscellaneous

The Major Crimes Unit will assist the Homicide Unit as needed including assuming investigative control for homicide Investigations as directed by the Homicide Unit supervisor.

Relationship to Other Units

Major Crimes works with Crime Analysis on a daily or weekly basis. CA provides information on individual cases and suspects on a weekly basis. During projects CA can provide daily updates of occurrences and charts.

MCU works with surveillance units on an as needed basis (this may be on a weekly or monthly basis depending on targets and requirement).

MCU may work with Ident on a daily basis at the front end of investigations.

TSU is used on a monthly basis to install covert equipment and assist with telephone intercepts on an as needed basis. (Intercepts may be every six months more.)

Staffing and Shifting

MCU operates with two sergeants, four detective sergeants, and 13 PC constables, according to the Organizational Chart. This is slightly different than the 16 PC constables that were reported by the unit. These officers are divided amongst two teams, operating on Sierra shift with day and evening coverage during the week.

Overtime Policies and Usage

The MCU utilizes callouts, with members on a rotation list. Each team is expected to be available every 2nd weekend.

This unit utilizes a large amount of overtime, averaging approximately 150 hours per week, primarily for continuing investigations and callouts.

Major Crimes Unit	Sum of WorkedHours			Sum of Amount		
REASON FOR OT	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Continuing Investigation	4,818	3,286	3,685	$ 339,361.06	$ 239,222.28	$ 277,419.70
Callout for Other Reason	2,988	4,114	2,817	$ 211,659.30	$ 299,240.99	$ 210,787.81
Court attendance	508	593	619	$ 30,404.46	$ 36,738.96	$ 40,026.52
Other	63	36	323	$ 2,692.22	$ 1,722.63	$ 15,682.00
Callout for Project			197			$ 14,229.08
Project	930	67	179	$ 65,411.58	$ 4,494.15	$ 12,375.59
Standby			9			$ 417.82
Callout for Specialty Unit		9			$ 614.56	
Court Attendance Traffic		14			$ 843.71	
Incident in progress(Civilian)	3			$ 148.20		
Grand Total	9,308	8,119	7,827	$ 649,676.82	$ 582,877.28	$ 570,938.52

Workflow

In general, workflow is not well tracked. The unit is unsure how many cases came in in 2012, how many were under their mandate, and how many were referred out. In addition, there is no tracking within the unit of clearance rates.

The following is a general representation of the types of offences that may fall under the MCU mandate. As much of their mandate is determined subjectively via the seriousness of the offence, this does not show an absolute workload measure. What is likely, however, is that robberies occupy the majority of this unit's workload.

Table 93: MCU Offences Under Mandate

Offences under Major Crimes Mandate	prior to 2008	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Grand Total
Robbery	6	1,565	1,915	1,737	1,720	1,661	8,604
Kidnapping	3	82	113	95	97	76	466
Discharge Firearm with Intent		14	24	14	10	9	71
Abduction (all types)	0	16	17	9	2	6	50

Again, not all robberies are covered by this unit, but these numbers can be used to infer workload and case clearance. Although actual case clearance is not tracked, using official Statistics Canada numbers the 'success' in clearing robbery offences can be compared to other jurisdictions:

With one of the lowest clearance rates in the country, it is imperative to better track exactly what types of offences come into the unit, how many are cleared, and what barriers exist to the successful charging of individuals.

Crime Prevention

This unit notifies the public about wanted suspects, and notifies general patrol about general crime trends (presumably with the assistance of the crime analyst). Much more can be done in terms of robbery prevention, personal safety, and other prevention campaigns.

Recommendations

Due to the amount of overtime and the inferred caseload of this unit, it is very likely that extra sworn members are warranted. However, without specific metrics regarding caseload and time and task, it is difficult to make that recommendation based solely on overtime numbers alone. The unit should immediately begin to track the cases referred in, the nature of those offences, how they are assigned, the time for each officer, and the clearance rate and charges resulting from investigations. If this shows a heavy workload (which is what is inferred by looking at the overtime), then it would likely be entirely reasonable to add an additional four members to the unit, without incurrent significant additional cost. This is based on the presumption that the addition of members would alleviate the overtime incurred for ongoing investigations.

RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.

RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.

RECOMMENDATION: A crime analyst should be assigned (or shared) to this unit to assist with strategic analysis, trend analysis, case investigation, and target identification.

ARSON

Mandate

Arson Unit Mandate (Updated January 2013)

The Arson Unit exists to reduce the number of arson fires in the City of Winnipeg through education and enforcement to:

- Ensure complete and thorough investigations are conducted with respect to fires resulting in fatalities, suspicious origins and substantial property loss.
- Maintain ongoing communications and effective working relationships with fire investigators of the Winnipeg Fire Paramedic Service and Office of the Fire Commissioner.
- Establish partnerships with outside agencies and community organizations in developing strategies and awareness campaigns for dealing with Arsons.
- Communicate with insurance companies to discover fraud motives when investigating suspicious fires.
- Locate and refer to the Youth Fire Stop Program (Fire Prevention Branch – WFPS) children under the age of 12 who exhibit fire setting behaviour.
- Facilitate in the education of our front line members regarding Arson related activities.

Relationship to Other Units

The Arson Unit is currently comprised of members from Winnipeg Police, Winnipeg Fire Department (WFD) and Office of the Fire Commissioner (OFC). The Winnipeg Fire Department investigators attend the majority of the fire calls within the City of Winnipeg, with the exception of clearly accidental fires that are determined by the Fire Captain on the truck attending the call. The WFD Fire investigator will conduct an origin and cause investigation. If the fire is determined to be suspicious or arson, or involves fatalities, the detective sergeant of the Arson Unit is contacted to enter into an investigation. Due to the complexities of fire investigations, investigators from the OFC may be required to assist in the investigation.

Staffing and Shifting

This unit is staffed with one sergeant, and four constables on November shift.

Overtime Policies and Usage

This unit accrues a relatively small amount of overtime, averaging about 15 hours per week.

Arson Unit	Sum of WorkedHours			Sum of Amount		
Reason for OT	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Callout for Other Reason	625	616	541	$ 40,436.40	$ 40,998.58	$ 39,482.31
Other	118	185	119	$ 6,136.14	$ 9,534.12	$ 6,797.65
Continuing Investigation	80	154	87	$ 5,453.75	$ 10,136.02	$ 6,384.66
Court attendance	47	59	52	$ 2,816.23	$ 3,587.01	$ 3,137.40
Incident in progress(Civilian)	174	60	11	$ 10,945.99	$ 3,808.31	$ 748.05
Heldover per Supervisor	8			$ 451.66		
Project		34			$ 2,038.15	
Callout for Specialty Unit	26			$ 1,540.14		
Grand Total	1,078	1,106	809	$ 67,780.31	$ 70,102.19	$ 56,550.07

Workflow

The unit notes there were 584 arson occurrences in 2012, primarily referred from Patrol or the WFD. Many of those instances were referred for information only, and although technically arsons, were not followed up on. The number of arsons, however, has been noted as increasing. In 2012, 75 cases were cleared and 116 people were arrested. Of the 509 not cleared, most of those were for information only.

The number of cases noted in the RMS is slightly below the unit's reported numbers, coming in at approximately 440 in 2012. Different counting methods may account for this discrepancy, or some referrals coming into the agency may not have necessitated entering into the RMS. Numbers should be checked within the unit for accuracy.

Table 95: Arson Offences

RMS Offences	prior to 2008	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Grand Total
Arson	1	298	401	374	458	421	1,953
Arson - Disregard for Human Life	1	20	16	16	12	19	84
Grand Total	2	318	417	390	470	440	2,037

Crime Prevention

The Arson Unit is currently leading an initiative in policing through social development, named Forming Integral Relationships to End Serial arsons (F.I.R.E.S). This initiative was designed to partner with various city departments, the Province of Manitoba and community organizations to develop creative solutions to the Arson challenges in Winnipeg.

This unit also maintains partnerships with community organizations such as Citizens on Patrol (COPP) to increase support in problem areas. This partnership focuses on educating COPP members on reporting overflowing

garbage bins and discarded furniture, which are often potential targets, and Home Audit Forms for households in problem areas on tools to protect themselves from arson.

Partnerships with the City of Winnipeg's Waste and Water Department have resulted in the waiving of the $20 waste removal fee for lower income areas, in order to avoid accumulation of high fire risk items.   Other partnerships focus on limiting the sale of lighting materials to youth, early detection and reporting of those exhibiting fire setting behaviour, and collaboration with designated Patrol officers to report on community issues and concerns in their area.

Recommendations

No recommendations regarding staffing at this time.

> *RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.*

COMMERCIAL CRIME

Mandate

The general work mandate of this unit involves financial crimes. This often consists of offences involving large dollar amounts, or those that are too complex to be handled at the divisional Crime level. Fraud offences (both high and low amounts), internet scams, phishing schemes, large employee thefts, credit card skimming, counterfeiting, and/or those involving organized crime groups all fall within this unit's mandate.

Relationship to Other Units

This unit may utilize the support of the Technological Crime Unit in cases where seized electronic equipment needs to be analyzed, and may utilize the Surveillance Unit for certain types of investigations.

Staffing and Shifting

This unit operates with one sergeant, four detective sergeants, and eight constables. All work on Sierra shift, covering weekday days and evenings.

Overtime Policies and Usage

This unit works a relatively small amount of overtime, generally averaging about 12 hours per week.

Table 96: Commercial Crime Unit Overtime

Commercial Crime Unit	Sum of WorkedHours			Sum of Amount		
Reason for OT	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Other	181	146	281	$ 7,844.08	$ 6,410.74	$ 12,442.25
Callout for Other Reason	87	97	125	$ 5,381.08	$ 6,565.96	$ 9,753.74
Court attendance	129	91	144	$ 7,507.28	$ 5,489.13	$ 9,266.89
Continuing Investigation	169	170	107	$ 11,878.24	$ 11,440.94	$ 7,304.12
Project	92	20	10	$ 5,600.90	$ 1,365.68	$ 614.10
Court Attendance Traffic			4			$ 245.64
Callout for Specialty Unit	30			$ 1,834.85		
Incident in progress(Civilian)	234	36		$ 15,961.68	$ 2,530.77	
Grand Total	*921*	*559*	*671*	*$ 56,008.11*	*$ 33,803.22*	*$ 39,626.74*

Workflow

This unit did not report specifics regarding their workload or workflow. It is strongly recommended that a tracking system be put into place, which keeps account of all files coming in, time and task of the members assigned, the resolution of those files, and any files that the unit is unable to complete due to staffing pressures.

Additional Information

The unit reports that for the past year it has been staffed with only half the compliments of detective sergeants. The option to attend conferences and other training opportunities for emerging techniques in financial crimes is also reported as rarely available.

Recommendations

The span of control for these units is relatively low, with one detective sergeant for four constables, overseen by one sergeant spanning two teams. While having four detective sergeants is likely necessary considering the four shifts (A/B side, days/evenings), there is little necessity in maintaining both day and evening shifts. Due to the nature of these investigations, there is no necessity in having an evening shift. Therefore, in order to increase efficiency within the unit, it is recommended that it switch to a straight day shift pattern, and remove two of the detective sergeants.

> *RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: A crime analyst should be assigned (or shared) to this unit to assist with strategic analysis, trend analysis, case investigation, and target identification.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: Shifting for this unit should be modified to align more appropriately with either internal or external service demands.*

PAWN

Mandate

The WPS Pawn Unit is responsible for the enforcement of the Criminal Code of Canada and the Doing Business In Winnipeg By-Law as it relates to pawnshops, used goods dealers, and gold buyers in the City of Winnipeg. Used goods and precious metals dealers, which category includes pawnshops, report all of their transactions daily to the Pawn Unit. These reports are uploaded into the WPS Niche reporting system, and crosschecked. There are, on average, 500 transactions per day that are reported to the WPS Pawn Unit. Pawn Unit recovers items confirmed via serial number to be stolen, and returns those items to their owners. Pawn Unit also interviews and arrests persons who have brought these items into pawnshops. Offences investigated by the Pawn Unit include Break Enter and Theft, Theft Under, and Possess Property Obtained by Crime.

Relationship to Other Units

The WPS Pawn Unit works closely with Divisional Investigative Units, as well as the City of Winnipeg Licencing branch. Generally the Pawn Unit will locate and seize stolen property from a Pawnshop, and task the file back to the Divisional Investigative Unit for follow-up when the offence involved is break and enter. Occasionally, the Pawn Unit will retain the file and continue with the investigation, a decision made in consultation with the Investigative supervisor. Several factors are involved such as the nature of the offence and the length of time between the offence and the property recovery. The Pawn Unit also works closely with the City of Winnipeg Licencing Branch to enforce the Doing Business in Winnipeg By-Law. WPS Pawn Unit has a similar working relationship with rural RCMP detachments in Manitoba as with Divisional Investigative Units.

Staffing and Shifting

This unit operates on dayshift, with one detective sergeant and one PC constable, along with one civilian clerk.

Overtime Policies and Usage

This unit uses minimal overtime.

Table 97: Pawn Unit Overtime

Pawn Unit	Sum of WorkedHours			Sum of Amount		
Reason for OT	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Other	20	100	60	$ 752.75	$ 4,262.18	$ 2,748.60
Continuing Investigation	2	13	34	$ 123.08	$ 831.86	$ 2,460.45
Court attendance	34		20	$ 2,183.77		$ 1,423.95
Court Attendance Traffic		4	4		$ 278.60	$ 270.20
Incident in progress(Civilian)			2			$ 144.93
Grand Total	56	117	120	$ 3,059.60	$ 5,372.64	$ 7,048.13

Workflow

The unit reports that 195 cases were taken on in 2012, and also notes that the number of cases has increased substantially from 135 files in 2010. Of the files referred, 25 were cleared by arrest, with another 80 referred back to the divisional Investigators. The remainder were cleared through warrant, caution or BOLO.

Additional Information

The workload in the Pawn Unit has increased substantially from 2010 to present. As stated, the number of files investigated by this unit has increased nearly 50% over this period, while staffing has remained constant. Pawn Unit is unable due to time and manpower constraints to do any pro-active work such as spot checks of Pawn shops and gold buyers to ensure compliance.

Recommendations

> *RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.*

STOLEN AUTO UNIT

The Stolen Auto Unit (SAU) is involved in any crimes involving stolen vehicles, whether related to motor vehicle collisions, committing other crimes, fraud, joyriding or for stolen car parts (chop shops). The mandate is defined in writing by the WPS organization and the unit is partly funded by Manitoba Public Insurance Corp. in order to reduce Auto theft in the City of Winnipeg. This Strategy is called WATSS: Winnipeg Auto Theft Suppression Strategy. Most auto theft investigations lead to charges under the Criminal Code of Canada and under the Manitoba Highway Traffic Act.

The SAU are also involved in the following events;

- Surveillance of known offenders (auto thieves)
- Mobile and/or stationary surveillance of areas experiencing high auto theft rates
    - This can include particular areas, shopping malls, etc.
- Warrant enquiries and arresting high risk auto theft offenders
- Curfew checks of high risk auto theft offenders
- Deployment of the ALPR (licence plate reader)
- AFIS investigations (Fingerprint hits involving possible suspects)

The SAU is also a support unit for divisional crime offices and general patrol divisions.   This unit also maintains a working relationship with Manitoba Justice, Youth Correctional Services and Prosecutions in order to liaise on a regular basis regarding high-risk auto theft offenders that breach their probation conditions. This relationship expedites the arrest process of offenders before they can steal another vehicle and potentially cause harm to the innocent citizens of Winnipeg.

Relationship to Other Units

This unit often works alongside the Identification/Forensics Unit on each case in order to obtain evidence (fingerprints/blood) on recovered stolen vehicles to substantiate a charge. They may also utilize the Technical Support Unit to set up stationary video surveillance and mobile surveillance evidence on potential suspects on a weekly basis or as deemed necessary.

Staffing and Shifting

This unit operates with one sergeant, two detective sergeants, 12 PC constables, and one civilian clerk.

Overtime Policies and Usage

This unit utilizes a moderate amount of overtime, averaging approximately 21 hours per week in total, with an average of eight hours per week in continuing investigations.

Stolen Auto Unit	Sum of WorkedHours			Sum of Amount		
Reason for OT	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Continuing Investigation	417	461	461	$ 26,407.43	$ 30,193.10	$ 31,130.94
Callout for Other Reason	230	74	196	$ 15,540.69	$ 6,030.75	$ 13,506.50
Other	160	226	257	$ 7,088.31	$ 9,593.09	$ 11,413.35
Court attendance	290	144	158	$ 16,316.08	$ 8,473.90	$ 9,781.51
Callout for Specialty Unit	16	18	29	$ 914.61	$ 1,167.38	$ 1,939.01
Incident in progress(Civilian)	979	129	8	$ 62,829.69	$ 8,510.00	$ 630.56
Court Attendance Traffic			4			$ 245.64
Heldover per Supervisor			4			$ 240.82
Project	20			$ 1,217.01		
Grand Total	2,111	1,050	1,116	$ 130,313.82	$ 63,968.22	$ 68,888.33

Workflow

Caseload has decreased (anecdotally) since 2010, likely due in large part of a successful suppression strategy.

According to the RMS, auto theft in Winnipeg has decreased approximately 65% from 2008-2012:

Table 99: Auto Thefts in Winnipeg (2008-2012)

Row Labels	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Grand Total
Theft of MV Over $5000	4,581	2,789	1			7,371
Theft of MV $5000 or Under	2,723	2,192				4,915
Motor Vehicle Theft			1	1,516	2,527	4,044
Theft $5000 or Under (of MV or Property) RETIRED		9	2,019	639		2,667
Theft Over $5000 (of MV or Property) RETIRED		7	2,102	537	1	2,647
Grand Total	7,304	4,997	4,123	2,692	2,528	21,644
Increase/Decrease over previous year		-32%	-17%	-35%	-6%	-65%

This accomplishment, and the suppression model employed, should be incorporated whenever appropriate in other units within the WPS.

Recommendations

With the significant decrease in auto theft, the work of this unit should focus on maintaining the surveillance of known auto thieves, and the continuation of the suppression strategy in place. However, the minimal use of overtime and the large size of the unit may infer that some resources should be reallocated within the Department. Although moving a great deal of resources out is not advisable as auto thefts may increase with less monitoring, moving some of the constables to other units should not adversely affect the effectiveness of this unit. The addition of a shared crime analyst will all assist with the targeting and analysis of offenders under this unit's mandate, thereby freeing up more time for the investigators, further offsetting any lost time due to decreased officers. Therefore, it is recommended that this unit be decreased by two constables.

RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.

RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.

RECOMMENDATION: A crime analyst should be assigned (or shared) to this unit to assist with strategic analysis, trend analysis, case investigation, and target identification.

INTEGRATED UNITS

Missing and Murdered Women Integrated Task Force

Also known as Project Devote, this task force (with the RCMP) focuses on unsolved historical homicides and missing person cases, where foul play is suspected. The primary link of this task force is that the victims were exploited and/or deemed to be at risk. Combined, there are 17 investigators in the unit, with one sergeant, three detective sergeants, and five PC constables originating from the WPS. The Executive Steering Committee, overseen by provincial and municipal representatives, provides oversight for the unit.

> *RECOMMENDATION: The duties and work of the Integrated Units should be reported on and assessed for functionality, effectiveness, impact of WPS contribution, and whether the participation is an effective use of WPS resources.*

Summary of Investigative Division Staffing Recommendations

Division 40 - Organized Crime	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Organized Crime					-1	2
Street Crimes			-2	-4	-20	
Green Team					-2	
Comm. Corrections Liaision					-1	1
Integrated Proceeds of Crime						
Integ. Warrant Apprehension						
Integ. Organized Crime TF						
Division Management						
Total	0	0	-2	-4	-24	3

Division 41 - Special Investigations	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Sex Crimes						1
Child Abuse						1
CEU (Vice)						
Internet Child Exploitation						
Domestic Violence				-1		1
Missing Persons						
Vulnerable Persons						
Youth Crime & Child Abuse Intake					-1	1
Int. High Risk Sex Offender						
ViCLAS - @ RCMP						
Division Management						
Total	0	0	0	-1	-1	4

Division 42 - Operations	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Crime Analysis						-7
Technical Surveillance				-1		1
Polygraph						
Technology Crime					-8	8
Forensic Imaging					-2	2
Secure Operations						
Surveillance						
CISM						
Administration						
Total	0	0	0	-1	-10	4

Division 42 - Forensics	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Forensic Identification				-4	-16	20
Forensic Artist					-1	1
Firearms Investigative Analysis					-1	1
NWEST						
Administration						
Total	0	0	0	-4	-18	22

Division 43 - Major Crimes	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Administration						
Arson						
Commercial Crime				-2		1
Historical Homicides						
Pawn Unit						
Stolen Auto					-2	
Homicide				2		1
Major Crimes						1
MMW Task Force						
NEW GIU			2	8	40	1
Total	0	0	2	8	38	4

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SERVICES REVIEW

Division 50 - Special Response Support

This division is made up of specialty support units, designed to provide additional support for front-line members during searches, high-risk apprehensions, high-risk entries, or those events that require special weapons, expertise, or equipment.   There are also several part-time units within this division that are highly specialized but do not require a full-time unit. The members of this unit are specially trained, and provide support when required on a call-out basis. These may include search and rescue, protective services, or events requiring officers trained in explosives handling.

Table 100: Division 50 Staffing

Division 50 - Ops Support	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Airport			1	4	20	
Bomb			1			
Canine			1	2	10	
Flight Operations				1	4	3
Tactical			5	4	28	
Clandestine Lab						
Crisis Negotiation						
Crowd Management						
Ground Search & Rescue						
Protective Services						
Underwater Search & Recovery						
Administration	1	1				1
Total	1	1	8	11	62	4

TACTICAL SUPPORT

Mandate

TST's primary purpose is to provide frontline tactical support to uniform officers.   TST is also responsible for planning and executing all search warrants meeting predetermined criteria.   The mandate is in writing in the procedure manual and within TST Standard Operating Guidelines.

Relationship to Other Units

TST works side by side with all uniform operations as well as most often with Street Crimes Unit and Community Support Units. TST works with SCU and CSU's continually; however, most operations are unrelated to each other. The TST responds jointly with uniformed operations to high-risk incidents, incidents of violence or those involving weapons.   Once TST is on scene, it is their responsibility to take over the lead on the high-risk incidents, and to lend support on lower risk events.

The work with investigative units often involves serving high-risk warrants. The investigative units may come to the TST with a search warrant and information regarding the targets and locations, and TST creates a tactical plan on how best to execute the search warrant. Once the warrant is turned over to TST for execution, it becomes their responsibility to ensure it is executed as successfully as possible.

Staffing and Shifting

This unit operates with one sergeant acting as the Coordinator, alongside a patrol sergeant who coordinates the Bomb Unit. Another four sergeants head four patrol sergeants and 28 constables. All constables and patrol sergeants operate on days and evenings.

Overtime Policies and Usage

This unit billed for a large amount of overtime in 2012, primarily related to "continuing investigations".

Table 101: TST Overtime

Reason for OT	Total Worked Hours			Total Charged Amount		
Tactical Support Team	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Continuing Investigation	828	1,214	1,610	$ 52,912.51	$ 81,092.79	$ 116,267.73
Other	1,531	1,543	1,596	$ 78,993.47	$ 86,937.45	$ 91,906.96
Callout for Other Reason	115	536	1,300	$ 7,470.36	$ 35,286.53	$ 88,304.03
Court attendance	683	748	655	$ 40,925.14	$ 46,192.79	$ 43,197.52
Callout for Min Strength	30	603	503	$ 2,015.51	$ 38,331.69	$ 34,724.87
Other OT	815	369	191	$ 52,320.96	$ 23,849.86	$ 12,842.94
Court Attendance Traffic	89	67	176	$ 5,343.09	$ 4,201.47	$ 11,758.32
Grand Total	*4,090*	*5,079*	*6,030*	*$ 239,981.04*	*$ 315,892.58*	*$ 399,002.37*

Most of the overtime was accrued on Tuesdays and Thursdays, presumably when units were on duty. The sergeant in charge of this unit should examine the timing of the overtime usage to determine whether there are greater efficiencies that can be reached. If most overtime is utilized in the evening at the end of the shift, then shift ladders should be adjusted accordingly.

Workflow

According to the CAD, the TST was deployed just under 2,000 times in 2012.

Table 102: TST CAD Calls 2012

TST (TAC) CAD Calls	call	on view	Total
SPECIAL ATTENTION		544	544
TRAFFIC STOP		408	408
DISTURBANCE	75	18	93
GUN SEEN	66		66
WELLBEING	52	1	53
NOISE	51		51
SUSPICIOUS PERSON	44	6	50
SHOTS FIRED	49		49
ASSISTANCE REQUIRED	8	33	41
WEAPONS NON-FIREARM	38	2	40
Top 10 Total	383	1,012	1,395
Grand Total	815	1,107	1,922

Although most appear suitable for the TST deployment, extra attention should likely be given to those on-view calls involving traffic stops. In all likelihood these involve intelligence-led stops of known or suspected offenders, but this should be verified as it utilizes nearly ¼ of this team's workload.

Recommendations

This unit needs to begin detailed tracking of their calls and utilization. Both overtime and types of tasks while on duty need to be tracked on an ongoing basis, to assess whether they are being utilized within mandate, and whether the shift pattern is efficient for their utilization. As this is one of the largest units in the department, their staffing numbers should be much more justifiable as a reactionary support-type of unit.

> *RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.*

FLIGHT OPERATIONS

Mandate

This unit provides aerial support during pursuits, robberies, violent crimes, or other events such as drug arrests.

They may be utilized for searching areas, securing and/or lighting crime scenes, and locating missing persons.

Staffing and Shifting

This unit is overseen by one patrol sergeant, with a Pilot and Line Pilot forming the flight operators (civilian).

Four constables function as Tactical Flight Officers.

Workflow

This unit responded to or assisted on over 2,500 incidents in 2012, and is shown as the primary file holder for

1,400 incidents in the CAD.

Recommendations

None at this time.

AIRPORT

Mandate

This unit is a contracted service with the Winnipeg Airport Authority. It will therefore be excluded from

recommendations.

CANINE

Mandate

The unit provides canine and handler coverage for the WPS. The special skills of dogs are useful when suspects flee and/or evidence is discarded, as their tracking and pinning ability is highly effective. The majority of the calls requiring this unit involve assisting front line members with calls for service, tracking, person searches, and drug and explosive searches. There are teams within the unit assigned specifically to assist the TST during high-risk entries, and the unit also operates closely with the Flight Ops team on many occurrences.

Staffing and Shifting

This unit consists of one sergeant, two patrol sergeants (A/B side), eight constables with assigned K9 units, and one constable with a specialty drug dog. The unit states there is sufficient staffing at the current time for the workload.

Recruitment and Tenure

Constables stay in this unit the length of the working dog's life, generally about 8-10 years. On average, constables will have to volunteer as a quarry for about 5-10 years before being accepted into the program, and will have to raise about 2-3 puppies successfully during that time.

Overtime Policies and Usage

This unit charged for minimal overtime in 2012 (< $15,000).

Workflow

The unit reports that calls for service from street units has decreased just slightly in 2012. Overall, it is reported that members attend approximately 6,000 calls each year. However, many public or community events had to be turned down in 2012 due to the priority being support for members on the street.

According to the CAD, the K9 Units were the primary units in just over 1,700 CAD events in 2012. What should be kept in mind is that because these units are support, they will be less likely to be assigned as the primary unit in CAD, despite assisting on a file. Therefore, this should be taken as a representation of a portion of their workload.

K9 CAD Calls 2012	call	on view	Total
TRAFFIC STOP		703	703
SUSPICIOUS PERSON	83	9	92
B&E RESIDENTIAL	89		89
ALARM BUSINESS	57		57
MVA	33	24	57
DISTURBANCE	35	14	49
DOMESTIC DISTURBANCE	39		39
ROBBERY - PERSON	36	2	38
WELLBEING	30	6	36
ROBBERY - COMMERCIAL	34		34
Top 10 Total	436	758	1,194
Grand Total	854	871	1,725

While the number of calls is likely an underrepresentation of their utilization, the volume of traffic stops should be examined. Although traffic duties are understandable to take on when there are no other pressing calls to attend to, there may be prevention or suppression activities that would be much more effective overall to the Service to devote the non-allocated time to.

Recommendations

None at this time.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP

These units are part-time units, made up of regular member of the WPS.

Bomb Unit

This is a part-time unit, responsible for responding to and mitigating and suspicious and/or bomb-related incidents. Suspicious packages, found explosives, improvised explosive devices and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents/threats are all within this unit's mandate to assess and deal with. Internal and external training is also a part of their workload, and can range from bomb threat planning to explosive safety. Disseminating intelligence information with regards to offences under this mandate also falls to this unit, in addition to information related to terrorist activity. This part-time unit works extensively with the TST as well as the Canine Unit for cross-training in bomb detection.

Crowd Management

This unit is utilized on a part-time basis to ensure public and police officer safety in response to incidents that have the potential for civil disorder and that may be beyond the capability of the conventional police resources. This Unit is specially equipped and trained to deal with riot situations, although all attempts are made to resolve situations and maintain or restore public order peacefully without the use of force. Unit members are trained in the use of various weapons and equipment as well as tactical communications and crowd management techniques. The unit may use the Services Crisis Negotiations to assist in negotiating a resolution as well as formation tactics to physically disperse crowds.

The CMU is responsible for attending numerous Public and Private Related Events such as:

1) Winnipeg Blue Bomber games
2) Winnipeg Jets games
3) Concerts and Events at both the MTS Centre, Investors Group Stadium and Shaw Park
4) Protests throughout the City of Winnipeg. I.e. Idle No More, 4/20
5) Special Events such as Pan-Am Games, Escorting the Olympic torch, and Political meetings.

There are two types of duty: Special Duty which is extra paid duty hired by local promoters or sports clubs for specific events Concert; and CMU Call-Outs whereby on-duty and off-duty members of the unit are deployed in an incident command structure for major events. Examples of special duty are: Blue Bomber and Jets games, which are all pre-scheduled and thus scheduled between the CMU members; and protests, where CMU is used on a call-out basis.

It is recommended that the deployment of Cadets be increased to focus on vehicular and pedestrian traffic flow in conjunction with CMU for large public events. This will allow CMU to focus more on situations and not traffic.

Protective Services Team

The Winnipeg Police Service Protective Services Team is committed to providing specialized support to ensure public and police officer safety in the resolution of high-risk incidents in which there is a real or perceived threat to human life. All members are required to maintain a high level of performance in their area of expertise and continue to improve their skills by participation in regular training exercises.

The Protective Services Team is commonly deployed in response to threats or perceived threats against individuals who fall within the VIP and IPP definitions, a working agreement with the RCMP VIP section in assisting the RCMP with IPP details. The unit may also be utilized to assist other divisions and Departments with Witness Protection duties where the suspects may or will respond with violence or weapons. These are often termed high-risk protection details. The Protective Services Team is also responsible for protection and threat assessments related to the Mayor's Office and Councillors. The unit may also be assigned alternate tasks as authorized by the Service's Executive.

Clandestine Lab

This part-time unit responds to reports of suspicious premises that are suspected of being clandestine labs. Their mandate is to secure the scene until a Chemist arrives from Health Canada to ensure safety. This unit works closely with Winnipeg Fire Service and HazMat teams to ensure scene safety during attendance and cleanup. Members of this unit attend an 80-hour Clandestine Lab course at the Canadian Police College, and respond to callouts when required. This generally averages approximately two per year.

Crisis Negotiation

This part-time unit is deployed as needed, often to between 40-60 calls per year. These may include responding with the TST to barricaded suspects, escalating incidents, attempted suicides, or hostage negotiations.

Ground Search and Rescue

These part-time units are deployed as needed, and may call on the 25 trained constables and/or the 25-50 trained community volunteers to assist in searching for missing persons, or large crime scenes. These searches often involve high-risk areas such as wilderness, riverbank, parks, etc.

Underwater Search & Recovery

This part-time unit is typically staffed with six to eight dive supervisors, 12 regular dive team members, and three spare members. They may be called in to recover bodies or vehicles that are submerged. This unit requires 24 training days per year, and is called out on approximately 15 incidents per year.

Division 51 – Community Relations

This division, also made up of Central Traffic (examined in a further section), focuses on community safety via education and outreach activities. These may include outreach to victims of crime, or to youth in the community through schools and other educational outlets. Specialty squads provide community outreach through visibility and availability of assistance, and the Diversity Unit provides a crucial link between the WPS and the prevalent community groups in the city.

The authorized strength of this division is as follows:

Table 104: Division 51 (Community Relations) Staffing

Division 51 - Community Relations	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Victim Services				1	1	2
School Education				1	6	
Diversity			1	1	4	
Crime Prevention				1	5	
Mounted Patrol					2	
Volunteer Coordinator					1	
Auxiliary Cadets			1	4	4	60
School Resource				1	12	
Division Administration (Insp. with Traffic)	1	1				2
Total	1	1	2	9	35	64

SCHOOL RESOURCE

Mandate

The School Resource Officer (SRO) program's mandate is to work in partnership with students, teachers, school administrators, School Board officials, parents, other police officers, and the community to establish and maintain a healthy and safe school community and to promote more positive relationships with police. This mandate is defined in writing through a contract that involves three parties: the School Division, the Province, and the City. Currently there are only two school divisions in the City of Winnipeg that have SROs. That is Winnipeg School Division and Pembina Trails School Division. The SROs offer counselling and classroom lectures and distribute educational resource materials, assist in the development of after-school activities, enforce the law and conduct investigations as needed, the goal being to build strong relationships and change preconceived negative views of the police.

Relationship to Other Units

The SROs work with all units of the Service depending on the circumstances. Most often they work with the Cadet Unit for various planned events at the schools. Quite often members of other units make enquiries with the SROs, especially if they are looking for a particular student that may be attending one of their schools. The SROs also obtain pertinent information from the students and staff members of the various schools regarding investigations that are ongoing. They then pass on this information to specialty units that are investigating these matters.

Staffing and Shifting

This unit is staffed with one detective sergeant, and 12 constables, all on dayshift.

Overtime Policies and Usage

This unit charged for minimal overtime in 2012, with approximately 275 out of the 368 hours charged being for meetings and fitness appraisal credits.

Workflow

According to the unit, approximately 1,700 events were arranged and attended in 2012. Some of the activities for the 2011/2012 school year included over 500 assistance events for parents, administrators and/or students; five weapons calls, five disputes, and 29 other events related to fights, drugs, or suspicious people.

Additional Information

The funding for the SROs is split between the City, the School District, and the Province.

[interviews with SROs and Patrol re: Youth]

The SROs have the opportunity to be proactive in their activities. As one SRO stated, "Coming from GP where it's call to call to call, you don't get to stay with people and follow through. Now I know the why behind some of the things I would see. In this position we get closure."

An SRO who works in an elementary school, middle school, and high school in the Downtown area or the "Inner City" described his role as one of building and promoting positive relationships with educational administration, teachers, students, and the community. According to the officer, the inner city is "like a village…everyone is somehow connected" and so establishing positive relationships with youth has a wide impact.

Much of the work of the SROs revolves around solving problems informally and within the community: "Anything I can do to make our schools run smoother." The position affords officers the opportunity to follow up on the problems and to keep up on, "the little things." One officer stated that the building of relationships has been made easier because he has, "the full support of my bosses."

The SRO position is highly proactive. The focus is getting to youth at an early age, before they are consumed by the gang lifestyle. The goal is to start with children at an early age (elementary school) and follow them through high school. Among the initiatives of the SRO are a hockey academy with police and cadet participation, a partnership with the 4Life Foundation, and partnerships with the Winnipeg Blue Bombers that involves two players coming to participate in school sports programs. This grassroots outreach work is a major part of the officer's work involves the whole community. The officer went on to state that a major goal of the work is to empower the youth at an early age and maintain it through completion of school.

Police Members Views of Youth

There was a widely held view among the police officers and community group representatives who are interviewed for the project that youth crime and delinquency, particularly among Aboriginal youth, was a critical problem facing the City. One SRO identified the key challenges facing youth as drugs, gangs, social media (cyber-bullying) and economics, noting: "Some kids have nothing." Indeed child poverty is a major issue in Winnipeg and is directly related to the rise of youth gangs.

The SRO program provides high visibility for the WPS in the community and with youth, many of whom may be at-risk. The SRO officers also have access to information that is beneficial for crime control. One officer stated, "The amount of intel that I get is invaluable." This officer stated that he works with the Community Service unit in identifying problem areas and problem people. "It's about using the resources we already have."

The officer also emphasized that the SRO position should be a longer posting than other units. According to the officer, "A spot like this needs to be more than a five-year spot. You need time to learn the idiosyncrasies of the community and the schools and to build and maintain the relationships. In addition to the time, the officer stated that the SRO position needs people that are suited for it and are willing to invest in it. He stated that the WPS needs to do a better job of recognizing members' strengths. "You see people that don't wanna be here and it really shows. We need people that wanna be in the position." For the officer, it was fine that not all officers would want to be in an SRO or community police position stating that, "Some guys would eat their gun doing this." For the WPS, they need to avoid using these members in community

Recommendations

> *RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.*

DIVERSITY RELATIONS

This unit's mandate, challenges and observations are discussed at length in sections titled, "The WPS Aboriginal and Diversity Policing (ADP) Section", within the "The Context of Policing In Winnipeg" section (click to follow link here).

Recommendations

RECOMMENDATION: The Diversity Unit should be fully staffed to what is noted in the organizational chart (1 patrol sergeant and four constables).

RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.

RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.

CRIME PREVENTION, SCHOOL EDUCATION AND COMMUNITY VOLUNTEER

The Crime Prevention, Community Volunteer, and School Education Units will be addressed within the same section below. All these units have a role to play in crime prevention, with the CP Unit focusing on community education, organizing Neighbourhood Watch programs, and Citizen on Patrol programs. The Community Volunteer position focuses on volunteer coordination, and the School Education Unit provides educational presentations in the classroom and organizes events for the youth in the community. While all have somewhat separate mandates, there is no reason why these units need be separated. Greater coordination and collaboration can likely be realized with the amalgamation and clarification of mandates.

Recommendations

As a primary focus of the Crime Prevention Unit overlaps with the recommended CSU mandate, it is recommended that this unit be amalgamated with the Community Support Unit, which would see four of the five constables appended to the complement in each district. The remaining Patrol sergeant would oversee the unit, and the remaining constable should continue on with coordinating and overseeing the Neighbourhood Watch and Citizen on Patrol programs. In addition, this unit should merge with the Community Volunteer position (below), which should be civilianized, and should be responsible for coordinating volunteers to participate in community prevention education in conjunction with the Community Support Unit and their analysts. And finally, the School Education Unit should become part of this unit, with the members focused on three functions: (1) elementary education presentations, (2) senior education presentations, and (3) community education presentations. This would require collaboration with the Neighbourhood Watch, Citizen on Patrol and the Community Volunteer Coordinator for the community education presentations/events, and the School Resource Officer and the Community Support Units (with the analysts) for school-related prevention topics and initiatives. This will streamline their structure and allow for better coordination. This will also lend itself to greater efficiency, with the following final makeup:

Table 105: Community Crime Prevention Unit

Area of Mandate	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Elementary presentations		1	
Senior school presentations		1	
Community presentations		1	
Block Watch and COP	1	1	
Volunteer Coordinator			1

RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.

RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.

VICTIM SERVICES

Mandate

This unit is made up of two civilians and two sworn members. The civilians include a social worker and volunteer coordinator, and the sworn members include a patrol sergeant and constable. This unit is called in to assist family members and/or victims in the aftermath of serious offences such as homicides, sexual assaults, and/or other death or serious violent offences. Volunteers are utilized to make contact with victims and other impacted persons by phone or mail, and provide follow up assistance however possible. This unit also extends into the community, and works with Justice partners, conducts hospital visits, runs public education presentations, and provides referrals for victims and families to resources that may be available to them.

Recommendations

None at this time.

MOUNTED PATROL

This unit, although small, has a very specialized role. Although the unit is not large enough to conduct wide patrols, the ability to positively affect public relations is an important contribution. The ability to have this team at public events, parades, etc., all reinforces the public face of the WPS. Therefore, no changes to this unit are recommended.

CADETS

Although the cadet program was outside the scope of this review, their general mandate is presented here for information.

Mandate

The Mandate of the Cadet Program is to be a support and complementary unit to front line general patrol officers. Cadets provide a visible presence by beat walking in highly populated areas such as the downtown business district, The Forks Market and Osborne Village.

Cadets are able to detain intoxicated persons (non-violent) and issue specific by-law and provincial offence notices. Cadets do not do traffic enforcement (traffic stops), but will provide support to general patrol members directing traffic at motor vehicle collisions, traffic signal issues and major crime scenes where their safety is not in danger.

Cadets also assist officers in the turnover of mental health patients detained by general patrol officers, after the patients are seen by the emergency physician and while waiting for long periods of time to see the psychiatric department. This allows front line offers to free up for higher priority calls for service.

Cadets provide a positive visible presence at numerous community events ranging from school functions to large-scale productions such Winnipeg Jet Games, Canada Day celebrations, parades etc.

Lastly, although not a specific mandate of the Cadet Unit, but still of significant value, the Cadet Unit has become a developmental environment for aspiring police officers within a team atmosphere.

Relationship to Other Units

The Cadet Unit primarily serves as a support unit to the front line general patrol units. Although, much focus still remains geographically on the downtown area, the cadets are mobile and capable of supporting front line officers in all areas of the city.

The cadets work frequently with newly assigned downtown beat officers. Cadets have been instrumental in sharing intelligence and information. Beat officers have also adopted utilizing some of the cadets by-law enforcement powers with nuisance persons that frequent chronic problem areas such as the millennium library, MTS center and Portage Place. Cadets have also been utilized with community officers in the north end.

The Cadet Unit has been extensively involved with school resource officers ranging from presentations to large sporting and community/charity events. This past winter cadets were extensively involved in a partnership with school resource officers running an inner city hockey school every Wednesday afternoon.

At crime scenes cadets provide crime scene protection and often deal directly with the supervisor of the Identification Unit. Cadets have also been utilized for ground searches with the GSAR Unit under the direction of the sergeant. On overlap days, the cadets have been utilized by the Tactical Support Unit for training purposes.

Additional Information

Overall, the Cadet Unit has had an enormous impact to alleviate front line officers regarding calls of lower priority. Cadets have also assisted greatly to free up officers from time consuming requirements such as non-violent mental health act assessments, detained intoxicated persons and crime scenes that have historically tied up police resources. Cadets have successfully targeted known problem people to police and citizens. This by-law enforcement often results in more significant charges on court breaches, warrants and weapon seizures etc. getting these problems off the streets.

The Cadet Unit has become a great developmental tool in the Police Service. The cadets not only provide a great service to officers and the community, but cadets are essentially on a yearlong plus job interview in most instances. Supervisors are truly allowed to assess an individual's character and skills toward possibly one day becoming an officer. Those cadets that have successfully become police officers are significantly ahead in their development and the community they serve.

Division 51 – Central Traffic

The Central Traffic Unit has numerous specialized mini-units or positions focused on different aspects of road safety. These include Photo Enforcement, which involves the placement and activation of photo enforcement at high-risk locations; the Collision Investigation Unit, which investigates vehicular accidents; Traffic Readers which process the paperwork for Traffic Court, and the Enforcement Unit, which conducts traffic patrols around the City.

The staff allocations for Central Traffic are below:

Table 106: Central Traffic Staffing

Division 51 - Central Traffic	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Photo Enforcement				1	1	
Traffic Collision Investigation				2	16	
Vehicle Inspection					4	
River Patrol						2
Traffic Readers					3	
Special Events/Speed Timing				1		
Impaired Driving Counter Measures						
Enforcement Section				2	10	
Administration		1	2			4
Total	0	1	2	6	34	6

As the majority of the units involve only a few members, the discussion will be conducted more holistically for the entire division, with the exception of the Collision Investigation Unit, which will be explored in greater detail below.

TRAFFIC COLLISION INVESTIGATION

Mandate

This unit's mandate is to investigate fatal and serious injury collisions, some hit and run collisions, as well as some collisions involving railway units. This unit is responsible for determining the cause of collision and liability and deciding on criminal charges or provincial statute charges when applicable. The mandate is not clearly defined nor is it accurate or reflective of what needs to be included. The mandate is very loosely interpreted by various members of the unit and is reported as being inconsistent.

Relationship to Other Units

The Traffic Collision Investigation Section (TCI) works most closely with Forensic Identification Section for scene photographs and DNA collection. They also work closely with the General Patrol Units throughout the city of Winnipeg, depending on where the crash occurs. They are called in whenever a crash occurs that falls within mandate criteria. General patrol members will secure the scene, and TCI do the rest. Ident will photograph the scene and collect DNA when applicable.

Staffing and Shifting

All members of this unit work on dayshift, and are off shift by 1700. This includes two sergeants, two patrol sergeants, and the 16 constables.

Overtime Policies and Usage

The majority of this unit's overtime is charged for Standby pay, which saw 2,752 hours of the 4,040 total charged for collision investigations (68%). Callouts accounted for 716 hours (18%) and continuing investigations accounted for 383 hours (9%). Overall, continuing investigations accounted for just over seven hours per week. What this points to is a shifting issue: as all investigators are on dayshift, it becomes necessary to keep a unit on standby. Night collisions (often fatal) surely dictate that overtime will be a necessity. However, if investigators were shifted more appropriately, the use of Standby pay might be reduced, as would be the need for callouts.

Workflow

According to the Winnipeg Public Works Department[226], traffic collisions involving a fatality between 2001 and 2010 fluctuated between 11 per year (2009) and 20 per year (2010). According to the unit, the workload is approximately 50 cases per year and has remained relatively steady year after year. Referrals may come through when a crash has just occurred, when a Medical Examiner requests consultation following a fatality, or when a district officer refers a file to the unit for follow-up.

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[226] http://www.winnipeg.ca/publicworks/Transportation/Collision_reports/2010collisions/Section1_2010.pdf

Additional Information

The unit advocates for a broader mandate, including participation on serious crime scenes where the Investigator's skill at drawing scenes may be utilized in addition to the photographs taken by the Forensic Units. The primary issue, as reported by the unit, is the lack of coverage beyond dayshift.

Recommendations

Based on the number of collisions and the unit's reporting of the workload, it is observed that this unit is likely overstaffed for their mandate. One of two options appears. The first is that of broadening the mandate. While this is a worthy pursuit, given the workload pressures and deficiencies in other areas, it is not feasible to not take advantage of the excess personnel in other areas of the Service. The second option is to reduce the number of Collision Investigators. This is ultimately deemed the best way to proceed. As the Enforcement Unit is extremely understaffed and unable to broaden over several shifts, the Enforcement Unit should take up the additional personnel in the Collision Investigation Unit.

The size of this unit should be reduced to 12 members, or six on each side, operating on a days/evenings structure. This would allow for three investigators to be on for the majority of the day, giving greater coverage and reducing the need for standby pay and callouts. This would also necessitate adding two detective sergeants to the unit to supervise the additional two shifts.

This unit should also work closely with the Winnipeg Public Works Department to obtain and analyst statistics regarding significant traffic accidents, fatalities, and other events within their mandate. This will help refine staffing needs and shifting times, as they should (as in Patrol) be shifted when the need is greatest.

> *RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.*

ENFORCEMENT SECTION

Mandate

The Enforcement Section is responsible for maintaining safety on the streets of Winnipeg by identifying and ticketing (where appropriate) individuals who are violating speed limits, disobeying traffic control devices, or are driving under the influence. Overall, the WPS reports delivering over 56,000 citations in 2011, including over 22,000 citations for speeding and another 13,000 for disobeying traffic control offences. New citations are also coming into play regarding cellular phone use, and photo radar cameras are being used to issue citations to those using their phones while operating their motor vehicle. In all, over 44,000 citations for mobile phones were issued in 2011.

Staffing and Shifting

This unit is staffed with 10 constables overseen by two sergeants, on A and B side (5 per day). All members are on dayshift. This is problematic, as traffic demands continue to occur after the daytime hours. Particularly, DUI offences are more often reported in the evening hours. Overall, it is not logical to stop enforcing traffic laws in the evening, and likely safety concerns would dictate that traffic laws should be enforced even more so in the evening when the dark raises the risk for pedestrians and other non-motor users of the roadways. What also appears to be happening is that without TEU support, the duty of enforcing traffic laws falls to General Patrol members. While much of their traffic enforcement activity is officer-initiated, with sufficient support from the Traffic Unit, they would feel more at liberty to focus on general offences and proactive enforcement, knowing that violators are being monitored. This phenomenon can be further examined using the CAD data:

Looking at all the traffic offences occurring in the City, it becomes clear that the responsibility for traffic enforcement is falling to General Patrol after the TEU is off shift at 1700:

Hour	Taken by Patrol		Taken by Traffic Units		Total Traffic Events
00:00-01:00	1,228	63%	115	6%	1,940
01:00-02:00	1,030	67%	69	4%	1,538
02:00-03:00	427	55%	40	5%	775
03:00-04:00	260	56%	12	3%	462
04:00-05:00	252	64%	3	1%	396
05:00-06:00	297	75%	7	2%	394
06:00-07:00	193	57%	18	5%	337
07:00-08:00	157	30%	200	38%	524
08:00-09:00	445	42%	232	22%	1,062
09:00-10:00	385	35%	270	24%	1,109
10:00-11:00	365	30%	264	22%	1,212
11:00-12:00	424	34%	250	20%	1,260
12:00-13:00	226	24%	221	23%	957
13:00-14:00	258	23%	288	25%	1,130
14:00-15:00	408	28%	298	20%	1,455
15:00-16:00	513	34%	268	18%	1,494
16:00-17:00	315	34%	143	16%	916
17:00-18:00	421	37%	149	13%	1,153
18:00-19:00	523	36%	163	11%	1,447
19:00-20:00	441	31%	175	12%	1,401
20:00-21:00	421	33%	174	14%	1,269
21:00-22:00	373	39%	102	11%	954
22:00-23:00	789	53%	97	6%	1,494
23:00-00:00	1,186	59%	124	6%	2,027

As can be seen, there are numerous traffic violations that occur in the evening and at night, and although these are essentially proactive and officer-driven, General Patrol may feel that it is necessary to enforce the traffic laws themselves when the TEU is not on shift (as they are aware that no one else will be doing it). Of particular concern are the plethora of traffic offences that are occurring between 2300 and 0200, to which the majority are falling to Patrol to enforce. Again, due to the likelihood of impaired drivers later on in the evening, and the elevated risk of night driving, the choice not to enforce traffic during the later hours is not in the best interest of public safety.

Therefore, it is recommended that the TEU operate on a more comprehensive shift structure, providing coverage for both days and evenings.

Overtime Policies and Usage

The following represents all overtime charged by the Traffic Division, excluding the Collision Investigation Unit. While this may overestimate the actual overtime charged by just the Enforcement Unit, due to the size of the remaining units, is should be a reasonable estimation. In all, this section charged for a great deal of overtime:

Table 108: Traffic Section Overtime

Traffic Section	Total Worked Hours			Total Cost Amount		
Reason for OT	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Callout for Other Reason	3,830	6,197	4,260	$ 231,389.33	$ 398,865.53	$ 285,128.33
Court attendance	1,204	1,043	1,082	$ 72,028.42	$ 63,879.23	$ 69,985.65
Other OT	764	821	1,200	$ 51,840.32	$ 50,260.82	$ 76,860.45
Other	1,125	831	766	$ 62,071.58	$ 45,641.37	$ 42,227.69
Continuing Investigation	179	153	200	$ 11,992.56	$ 10,679.51	$ 14,463.18
Standby	38		8	$ 1,677.90		$ 378.90
Callout for Min Strength			20			$ 2,173.92
Callout for Project			62			$ 4,553.35
Court Attendance Traffic			188			$ 12,556.30
Grand Total	*7,139*	*9,043*	*7,785*	*$ 431,000.11*	*$ 569,326.46*	*$ 508,327.77*

A great deal of the overtime was for callouts. Further examination revealed that 78% of the hours charged for Callouts (Other Reason) were for police escorts. Due to the nature of the overtime data, it is impossible to see whether those police escorts were during daytime working hours or evening hours. However, most occurred during weekdays, and likely required callouts due to the size of the unit and the other priorities that had to be handled. This lends further credence to the necessity of expanding both the size and the coverage of this unit. It may be the case that the cost of these escorts should be incurred by the person or organization requesting the escort; however, that should not negate the necessity of providing adequate traffic enforcement coverage to the City of Winnipeg.

Recommendations

Modify the shifting to cover days and evenings. However, with the size of the current unit, expanding coverage will necessitate thinning the complement on shift, which will not be efficient or effective. In order to offset the General Patrol traffic duties, the TEU must be properly staffed to cover all four shifts. Therefore, it is further recommended that an additional 10 constables and two patrol sergeants be added to the section. This will result in five constables and one patrol sergeant covering traffic enforcement between the hours of 0700 and 0100. This will increase road safety for the City, as well as offset some of the additional burden on General Patrol to monitor traffic enforcement rather than focusing on crime prevention and proactive activities in their districts.

RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.

RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.

RECOMMENDATION: Shifting for this unit should be modified to align more appropriately with either internal or external service demands.

VEHICLE INSPECTION

Mandate

[From the City of Winnipeg website]:

The Vehicle Inspection Unit is responsible for the enforcement of commercial vehicle and light vehicle laws within Winnipeg city limits. Their mandate is to enhance vehicle safety through education and enforcement. The unit also provides escorts for oversized loads and presents safety lectures to trucking companies. The officers also assist the public by answering questions about commercial vehicles, as well as passenger vehicles.

All Vehicle Inspection Unit officers are trained Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) Inspectors. This qualifies them to conduct cursory mechanical inspections on commercial vehicles and enforce transportation industry legislation, including driver qualification, hours of operation, mechanical fitness, load/cargo security and the transportation of dangerous goods.

This unit is made up of two constables on each side (4 total), reporting to the patrol sergeant under the Enforcement Section.

Recommendations

> *RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.*

RIVER PATROL

Mandate

This unit generally operates with two staff in winter, but adds on seasonal staff (four additional) for the summer months. Their mandate is to patrol and monitor waterways, and maintain safety and proper boating and water usage regulations. This may also include the seasonal tasks of patrolling riverbanks on quads, and utilizing snowmobiles to patrol frozen areas in the winter.

Recommendations

None at this time.

Summary of Operational Support Services Staffing Recommendations

Division 50 - Ops Support	Insp.	Staff Sgts.	Sgts.	Det/Pat. Sgts.	Constables	Civilian
Airport						
Bomb						
Canine						
Flight Operations						
Tactical						
Clandestine Lab						
Crisis Negotiation						
Crowd Management						
Ground Search & Rescue						
Protective Services						
Underwater Search & Recovery						
Total	0	0	0	0	0	0

Division 51 - Community Relations	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Victim Services						
School Education				-1	-3	
Diversity						
Crime Prevention					-4	1
Mounted Patrol						
Volunteer Coordinator						-1
Auxiliary Cadets						
School Resource						
Division Administration (Insp. with Traffic)						
Total	0	0	0	-1	-7	0

Division 51 - Central Traffic	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Photo Enforcement						
Traffic Collision Investigation				2	-4	
Vehicle Inspection						
River Patrol						
Traffic Readers						
Special Events/Speed Timing						
Impaired Driving Counter Measures						
Enforcement Section				2	10	
Administration						
Total	0	0	0	4	6	0

DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT SERVICES REVIEW

Division 31

This division focuses on the administration and management of records, public inquiries, reporting requirements, and evidence processing. Most units are staffed by a majority of civilians, and some units such as the Alternate Phone Response are informally staffed with accommodated sworn members.

The breakdown of unit staffing is as follows:

Table 109: Division 31 Staffing

Division 31 - Development Support	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Evidence Control Unit			1			14
Central Reading			1		18	
Court/Property Forfeiture					1	12
Arrest Processing				4	20	
Central Reporting Unit			1			
Service Center				2	42	
Alternate Phone Response						
Report Car				2	14	
Info Cell (CPIC)						29
Direct Voice Entry (DVE)						35
Records Compilation						30
Administration	1	1				3
Total	1	1	3	8	95	123

EVIDENCE CONTROL UNIT

Mandate

This unit is mandated to maintain the continuity and accurate recording of property and exhibits for the WPS. This includes storage, retrieval, return and disposal of all property/exhibits in the care and control of the Service. This unit is also responsible for storing found property, and collecting property and evidence in various WPS buildings.

Relationship to Other Units

The ECU is a support unit for Police operations. This includes all uniform and plain clothes members. The role of the ECU is to receive from and provide property to the requesting officer as required for court or further investigational need. Additionally, to dispose of property as directed by the membership. This role is performed daily.

Staffing and Shifting

This unit is headed by one sergeant, and staffed with 11 Property and Exhibit technicians (civilian), two civilian clerks, and often accommodates seven to ten sworn members (although this is not technically an authorized staffing component). Members all currently work dayshift.

Overtime Policies and Usage

This unit charged for minimal overtime in 2012; however, this was down from a high of over 800 hours in 2010, noted as being primarily due to "backlog of work". It is likely that this pressure on the staffing of the unit is a result of the changes they note in legislation and software systems (discussed below). The relatively small amount of overtime in 2012 (183 hours) is more than likely due to accommodate members filling out the staffing complement on a short-term basis.

Workflow

In 2012, the ECU received 54, 211 items (property and exhibits) and disposed of 53, 353 items (total of 107,564). That amounts to handling just under 300 exhibits (receiving and disposing) per day. If hosting a complement of nine sworn members in addition to the 11 civilian technicians that would come to nearly 25 items per day, per staff member. Assuming no sworn members, that would mean processing nearly 45 exhibits per day. With the time required filling out paperwork and logging each exhibit, it is easy to understand why the backlog continues to be significant.

ECU general side: Workflow generally comes from the members seizing property/exhibits. These exhibits must be entered into the data report systems, stored, retrieved as needed for Court or investigations, shipped and/or disposed of.

Firearms Control side: Clerks manage the administration of court dispositions/firearms licencing/firearms return. The unit reports that this side of their operation has an extremely heavy workload, which has been increasing following firearms regulation laws in 2005.

The unit reports backlog in the following areas:

Trust Cash: The backlog in this area is approximately five months and largely due to a software changeover and the tech problems it created in 2010.

Drug Forfeiture: The backlog here is due to involvement of outside agencies and other WPS members not completing their administrative work. Relying on others to be timely in their duties creates a backlog, which is difficult to overcome. It is estimated to be approximately five to six months.

General Drug Intake: The volume of cases coming in and the time it takes to process the drugs exceeds the capacity of this unit. These members process drugs for the Crown on an as needed basis, dictated by the pending court docket. The backlog currently sits at almost one year.

Firearms Control: Due to the expanding duties in this position a current backlog of approximately five months exists.

Infrastructure and Working Environment

With only one supervisor, the unit reports that the supervision is inadequate.

Additional Information

The maintenance and timely processing of property and exhibits is necessary to ensure the issue of continuity of evidence is not challengeable in court, and details of the property records are entered into the RMS in a timely fashion to assist in investigations and preparation of court materials. The delay in entering or retrieving property may lead to investigational errors or delays in solving cases; or, dismissal of cases due to poor evidence handling or delays in proving the continuity of the chain of evidence. While this unit works behind the scenes and may be easy to gloss over in reviews such as this, their work is extremely important to the legal and operational functioning of the Service.

As this unit is functioning largely due to the reality of accommodated members, a more permanent solution is likely necessary. However, with the recommendations of numerous civilianized positions throughout the Service, this unit may become one of the primary recipients of accommodated members for the Service. It is recommended, however, that the unit keep close track of when gaps in staffing occur due to a lack of accommodated members, as that will give reasonable backup to the need for more permanent members.

Recommendations

The Service aims to accommodate between 15 and 20 members in this unit. This can be accomplished by putting the priority of this unit above other areas where accommodated members may have historically been sent. This will be discussed in greater detail alongside the Alternate Phone Response Unit and the Service Center.

As per the civilianization analysis, the sergeant position in charge of this unit should be civilianized as a special provincial constable to oversee the unit. A second SPC should also be added to the unit to assist with supervision. With one supervisor (currently the sergeant) overseeing 13 civilians and up to 10 sworn members, this span of control is far too large. Adding a second supervisor is particularly necessary given the recommendation for increasing the accommodated sworn positions in this unit.

> *RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.*
>
> *RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.*

CENTRAL READING

Mandate

Central Reading is responsible for efficiently and effectively approving all reports from general patrol, division crime units, planned response and phoned in reports. In addition to completing the "UCR" scoring the UCR ensures accuracy and completeness of the reports while providing direction and feedback to frontline officers and their supervisors. Part of the mandate is to improve accountability internally and externally. The unit reports that a Central Reading manual is being created to streamline the process and ensure that the mandate is achieved.

Relationship to Other Units

Central Reading deals directly with reports in consultation with constables and supervisors from all General Patrol Units, Divisional Detective Units, Station Duty, Report Cars, Street Crimes Unit, Integrated Warrant Unit, Airport Unit, as well as Sheriff Officers with arrests.

Staffing and Shifting

This unit operates under one sergeant who oversees Arrest Processing and Property Forfeiture, and is comprised of 18 constables on Delta shift, with 24 hour per day coverage.

Overtime Policies and Usage

This unit charged minimal overtime per member in 2012 (875 hours total, or 48 hours per member per year). What is important to note, however, is that a nearly 40 percent of that overtime was charged for fitness appraisal benefits (160 hours) and statutory holiday pay for jobshares (169 hours). Only 430 hours (49%) were related to callouts for minimum strength.

Workflow

The unit reports that there is no backlog in their report processing.

Additional Information

In response to a UCR audit focused on erroneous statistical data, it was recommended that CRU no longer be responsible for UCR scoring. This should rather be under the responsibility of the DVE Unit.

Recommendations

This recommendation will be tied in with the Civilianization section of this report. Specifically, it is recommended that this unit be disbanded and an alternate service model be put into effect. It is observed that the patrol sergeants in General Patrol (and other non-Invest units) do not read the reports of their constables,

nor do the administrative sergeants assigned in the same area. This phenomenon has necessitated this unit in order to quality control reports from the front-line units, but is deemed an inefficient use of resources. The patrol sergeants should act as a supervisor and mentor to the constables on the front lines, which includes review of their report writing skills and investigations. This should not be taken outside of the unit. The patrol sergeant is in the best position to periodically review members' reports, advise on shortcomings, and keep track of those constables under their watch who need additional assistance in this area. They interact with them on each shift, and are in a much better position to know the needs of their squad. As a second level of quality control, the Administrative sergeant should take on the responsibility of reviewing reports, perhaps following the patrol sergeant's request for a 'second glance'. As the role of the Direct Voice Entry (DVE) Unit is to enter the reports properly, maintain UCR coding standards, and ensure all necessary elements are completed in the RMS, the only missing quality control piece comes by way of recommendations regarding actual investigative steps. This, obviously, is not appropriate to come from DVE as a civilian unit, but should also not come from a unit external to the workings of each platoon. Again, the mentoring and supervision needs to come within the units on Patrol, and thus, should be the responsibility of the patrol sergeant and administrative sergeant.

COURT/PROPERTY FORFEITURE

Mandate

The Property Forfeiture Unit position was set up to effectively and efficiently disclose and vet reports to be turned over to the Provincial Property Forfeiture Unit. This position deals with the Province of Manitoba Property Forfeiture Unit daily and Evidence Control frequently, and other units as required for disclosure and vetting of reports.

Recommendations

This position appears to be an administrative position that does not require investigative or enforcement duties. Therefore, as per the civilianization analysis, this should be a civilianized position.

ARREST PROCESSING

Mandate

Arrest Processing processes all arrested persons citywide who are to be detained or appear before a magistrate. The purpose of the unit is to get front line officers back on the street as soon as possible. This unit is staffed with four patrol sergeants and 20 constables on Echo shift.

Overtime

This unit charged for minimal amounts of overtime on a per-person basis (~ one hour per week, per member). However, the majority of the overtime was charged for "callout for minimum staffing". This may point to deficiencies in the staffing model, or an insufficient number of members available to cover all shifts. The 20 authorized strength allows for five members per shift; however, if the minimum is set at five, then attaining this on a regular basis will be next to impossible with holiday time and other requisite time off. If the 'usability factor' of officers is around 70%, then the minimums for this unit should be set at three for each shift, allowing some buffer room when requisite time off dictates that all five cannot be on shift. The minimums for this unit were not reported, but should be modified if they are higher than three.

RECOMMEDATION: This unit has been considered for civilianization, as it may be that special constables would be able to fulfill the job function, allowing sworn members to be redeployed. However, in the absence of job summaries, it is recommended that these positions be reviewed as to the necessity for sworn members performing the jobs.

CENTRAL REPORTING UNIT

The CRPG is responsible for answering approximately 30,000 calls per year. These calls are generally property related reports including motor vehicle collision reports (hit and runs) that can be taken over the phone where there are no suspects.

These calls are taken by Service Center and APR members in addition to their other duties. The CRPG line has grown into a unit in its own right as they have taken on the majority of calls that used to go to the Communications Center prior to the IVR being implemented. The unit reports that there are numerous times where they are unable to answer this phone line, which can be frustrating for callers.

This unit is made up of the Service Center, Alternate Phone Response, and the Report Car.

(1) SERVICE CENTRE

Mandate

The Service Centre Section is responsible for providing high quality service to the members of the public at the police service centers throughout Winnipeg by:

- Fielding enquiries in person and by telephone
- Taking various reports
- Attending to other related police duties

The Service Center personnel work in conjunction with whatever division they are situated in on a daily basis. Also, our Public Safety Building members work daily with Division 11, Street Crime, Division 41, Beat Unit, and internally with Arrest Processing.

This unit is staffed with two patrol sergeants, and 42 constables, on A/B side dayshift.

Workflow

This unit's workflow comes by way of community members attending in person to report events, or calling over the phone for reporting or requesting general information. The unit reports that approximately 70,000 to 90,000 calls or walk-ins are handled each year. In one month, it is reported that the 42 Service Center members wrote 3,164 reports. This is a workload of approximately 75 reports per member per month, or just over four reports per day. This would be in addition to the average of nine calls per day. Undoubtedly, there are some busier times and busier days, but overall, the workload does not appear to be overwhelming.

Recommendations

It is recommended that the majority of the positions in this unit become civilianized. Many departments across Canada have civilians as the primary contact for inquiries, as not all duties require a sworn member. The unit has echoed this sentiment. It is particularly emphasized that the duty of taking accident reports over the phone does not necessitate a sworn member. As Internet reporting is allowable (and should be encouraged), civilians are perfectly capable of taking over this responsibility. In addition, the DVE Unit reports that they handle the entering of accident reports, so there is obviously some overlap in mandates (or a misunderstanding about whose mandate it is). It is acknowledged that having a sworn member available would be advantageous in some situations, so a combination of civilian clerks and sworn members would undoubtedly see a more efficient functioning of this unit, allowing resources to be redeployed where needed. An ideal makeup would see one sworn member in each Service Center, supported by two civilians. This would keep the actual service levels the same at each center, but with increased efficiency and cost effectiveness.

> *RECOMMENDATION: Change staffing to 16 sworn members and 26 civilians in this unit (for a total of 42 as before). This allows for one sworn member per location on day shift, and a day and evening structure for the location with extended hours.*

(2)   ALTERNATE PHONE RESPONSE

Mandate

The Alternate Phone Response Section is responsible for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of our police response by:

- Monitoring the calls for service queue and identifying those calls that are appropriate for service through a telephone response and then provide this response.
- Establishing contact with complainants of selected calls for service, which require a physical police presence in order to provide advice and direction prior to police attendance.

Alternate Phone Response has NO authorized complement and is currently staffed with members that are unable to work the street for various reasons.

Staffing and Shifting

Although none are authorized positions, the unit reports that they generally function with 10 accommodated constables on Echo shift.

Recommendations

As per the recommendations for the Report Car below, two patrol sergeants and 14 constables should be permanently re-assigned to form the base for the Alternate Phone Response Unit. This should not preclude accommodations of additional staff; however, as stated above in the Evidence Control Unit section, the priorities should be to accommodate members in that unit as well as the APR Unit.

Having members available to take lower-priority calls will have enormous benefits throughout the Service. As has been shown earlier, the pressure on General Patrol is enormous, and the cadets are only able to take lower-priority calls in some areas where they are deployed. Having a more solid and permanent APR will take some of the pressure off of GP, allowing them to become higher functioning and more proactive, and will allow for a greater level of service to those individuals who phone in with low-priority calls. Rather than waiting hours for a GP or cadet to respond, they can speak with an officer from the APR much sooner than they would otherwise. For many community members, having phone contact is an agreeable resolution to complaints. In other cases, they may insist of having someone attend, which the officer will be in a better position to assess and weigh against all other factors (such as workload backlog, severity of the complaint, ability to solve, etc.).

It is likely that the APR should reduce to one shift per day, covering the busiest times. Examining the Patrol analysis, it can be seen that the heaviest burden on General Patrol members occurs between 1300 and 2200. Once nightshift begins and the call volume decreases, this burden alleviates somewhat. However, throughout much of the morning, the demands are manageable. Therefore, in order to provide the most effective service and efficient support to Patrol, it is likely that the APR would be at its more effective on a straight evening shift, ideally commencing at 1300. Given the constraints of the Collective Agreement, the starting time can likely only be pushed back to 1500, which would give adequate coverage for low-priority calls between 1300 and 2200.

However, looking at the CAD data can give an alternate view on the best shifting model. By examining when the lower-priority calls come in, the best shift pattern for the APR can be seen. Although staffing Patrol's busiest times would mean an afternoon shift, the number of low-priority calls coming in appears to peak mid-day.

> *RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.*

> *RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.*

CALLS ONLY	Higher Priority (0-5)	Lower Priority (6-9)	Higher Priority (0-5)	Lower Priority (6-9)
00:00-01:00	5,364	582	5.37%	4.27%
01:00-02:00	4,702	490	4.71%	3.60%
02:00-03:00	4,403	414	4.41%	3.04%
03:00-04:00	3,780	328	3.79%	2.41%
04:00-05:00	2,943	260	2.95%	1.91%
05:00-06:00	2,251	184	2.26%	1.35%
06:00-07:00	1,888	214	1.89%	1.57%
07:00-08:00	2,038	325	2.04%	2.39%
08:00-09:00	2,415	617	2.42%	4.53%
09:00-10:00	2,718	656	2.72%	4.82%
10:00-11:00	3,157	802	3.16%	5.89%
11:00-12:00	3,236	709	3.24%	5.21%
12:00-13:00	3,750	748	3.76%	5.49%
13:00-14:00	4,091	732	4.10%	5.37%
14:00-15:00	4,345	723	4.35%	5.31%
15:00-16:00	4,537	731	4.55%	5.37%
16:00-17:00	5,000	682	5.01%	5.01%
17:00-18:00	5,243	651	5.25%	4.78%
18:00-19:00	5,110	631	5.12%	4.63%
19:00-20:00	5,451	561	5.46%	4.12%
20:00-21:00	5,440	589	5.45%	4.32%
21:00-22:00	5,816	599	5.83%	4.40%
22:00-23:00	6,232	696	6.24%	5.11%
23:00-00:00	5,893	695	5.90%	5.10%
Grand Total	99,803	13,619	100%	100%

With 14 constables available, the best shifting model would ensure there is adequate coverage to receive the number of low-priority calls that come in. Judging from the table above, this appears to be approximately two per hour during the busiest times (day/evening). With the need to provide more backup to Patrol in the evening hours, however, a slightly modified shift schedule would likely work best. Considering all of these factors, remaining with an Echo shift appears the most appropriate for the workload and community demands. However, as there are an odd number of constables, the best way to use these resources would be to staff Platoon 4s (A and B side) with four members, saving three for Platoon 3s (A/B). The patrol sergeants, on the other hand, should work a straight evening shift, as there is more coverage around the Service during the day. Supervision or support, if needed for the dayshift contingent, could be provided by the Central Reporting Unit sergeant, who would be available during the day. The second option, available as a backup, would be to obtain supervision or advice from the district sergeant where the call originated.

(3)   REPORT CAR

Mandate

The Report Car Section is responsible for providing a high level of customer service by attending calls for service appropriate for one-member units as well as engaging in other appropriate duties such as traffic enforcement and beat walking. This unit works and interacts daily with the Divisional Crime Units, General Patrol, Traffic Unit as well as the Forensic Ident Unit.

This unit is staffed with 14 constables and two patrol sergeants on Echo shift, providing seven day per week coverage, spanning days and evenings.

Recommendations

It is recommended that the placement of this unit be modified. This unit functions much like an extension of Patrol, and as such, should be situated in Patrol. Rather than have 14 constables and two patrol sergeants permanently assigned, however, a de facto assignment to the Report Car should be made in the districts when an odd number of Patrol officers are on shift. This determination should be left to the sergeant within each district, who should have the flexibility to move the solo Patrol officer to the Report Car or Foot Patrol Unit as needed for that particular shift. It is a duplication of efforts and inefficient to have this "patrol" unit functioning outside the control of the district sergeant.   This would allow the staffing in this unit to become a permanent fixture in the Alternate Phone Response Unit, which should not be operating solely with accommodated members.

Providing that General Patrol is reorganized and staffed up to the recommended numbers, this unit should be disbanded and the staff moved over to permanently form the Alternate Phone Response Unit. This will allow for continued support for lower-priority calls from the APR, and will ensure that higher-priority calls will have better service levels from Patrol.

INFO CELL (CPIC)

Mandate

CPIC (Canadian Police Information Center) unit is responsible for thorough data assessment and verification of entries into the national system according to National CPIC guidelines. All information entered must be precise and entered in a timely manner as CPIC is available to agencies across North America on a 24-hour basis. Agencies that have access to this information have the ability to make judgement calls according to the entries on CPIC, and offenders are apprehended based on the information on CPIC. CPIC operators receive, prioritize, verify and process requests from documents received for entry, variation and removal from CPIC. CPIC operators receive requests from WPS officers and members, outside police agencies, the courts and other individuals authorized by WPS to receive information according to policies and procedures enforced by CPIC (National) and WPS. These requests are of various natures by phone or radio including CPIC queries to see if persons are Wanted, Enforceable Conditions from Court Orders, Missing Persons, etc. Persons can also be queried through CPIC for NCIC queries from the USA. The CPIC Unit is responsible for monitoring all incoming messages for WPS through CPIC and ACUPIES. Operators are responsible for responding to these messages immediately with information, action to the appropriate division or person that the message pertains to. Next of Kin, Stolen Vehicle Recoveries, Warrant Extensions, BOLF'S, etc. are some of the examples of messages received. CPIC operators are responsible for entry of all person, property and security entries on CPIC. Person entries include Warrants, Special Interest Persons, Surveillances, Prevention & Protection Orders, High Priority Domestic Violence Court Orders, All Court Orders, High Risk Offender Prohibitions, and Peace Bonds.

Relationship to Other Units

CPIC operators work with various units on an ongoing basis. Most of the daily tasks are routed through DVE; however, officers also task the unit with different types of requests that need to go on CPIC.

The Court Unit has a lot of interaction with CPIC due to charges and conditions that go on CPIC, as well as Warrants that are delivered daily (Mon-Fri) by the Court Unit to be entered on CPIC, or cancellation of warrants. Records & Report Management Disposition Section has a lot of interaction with CPIC as all their dispositions are forwarded to CPIC for removal of court orders that have been disposed. Specialty police units (such as Warrant Unit) have daily interaction with CPIC due to executing warrants, and all police officers have to contact CPIC for warrants, copies of court orders, etc., as CPIC enters all these documents and holds them in the office. As Missing Persons works Mon-Fri, CPIC takes over all their entries after hours and on weekends.

Staffing and Shifting

This unit is made up of one Coordinator and one supervisor on dayshift; four shift leaders on days and evenings; and, 24 operators on days/evenings/nights. The operators work on a 7-day per week basis, and provide support to the Missing Persons Unit and Court Unit by managing their CPIC entries when their units are not staffed (overnight and on weekends).

Overtime Policies and Usage

This unit charged minimal overtime in 2012, totalling approximately 314 hours.

Workflow

CPIC's workload comes in various ways. Most of the Maintenance entries –SV's, Property & Securities are tasked via NICHE computer system, Prohibitions & Undertaking are also tasked via NICHE. All other Court Orders come from the Courts daily, including Recognizances, Undertakings, Conditional Sentence Orders, Prohibitions, Peace Bonds, Protection/Prevention Orders, etc. Warrants are received mainly by Court Unit, however, officers deliver high priority warrants as well as Probation Services deliver High Priority Warrants.

Table 111: CPIC Unit Workflow 2012

CPIC Entries as per 2012 Statistics	Add	Modify	Remove	Total Entries	Entries per Member/year	Est. Entries per Work Day, per member
Accused Persons	8,015	13,929	615	22,559	940	4.7
Warrants	8,096	2,136	9,573	19,805	825	4.1
Missing Persons	4,160		3,288	7,448	310	1.6
Prohibitions	964	58	1,128	2,150	90	0.4
Prot/Prev Orders	439	747	496	1,682	70	0.4
Cond Sent Orders	344	303	264	911	38	0.2
Peace Bonds	445	34	373	852	36	0.2
Probation Orders	4,326	1,736	3,909	9,971	415	2.1
Recogs/Undertakings	10,153	3,463	4,174	17,790	741	3.7
Prop/Securities	8,126		7,903	16,029	668	3.3
Stolen Vehicles	1,750	44	1,812	3,606	150	0.8
License Plates	775	16	997	1,788	75	0.4
TOTAL	**47,593**	**22,466**	**34,532**	**104,591**	**4,358**	**22**

This unit reports normally having a backlog. Priority Orders such as Domestic Violence, NCC's, and High Risk Offenders are entered as soon as possible. Phone & Radio queries consume a large amount of time, especially when it involves faxing warrants and court orders (which is the majority of the time), so workloads back up due to phones, radios, executing warrants, front counter requests, CPIC messages, etc. Warrants, drive prohibitions and monthly validations mandated by CPIC are usually in a backlog state, along with lower priority court orders.

Operating in a backlog (as the unit reports it generally is) may have ramifications for both officer and public safety. For instance, if information/data is not entered on CPIC in a timely manner, false arrests could result and have impacts on officer safety. Additionally, if accused persons are not entered on CPIC for Warrant & Court Order Conditions, arrests are not being made. If no contact/communication conditions are not on CPIC, then victims may be at risk.

Additional Information

The CPIC operator's job description has changed in the past years with more responsibility and workloads. In the year 1999, the Provincial Legislature enacted Bill 40 "Domestic Violence and Stalking Prevention, Protection and Compensation Act" now named "Domestic Violence and Stalking Act". Because of the high priority of domestic violence orders, it was decided that the courts would cease entering court orders on their PINS (Prohibition Information System) and forward all court documents to CPIC for entry on the national system. The heavy workload, complexity of the court orders and added responsibilities of these orders has deeply impacted CPIC operators and changed the job description drastically. However, CPIC operators report not having a job review since that change. CPIC operators have to be very precise when entering these orders as the consequence of error impacts officer and public safety due to a lack of information available within 24 hours and errors can result in injury or even death. Officers on the street attend to calls based on information they can access on CPIC, so it has to be accurate and timely. Because they are a 24 hour Unit, CPIC is constantly assigned extra duties such as adding missing persons after hours, Child & Family Services Emergency Placement checks, etc. Also, shift Leaders are now responsible for radiusing warrants, which used to be done by the staff sergeant in Crime.

Recommendations

This unit is likely understaffed for the amount of work; however, without more clear time and task estimates, it is difficult to ascertain what their true numbers should be. Therefore, the unit should start collecting very detailed timing estimates for each type of CPIC entry, the number of phone and front counter inquiries, the time dedicating to faxing and/or sending information, etc.   That way, the workload can be properly quantified, likely justifying a request for additional staff. Based on the number of CPIC adds/deletes, it is likely each member is spending almost four hours per shift simply focused on that task. With the ability to quantify the other tasks, the unit should have no problem accounting for the remaining hours and beyond.

> RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.

RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.

DIRECT VOICE ENTRY (DVE)

Mandate

The mandate for DVE is to provide administrative support to frontline police resources directly improving overall response time to calls for service. Via telephone communication, operators effectively guide officers through the formulation of all types of police reports ensuring compliance with report writing standards, while maintaining data integrity and ensuring statistical requirements are captured. DVE is responsible for completing arrest and non-arrest reports, via telephone, with officers. DVE is also responsible in ensuring the appropriate documents are scanned into the reports so other units (Arrest Processing Unit, Court Unit) can complete their tasks. DVE is responsible for taking Stolen Vehicle reports, via telephone with the public. These reports require a detailed narrative with all appropriate information so other units can follow up as well as tasking CPIC to enter the vehicles on the National System. DVE is also responsible for completing Coplogic reports for the public once approved by Central Reading Unit.

Relationship to Other Units

The work performed by DVE involves constant interaction with reporting officers from all units within the Service. Through this work, follow-up interaction is frequent with the Central Reading Unit to ensure the DVE actions are understood and accepted through the CRU approval process, likewise with Arrest Processing Unit and Court Unit. Essentially, the DVE are the first step for initiating the arrest report flow, creating required documents and triggering applicable notification tasks i.e. fingerprint and undertaking workflows. Through this daily interaction, operators develop a keen sense for organizational structure, and are often the first sought for advice and information pertaining to reporting and general business processes.

DVE currently works closely with the Central Reading Unit to ensure reports are completed correctly. Communication between the two is done on a daily basis with DVE operators asking for instructions on taking a report as well as Central Reading Unit requests for guidance. This interaction should be taken over by communication between DVE and the Patrol (or other unit) supervisors. DVE also works closely with the Arrest Processing Unit and Court Unit, as they require DVE to make appropriate changes in a report. DVE also sends tasks to CPIC to have stolen vehicles and property with serial numbers added to the National System. Undertakings are also tasked to CPIC so conditions can be added to the system for an accused. The DVE shift leaders also work closely with specialized units, such as Homicide, Sex Crimes, etc. to complete reports that must maintain a restricted and confidential level.

Staffing and Shifting

This unit has a senior civilian clerk on days, with four shift leaders on days and evenings, and 30 operators working days, evenings and nights. Currently operators work unsupervised between 0300 and 0700.

Overtime Policies and Usage

This unit's overtime, although moderate, was all related to staff shortages and backlogs of work (96% of the 600 hours in 2012).

Workflow

The unit reports that since 2010 they have seen an increase in non-arrest reporting by GP officers through expansion of pilot project to include additional divisions. In 2012 implemented Coplogic online report submissions from citizens. These reports are received for input and response to citizen by email. A reality of the workload is that during busy times, calls missed would account for delays in the processing of reports, forcing officers to remain on hold or call back during less busy times. The unit notes they are also first responders for receipt of stolen vehicle reports from citizens, with subsequent notification to CPIC for entry onto national system. This appears to be somewhat of an overlap with the Service Centers, a mandate issue that will need to be clarified going forward.

In order to better assess workflow, the number of events that patrol officers have to respond to can be used as an indicator. Assuming each report takes the DVE operator approximately 20 minutes to enter (on average – this number may be an under or over estimate for some files), the estimated number of operators on shift at any one time can be inferred.

Table 112: DVE Workload Indicators

Patrol Only Calls/On-View	Higher Priority (0-5)	Lower Priority (6-9)	Grand Total	Per Day	DVE Operators Needed (20m/report)
00:00-01:00	4787	2045	6832	18.7	6.2
01:00-02:00	4268	1764	6032	16.5	5.5
02:00-03:00	3663	800	4463	12.2	4.1
03:00-04:00	3179	549	3728	10.2	3.4
04:00-05:00	2518	540	3058	8.4	2.8
05:00-06:00	2103	526	2629	7.2	2.4
06:00-07:00	1799	333	2132	5.8	1.9
07:00-08:00	1875	403	2278	6.2	2.1
08:00-09:00	2110	685	2795	7.7	2.6
09:00-10:00	2316	646	2962	8.1	2.7
10:00-11:00	2681	622	3303	9.0	3.0
11:00-12:00	2740	662	3402	9.3	3.1
12:00-13:00	3031	399	3430	9.4	3.1
13:00-14:00	3290	401	3691	10.1	3.4
14:00-15:00	3605	642	4247	11.6	3.9
15:00-16:00	3966	748	4714	12.9	4.3
16:00-17:00	4401	480	4881	13.4	4.5
17:00-18:00	4551	665	5216	14.3	4.8
18:00-19:00	4253	777	5030	13.8	4.6
19:00-20:00	4415	704	5119	14.0	4.7
20:00-21:00	4466	674	5140	14.1	4.7
21:00-22:00	4789	643	5432	14.9	5.0
22:00-23:00	5332	1373	6705	18.4	6.1
23:00-00:00	5119	1988	7107	19.5	6.5

Based on these estimates, having 30 operators (5 per shift) is largely adequate for most times of the day. However, with the presumed increase in workload following the re-assignment of Central Reading duties to Patrol supervisors (and the presumed additional follow-up that would result for DVE), the numbers would likely need to see an increase. A better structure would be more adaptable to the workload pressures, seeing extra DVE operators during the evening and fewer overnight and in the morning. One way to do that within the current shift structure is to have de facto four shifts, each with four operators. The rotation for each shift on each side could be days, evenings, evenings, night, etc. This would allow for additional coverage when the unit is the busiest (evening shift). This would result in an increase of only two operators, but would see substantial improvements to effectiveness and efficiency.

Additional Information

Delays in processing arrest reports through DVE essentially halt the process, as officers are unable to process the required documents with their role access. This is to ensure quality of data input and initiation of required workflow notifications. The general public is also impacted in that failure to provide receipt of report notifications, which may result in subsequent inquiries to other units, i.e. CRPG, Records, etc.

The unit reports that the primary challenge is with respect to the lack of data quality. It was suggested that having a system/program be put in place that allows officers to formulate reports that have zero impact on data housed in our system. Information entered by officers should serve reporting purposes only, remaining unlinked until approved for accuracy and completeness. At that time support staff would extract the required information for entry into the RMS system, enhancing the effectiveness of the data. While this would be worth investigating going forward, it is not recommended as a permanent change at this time without further examinations of the impacts Service-wide.

From the unit survey:

> *Specific to DVE, it is my belief that we should remain the first point of contact for officers reporting. I believe portions of the Central Reading Unit responsibilities are a duplication of our efforts in DVE. Originally, CRU's mandate was to have sworn constables act as Sergeant Readers for approving report content to ensure a complete and accurate investigation, while ensuring proper data entry and UCR scoring requirements are met. As a result, Platoon Sergeants have become less involved in the assurance of a complete report with developing an understanding that CRU serves that purpose. This does not make sense in that Platoon Sergeants are responsible for officer evaluation and providing that feedback would be difficult without significant involvement in developing the required report writing skills of their direct reports.*

Recommendations

While the arguments for being the first point of contact for all police reports is likely sound, it is not recommended that the mandate of DVE extend beyond its current scope at present. However, as the Central Reading Unit is recommended to disband, moving the onus for complete investigations and reporting back to the patrol and administrative sergeants, the DVE will likely need to take on a greater feedback role, which could see multiple examinations of a single report should follow up be required. It is envisioned that for Patrol, the first reporting would come through DVE. The file would then be routed to their patrol sergeant, who would either approve it as complete, or route back to the member for follow-up or administrative for additional review. If follow-up and/or additional revisions were needed, the DVE would need to have a second look in order to ensure all data integrities issues have been maintained. This would not double the DVE efforts on all files, but would certainly lead to an increased workload in some instances.

Therefore, it is recommended that the proposed 4-shift model be put into place, with four operators per shift. This would allow for adequate coverage during days and overnight, with at least eight operators on shift during the busiest times of the evening shift. This will allow faster service to members in filling out reports, and will

allow for more time available to respond to follow-up requests from Patrol supervisors. This requires the addition of only two additional operators, and the modification of assignments per shift.

Additional Recommendations

- Access Control List: As per the previous recommendation regarding removal of the Central Reading Unit, the policy on reporting procedures (POLICE REPORTS [CALEA 82.1.1A, 82.1.7], Paragraph 6) will likely need to be amended to include all patrol supervisors in the Access Control List (ACL).

- Data quality: Should have one position designated for the Master Name Index within the RMS. This is crucial for tracking and investigations to ensure it is up to date and correct, and it should not be under everyone's ability to change the MNI without just cause. To that end, it is recommended that a role be created under the current structure for MNI Administrator, and all requests for amend the MNI run through that individual noting the change, and the reason for it. This does not have to be an onerous reporting issue: an e-mail with a few quick lines about the change would likely suffice in most situations. This will aid in data integrity, without slowing down police processes.

- Warrant Radius: Should return to the responsibility of the staff sergeant of the division or suitable experienced officer. As warrant radii may result in consultations with external agencies due to 'travelling criminals', this needs to be at the discretion of a senior officer.

RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.

RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.

RECOMMENDATION: Shifting for this unit should be modified to align more appropriately with either internal or external service demands.

RECORDS COMPILATION

Mandate

The Records Compilation Unit is responsible for the data entry of court dispositions, the quality assurance of the Niche Records Management System for the Service, the Police Criminal Record Checks and Vulnerable Sector Checks and the Customer Service Unit. The Court Disposition section of the unit is responsible for processing court dispositions, building an accused record, and sending fingerprints to Ottawa for the national criminal records database. This has been the function of this unit for at least the last 35 years. The Inquiry section (customer service area) is responsible for providing police information to the public and government organizations. Their biggest responsibility is providing criminal record checks to the public for employment or volunteer purposes. They receive many requests for police reports from provincial and federal governments, and answer phones, respond to emails and faxes. They are also responsible for receiving payment and civil fingerprinting.

When the Service bought the Niche Records Management System it became this unit's job to correct the entries on the system and thus this unit became the Niche quality assurance for the entire Service. This unit could not data enter court disposition information without first fixing niche entries that were caused by all service members entering information. All systems problems are sent via email to the Quality Assurance Section of the Records Compilation Unit. No new positions were created, and the technical expertise required significantly increased created significant burdens and service gaps within the current structure.

Relationship to Other Units

As the Records Compilation Unit is in charge of quality assurance, this unit has a close relationship with all units of the WPS, with daily communication. In particular, the unit communicates with the Forensic Unit on a weekly basis with regards to identity matters, and with the CPIC/Court Unit/DVE on a daily basis to correct issues in Niche.

Staffing and Shifting

The unit operates with one senior clerk, two clerk C's, and 27 clerk B's (internal unit survey indicated 29 clerk B's), all on dayshift Monday through Friday.

Overtime Policies and Usage

The unit reports a need for overtime to keep pace with the workflow. Backlogs in their workflow create backlogs in other areas, as follow up requests dominate a great deal of time. Public requests for fingerprinting are constant, and delays cause problems for employment and volunteering. Other agencies such as Border

Services and Corrections are also delayed with backlogs in the unit. The overtime for this unit for 2012 was approximately 484 hours, of which 326 hours (67%) was noted as being for "backlog of work".

Workflow

The unit reports processing over 48,000 criminal records checks last year (over 180 per working day, or 18 per staff member in the Inquiry Unit per work day), and provided over 3,400 vetted reports to various government and private agencies. It is further reported that each year has seen a steady increase of approximately 200 reports per year. The cost to the public for a criminal record check ranges from $33.75 to $39.00. According to the Winnipeg Police Service website, as of August 30, 2013, applications were being returned that were filed on August 13, 2013. This represents an approximate turnaround of 12 working days from the date of application. For those awaiting employment or volunteering activities, to wait nearly three weeks to receive the criminal record check in the mail may be frustrating.

Infrastructure and Working Environment

The supervisory structure of this unit is inadequate, with the span of control being far too large. One supervisor (Court Dispositions) oversees 13 direct reports, while the other (Inquiries) oversees 14 direct reports according to the organizational chart. There is also a senior clerk overseeing the unit; however, the direct span of control is still too large.

Additional Information

The work within this unit mandates a great deal of expertise and knowledge working within Niche. However, without any specialized positions or technological experience within the unit, the service and efficiency undoubtedly suffer. As jobs become more complex and information systems take over mandates, staffing must respond and allow members the best chance to succeed in their position.

Recommendations

When looking at the cost required for the criminal record check (~ $35), the unit would have generated approximately nearly $1.7M in cost offsets in 2012. Whether the Service absorbs that money or it is sent to the City is unknown. However, based on this workload and the potential cost offsets, it is entirely feasible that adding additional strength to the unit will reduce wait times for criminal record checks, without imposing additional cost to the Service should the monies be kept within the WPS budget. Assuming the typical clerk B costs the Service approximately $275/day, an additional eight reports processed per day would offset that cost. If one clerk were able to process approximately 18 per day (based on the yearly estimates above), the cost

received from those records checks would offset over two FTEs. This cost offset, however, is hypothetical as it is unknown whether the Service is permitted to absorb this cost or whether this is paid to the City.

RECOMMENDATION: Based on the backlog and the cost offset, additional staffing is recommended for the Inquiry Unit. An additional five members could bring the backlog down to one week, which would be a far more reasonable delay. This recommendation, however, is set aside until confirmation of the funding is clarified.

In addition, to assist in the overall supervision of the unit and address IT concerns, adding an information systems programmer I to the supervisory structure alongside the senior clerk will ensure a smoother workflow and greater efficiency gained from the ability to troubleshoot and remedy issues in Niche within the unit.

RECOMMENDATION: A business plan should be developed for the unit which tracks time and task, long terms trends, staffing levels and operational goals.

RECOMMENDATION: A performance measurement system should be developed for this unit to coincide with business plan development.

Summary of Development Support Services Recommendations

Division 31 - Development Support	Insp.	S/Sgts	Sgts	Det/P Sgts	Csts	Civilian
Evidence Control Unit			-1			2
Central Reading					-18	
Court/Property Forfeiture					-1	1
Arrest Processing						
Central Reporting Unit						
Service Center				-2	-26	26
Alternate Phone Response				2	14	
Report Car				-2	-14	
Info Cell (CPIC)						
Direct Voice Entry (DVE)						2
Records Compilation						1
Administration						
Total	0	0	-1	-2	-45	32

Chapter X: Statistics and Measurement Going Forward

PERFORMANCE MEASURES: BEST PRACTICES REVIEW

In recent years, there has been a significant change in the fiscal and political environments in which police services operate. There are increasing pressures on police services to: 1) be accountable for their budgetary expenditures; 2) develop strategic plans; and 3) develop the capacity to monitor, measure, and evaluate the performance of patrol officers, investigative units, and support services. Consequently, police leaders have become more accountable to municipal authorities with respect to resource management.

A focal point in discussions of the economics and sustainability of policing is the argument that the costs of police services are rising at a time when crime rates are decreasing. This perspective is used to justify the expansion of private policing, the development of community constable programs, and to reduce the numbers of sworn officers. This argument, however, oversimplifies the role and activities of police officers in the early 21st century. What is required is the development of police performance measures that accurately capture core policing and a move away from a singular focus on crime rates and clearance rates as indicators of police effectiveness (Bruce, 2011).

To effectively assess performance, police services must have the capacity to: 1) conduct proactive and responsive evaluations, 2) implement the research and analytical protocols necessary to ensure that information is generated on an ongoing basis, and 3) incorporate this information into the strategic planning process on a continual basis.

Measuring Police Performance

Performance measurement can be taken to mean "the collective actions taken by a police service to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of its activities and interventions". Performance-based management "…essentially uses performance measurement information to manage and improve performance and to demonstrate what has been accomplished"[227].

Performance measurement assists in determining:

- Whether the programs, projects, or other initiatives being undertaken are properly aligned with the mission/goals of the (police) service;

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[227] Artley, Ellison and Kennedy, 2001:4

- Whether the objectives and strategies designed to achieve these objectives produce tangible improvements in achieving the mandate of the police service;

- What factors are most clearly associated with success and failure; and

- Whether a particular initiative can be duplicated in another neighbourhood or community and is sustainable over time[228].

The Importance of Measuring Police Performance

Police scholars and police leaders have identified a number of reasons why it is important to measure police performance. These include, among others:

- to ensure that police services are being delivered effectively and efficiently;

- to provide a cost-benefit measure with respect to how resources in the police service are allocated;

- to provide governments with information on police activities and outcomes;

- to provide the general public with timely information on police activities and outcomes;

- to fill the "information vacuum" which otherwise may be provided by politicians and interest groups;

- to document the demands that are made on the police service and the capacity of the police organization to respond to these demands;

- to identify areas of police activity that should more appropriately be within the purview of other agencies;

- to identify opportunities for the police to engage in collaborative partnerships with the community; and

- to provide an opportunity for the police service to adopt best practices in police work.

Good performance measures are:

- relevant (useful to managers, decision-makers, the community, and government);

- responsive (accurately reflect changes in level of activity);

- valid (capture the information intended);

- reliable (provide accurate, consistent information over time);

- cost-effective (the cost of collecting and maintaining data is justifiable);

- useful (provides information to be used by decision-makers);

- accessible (provides periodic information about results); and

- comparable (can be benchmarked internally).

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[228] Roberts, 2006:20

Most police services lack the necessary capacities to effectively measure performance and to integrate the findings from evaluations into policy and practice. Current performance measures are heavily biased toward enforcement and strategic plans generally set out targets for reducing specific categories of crime by percentage amounts. This not only places the police service and its officers in the position of being responsible for criminal behaviour that they may have little control over, e.g. crimes against the elderly, but also sets the service up for failure. Strategic plans do not capture the wide range of activities of police officers, nor what community residents expect of the police.

KEY CONCEPTS IN POLICE PERFORMANCE

Effectiveness vs. Efficiency: *Effectiveness* is the extent to which goals and objectives are met. In contrast, *efficiency* is the extent to which the use of existing resources is maximized.

Measurement and Police Accountability: A key principle in police performance measurement is that the police should be held accountable only for those things that are under their control, so that they may provide an assessment of what they actually do[229].

Inputs vs. Activities vs. Outcomes: *Inputs* are resources that are expended in pursuing objectives; *Activities* are initiatives taken in pursuit of an objective, e.g. X amount of training sessions, community consultations, etc. *Outcomes* are the impact of the activities on the stated objectives, e.g. impact on communities and levels of crime[230].

KEY QUESTIONS IN PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

Among the key questions that should be asked are the following:

- Whose performance is being measured? (I.e., the police service, its managers, and/or officers, the community?)
- What, specifically, is being measured?
- What is the objective of the measurement?
- What metrics will be used to measure performance?
- What provisions are required to ensure that the findings from performance measurement are integrated into strategic planning and operational practice?
- What performance measures should be used for policing northern and remote communities?

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[229] Klockars, 1999
[230] Spottiswoode, 2000

Traditional Measures of Police Performance

As noted, traditional measures of police performance do not capture the multi-faceted nature of core policing in the early 21st century[231]. Further, these measures generally focus on patrol officers. The performance of specialty units, police service as an organization and the community have received less/no attention. Similarly, little consideration has been given to the development of performance measures that can be used in rural and remote policing.

Some of the more common quantitative and qualitative measures of police performance are set out below.

Table 113: Quantitative Measures of Police Performance[232]

Measure	Method/Challenges/Value
crime rates	easily attainable; most problematic; slippage between actual and official rates; reporting and recording issues; may increase with higher levels of public confidence in the police; rates fluctuate irrespective of police activities; can be a component of performance measurement; useful for "hot spot" policing
arrest rates	commonly used; problematic; arrests are *outputs* not impacts; difficult to determine if arrests are useful in achieving goals and objectives; rates may be due to artificial fluctuations in enforcement
clearance rates	police officers spent only a small portion of their time apprehending offenders; not all officers work in the same types of communities or engage in the same type of police work; enforcement oriented
patrol car response times	often used as a measure of police response to citizen requests; can be problematic; may be a function of deployment or insufficient patrol resources; response highly dependent upon caller; citizen *expectations* of response times important; difficult to compare across and within jurisdictions; issues in calculating response times
cost per capita	cost expenditures are indicators of budget priorities; more officers does not equate with enhanced performance; rather, the issue is effectiveness of deployment and activities on shift
police population ratios	no consensus on optimal police/pop ratio; depends upon many factors, including the policing environment and priorities; must be matched with the needs of the jurisdiction
percentage reductions in crime	not an accurate measure of police performance; places police services in a "no win" position by committing to achieve results over which they have little control
Compstat	concern with near singular focus on crime stats; may be lack of buy in from front-line, does not address many of the dimensions of core policing

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[231] Griffiths, 2008; Moore and Braga, 2003a
[232] Blumstein, 1999; Demers, Palmer and Griffiths, 2007; Griffiths, 2013; Shane, 2010; Verma and Gavirneni, 2006

Measure	Method/Challenges/Value
community surveys	administered by mail or telephone; questions about perceptions of crime; feelings of personal safety; victimization; satisfaction with police service; expensive; responses of limited value; don't target high- risk/vulnerable/high- police contact groups, e.g. youth/young adults; visible/cultural minorities; most respondents have no contact with police/limited information on police activities/outcomes; limitations of fixed choice surveys
contact surveys	can produce useful information; target persons who have had contact with police including victims, witnesses, and accused
employee surveys	can be used to measure officer morale, commitment to the service, perceptions of leadership and views of specific initiatives/outcomes; also, to measure the performance of the police service
community consultation	community "open mike" meetings generally of limited value; dominated by special interest groups; generally exclude at-risk and vulnerable groups; may be a "legitimizer" for police; focus groups are a cost-effective and efficient way to gather information from communities; can be tailored to specific groups and vulnerable groups; provide an opportunity for community involvement in assessing police performance and identifying areas of concern; opportunity to probe citizen perspectives
web-based surveys	considerable potential; see discussion of the Chicago Internet Project below

Establishing a Performance Management System

A major component of developing the capacity measure police performance is establishing a performance management system. Although there is room for variation, a useful strategy is depicted in Figure 107: Steps for Establishing a Performance Management System.

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[233] Maguire, 2003; Skogan, 1999

New Frameworks for Measuring Police Performance

Although not an easy task, there have been efforts to develop new measures of performance that extend beyond the enforcement role of the police[235]. Several of these are set out in Table 115: Dimensions of Police Performance.

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[234] Roberts, 2006:31
[235] Davis, 2012; Milligan, Fridell and Taylor, 2006

Performance Dimension	Indicators
Reduce criminal victimization	Reported crime rates Victimization rates
Call offenders to account	Clearance rates Conviction rates
Reduce fear and enhance personal security	Reported change in levels of fear Reported changes in self-defence measures
Guarantee safety in public spaces	Traffic fatalities, injuries, and damage Increased use of parks and other public spaces Increased property values
Satisfy customer demands	Satisfaction with police services Response times Citizen perception of fairness

WEB-BASED SURVEYS: THE CHICAGO INTERNET PROJECT (CIP)

A recent innovation in police performance measurement has been the development of web-based surveys. The Chicago Internet Project (CIP) illustrates this. The CIP was a tri-partite initiative of the University of Illinois at Chicago, the Chicago Police Department, and Chicago community residents[237].

The two goals of the project were: 1) to successfully implement a large-scale comprehensive web-based community survey and identify the challenges encountered when transferring this infrastructure to other settings; and, 2) to determine whether a web-based survey system can enhance the problem-solving process, increase community engagement, and strengthen police–community relations[238]. The survey was designed to capture general assessments of police officers; the experiences of residents who had contact with the police; and assessments of the Chicago Police Department[239].

The CIP utilized a number of indexes, several of which are set out in Table 116.

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[236] Modified from Moore, 2002
[237] Rosenbaum et al., 2008
[238] Rosenbaum et al., 2008:iii
[239] Rosenbaum, 2008:vi

Table 116: Selected CIP Indexes

Index	Measure
Police Manners Index	public's perception of police officer courtesy/manners when interacting with the public
Police Fairness Index	public's perception of police officers fairness in the treatment of residents, and in enforcing the law
Responsiveness to Community Index	residents' views on how well police are responding to problems in the community and sharing information with residents; with residents to solve problems
Assessment of Organizational Outcomes Index	focus on equity, i.e. how well services are distributed in the community and the treatment of community residents
The Community	neighbourhood conditions, including fear of crime, crime and disorder problems; information on crime prevention and knowledge among community residents
Resident Contact With the Police	residents personal experiences with the police; the quality of police stops and police contacts

An evaluation of the CIP demonstrated that web-based surveys could be an effective way to gather a variety of information on community perceptions of the police and police performance as well as on the "psychology" of the community[240]. The evaluation also revealed that web-based surveys are sensitive to differences that may exist within a community that may have been masked by large-scale surveys. The results of Internet surveys can be used to compare police activities/interventions and community resident experiences and perceptions across neighbourhoods and communities.

MEASURING POLICE PERFORMANCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Police performance measurement is perhaps most extensively developed in England and Wales, where Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) assesses each police service at regular intervals[241]. The domains, data gathered, and questions asked are set out in Table 117.

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[240] Rosenbaum et al., 2008: vi
[241] see Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, 2010

Table 117: Performance Measurement Domains, UK

Domain	Types of Data	Sample Questions
Confidence and Satisfaction	crime surveys; public satisfaction surveys	"How confident are community residents in the police service?" "How satisfied are users with the quality of services provided?"
Local Crime and Policing	crimes per 1000 population; serious violent crime rate; priority offender re-offending rates; neighbourhood presence	"What are the activities of the police in the community?"
Protection from Serious Harm	reported homicide rate, serious drug crime rate, serious sexual offences brought to justice	"Can the police the police service deploy appropriate specialist techniques to investigate serious offences?" "How well are the police service protecting vulnerable persons?"
Value for Money and Staffing Costs	gross revenue expenditure costs per 1000 population; gross costs per full-time police officer	"Are resources being expended in an efficient and effective manner?" "How do police officers spend their time?"

The scoring system is centered on four categories: Poor, Good, Fair, and Excellent. On the basis of the inspection, a "Report Card" is issued, which informs citizens how safe they are in their community, how much money is spent on policing in the municipality, whether the police service is performing well, and whether the police service is likely to improve going forward. Community residents can access this information via the HMIC website simply by typing in the name of their community[242].

The UK model provides an illustration of the efforts in one jurisdiction to establish a standardized measurement framework. A critique of this system of performance measurement is that it is too centralized and fails to account for variations across the various police services with respect to demands for service, demographics, etc. As well, it is heavily weighted toward enforcement and does not include any measure of the activities of other agencies that may compromise the effectiveness of the police. This latter concern has led to efforts to decentralize the system of performance measurement[243].

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[242] see Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, 2010
[243] Barton and Barton, 2011

CRIME STATISTICS: BEST PRACTICES REVIEW

An increasing number of police agencies across Canada are diverting resources into criminal intelligence analysis, crime mapping, and the dissemination of crime statistics. Furthermore, some of the data collected and processed by crime analysis is being disseminated via public consumption in the form of downloadable content (e.g., annual reports; statistical reports; strategic plans), interactive content (e.g., crime maps), or simply in the forms of tables and charts accessible via department websites. There is no consistent way in which departments disseminate their information (if at all) and much of this is likely resource dependent. The following is an analysis of what statistical data police agencies are producing, the degree and breadth of the information being produced, who is responsible for producing this data (crime analysts; criminal intelligence section), and in what for the data is being disseminated (if at all). A number of police agencies from each province were selected for this analysis.

Crime statistics are necessary to inform the public (and the Service) about what you are doing, and how you think it is going. Statistics can show you where you may have emerging problems, and where you have done a good job in keeping issues at a minimum. There are, however, many pitfalls and cautions when using crime statistics, and limitations that should be made very clear.

The first reality about crime statistics is that they produce an incomplete picture, no matter how careful the collection procedure. This is because a large percentage of crimes never come to the attention of police. Victimization Surveys, now produced on a regular basis by Statistics Canada, show that 'hidden' picture of crime and explore why victims may not bring their issues to the police. Many times underreporting is due to the offence being 'too minor' in nature, and not worth police assistance. Other times individuals feel the police could not do anything about it, and so they do not bother to report it. For some offences, there is shame and embarrassment on the part of the victim, which often results in them keeping the offence a secret. All of these reasons impact crime rates. For the more minor offences, this may result in hundreds if not thousands of crimes going unreported in areas. Generally, however, the base rate is such that this does not necessarily skew the property crime statistics. What can impact it is whether reports to police are required for insurance purposes. For instance, many drivers may not report a smashed car window to the police simply because it is too minor in nature for the police to deal with. They will simply contact their insurance agent, and likely proceed to a glass repair shop. This crime, therefore, will not make it into the public record. However, if police bring in non-emergency reporting or online reporting, the number of these reports may go up. The public may see it as important to let police know where these offences may be happening, but previously would not bother to report

it for action. Police should be aware of these influences, and ensure the statistics are being interpreted alongside these changes if applicable.

Similar to this is the possibility of changes in crime rates due to police action or inaction. This may be particularly salient for offences related to drugs or sexual offences. The former is often entirely dependent upon police action. Very rarely (compared to the actual instances) will the public phone the police to report drug use. This is generally only in occasions when they suspect drug activity occurring, or when they are wary of a group appearing to use drugs. Generally, drug arrests are highly sensitive to the number of officers on the street, the amount of time they have, how many may be on foot vs. in their cars, and whether there is a 'sting' operation planned. Any changes in these elements may increase the number of drug arrests, thereby artificially giving the impression that drug use and/or distribution is increasing. Likewise, if police largely ignore these behaviours, the statistics will indicate sharp decline in drug use and/or distribution. Neither is an accurate representation of the reality, and official statistics should note and discuss this limitation before utilizing these results for indicators of policy efficacy or failure.

With reference to sexual offences, these too are extremely sensitive to changes in police policy and/or action. As one of the most underreported crimes in Canada, sexual offences in the official statistics are often far under what their actual prevalence is. Police action and policy may significantly impact this. For instance, if police begin to develop more supportive relationships with prostitutes, assuring them that any victimization against them will be investigated and prosecuted, then the crime statistics will likely indicate a large spike in sexual assault as more sex workers may be willing to come forward following an assault. Likewise, policies aimed at encouraging reporting of date rape, etc., may prompt a wave of reporting of previously unreported offences, and 'successes' in investigations and prosecutions may motivate other victims to report more often due to their increased confidence in the police response.

Crime statistics can be invaluable when it comes to monitoring and evaluating policies and projects on the part of the police. Today's reality of economic constriction necessitates that no time is wasted on elements of the police function that are not 'working' to produce their goal. Simply examining the crime rate is not enough – police departments must use more nuanced statistics to ascertain what impact, if any, their activity is having. Again, this is where an experienced and highly trained crime analyst comes into play. Without this resource, the Service will continually be unable to highlight their successes, and demonstrate areas that require improvement.

The following represent some advice on creating crime statistics, according to best practices from the UK[244].

1. **Show the full picture**
   Your statistics should show a balanced approach, and give readers the complete picture. Do not simply highlight successes. Note what the change was, and also note what it changed from in previous years, whether up or down.

2. **Don't claim too much**
   Statistics can only show relationships or trends, they cannot prove that interventions or policies have impacted crime in any way. It is appropriate, however, to show statistics and discuss how they "indicate" or "suggest" that the police intervention or policy had an effect.

   For example:
   "There was a 27 per cent fall in knife homicides in areas piloting my knife crime initiatives, from 199 in 2011/12 to 145 in 2012/13, compared with a 13 per cent increase in areas where these initiatives have not yet been implemented (55 to 62, respectively). These data suggest that my initiatives may be contributing to a fall in knife-related deaths."

3. **Compare similar data**
   Ensure you are not comparing dissimilar data: comparing summer to winter, or other non-similar seasons can be problematic. It is better to compare the same period the year before, or a complete year of data.

   Also be very careful when comparing to other forces or Departments. Sizes of jurisdiction vary, the types of crimes vary, and populations vary. All these factors may influence the crime in those areas, and thus influence police service. Comparing yourself to a relatively 'quiet' police area will artificially inflate your workload, and vice versa.

4. **Be clear where the statistics are from**
   State the data source(s) that the statistics come from. Your numbers must always be replicable, so the exact source of the data and any methods for retrieval and analysis should be noted on the product to ensure transparency and reliability.

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[244] Shute, 2013

5. **When numbers are small (e.g. less than 100) beware of percentages**
   Some crimes, such as homicide, are often not as plentiful as other types of crimes (such as break & enters). Any slight change will therefore produce a massive impact on the "percentage change" reports. Small numbers, therefore, should omit this percentage change and rely on reporting the raw numbers. This will avoid misleading statistics and misinterpretation.

   For example, if homicides went from 20 to 22 in 2013, the percentage change would be 10%. If people see this, they may become more alarmed than necessary, as the actual numbers are quite small.

6. **Be clear about limitations or quality issues affecting the data**
   Issues reside within police databases, and should be reported. For instance, if the field you have gathered information on is a non-mandatory field, you must report this in a footnote or endnote to indicate to your reader that this 'sample' may be incomplete. Other issues such as how response times are calculated, how missing data is dealt with, and some of the factors that may refine the databases over time must all be considered and disclosed.

Many police departments now are producing high-quality statistics, both publically and internally to guide strategies, projects and overall initiatives. One of the leading agencies for analysis is the Vancouver Police Department. Some of their publically available statistics are shown and discussed below.

VANCOUVER POLICE DEPARTMENT (VPD) [245] [246]

- Annual reports 2004-2011 with crime statistics
- Statistical reports by district/city totals updated to June 2013
- Statistical reports by neighbourhood updated to June 2013
- VPD Patrol Deployment study
- Weekly crime maps
- Civilian crime analysts
- COMPSTAT

The Vancouver police department disseminates its crime statistics in a plethora of forms. First, the VPD website has annual reports for the department from 2004 to 2011. The annual report contains a section on crime statistics dived into a number of categories including violent crime, property crime, "other" crime, narcotics, traffic accidents, traffic enforcement, and total incidents. Each of those categories is broken down further into

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[245] VPD Annual Report, 2011: 4
[246] VPD, June, 2013

specific Criminal Code offences (e.g., the violent crime category is broken down into culpable homicide, attempted murder, sex offences, assaults, abduction, and robbery). For each offence the VPD includes the number of offences in the previous and current year, the crime rate per 1,000 of the population, and the percent change in the crime rate between the previous and current years. In addition to statistics on criminal code offences, the VPD also includes calls for service data and a summary of financial statistics – membership (sword & civilian), staffing, and operating costs – for the calendar year.

Figure 108: VPD Annual Crime Stats – Violent and Property Crime Stats[247]

CRIMINAL CODE OFFENCES

	2010	2011[1]	2010 CRIME RATE /1,000 POP	2011 CRIME RATE /1,000 POP	% CHANGE* (CRIME RATE)
VIOLENT CRIME	**6,704**	**6,704**	**10.4**	**10.3**	**-1.3%**
Culpable Homicide	10	15	0.0	0.0	48.1%
Attempted Murder	10	13	0.0	0.0	28.3%
Sexual Offences	540	496	0.8	0.8	-9.3%
Assaults	5,064	5,122	7.9	7.9	-0.2%
Abduction	3	6	0.0	0.0	-
Robbery	1,077	1,052	1.7	1.6	-3.6%
PROPERTY CRIME	**34,713**	**33,256**	**54.0**	**51.1**	**-5.4%**
Break & Enter	4,949	5,032	7.7	7.7	0.4%
Theft of Vehicle	1,527	1,133	2.4	1.7	-26.8%
Theft from Auto	8,701	7,508	13.5	11.5	-14.8%
Theft (Over/Under $5K)	11,209	11,035	17.4	16.9	-2.8%
Have Stolen Goods	984	1,035	1.5	1.6	3.8%
Fraud	2,550	2,378	4.0	3.7	-7.9%
Arson	196	274	0.3	0.4	38.0%
Mischief (Over/Under $5K)	4,597	4,861	7.2	7.5	4.4%

The VPD also provides monthly statistical reports by district and city totals. These reports are current as of June 2013. Criminal code offences are organized by category under the headings of violent crime, property crime and "other" crime. The district and city totals for the month are compared with the district and city totals from the monthly totals of the previous year (i.e., June 2013 and June 2012) and the percent change in the totals is

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[247] As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, small numbers (such as the VPD reports for Homicide and Abduction) should be avoided.

displayed for each offence. See Figure 109 for an example In addition to monthly statistical reports by district and city totals[248], the VPD also provide monthly statistical reports by neighbourhood. See Figure 110.

Figure 109: VPD Monthly Stats Report – Violent Crime

	June 2013[z]						June 2012						% Change 2012 to 2013					
	D1	D2	D3	D4	City[3]	YTD	D1	D2	D3	D4	City[3]	YTD	D1	D2	D3	D4	City	YTD
Violent Crime	128	216	82	70	499	2952	140	237	125	75	579	3238	-8.6%	-8.9%	-34.4%	-6.7%	-13.8%	-8.8%
Culpable Homicide	0	0	1	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	5	0.0%	0.0%	n/c	0.0%	n/c	-40.0%
Attempted Murder	1	1	0	0	2	11	0	1	1	0	2	11	n/c	0.0%	-100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Sexual Offences	21	4	7	9	43	269	12	9	8	6	36	250	75.0%	-55.6%	-12.5%	50.0%	19.4%	7.6%
Assaults	94	189	65	50	399	2247	111	193	92	59	457	2469	-15.3%	-2.1%	-29.3%	-15.3%	-12.7%	-9.0%
Robbery	12	22	9	11	54	422	17	34	24	10	84	503	-29.4%	-35.3%	-62.5%	10.0%	-35.7%	-16.1%

This allows for comparison across districts, which may assist in staffing planning and the allocation of resources. In every City, some areas will be more crime prone and/or violent than others. It is important that resources and personnel are prioritized so as to address those areas adequately.

Figure 110: VPD Monthly Stats Report by Neighbourhood

June 2013[z]

	Assaults	Robbery	B&E [3]	Theft MV	Theft <> $5K	Arson	Mischief [3]	Prostitution	Offensive Weapons	Traffic Accidents Fatal	Traffic Accidents Non Fatal
TOTAL	389	54	378	89	1900	18	313	30	85	4	93
Arbuts Ridge	2	0	5	2	8	0	3	0	0	0	1
Central Business District	135	23	56	10	624	6	72	1	31	2	15
Dunbar Southlands	0	0	4	2	16	1	7	0	3	0	1
Fairview	16	2	16	2	152	0	10	0	0	0	5
Grandview Woodlands	35	4	36	3	97	1	37	0	8	0	8
Hastings Sunrise	17	2	15	5	42	0	10	0	1	0	6
Kensington Cedar Cottage	19	1	30	5	89	3	26	24	6	1	6
Kerrisdale	5	0	10	1	22	0	5	0	0	0	0
Killarney	6	0	7	6	21	0	3	1	0	0	1
Kitsilano	6	1	18	7	76	1	23	0	0	0	0
Marpole	7	1	13	2	28	1	10	0	0	0	7
Mount Pleasant	22	2	42	7	132	0	17	0	3	0	6
Musqueam	1	0	2	0	2	0	1	0	1	0	0
Oakridge	4	2	7	0	21	0	4	0	0	0	1
Renfrew Collingwood	13	7	16	6	66	0	14	3	4	0	5
Riley Park	5	1	10	2	60	0	9	0	1	0	6
Shaughnessy	0	0	4	4	11	0	1	0	1	0	2
South Cambie	1	0	3	2	22	0	3	0	0	0	1
Stanley Park	2	0	1	0	28	0	2	0	1	0	0
Strathcona	48	4	27	8	82	2	15	0	13	0	6
Sunset	4	0	12	3	36	1	9	0	3	1	4
Victoria Fraserview	6	0	7	6	25	0	5	1	2	0	5
West End	35	1	30	5	227	2	25	0	7	0	5
West Point Grey	0	3	7	1	13	0	2	0	0	0	2

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[248] VPD, June, 2013

Again, comparing across neighbourhoods can assist in seeing changes throughout the City, and alert officers in that area where burgeoning issues may be occurring.

According to the VPD, the statistical data used for these reports are gathered from PRIME (Police Records Information Management Environment) and CAD (Computer Aided Dispatch) and are subject to change. It should also be noted that the VPD reports its crime statistics using the "all violations method," similar to other agencies such as Edmonton, Toronto, Ottawa, and Calgary. This method includes all separate offences that occur in a given incident as opposed to just counting the most serious offence. Lastly, the VPD is no longer including motor vehicle accidents in their monthly statistics tables because the VPD data is largely different from ICBC reported traffic injury data.

This data is disseminated under the auspices of the VPD's Planning Research and Audit Section, which is a component of the Officer of the Chief. In addition to Planning and Research, the VPD also has a Crime Analysis Unit, which falls under the guise of the General Investigation Section. According to the VPD, the Crime Analysis Unit (CAU) "assists investigators, patrol officers and managers by providing analysis and information, relative to active suspects, crime patterns and trends. Both long and short-term analyses are provided, to assist with immediate resource deployment, as well as with setting of long term Departmental strategy" VPD, 2013). Lastly, though they do not specifically mention this on the website, the VPD does have CompStat in which crime analysis plays a significant role. Every month, district commanders come together to discuss, monitor, and report on crime suppression progress in their area. They are held to account by the Deputy Chief, to ensure that emerging issues are not ignored, giving them time to flourish. As issues come forward, it is the expectation that the district commander will reallocate resources and come up with a strategic plan or initiative to combat that issue in their area. At the following CompStat meeting, it is expected that positive progress will be reported.

Other jurisdictions are coming up with creative ways to display their statistics and demonstrate the trends that are occurring in their area. Below are some examples of excellent products.

Table 1. Person Crime Offences, 2007-2011

Crime Type	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Trend
Homicide*	26	33	24	16	10	
Other Offences Causing Death**	0	0	1	0	2	
Attempted Homicide***	20	36	38	13	12	
Robbery	1375	1199	1260	1216	1040	
Sex Crimes	637	714	729	862	794	
Assault	5682	5853	5916	6156	5801	
Miscellaneous****	413	511	531	595	524	
Total	8153	8346	8499	8858	8183	

[249]

The benefit of this report is that it shows not only the raw numbers, but then graphically displays the 'trend' data, so the reader can easily and quickly ascertain whether crime is going up or down.

Comparing to the national or regional trends can also be helpful in seeing where your police service is heading in reference to the other areas. Again, care must be taken to ensure direct comparisons are not used between dissimilar agencies. However, used as a 'check-in' reference, these can be helpful.

## Figure 2. Violent Crime Severity Index, Calgary 2002-2011[1]

[250]

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[249] CPS Annual Statistical Report 2007-2011, p.6
[250] CPS Annual Statistical Report 2007-2011, p.7

Certain types of crime may also be of special concern in your police department. Areas dealing with a high number of traffic accidents, firearms offences, public intoxication, etc., may want to track those specific offences over time, particularly if there is specific police action aimed at reducing those behaviours.

Figure 113: Calgary Police Service – Disorder Calls for Service

Figure 6. Disorder as a Portion of Total Calls for Service, 2011

OTHER CALLS FOR SERVICE 71%

DISORDER 29%

Disorder is a high volume issue; at least every 4th call generated by officers or members of the public is related to a disorder incident. In 2011, disorder calls accounted for:

‡ 26.6% of public generated calls

‡ 42.6% of police generated calls. [251]

Clearance rates may also be utilized to show how many the police 'solved' of a particular crime. Care must be taken with clearance rate statistics, as they do not necessarily reflect the capability of the officers, but if examined for one crime type over time, they can indicate changes in the nature of those crimes, the capacity of the unit, and/or the changing capabilities of offenders.

Figure 114: Toronto Police Service – Homicide Statistics

			Homicides**			
Year	Reported	%Change	Rate	Cleared	%Clear	
2007	86	19.7	3.1	60	69.8	
2008	70	-16.5	2.5	42	60.0	
2009	62	-11.3	2.2	37	59.7	
2010	63	-1.6	2.2	35	55.6	
2011	49	-22.6	1.7	33	67.3	

[252]

This report from the TPS above shows a summary table and chart for Homicides. At a glance, the reader has a four-year history of the number, percentage change (although small numbers are problematic), the rate according to population change and the percentage that were 'solved' in that year. The chart, however, is a little harder to interpret given the size, but graphics can be changed to allow for easier viewing.

Another unique option is to display crime activity for certain groups or provide greater detail in terms of those affected by those crimes. While extremely helpful in terms of accurate detail, care must be taken to ensure that

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[251] CPS Annual Statistical Report 2007-2011, p.11
[252] TPS Annual Statistical Report, 2011, p.17

the publication of such statistics does not have the unintended effect of causing fear in the community. Often, these types of detailed offence breakdowns are best kept to internal reports and usage.

Figure 115: Toronto Police Service – Victim and Offender Statistics

Age	Males	Females	Unknown	Total	% Total
1-11	778	5	722	1,505	4.8
12-17	2,648	13	1,917	4,578	14.6
18-24	2,932	21	3,621	6,574	21.0
25-34	2,719	30	3,729	6,478	20.7
35-44	1,858	15	2,463	4,336	13.8
45 Plus	2,874	23	2,663	5,560	17.7
Unk	928	966	407	2,301	7.3
Total	14,737	1,073	15,522	31,332	100.0

*Violent crime includes homicide and homicide related offences, sexual assaults, sexual offences, non-sexual assaults, abduction, and robberies.

Age	Males	Females	Total	% Total
12-17	1,754	346	2,100	12.9
18-24	3,168	619	3,787	23.2
25-34	3,543	679	4,222	25.9
35-44	2,633	500	3,133	19.2
45+	2,708	363	3,071	18.8
Total	13,806	2,507	16,313	100.0

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Overall, crime statistics can be used for both internal and external purposes and publication. Care must be taken to avoid certain issues with data, and the analyst must be mindful of the best ways to present data. In the case of public reports, simpler is better. Graphs and charts can easily become overcomplicated if too many colours or graphics are used. Likewise with the sheer volume of numbers: simply producing a large table will do little to assist the reader in interpreting that table. Simple charts and graphs that show trends (if applicable) will form a great complement to that data so that misinterpretation does not occur. Care should also always be taken to explain the data where appropriate, and give it context, particularly if being released to the public.

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253 TPS Annual Statistical Report, 2011, p. 22

Chapter XI: Additional Recommendations

TENURE POLICY

One of the most consistently stated issues from the unit surveys revolved around the tenure policy. This was particularly salient for the specialty investigative squads. For all mentioning it, the issue was that the current tenure policy was far too short to allow for succession planning, appropriate mentoring and training, and allowing able investigators to become successful in their position.

As written in the Transfer Policy, the purpose is:

A. To create opportunities for members to broaden the collective experience of the Service.
B. To ensure experienced members are cycled into an operational capacity to provide leadership to the front line members.
C. To ensure an appropriate work / life balance.
D. To provide breadth of experience for members who move into supervisory positions.

This is clearly well intentioned, as having a well-rounded police force with a broad experience base is a laudable aim. However, this impairs the functioning of some units, and therefore, should be balanced against the success of the unit and its mandate vs. the overall experience of the Service.

The maximum assignment lengths are outlined in the policy, for constables and Patrol/detective sergeants. Those that are recommended for extension and/or modification are discussed below. All others are deemed reasonable for the purposes of this review.

These recommendations apply to ALL positions: constables, Patrol/detective sergeants, and sergeants within each of the divisions below.

1) **Division 11-16**
   a) <u>Community Support Unit</u>
      i) Tenure should be extended to five years, as the recommendation is to enhance the purpose and mandate of this unit to become intelligence and evidence led, which requires the development of knowledge of the area and residents, and the development of contacts and informants within the community.

      ii) <u>Crime Unit (now GIU)</u>

(1) Tenure in the new GIU Unit should be set at five years, to coincide with other investigative Units.

2) Divisions 40, 41, 42, 43 (Criminal Investigations Bureau)
   a) Criminal Investigative Units
      i) Tenure should be extended for all units to a maximum of five years, save for Homicide, which should be extended to seven years. This will coincide better with departments throughout Canada, and will allow for the appropriate time to develop new applicants, provide mentoring, and allow them to fully become successful in their position before moving.

      In addition, the 1+1+1 for these units should be modified to the first three years only, with the third application being for the remainder of the tenure. This will secure positions, allowing for the individual's investment in their position when they become more senior.

3) Division 51
   a) Community Relations Unit
      i) Tenure should be extended to five years to allow for sufficient time to establish connections and relationships within the community.

Modification of this policy will allow the more efficient and effective functioning of those units, resulting in more success with case handling, better clearance rates and greater job satisfaction and morale.

Some Responses from Members:

The length of assignment to the unit is very short at three years given the learning curve involved in … crime investigations. The length of time required to complete complex investigations results in the most experienced investigators not being able to investigate as they are due to leave.

The WPS employs a Mandatory Transfer Policy, which is often counterproductive in its application. It is an accepted and acknowledged fact that … units should be staffed by highly motivated, skilled and experienced Investigators. Further, that experience within the unit is crucial to the success of investigations and the ultimate outcome in court.

It has been established through the last unit review that the WPS Homicide Unit has the shortest tenure of any major police agency within North America. Despite the recommendations of that review the Transfer Policy remains intact and the tenure issue within the unit has not been addressed.

Service-Wide Recommendations

RECOMMENDATION: The practice of borrowing non- accommodated members from specialty investigative units should cease. The Service should either expand the number of retired officers performing this function or assign only accommodated members as required to complete these investigations if they are unable to perform in their current position due to their accommodated limitations. In short, no member who is able to perform duties within their assignment, whether accommodated or not, should be reassigned to conduct background investigations.

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APPENDIX B: PATROL FIELD INTERVIEWS

Patrol Members

- Years' service –time in patrol

- How do you perceive the role of uniform policing in Winnipeg and in your district?

- What sort of career path does uniform policing offer for a member of Winnipeg Police?

- What kind of training is offered to support you in your career?

- Does your promotion system require you return to patrol for promotion?

- Do you feel encouraged to work toward promotion/supervisory positions?

- How do you perceive your work load?

    o are you running from call to call?

    o Who writes your warrants?

    o do you have time for self-generated work?

    o is there an expectation that you do self-generated work?

    o how do you see your role re: proactive policing/crime reduction?

- do you have access to alternative methods/referrals as opposed to arrest/criminal charges.

    o is there a detox facility

    o can you utilize mental health facility/workers

    o are there alternate/restorative justice resources

    o Any resources for kids you identify as 'at risk' – pre delinquent behavior

- how do you see the specialized units?

    o What kind of acknowledgement/support do you get from them?

- How long are you assigned to a district? Does your workload allow you to become familiar with local issues and become involved?

- Are you able to do your report writing in the p/c or do you do it in the office?

- When do you rto @ the end of shift?

- How much time is spent processing prisoners – is there a wagon or do you go to the gaol?

- How frequently are you assigned to calls/issues outside your district?

- Do you get cover cars automatically or do you have to request it?

Supervisors

- What sort of training/preparation does WPD offer to encourage you to move into supervisory positions?

- How do you measure performance?

- What are the main issues facing your members working on the streets?

- What are the main resource stressors?

    o mental health

    o crack houses

    o drunks/detox

    o domestics

    o immigrant issues

- How do you deal with priority calls?

- How many levels of priority calls?

- How are your members encouraged to participate in goal setting relating to crime reduction?

- Are there parades prior to shifts?

    o If so, what is dealt with (prolific offender info, crime reduction, patrol targets)

    o If not, how is important information communicated?

- Do you have your members siphoned off to support other functions without replacements, i.e. special events? Are the minimum shifting levels enforced via call in? Is this an o/t driver?

- How are members assigned to districts – do they stay long enough to become sufficiently acquainted with local problems?

- Does uniform policing represent a real career path within your department?

    o Promotion system

    o training

- Does the patrol division have access to crime analysts for planning/setting of priorities?

General issues

- Crime analyst's involvement in uniform policing

- Separate analyst for drugs/intelligence.

- Interaction with community

- Interaction with community resource groups.

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